



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.


About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>


NYPL RESEARCH LIBRARIES




3 3433 08175163 2











THE BRITISH
CONTROVERSIALIST,

AND

LITERARY MAGAZINE:

DEVOTED TO THE IMPARTIAL AND DELIBERATE DISCUSSION OF
IMPORTANT QUESTIONS IN

RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY, HISTORY, POLITICS,
SOCIAL ECONOMY, ETC.,

AND TO THE PROMOTION OF SELF-CULTURE AND GENERAL
EDUCATION.


"MAGNA EST VERITAS, ET PRÆVALEBIT."

* *

NEW YORK
PUBLIC
LIBRARY

LONDON:
HOULSTON AND WRIGHT,
65, PATERNOSTER ROW.

MDCCCLX.



J. AND W. RIDER, PRINTERS,
14, BARTHOLOMEW CLOSE, LONDON, E.C.

2

NOV 1904
1860
VIA 1861

PREFACE.

ANOTHER sheaf of thoughts we now bind for the reader's garner—for the great Harvest. As the years roll on, and the seasons revolve, the fruits ripen and are gathered. So is it with a Serial such as ours. Growth is its grand law, and by its fertility must it be judged. Intentions do not suffice; nor will "flexure and low bending" secure acceptance, if worth be wanting. The years have already borne witness to "the place, degree, and form" of our literary efforts, and by this time the objects of our Magazine are, or should be, sufficiently well known.

"As many arrows, loosed several ways,
Fly to one mark;
As many several ways meet in one town;
As many fresh streams run to one self-same sea;
As many lines close in the dial's centre:
So"

do all our aims and exertions tend to the excitement of the reflective spirit in man, the awakening of the intellect to effort, the stirring up of the powers of thought, that they may all co-operate in the investigation of all subjects for the attainment of truth, and for the advancement of the mind's own capacities. The following review of the contents of the pages now submitted to the reader's notice seems all that is needful to commend them to the judicious.

An undiminished interest has been felt and shown in the *Debate* department in all its divisions. Keen, logical, vigorous thinking, well-linked and terse expressions, closely serried facts, and acute yet kindly opposition, have been displayed in the consideration of the various important questions which have been submitted to the ordeal of controversy. The sensible advice of Plato—"Do not quarrel about subjects, but discuss them"—has, we think, been followed in our pages with some effect. The *Topic* has been successful in bringing out the ardour of disputation, and producing some well-sustained specimens of concisely expressed thought upon several of the more immediate subjects of debate which the passing months have furnished. Several contributions of high value have

had a place assigned to them in the *Essayist*. The *Poetic Section* has brought into the permanence of type not a few specimens of ideas touched with Castaly's dews, or breathing with the perfumes of Parnassus. The *Reviewer* has been conducted, as far as possible, upon the same impartial plan as heretofore of speaking the truth in love of all books brought under inspection—judging and determining the merits of their execution, and their special adaptability to attain their object, rather than adjudicating upon the peculiar tenets held by the authors compared with the critics. The *Inquirer* has been freely opened, and we are happy to note not only the general ingenuousness of the queries proposed, but also the ingenuity and intelligence of many of the answers—in great part contributed by the general body of our readers. Our *Literary Notes* have been at once concise and copious; they form a brief summary of the chief matters that have had the power to stir the book-loving world. The *Societies' Section*, though second to none in importance, has, we are afraid, had less justice done to it. If brevity were more studied by our contributing friends, this section would be richer and more valuable. We give this "word to the wise."

Some of our contributors have been casual; some have but recently been placed upon our roll; others have been co-labourers with us for years. The acceptance which their labours have met with from our readers and the critical press is matter of high gratification [to us]. The unpayable gratitude of heartfelt thanks is due to all who have aided our exertions by act, or voice, or pen—to our known and unknown helpers alike—in the attempt to train our fellow-men to a sincere and earnest search for truth.

It is no part of our aim or business to persuade our readers either to quit or follow any special creeds, canons, or opinions; we wish to culture, in all, a loving reverence for truth—the mistress of a right life—without reference to the number of those who throng her temples and follow her behests. Opinion we regard as valuable only when it has been formed after deliberate and honest examination—after an inquisitive, rigid, and impartial criticism of all that can be best said on all sides of a subject. Our mission is strictly *educative*, not *propagandic*. We have no special tenets to impress on any mind, and we desire that each human soul should regard truth as "the pearl of great price," and search for it "as for hid treasure." Truth is the highest, best, and holiest gift of heaven;—may it be ours to become successful inquirers as to how, where, or wherein it may be found.

THE BRITISH CONTROVERSIALIST.

Epoch Men.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES, the son of Sophroniscus, a sculptor of repute, and of "the noble-minded midwife Phænarete,"* was born in the *deme* (township) of Alopece, a suburb of the city of Athens, on the 5th day of the month Thargelion, in the year 468 B.C. (Olympiad LXXVII. 4). He had an elder brother by the mother's side, named Patrocles. He was himself of strictly Attic descent, being of the tribe of Antiochis, and of the *gens* (clan) Dædalidæ. His family, though poor and humbly circumstanced, was good and old. Of his early life little or nothing is known. The highest charm of modern biography,—its detail of private particulars and of personal characteristics,—was seldom consciously imparted by ancient authors to their works. Individual and domestic existence formed a theme too lowly, and the daily routine of life was too petty to merit record in the enduring pages which they wrote. Inference can lend but little help in filling up the foreground of a sketch of the life of Socrates. Doubtlessly the sculptor's doors would wear the usual ornaments of olive, indicative of the birth of a son, on that springtide morning when he first puled in the nurse's arms. On the tenth, or name-day, gossips would assemble round the hearth, and the celebration feast would be at once fitting and choice. The *λαλα* (*lullaby*) would be sung over him, the *μορμολύκειον* (*bugaboo*) would be used to frighten him to quietness, and a honied sponge would sometimes tickle his palate when it was inconvenient to attend otherwise to the wants of his babyhood. The public registrar would get notice of the father's intention of bringing him up, and he would grow in stature as the months flew past.

The years of childhood being spent, the mother's and the nurse's special care would be exchanged for the labours of the pedagogue, the schoolmaster, and the gymnast. That he received the ordinary education within reach of the Athenians we know,† but there is no reason for supposing that in his youth he had any superior advantages. The law enjoined that the children of citizens should be

* Plato's "Theætetes," par. 17.

† Plato's "Crito," par. 12.

instructed in grammar, music, and gymnastics; grammar included the arts of reading and writing, a little history, and some elocution; music was used as a generic name for intellectual culture, *e.g.*, philosophy, poetry, rhythm, melody of speech, voice, and song-tone, as well as the empiric use of the lyre, the flute, the pipe, and choral singing; gymnastics was a systematic course of physical training in all those arts which

"Brace the nerves, or make the limbs alert,
And mix elastic force with firmness hard."

From six to sixteen this process of education would most probably, as was then usual, go on; for the jealous watchfulness of the law was superadded to natural affection to secure the proper upbringing of the young. Bodily strength, intellect, and taste, having thus been, in some measure, subjected to culture, as his father was not wealthy, it became necessary to decide upon a profession for him. It was at length—some authors say, against his own will—determined that he should follow his father's business; and hence Timon, the Sylligraph, speaks of him as

"The stone chipper,
The reasoning legislator, the enchanter
Of all the Greeks."

The labours of apprenticeship would occupy some years closely. On attaining his eighteenth year he would be enrolled among the citizen *Ephēbi* (persons of age); would receive a spear and buckler from the State, and would, according to law, take oath, that he would never disgrace his armour, desert, revolt, or damage his country, but would conform to the religion, and endeavour to extend the dominion of Athens, defend its laws, maintain its rights, fight, and if need be, die, for his country. The *Ephēbi* were the guardians of the bounds of Athens, and performed the duties of an internal police during the two years which elapsed between that enrolment and their introduction to their fellow-burgers and their registration *εἰς ἀνδρας* (among the men). At twenty the Athenians were emancipated from the government of parents and guardians, and became subject to the laws alone. They then became men in the civic sense, and were free to make their way in the world as best they might or could. He appears to have devoted himself with some earnestness and industry, for a time, to his business as a sculptor, an art which in the luxurious age of Pericles was both remunerative and popular. Pausanias (*circ.* 170 A.D.), the geographer (in the "*Periegesis*, or Itinerary of Greece," book i.), reports, that when he visited Athens a statue of Mercury, and a group of the Graces, clothed in flowing drapery, were preserved and shown on the walls of the Acropolis as his work. It is believed that his father died shortly after the majority of Socrates. He left him an inheritance of eighty *minæ* (about £320); but this he lost by the treachery of the trustee, and he was compelled to earn his bread by the exercise of his professional skill; contenting himself,

however, with doing enough to procure a simple subsistence, suited to his unambitious life; and devoting his whole leisure to the perusal of all the accessible works of the ancient philosophers, or in listening to those teachers of wisdom who from time to time visited Athens. This greedy thirst for knowledge attracted, it is said, the notice of Crito, a wealthy Athenian, subsequently both a disciple and a friend of the reflective statuary, who supplied Socrates with the means of cultivating his talents, and of paying for the instructions of those who taught the various accomplishments of life in Athens. He is reported, though this is thought improbable, to have been one of the students and auditors of Anaxagoras. Under Archelaus he studied physics; Evenus of Paros, a famous elegist, taught him poetry; Theodore, of Cyrene, gave him lessons in geometry; he may have seen Zeno, and must have been acquainted with his system of dialectics; the art of eloquence was expounded to him by Prodicus; the ethical and political uses of music were confided to him by Damon; and even in his old age he "put himself to school" under Konnas, an eminent and highly cultured musician, to acquire the power of playing on the lyre. Though all his life professing to know nothing, he was in reality possessed of the most encyclopædic store of information of any Greek. This is abundantly proven, not more from the felicity than by the range of his illustrations, and the fearless readiness with which he met all men on their own ground.

Against these traditions regarding the teachers, and this remark about the acquired knowledge of Socrates, the ironic humility with which, in Xenophon's "Symposium," he confesses himself to be only "self-taught in philosophy," does not really militate, even if interpreted in the most literally serious sense. He drew the vital elements of his philosophic system from no predecessor. He struck out a pathway in the maze of speculation for himself. He had every right to advance a claim to originality. "He taught that man has to discover and recognize in himself what is the right and the good; and that this right and good are in their nature universal. Socrates is celebrated as a teacher of morality, but we should rather call him the inventor of morality,"*—if we dare say that any man invented that which God at first impressed on the heart, and afterwards expressed in His law, which, however, was then only revealed to the Hebrews. But hold! this is criticism, not biography. Let us return.

Marriage was directly enjoined as a duty due to the Gods and the State by every Greek who had attained the full development and vigour of his physical being. Abstinence from it was discountenanced, and no man was permitted to exercise important political functions, to manage public trusts, or to regulate national affairs, unless he had given proof of his attachment to the State by placing himself in such relations as to be likely to contribute to the increase of its citizens, and had tied himself, by the bands of conjugal or parental affection, to his country. We have no certain information as to

* Hegel's "Philosophy of History," part ii. sect. ii. chap. 3.

the date of the marriage of Socrates. Solon thought thirty-five the best age for the marriage of males, Aristotle thirty-seven, Plato and Hesiod thirty; and it is the impression of scholars that "the usual age for men was thirty, and for women twenty years." We may safely infer that Socrates was married between 438 and 433 B.C. His first wife is said to have been Myrto, daughter of Aristides (the Just), who was at that time a widow. This is probable, though some classicists dispute the story as well as explicitly contradict the grosser tale, which affirms that Socrates had two wives at once. We know that he was married to the ill-reputed Xantippe, *now* the synonym for a shrew. We are inclined to believe that calumny has had a large share in the making of this unpleasant characterization; for Xenophon* gives a dialogue in which Socrates pleads affectionately in her favour with Lamprocles, his eldest son, who had indulged in some peevish anger towards her; and Lamprocles denies no one of her claims to his regard which his father presses upon him. He does, indeed, speak of her ill-temper; and Socrates does not directly deny it. In the "Symposium," too, when he is bantered by Antisthenes about her passionate violence, Socrates good-humouredly breaks a jest about it, and changes the subject.

Active life opens upon Socrates in the shape of military service—which every Athenian was bound to give on demand—between the ages of twenty and forty, when he was about thirty-seven.

The Peloponnesian War began in 431 B.C., and lasted for twenty-seven years; that is, till within five years of the close of the life of Socrates. The story of that eventful contest has been narrated with such artistic grace by Thucydides, and that narration has been transferred with such singular fidelity from the Greek original into English, by Hobbes—besides being retold with all aid and illustration from comparison of ancient writers and extensive scholarship by Mitford, Thirlwall, and Grote—that there is no need for interpolating the merest sketch of the cause, events, and termination of it in the present paper. We shall therefore only notice the circumstances in which Socrates took a part—of which we have accounts in the "Apology" and in the "Symposium" of Plato, &c.

Potidæa, a town in Macedonia, colonized by Corinthians, but tributary to Athens, revolted against the dominion of that city—at the instigation of their mother-city, and with the connivance of the other states in the Peloponnesus—the south and peninsular, mulberry-leaf shaped part of Greece, now called the *Morea*. In the campaign against it Socrates performed military service as an *hoplite*—a heavily-armed soldier. There he endured the severe intensity of a Thracian winter, bare-foot, and clad only in his ordinary dress, sustaining hunger uncomplainingly, and out-doing most in the endurance of fatigue. In the engagement there, he distinguished himself by his valour, by defending Alcibiades—who himself tells the story—when fallen and wounded, and thus saving

* "Memorabilia," II. ii.

his life and arms. The prize for courage, though acknowledgedly due to Socrates, was conferred, at his request, on Alcibiades, that he might be encouraged to merit well of his country in her hours of danger again.

At Delium, a town on the coast of Boeotia, a territory north of Attica, when the Athenians, under Laches, were defeated, 424 B.C., Socrates fought bravely and retreated reluctantly. Xenophon, the historian, was thrown from his horse and disabled. Socrates, as Æneas

"Did from the flames of Troy upon his shoulders
The old Anchises bear,"

caught him up, and carried him beyond the reach of danger. Alcibiades was there, mounted, and kept between Socrates and the enemy to cover his retreat. This valour in saving life is far more glorious than if he had stood

"Companionless, spreading destruction abroad."

The courage of kindness is preferable to the bravery of carnage. The above two incidents are related with due enthusiasm by Alcibiades in Plato's "Symposium," which has been beautifully translated by Shelley.

Amphipolis, one of the most important commercial towns in the Athenian possessions in the north of the Egean Sea (*Archipelago*), colonized in 437 B.C., was seized by Brasidas, a Lacedemonian general, in 424 B.C.; and an expedition was sent out from Athens, under Cleon, for its recovery. Socrates, though beyond the years when he was legally bound to do service, was present and active. The affair was unsuccessful; and Socrates returned to the more congenial pursuits of peace.

We have, in the preceding paragraphs, anticipated chronology, and must now revert to prior events. At what time Socrates became the public controversialist of Athens it is impossible to determine accurately—nor is it requisite; the manner, and in great measure the matter, of his teaching we know; and these things are to us much more precious than a mere knowledge of the time at which he began his mission.

Athens was at this time indeed—as Pericles affirmed—"the school of Greece." Though burnt by Xerxes only twelve years before the birth of Socrates, it had—under the administrations of Themistocles, Cimon, and Pericles—been so rebuilt, as to have compelled the admiration of succeeding ages. Its streets, it is true, were ill laid out, and its private houses mediocre; but its public edifices and temples were witnesses at once of Attic taste, genius, skill, munificence, and magnificence. The Acropolis, temple-crowned and sculpture-crowded, rose in the centre. The Parthenon and the Erechtheum were there, and between them the colossal statue of *Athena Promachos* (first in fight) threw the gleam of its helmet and the flash of its spear from sea-board to wall. The Areopagus, with law-engraven walls, is there too; and on it the wise men of the state

hold counsel and give judgment in presence of the citizens—then numbering about 140,000. The Gardens of Illysus margined the river on the city side, and the long walls stretched down to the three harbour towns, where, by the commercial enterprise of her citizens, Athens had gathered the precious things of all known lands; Gymnasia, Agorai (market places), and public halls were numerous, and, in or near these, assemblies were frequent; for the people were notorious gossips and newsmongers, inveterate talkers, adepts at scandal, and anxious about nothing so much as “either to tell or to hear some new thing.” Athens had an annual revenue of about £200,000; and its public offices were filled with functionaries who looked keenly, if not well, after their affairs. Pericles, Alcibiades, Nicias, Cleon, &c., were, in the time of Socrates, among its lawgivers and rulers; Herodotus, Xenophon, and Thucydides composed history; Æschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides produced the masterpieces of Greek tragedy; and the satiric humour of Aristophanes vented itself in comedy; the sculptures of Phidias, Calliocrates, and Mnesicles, the paintings of Parrhasias, and the orations of Lysias and Isocrates, excited and delighted the people; while the Sophists walked in pompous grandiosity, making a parade of their knowledge amongst the wondering crowds of the Athenian populace. Wealth, luxury, energy, intellectual inquisitiveness, wit, conversational urbanity, and immense power of quibble and quarrel, abounded in Athens. It was an age of general intermeddlement and mutual interference. Wordcraft and statecraft were confounded and intertangled; and logic-chopping was more industriously and artistically studied than stone-chipping—as the Sophists sneeringly called sculpture. Socrates chose his life’s aim well, and fitted it excellently to the spirit of his age. Among talkers, he too would talk—but with a purpose; among a dramatically-inclined people he would win attention by the quick-cued dialogue of everyday life; among the critical, he too would criticize—but among pretenders he would not be one. Talk, with him, was thought made vital—it was the gymnastic training of Reason. Truth has seldom or ever had sterner or stranger devotees among men.

There he goes—squab, rotund, ungainly, and protuberant of paunch; snub-nosed, ox-eyed, thick-lipped, burly-headed, broad-browed, with a nape of the neck like a butcher’s; bare-foot, shabbily dressed, almost satyr-like; mean-looking, rude, virtuous; in each affair measuring all wisdom by its last results. A hero unrefined in speech, yet with a witchery of tongue, a keenness of logic, a readiness of wit, a pungency of style, and skill in exciting intellectual activity, unequalled in Athens. In contented poverty, yet haughty independence; in public converse distinguished—even amid crowds of Sophists and professional haranguers—for striking originality and appropriateness to time, place, and subject, he passes his life in the self-imposed task of teaching and suggesting topics of thought to any and every one who chooses to listen. “He was constantly in public; for he went in the morning to the promenades and the gymnasia;

at the time when the market-places were full, he was to be seen in them; and the rest of the day he was where he was likely to meet the greatest number of people. He was generally engaged in discourse,"* and every now and again there quivered out from his lips, in his usual shrewd, broad, buffeting style of speech some dauntlessly bold inquiry into the innermost nature of things; or glances into the more momentous speculations which referred to the moral aspects of his age. There was a manly courageousness about the way in which he stalked about in Athens; as Aristophanes said,

"With stately strut along the streets, with eyes askance and mocking,
Proud to be poor, though destitute of either shoe or stocking."

Ameipsias, too† even while ridiculing him, is obliged to confess—

"This worthy man,
Though ne'er so hungry, never flatters any one."

What singular seductiveness of manner, of *bonhomie*, mingled with irony! What strange sympathies must his have been, who knit to himself the affections of the wealthy, the beautiful, the noble, the intellectual, and the young! Seizing and transporting with the fervour of passion alike the wise Euripides, luxurious Alcibiades, spiritual Plato, enthusiast Xenophon, fair, frail, but intellectual Aspasia, and the coy decoy Theodota! Yes! this is the man of whom the Pythia of the Delphic oracle has made this declaration—"Sophocles is wise, Euripides is wiser, but the wisest of all men is Socrates!" Had this Pythic and pithy compliment any influence upon his mind in inclining him to make the inscription on the temple at Delphi—"Know thyself"—the text of his philosophy?

One means only have we now of ascertaining the date of his public apostolate in favour of morality, *i. e.*, the production of "The Clouds." In the spring of 423 B.C., at the Dionysian festival, when Athens was filled with tribute-bringers from all parts of Greece and the islands of the Ægean, this play was first performed. Prior to this, therefore, Socrates must have acquired sufficient notoriety to be singled out as a fit object for theatrical caricature, and been of mark enough to make a taking subject. Of the moral signification of this play we have already spoken,‡ and have attempted to supply a reading consistent with the known friendship of Socrates and Aristophanes, and the hatred of both for the Sophists and their demoralized disciples; and to that interpretation we still adhere. That the play unintentionally operated against Socrates, when the jealous Meletus—well bitten by the satire of both Aristophanes and Socrates, and therefore well acquainted with both—took from it, by suggestion, the grounds of an accusation against the burgher of Alopece, it would be unwise to deny; though it was, we are sure, intended to hit harder against Euripides, Theramenes, Critias,

* Xenophon's "Memorabilia," I. i. 10.

† Diogenes Laertius, "Socrates," ix.

‡ *British Controversialist*, May, 1860, p. 290.

Prodicus, and Alcibiades—who is specially and poignantly touched in the body of the drama—than against him whom, in that very comedy, Aristophanes makes the chorus address thus:—

“Prudent man, who long’st through us to be true wisdom’s phoenix,
Happiness will be your lot in Athens and among all the Hellenics;
For you’ve a noble memory, careful thought, and good invention,
Patience dwells within your soul, and cold you never mention;
You walk or stand, and never tire, and are unawed by hunger,
Wine, play, and gluttony you shun, and leave to those far younger.
With word and deed and sage advice you artfully bamboozle;
And prove it best for every man that nothing he should use ill.” *

Before 423 B.C., then, Socrates must have been teaching; and so teaching, though unprofessionally and unprofessedly, as to have acquired a wide reputation for eccentricity of manner, curious multifariousness of lore, and strange notions of man and his highest happiness; and we know that this comedy made no alteration in his conduct, but that he went about fearlessly and actively as ever, braving the scorn of men with itching ears; and, with impassive firmness, working the work before him, despite of the misconstructions of men.

Pericles died in 429 B.C. Cleon, Nicias, and Alcibiades then became competitors for supremacy in Athens. Cleon was rash, blustering, talkative, and atheistic; Nicias, cold, timid, superstitious, and reserved; Alcibiades, egotistic, versatile, wealthy, eloquent, ambitious. In their contests Socrates took no part. Cleon fell at Amphipolis, 422 B.C.; Nicias perished in Syracuse, 413 B.C.; Alcibiades, after Cleon’s death, became a leading politician, but was scarcely deemed trustworthy, and popular fear and jealousy kept Athens on the rack about his likings and doings. He was suspected, charged with wishing to establish a democracy, recalled from a command he had received in Sicily, 415 B.C., fled in fear of injustice, was restored to citizenship in 407 B.C., was superseded next year, went into exile, and was assassinated at Bisanthe, in the Thracian Chersonesus, 404 B.C. Socrates opposed the expedition against Sicily, as unjust; and the sorrow in which it closed seemed to make good his auguries.

In this interval the victory of Arginusæ, 406 B.C., occurred.

* That we are so far right in our conjecture regarding this drama may be further inferred from the fact that, though the comedy was popular with the people, the judges awarded the prize to Cratinus, “the wine-bibber,” who contested with Aristophanes and Amepsias, both of whom had placed Socrates amongst their *dramatis personæ*. As these judges were specially appointed to decide upon the merits of each drama critically, there can be little doubt that defects in characterization—so palpable in their nature as those regarding Socrates—must, notwithstanding the wit of the dialogue and comicality of the incidents, have been the cause of the failure. Aristophanes himself thought it the best of his pieces; and as he lived till after the trial and death of Socrates, it is not likely that he would have remained in that opinion, had it been through other cause than a misunderstanding of its meaning that his friend had been treated to hemlock by the State.

Near these three islands the Athenians conquered the Spartans. After the battle a storm arose; and neither were the warriors slain in battle picked up and buried, nor the living saved from the vessels wrecked by warfare or by the storm. Joy for the victory was mingled with grief and horror at the fate of these victims of battle and the elements. The generals, though thanked, were superseded, and recalled. Six came, one was faultless, one slain, and two held aloof in fear. They were tried before the public assembly. An astute, far-sighted, ambitious statesman, Theramenes, was their accuser. Thrasybulus, who was implicated in the generals' report, helped him. The evidence was contradictory, and the trial was adjourned. The solemn days of the Apaturia (registration) intervened. The relatives of the dead clad themselves in mourning during those days of joy; for it was the belief of the Greeks that the unburied dead wandered in woe a hundred years along the banks of the Styx. This affected the citizens much, and the minds of the people were inflamed against the generals by this sad demonstration. It was proposed to take the votes upon the criminality of the accused at one finding—guilty or not guilty on all in one. This was contrary to all law and precedent; for each man was entitled to separate trial and judgment. The people determined it should be done. The tribe Antiochis occupied that day the Prytanæum (judgment hall). Socrates was president—an office legally held one day only. He refused to entertain the proposal, because it was illegal. Menace and clamour were employed: the mob became furious. Socrates would not commit an act of injustice on the seat of justice, and he held out. The other judges wavered, then yielded; but he would not put it to the vote. His duty he would do, whatever betide. The assembly was adjourned—a new president was chosen—the vote was taken—the urns were set—the generals were doomed, and they perished by hemlock. It is pleasing to know that one man in Athens could outbrave the mob in the interest of law, justice, and a reverence for right; still more so, that that one man was Socrates. It is a noble power that—to be able to stand *alone*.

Athens after this fell into sore straits. Calamity and failure followed each other with close-coming footsteps; and, in the leaderless state of Athens, intrigue—which had become more fashionable than intelligence and effort—became active, powerful, supreme. Ambition impeded its wings. Antiphon gained a change in the constitution. The uncontrolled power of the State was vested in four hundred men of wealth and dignity. Their tyranny became intolerable, and they were overthrown. War continued. Famine and disease united their energies with war to feed death. Athens fell before Lysander; and the seventy-sixth anniversary of Salamis saw the queen of the sea subject to Sparta. Thirty tyrants—persons possessed of supreme power—were appointed. To be popular was dangerous; to be wealthy was a crime. Socrates continued his dialectic conversations throughout all changes of men and things. The tyrants desired to silence him; and forbade the pursuit of his

usual course. Socrates persevered; and even went the length of remarking, that if a cowherd under whose care cows grew fewer and thinner was a bad one, much more was a governor who lessened the happiness and the number of the citizens. Anxious to make a tool of the sage, they commanded him and four others—among whom was Meletus, afterwards the accuser of Socrates—to bring Leon of Salamis to Athens. The others went on their message; Socrates went home. Of this act he says—in Plato's "Apology"—that he did it, "caring not a jot for death;" and indeed, on account of it, he "might have been put to death, if that government had not speedily broken up." The only recorded instance of opposition to their tyranny is this of Socrates, to whom, once more, if it is permitted, in the interests of justice and in protest for the right, to be alone. "The inflexible resistance of Socrates," says Grote, "stands as a worthy parallel to his conduct as Prytanes, in the public assembly held on the conduct of the generals after the battle of Arginusæ."*

Democracy was restored in Athens early in 403 B.C., and Socrates escaped for that time.

Office-less, unpaid for teaching, courting no applause, fearing no frown, undepressed by failure, unrelaxed by change, holding duty as the supreme law of life, and morals as the holiest wealth of nations, this man—in some measure the De Foe of antiquity—offended many, conciliated none, pleased few; but these few were grappled to his soul with hooks of steel, and in their hearts the deepest reverence of discipleship and the keenest favour of love were felt for him. He was the morning-star of their intellectual heaven; the pilot of their souls towards truth; the seedsman to whom the after-harvest of their thoughts was due. Of his thoughts, contrasted with his Silenic outward form, Alcibiades affirms—"They are so supremely beautiful, so golden, so divine and wonderful, that everything which Socrates commands ought assuredly to be obeyed,—even like the voice of a god."† Yet all the while envy was working itself into traditions round "the old man eloquent;" and as he had acquired the dangerous eminence of noticeability—which forms a tacit yet continuous irk and reproof to the soul of the mediocre, and excites the jealousy of that dangerous passion, egotism, so as to convince it that it cannot permit, with impunity, the growth of a fame so destructive of democratic equality as that of a self-constituted critic of men, manners, and events, because it might imperil the reign of noodledom—envy was heated to a tenfold warmth of patriotic conservatism, and found it necessary to denounce the guileless, guiltless benefactor of Athens; so that, in 399 B.C., he was summoned before the court of the Heliastæ (judges chosen by lot from the people) as a disbeliever in the gods, and a corrupter of youth, and had, as he says himself, to "come, for the first time, before a court of justice, though more than seventy years of age."

* Vol. viii. part ii. chap. lrv. p. 332.

† Plato's "Symposium."

The accusations read thus :—"Meletus, son of Meletus, of Pittæa, impeaches Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus, of Alopecce. Socrates is guilty, for he does not believe in the gods whom the city worships, but introduces other new deities. Again, he is guilty, for he corrupts young men. The punishment incurred is *death*."

Meletus was a dramatist, whose tragedies are now only known of by the ridicule with which Aristophanes pilloried them; yet he opposed Euripides, the friend of Socrates—who had the repute of helping the most speculative and philosophic of Attic tragedians: he was also one of the captors of Leon, of Salamis; and may have had other causes of enmity. Concurrents with him in the accusation—but by his request—were Lycon, a public orator, and Anytus, a tanner, a demagogue, a magistrate, one of those who aided in the expulsion of the Thirty—and on many accounts a personal enemy to Socrates, who had now outlived many of his powerful friends, and most of those who knew the nature of his life-long labours. Many enmities had been evoked by his style of bantering men of reputation, so as to show up their real ignorance; many calumnies had arisen round him, because people construed his disproof of others' wisdom into an underhand assertion of his own; and besides, he was poor, and of no estimation by the possession of political office and—an example was needed to terrify Sophists, and to keep down censors. Self-conceit plays sad havoc with justice; self-examination is far less agreeable than self-satisfaction; and irony is so different from the complimentary flatteries which men love. To be told and shown that "well-doing" is the duty of man, and is the only true secret for attaining to "well-being," is so disagreeably suggestive of ill-doing as the source of Athenic woe, that the man who pushes it continually into the foreground of conversation and consciousness is sure to incur popular odium and antipathy; so that Meletus had well calculated the likelihoods before he issued his indictment.

Socrates appeared before the bar. Lysias, a graceful and elegant orator, prepared a defence for him; but this he haughtily rejected, saying, "My whole life forms my defence against this present accusation." He defended himself as one confident in his integrity, and careless of the humours of the judges—holding his superiority to fear of death before them, and expressing fear only of their disgrace and degradation. It was a deliberate foregoing of all chance of acquittal. He was found guilty; but that only by a majority of six in a total of 557. Meletus prosecuted for the penalty; and Socrates refused to plead for its remission. He again stood solitary in the superiority of his nature, and in his reverence for law and duty. Jocularly he submitted that, as a public benefactor, he should be decreed subsistence for life in the Prytæum; then suggested a fine of a mina (£3 5s.), but raised it, at the desire of his friends, Plato, Crito, Critobulus, Apollodorus, &c., to thirty minæ. The proud independence and contumacy of his manner inflamed his judges to rage; and he was "condemned to be surren-

dered to the eleven"—a euphemism for death. He addressed his judges with calm irony, intrepid resignation, pious exhortation, and sage advice. He asserted the injustice of his sentence; and closed with a discourse on death. After that, he concluded by saying, "Now, however, it is time to go—me to die, you to live; to which of us the better fate is assigned is known to God alone." He was fettered and imprisoned, and next day would have been executed, but that the festival *Theoria*—during which it was unlawful to put criminals to death—had begun the day before. Thirty days elapsed before its return. All this time he was kept in chains, though his friends had free access to him, and visited him regularly. Crito had bribed the gaoler to allow him to escape; but of this he declined to take advantage, because it was a breach of the law. A great part of his doctrinal teaching was uttered during these days. He seemed—like the setting sun—to flash a brighter radiance forth nearest the hour of his departure. The day on which he drank the fatal draught was suitably spent in discoursing on "the immortality of the soul." Having taken a tender farewell of his wife Xantippe, and of his children—three sons, one advanced in years, and two of whom had only reached their unripe boyhood—and having had them kindly conveyed from the prison-house, his chains being stricken off, he conversed seriously and affectingly with his friends—among whom were Crito and his son Critobulus, Æschines, Euclides, Antisthenes, &c. Plato was absent, because unwell. In the "*Phædo*" of that philosopher an account of this last day is given; but the arguments are supposed to be the pupil's, rather than the master's. The dying speech of Cyrus, in Xenophon's splendid historico-fiction, *Cyropædia*, is thought by critics to be a nearer and closer version of the opinions of the great humanist. The minister of death approached apologetically, and announced that the hour of doom was near. The cup was brought—accepted—its contents were quaffed. The sun stood on the mountain-top as he lay down. The ice-chill supineness of Death crept up his frame apace. His friends wept. He mildly rebuked them. His heart beat slow and hesitantly. He stirred, and said, "Crito, we owe a cock to Æsculapius." His eye glazed; the executioner covered him, for he was dead. The sun set,

"Like an ear of corn
Full ripe he fell, on nature's noblest plan
He lived to reason; and he died a man."

"This was the end of our friend; a man, we may say, the best of all his time that we have known; and, moreover, the wisest and most dutiful."*

[We have not thought it necessary in this paper to speak of the *Dæmon* of Socrates; nor have we ventured on any prologue or epilogue of reflections. In a subsequent paper on the *Philosophy of Socrates*, we shall return to the consideration of the influences of the life and thoughts of this renowned dialogist.]

* Plato's "*Phædo*," par. 155.

Religion.

IS THE CATHOLIC RULE OF FAITH TRUE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

It may not be altogether unnecessary to inform new subscribers that this debate is an indispensable counterpart of one which was completed in last month's *British Controversialist*. I would strongly urge all who have not read that debate, to purchase the last volume and read it, otherwise much that will be said in this and subsequent papers may possibly be unintelligible. To those who have already read the articles as they appeared, I would say, re-peruse them, and give them a diligent reconsideration *as a whole*.

It will be seen that one writer, in order to be a consistent Protestant, felt himself constrained to maintain the absurdity that the Old Testament *alone* is a sufficient Rule of Faith (p. 380); while another was driven to deny the all-sufficiency of the Bible, and to allow that, on the question of the canon of Holy Scripture, "we must have recourse to the testimony of the ancient churches (p. 301). This is a virtual admission that the Bible cannot instruct us on *all* points of Christian doctrine and practice. It will be the aim of the writers on the affirmative side of this question to explain and defend a Rule of Faith in which this "testimony of the ancient churches" is recognized as a legitimate principle, a rule by which alone you can steer clear of the difficulties which have been urged against the "Bible only" theory.

But first of all it will be necessary to state our Rule of Faith. I do not think there is any subject upon which so much misconception prevails, in this country, as upon the Catholic religion. Most persons who are, as the French say, *au fait* on a subject—that is, who have a professional and matter-of-fact knowledge of things appertaining to their own state or mode of life—have been led to wonder at the coolness with which people who have not that sort of knowledge undertake to hazard bold assertions on such subjects, or, at any rate, have seen through the shallowness of argument and the incorrectness of statements which are commonly ventured upon by writers who aim at effect rather than at truth. On any other subject than the Catholic Church, men's sense of shame is enough generally to keep them from talking at random. But the critics of our religion have an advantage peculiarly their own, in the deep ignorance of the public whom they address. Their statements pass

current in England, because the generality of people are about as wise as themselves. If a man talk nonsense about public affairs, he is soon put down, because there are, on every side, others with information and good sense enough to expose him. But to misrepresent Catholics in this country is no difficult matter; for all ears are ready to drink in the abuse, and equally deaf to the defence.

I make these remarks in order to try to induce those readers who have imbibed their ideas concerning the nature of the Catholic Rule of Faith from *hostile* sources, to lay them aside, or, at all events, to test their accuracy by *Catholic* sources. It may surprise some to be told that some of the Protestant writers, in the last debate, ventured upon some most glaring misrepresentations, knowing full well that there were opponents to contradict them. Thus H. B. charges J. H. with saying that "the Bible is the prolific source of every heresy and blasphemy;" while the writer referred to merely said that private interpretation of the Bible was the source, &c. Other charges are worse still. It would really seem incredible, if the facts were not before our eyes, that men of education and competent acquirements should bring themselves to believe that others, of equal education and acquirements, should deliberately offer to the Blessed Virgin the worship due to God alone; that they believe they will be saved by works only; and that they have adopted a religion in which licences to commit sin are regularly granted to its adherents. Yet all these charges have been brought against the Catholic Church by the Protestant writers in the religious debate in the last volume of the *British Controversialist*.

These considerations have prompted me to devote the opening paper to an explanation of the Catholic Rule of Faith, leaving the defence to future writers. This course is the more necessary, as the rule is not defined in the question at the head of the debate; and I fear that very few of my Protestant readers would take the trouble to ascertain its nature from a reliable source.

Subjoined is the decree of the Council of Trent on the Rule of Faith (Sess. iv.) :—

"Sacrosancta œcumenica et generalis Tridentina Synodus, in Spiritu sancto legitime congregata, præsidentibus in ea eisdem tribus apostolicæ sedis legatis, hæc sibi perpetuo ante oculos proponens, ut, sublatis erroribus, puritas ipsa Evangelii in Ecclesia conservetur; quod promissum ante per prophetas in Scripturis sacris (Jerem. 51) Dominus noster Jesus Christus, Dei filius, proprio ore primam promulgavit, deinde per suos apostolos, tanquam fontem omnis et salutaris veritatis et morum disciplinæ, omni creaturæ prædicari jussit (Matt. et Marc. ult); perspiciensque hæc veritatem et disciplinam contineri in libris scriptis et sine scripto traditionibus, quæ ab ipsius Christi ore ab apostolis acceptæ aut (2 Thess. ii.) ab ipsis apostolis, Spiritu sancto dictante, quasi per manus traditæ, ad nos usque pervenerunt, orthodoxorum patrum exempla secuta, omnes libros tam Veteris quam Novi Testamenti (quæ utriusque unus Deus sit auctor) necnon Traditiones ipsas, tum ad fidem, tum ad mores pertinentes, tanquam vel ore tenus a Christo, vel a Spiritu sancto dictatas et continua successione in Ecclesia Catholica conservatas, pari pietatis affectu ac reverentia suscipit et veneratur."

Literal translation:—

The sacred oecumenical and general Council of Trent, lawfully assembled in the Holy Ghost, and presided over by the same three legates of the apostolic see, having it constantly in view that by the removal of errors, the Gospel (which, promised aforetime in the Holy Scriptures by the prophets, Christ himself first published with His own mouth, and then commanded His apostles to preach to every creature, as the source of all saving truth and discipline) should be preserved pure in the Church; and clearly perceiving that this truth and instruction is contained in written books and unwritten traditions,—which traditions have been received by the apostles from the mouth of Christ himself, or dictated by the Holy Spirit, and by the apostles handed down even to us,—receives and reverences, conformably to the example of the orthodox Fathers, with the same pious regard and veneration, all the books of the Old as well as the New Testament (one God being the author of both), and the traditions relating both to faith and practice, inasmuch as these traditions were either delivered by word of mouth from Christ himself or dictated by the Holy Ghost, and preserved by uninterrupted succession in the Catholic Church. (Then follows the Catholic Canon of Scripture.)

It will be seen from this that the Catholic Rule of Faith is *the whole Word of God*, viz., Holy Scripture and Divine traditions, which, as the Council of Trent says, were delivered to the apostles by Christ himself, or dictated to them by the Holy Spirit, and such traditions only. Hence the futility of the objection which Protestants often make that our Lord condemned the “traditions of men.” We distinguish true from false tradition by the same method that we distinguish an authentic copy of Scripture from a false one. In both cases we must depend on the uniform and universal testimony of Christian antiquity. Both Protestants and Catholics believe the four gospels to be a reliable account of the life of our Lord, because all Christian nations and ages have done so before them. Catholics have the very same testimony for the traditional doctrines held as Divine by the Catholic Church. We have as much evidence for the truth of universally admitted traditional doctrine, as we have for the truth of the four gospels.

The subject-matter then of the Catholic faith is the original revelation of God. To that revelation nothing may be added, from it nothing may be taken away. We may neither fix our own private meaning upon it, nor may we misinterpret it, pervert it, or make it speak our own sense. We must receive it as God gave it, in its perfect fullness, with its true sense and purport, as it was revealed.

But how are we to obtain a certain and definite knowledge of this revelation? The Catholic's answer may be inferred from the decree of the Council of Trent, which I have just quoted. Christ himself first promulgated the Gospel with His own mouth, and before His ascension commissioned a body of men “to preach it to every creature,” promising to be with them to the end of the world (Matt. xxviii. 19, 20). Our Lord also said to them, “I will ask the Father, and He will give you another Paraclete, that he may abide with you for ever, the Spirit of truth” (John xiv. 16). From these promises the Catholic infers that there is, and will be until the end

of the world, a body of men in existence who have authority to teach him all that Christ has revealed, and, moreover, that this teaching body, which the Catholic calls the Church, in consequence of its being assisted and guided by Christ and his Spirit, can teach him no error.*

Thus, to a *visible society of men*, is the great and important work of preaching the kingdom of heaven entrusted. The ultimate reason of the visibility of the Church is to be found in the *incarnation* of the Divine Word. Had that Word descended into the hearts of men, without "taking the form of a servant," and, accordingly, without appearing in a corporeal shape, then only an internal, invisible Church would have been established. But since the Word became *flesh*, it expressed itself in an outward, perceptible, and human manner; it spoke as man to man, and suffered and worked after the fashion of men, to win them to the kingdom of God; so that the means selected for the attainment of this object fully corresponded to the general method of instruction and education determined by the nature and wants of man. This decided the nature of those means whereby the Son of God, even after He had withdrawn himself from the eyes of the world, wished still to work in the world, and for the world. The Deity having manifested its action in Christ, according to an *ordinary human* method, the form also in which His work was to be continued was thereby traced out. The preaching of His doctrine needed now a visible human medium, and must be entrusted to visible envoys, teaching and instructing after the wonted method. And as in the world nothing can attain to greatness, but in society, so Christ established a community,—a Church wherein He continues to live—His Spirit continues to work, and the word uttered by Him eternally resounds. In fact, the Church is the Son of God Himself,

* It must be borne in mind that I am merely *stating* the Catholic doctrine, and not *proving* it; this will be done by others. I make this remark because, strictly speaking, our theory requires that we should prove the authority of the Church without having recourse to the Bible as an *inspired volume*, though of course we may use it as an *authentic history*. The demonstration of the Catholic Rule of Faith will be best understood by supposing one's self in the position of an apostle or missionary arguing with a heathen, or a Christian arguing with a deist. We first prove the Divine mission of Christ from His miracles, &c., and thence deduce the necessity of yielding implicit credence to whatever we find Him to have taught. We then show (merely as a matter of history) that He appointed a succession of men, whose province it is, by the aid of supernatural assistance, to deliver inviolate to man all that God has revealed. Here we find ourselves in the presence of the Church. The Church informs us that *some* of those works, which we had been looking upon merely as historical documents, are divinely inspired. We thus arrive at the canon of Scripture, and may henceforward use it to confirm the authority of the Church. In short, we admit the Divinity of Christ, on the strength of the miracles which He worked to prove the fact; we believe the Church on the authority of Christ, and believe in the inspiration and canonicity of the various books of the Bible on the authority of the Church.

perpetually manifesting Himself among men in a human form, or, as St. Paul says, "It is the body of Christ."* Hence it is evident that the Church, though composed of men, is yet not purely human; for as in Christ the Divinity and the humanity are to be clearly distinguished, and are yet bound in unity, so it is with the Church, His permanent manifestation—she is at once human and Divine. It is Christ Himself who, concealed under earthly and human forms, works in the Church; and this is the reason why she has a Divine and a human part in an undivided mode, so that the Divine cannot be separated from the human, nor the human from the Divine. Hence these two parts change their predicates. If the Divine—Christ and His Spirit—constitute, undoubtedly, that which is infallible, and eternally unerrable in the Church—so also the human is infallible and unerrable, in the same way, because the Divine, without the human, has no existence for us; yet the human is not unerrable in itself, but only as the organ and as the manifestation of the Divine.†

Those who deny the infallibility of the Church, practically assert that Christ has not fulfilled those glorious promises which He made before His ascension. They must maintain that Christ has not sent the Spirit of truth to remain with His Church for ever; they must maintain that Christ has failed in His promise of being with His Church, to guide it, "all days, even till the consummation of the world" (Matt. xxviii. 20).

A well-known Catholic divine‡ has truly said, "It will be found that the reluctance of too many, even among good men, to receive the doctrine of the infallibility of the Church of God, springs from this—that they base their religious opinions upon human reason, . . . and not upon the illumination and supernatural guidance of Christ, and His Spirit, ever present and ever dwelling as a teacher in the Church. It will be found to involve a doubt as to the office of the third person of the ever-blessed Trinity. . . . The discernment they ascribe to the Church is human, proceeds from documents, and is gathered by reasoning. We rise above this, and believe that the Holy Spirit of God presides over the Church, illuminates, inhabits, guides, and keeps it; that its voice is the voice of the Holy Spirit himself; that when the Church speaks God speaks, . . . so that the ultimate authority upon which we

* "He gave some apostles, and some prophets, and other some evangelists, and other some pastors and doctors, for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ, until we all meet in the unity of faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God . . . that henceforward we be no more children, tossed to and fro, and carried about with every word of doctrine," Ephes. iv. 11—13. See also 1 Cor. xii. 27. The reader is particularly requested to peruse the whole of the twelfth chapter of the first epistle to the Corinthians. It will be found to be a remarkable confirmation of the views here developed:

† This will be a sufficient answer to those who, in the last debate, were constantly making inquiries as to the seat of infallibility in the Catholic Church.

‡ Dr. Manning, late Protestant Archdeacon of Chichester.

believe is the voice of God, speaking to us through the Church. We believe not in the Church, but through it, and through the Church, in God." * ("Grounds of Faith," page 47.)

As the Catholic doctrine respecting Divine tradition has already been touched upon in the last debate, and will, no doubt, receive ample attention from other writers, I will not prolong this already too lengthy paper by discussing it in detail. Having laid before my readers an exposition of the Catholic Rule of Faith, and having explained its theory and leading principles as lucidly as I possibly could, I will close my remarks with a few admissions which some celebrated Protestant writers have made on the subject.

Bishop Bull, "Defence of the Nicene Creed," page 2:—

"The matter in question in the first Nicene Council, was a main article of the Christian religion (the Trinity). If, in a matter of such importance, all the pastors of the Church could fall into error, how shall we be able to defend the word of Christ, who hath promised to His apostles, and in their persons their successors, to be always with them? Which promise would not be true, the apostles not being to live so long, were it not that their successors are here comprehended in the persons of the apostles themselves."

Dr. Whittaker, "Controversy," ii. 13:—

"The Church cannot hold any erroneous doctrine, and remain a Church. *Truth* constitutes the Church, and the Church shows where truth is to be found. The first of Timothy proves that truth ever remains in the Church, nor can be separated from her. *Other* societies may err; this society never can err.

Bishop Montague, "The Gagger Gagged," page 20:—

"Traditions instituted by Christ in points of faith, have Divine authority, as the written Word hath. Traditions from the apostles have equal authority with their writings; and no Protestant in his senses will deny that the apostles spoke much more than is written."

Dr. Brett, on Tradition, page 73:—

"It is evident, from the Scriptures themselves, that the whole of Christianity was at first delivered to the bishops succeeding the apostles, by *oral* tradition, and they were also commanded to keep it, and deliver it to their successors, in like manner (2 Tim. ii. 2). Nor is it anywhere found in Scripture, by St. Paul, or any other apostle, that they would either jointly or separately *write* down *all* they had taught as necessary to salvation."

IGNATIUS.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE—I.

1. It is of great importance at the commencement of a debate that the terms of the question should be explained and freed from all ambiguity. The sense in which any word of dubious meaning is used should be determined; the propositions by which the question is affirmed or negatived should be clearly laid down; and then the

* "All thy children shall be taught of the Lord, and great shall be the peace of thy children," Isa. liv. 13.

strongest arguments should be lucidly brought forward to demonstrate the truth of the propositions. This we shall endeavour to do in the present article.

2. By the "Catholic Rule of Faith," we understand the "*Roman Rule of Faith*;" and, in speaking of its being "true," we refer to its *Divine authority*. This Rule of Faith includes the "Bible," the "Apocrypha," "unwritten traditions," and the "interpretations" of these by the Romish Church.* As we both admit the Divine authority of the "Bible," so our dispute will not relate to it, and we shall assume, of course, that that part of this Rule of Faith is "true." We deny the Divine authority of the others, and hope to make good our denial before we conclude this paper.

3. The Divine authority of the "Apocrypha," "unwritten traditions," and the "interpretations" of these by the Romish Church, entirely depends upon the *infallibility* of that church. If it were admitted that this church were infallible, it would follow that these are "true," simply because she has declared them to be so; and were we to discuss these one by one, our opponents would ultimately refer us to the infallible authority of their church for proof. They even assert that the Bible has no Divine authority but for her infallibility; and when we ask for proof of this infallibility, she refers us back to the Bible. This reminds us of the man who, when asked what he believed, said, "I believe what the Church believes." "And what does the Church believe?" "The Church believes what I believe," was the reply. It requires no argument to prove that these have no Divine authority except for the infallibility of the Romish Church, as the fact is maintained by our opponents. Bellarmine says:—"That is a true tradition which all former doctors have successively, in their several ages, acknowledged to come from the apostles, and by their doctrine or practices have approved, and which the universal Church owneth as such; *and the reason is, because the universal Church CANNOT ERR.*"† By "the universal Church" he means, of course, the *Romish Church*. Instead, then, of taking up these three topics *seriatim*, and discussing their "truth" separately, we purpose showing that the very *foundation* on which their Divine authority rests, is false; in fact, that they have no foundation whatever for such a distinction. For as their "truth" depends upon the infallibility of the Church of Rome, so, if it be proved that this Church is *not* infallible, it will follow that they are not of Divine authority, and, consequently, that "The Catholic Rule of Faith is *not* true." Let our opponents prove their Church to be infallible, and we must of necessity admit that their Rule of Faith is *true*.

4. We shall endeavour to make good our denial of the question by proving the truth of the following propositions:—

* Douay note, 2 Tim. v. 16. 1853.

† "De Tradit." cap. 9: "Poole's Dialogues," p. 50, 1839.

- (1.) The "Catholic Rule of Faith" is not true because the Roman Catholic Church is not infallible.
- (2.) The "Catholic Rule of Faith" is not true because the Roman Catholic Church by her "traditions" and "interpretations" teaches doctrines and commands practices which are erroneous, being contrary to the plain teaching of the Holy Scriptures.

5. Prop. 1. "The Catholic Rule of Faith is not true because the Roman Catholic Church is not infallible." To be infallible is to be exempt from any liability to error, mistake, or deception. Now the Romish Church grounds her doctrine of infallibility upon the Sacred Scriptures. She must either do so, or prove it independently of the Bible. This she does not attempt; and as she appeals to the Scriptures for proof, so by their evidence must she be tried. Upon the Bible *alone* must we rest for the proof of this important question, because that *alone* is the authority which we both admit to be Divine, and to which we both can appeal in this matter. *We therefore assert that the Romish Church is not infallible because she has no Scripture authority for this doctrine.*

6. The first and principal passage to which she appeals is Matt. xvi. 18: "And I also say unto thee, that thou art Peter, and upon this rock will I build my Church; *and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.*" The italicized words are those on which she builds this doctrine of infallibility. But that they prove what the Romish Church says they do, will depend—1. Whether it is Peter or the Divine dignity of Christ, as confessed by Him, that is the *rock* of the Church. 2. If it be Peter, does it include all his successors? 3. Whether is the promise general or particular? 4. Does it relate to matters of *faith* AND *practice*, or to matters of *faith only*? 5. Does it prove the infallibility of Peter or the Church?

7. Is it Peter or the Divine dignity of Christ that is the *rock* of the Church? That it is not Peter will appear from the words translated *Peter* and *rock*. The Greek word *petros*, anglicized *Peter*, does *not* mean a *rock*, but a *stone*, or *piece of a rock*. "Thou art Simon, son of Jona; thou shalt be called Cephias, which is by interpretation, a *stone*," or *Peter* (John i. 42). The word *petra*, translated *rock*, means a *real rock*, not a *stone* or *fragment* of one, as does *petros*. And as *petra*, a *rock*, is of superior dignity to *petros*, a *stone*, so we understand the *rock*, the *true foundation* of the Church, is superior in dignity to *Peter*. That this is the true meaning will be evident when we consider that the term *rock* is a scriptural, figurative expression, to signify a *Divine Protector*; and is only applied to God or Christ. "Jehovah is my rock," 2 Sam. xxii. 2. For they drank of that spiritual Rock (*Petra*), and that Rock (*Petra*) was Christ," 1 Cor. x. 4. But the term *petros*, a *stone*, if applied figuratively to Peter, can only mean that he is but one of the true believers who, "as living stones, are built up a spiritual house, . . . acceptable to God by Jesus Christ," 1 Peter ii. 5.

8. Again, the *grammatical* construction of the sentence will prove that Peter is not the rock of the Church. The word *petros* is a noun *masculine*, and *petra* a noun *feminine*. If our Lord had intended by the *rock* Peter himself, He would have repeated the *masculine* noun in the *dative* case with a *masculine pronoun* and *article*, thus,—“*epi touto to petro.*” But the text is “*epi taute te petra,*”—words which are all *feminine*, and cannot therefore refer to *Peter*. What our Lord did refer to will be seen from the context. Peter had said, “Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God.” Our Lord answered, “AND I ALSO say unto thee,” &c. This, by the copulative conjunction *and*, and the connective adverb *also*, points out the inseparable connection of this verse and Peter’s declaration of Christ’s Divine dignity, and proves that the declaration of Peter was the main object of the sentence, and the true and only foundation of the Christian Church. Seeing then that *Peter* is not the *rock* of THE Church, against which the gates of hell shall not prevail, it is evident that the Church of Rome, being built upon *Peter*, cannot be the Church referred to in this text; and, therefore, this passage does not prove the infallibility of the Church of Rome.

9. Suppose Peter to be the *rock* of the Church, does it include all his successors? First. Who was Peter’s successor in this supposed supremacy? Was it *Linus* or *Clemens*? How careless of Peter not to name him, when by so doing he would have put away no end of disputes! He might have said, “And to this end I leave my successor, Pope —, whom you must hear in all things, and who will be as infallible in doctrine and practice as I have been” (Gal. ii. 2.) If this privilege belongs to *all* his successors, it will follow that—to quote D’Aubigné—“*Benedict IX.*, a boy of twelve years of age, who, after being tutored in debauchery, continued his horrible turpitudes as Pope,” was the rock of the Church for the time being. That *Alexander VI.*, a fornicator and incestuous person, a compound of vice in all its evil shapes, was the rock of the “infallible” Church. We cannot believe that these, and other Popes of this class, could be the foundation of the Church, or a *security* from the “gates of hell.” It will not find credit with seriously thinking men till east and west meet together.

10. Is the promise general or particular? If it be particular, and refers to the Church built upon Peter, and proves the infallibility of *any* who are built upon him, it also proves the infallibility of *all* who are built upon him. There is nothing in the text or context to prove the contrary. And since the Church of England and those of Germany were once built upon him, and having apostatized, according to the views of our opponents, it follows that their being built upon Peter, while subject to the Pope, did not make them infallible, nor secure them from falling. So those who are now built upon him may, in like manner, fall away, until the Pope be left the head without a body, a shepherd without sheep. This shows that the promise is not a particular one, does not refer to any one par-

ticular church, but that it is a general promise to Christ's own Church, which includes *all true believers in all ages*; and that it signifies that the Church built upon the only true foundation, Jesus Christ, shall be maintained in the world to the end of time.

11. The Church of Rome claims to be *infallible* in matters of *faith* ONLY. But this text speaks no more about matters of *faith* than of *practice*. It secures the Church of Rome no more against the one than the other; and the "gates of hell" prevail as much against the Church by *practice* as they do by *doctrine*; and "since it is acknowledged that some of Peter's successors have died in damnable sins, they may also die in damnable heresies," for they are no more secured from the one by this text than from the other. This passage, therefore, does not favour the pretensions of Rome to be infallible in matters of faith or doctrine *only*; but the fact of her claiming infallibility in this *alone* is a tacit acknowledgment of her *fallibility* in matters of *fact* and *practice*.

12. Does it prove the infallibility of Peter or the Church? The passage evidently speaks of the infallibility of the Church, if it speaks of infallibility at all. But the infallibility of the Church will depend upon that of the rock on which it is built. Now, the Church of Rome is built upon Peter, and the Popes as his successors. But the infallibility of the Pope *alone* is denied by the majority of Roman Catholics; and we have proved that Peter cannot be the rock of the Church spoken of in the text, which also proves that he is not infallible; and this shows at once that the claim of the Romish Church to infallibility is not found in this passage of Scripture, since the *stone*, Peter, on which she is built, is not infallible, and the Popes are no more so than he.

13. We have thus gone through this passage more minutely than we intended; but as it is the great stronghold, the chief passage on which the Romish Church founds this absurd notion, perhaps it is better to investigate it more fully than any other. We shall now glance at some others, to which we are referred for proof of this doctrine, and then pass on to our second proposition.

14. The next passage is found in 1 Tim. iii. 15, where the Church is called "the pillar and ground of the truth." And "therefore the Church of the living God can never uphold error, nor bring in corruption, superstition, or idolatry."*

But the church here spoken of was not that of Rome, but of Ephesus; and if any particular church was meant, it must have been the latter. If it were the universal Church of Christ, *that* might be infallible, though the Church of Rome were obliterated. It is generally acknowledged by our opponents that infallibility resides only in "the Pope and a general council agreeing together;" and that these alone constitute "*the Church*." Accordingly, the following paraphrase will convey the true meaning of this text,— "That thou mightest know how to behave thyself in a Pope and

* Donay note, 1 Tim. iii. 15. 1853.

general council, which is the Church of the living God." This is nonsense; and none but those who blindly follow the blind can believe that St. Paul would give directions to Timothy how to behave in a "Pope and general council," which was not then in being, nor, indeed, till more than two centuries after. The passage evidently refers to his behaviour in the Church of Ephesus, over which he was bishop; and it has no more to do with the Church of Rome than with the Church of the "Latter-day Saints."

But the words, "pillar and ground of the truth," are figurative; and whether they refer, as some think, to Timothy himself, or to the Church of Ephesus, they evidently mean being well *rooted* and *grounded* in the faith—a *strong supporter* of it—as he is a *reed* who is tossed to and fro by every wind of doctrine. Jeremiah was called an "iron pillar;"—was he, therefore, infallible? The saints of Vienna and Lyons called Attalus, the martyr, a "pillar and ground of the truth;"*—was he, therefore, infallible? James, Cephas, and John, seemed to be *pillars* (Gal. ii. 9). If this made Peter infallible, so were likewise James and John; and, consequently, so were the churches over which they were bishops. But enough has been said to show that this passage does not favour this celebrated dogma of the Church of Rome.

15. John xvi. 13: "When He the Spirit of truth is come, He will guide *you* into all truth." This promise was made to the apostles only. If it relates to them *alone*, it does not prove the infallibility of the Romish Church; but if it refers to their successors, it includes *all* the successors of *all* the apostles; and it proves no more the infallibility of Peter's successors than it does of all the others. John xiv. 16: "And I will pray the Father, and He shall give you another Comforter, that He may abide with you for ever." This passage does not say that *every one* with whom the Comforter abides *should be led into all truth for ever*. "*For ever*. Hence it is evident that this Spirit of truth was not only promised to the persons of the apostles, but also to their successors, through all generations."† If this implies the infallibility of all who are led by the Spirit of God, then all believers are infallible, for they are led by the Spirit (Rom. viii. 14). The Spirit of truth is promised to all who ask it (Luke xi. 13); and a knowledge of the *doctrine*, whether it be of God or not, is promised to *all* who *obey the will of God* (John vii. 17). This passage, therefore, has no more to do with the infallibility of the Church of Rome, than with that of every Christian believer.

The last passage we shall examine is one in the Old Testament, on which they found this dogma of infallibility. Deut. xvii. 8, 12, is one of the principal arguments they bring forward to prove it. Our opponents argue that, inasmuch as God gave to the Church-guides of the Old Testament infallible authority in deciding,

* Eusebius, lib. 5, cap. 1: Poole's "Dialogues," 1839.

† Douay note, John xiv. 16. 1853.

without appeal, all controversies relating to the law, that He has not done less for the Church-guides of the New Testament. The infallibility of the Jewish Church, in the person of the High Priest, is made the foundation of the infallibility of the Romish Church, in the person of the Pope. Well, then, since the Jewish Church was *infallible*, it will follow that those books only are canonical which the Jewish Church received. The Jews rejected the books of the Apocrypha; they never received into their canon of Scripture those books which we Protestants reject; and as they were *INFALLIBLE*, they *must be right*. And unless the Church of Rome can show that they were *not infallible*, or that she has received *Divine authority* to declare the *infallible* decisions of the Jewish Church to be *fallible*, it must follow that the Apocrypha is *not any part of the revealed will of God*, and, consequently, that this part of the "Catholic Rule of Faith is" *not "true."* Josephus bears testimony to the Jewish canon of Scripture, and declares that the apocryphal books "are not of the same credit with the former, because there was no certain succession of prophets."* Bellarmine says:—"All those books which the Protestants do not receive, the Jews also did not receive."†

16. We have thus gone through the principal passages of Scripture alleged to support this favourite dogma of the Romish Church, and have found that they do not, in the slightest degree, give countenance to any such notion. We believe, therefore, that our first proposition has been demonstrated, and that, *because* the Church of Rome is *not infallible*—not having scriptural authority for the doctrine, that her "Rule of Faith" is *not "true."* We have seen that the argument she brings forward to prove her own infallibility, namely, that respecting the Jewish Church, proves that the Apocrypha, which she receives as *part* of her "Rule of Faith," cannot be of Divine authority. We shall now pass on to consider the second proposition.

17. Prop. 2. "The Catholic Rule of Faith is not true because the Roman Catholic Church, by her 'traditions' and 'interpretations,' teaches doctrines and commands practices which are erroneous, being contrary to the plain teaching of the Scriptures."

Our space bids us to be brief on this part of our subject. We shall, therefore, not enter into any lengthy arguments to prove our position, but shall put in parallel columns the teaching of the Scriptures, and that of the Church of Rome, and leave the readers of the *British Controversialist* to compare the two, and to draw their own conclusions, which, we doubt not, will be generally in accordance with our proposition.

THE BIBLE.

18. "Whatever things were written aforetime were written for our learning,

THE CHURCH OF ROME.

18. "Translated Bibles must not be in the hands of every husbandman,

* Josephus, "Contra Appionem," lib. 1: Poole's "Dialogues." 1839.

† "De Verbo Dei," lib. 1. c. 10: *Ibid.*

THE BIBLE.

that through patience and comfort of the Scriptures we might have hope."—*Rom. xv. 4.*

"Let the word of Christ dwell in you richly."—*Col. iii. 16.*

"Search the Scriptures."—*John v. 39.*

"These are written that ye might believe."—*John xx. 31.*

"From a child thou hast known the Holy Scriptures, which are able to make thee wise unto salvation through faith in Christ Jesus."—*2 Tim. iii. 15.*

"Ye do err, not knowing the Scriptures."—*Matt. xxii. 29.*

"Jesus said unto him, *It is written again*, Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God."—*Matt. iv. 7.*

"Is it not written?"—*Mark xi. 17.*

19. "Full well ye reject the commandments of God, that ye may keep your own tradition."—*Mark vii. 9.*

"Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, and not after Christ."—*Col. ii. 8.*

"Refuse profane and old wives' fables."—*1 Tim. i. 4.*

20. There is none righteous, no not one."—*Rom. iii. 10.*

"All have sinned, and come short of the glory of God."—*Rom. v. 12.*

"The Scripture hath concluded all under sin."—*Gal. iii. 22.*

"That which is born of the flesh is flesh, that which is born of the Spirit is spirit."—*John iii. 6.*

21. By grace you are saved *through faith*; and this not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God: *not of works*, that no man may glory."—*Eph. ii. 8, 9. Douay version.*

22. "Behold the Lamb of God; he who taketh away the sin of the world."—*John i. 29. Douay.*

"Who gave himself a ransom for all."—*1 Tim. ii. 6.*

THE CHURCH OF ROME.

artificer, prentice boie, girl, mistress, man—*this holy booke is the booke of the priests*, at whose hands and dispositions we must take and use it."—*Preface to Douay Testament, 1633.*

"It is not a command for all to read the Scriptures."—*Douay note, John v. 39. 1653.*

"Of these translations (of the Bible), are come much vanitie, curiositie, contempt of superiors, horrible errors and divulgation of the dreadful sacraments which of purpose were hidden from the vulgar."—*Douay note, 1 Cor. xiv. 2.*

"The apostle affirmeth only that Timothee knew the Scriptures, and therefore had studied them by *hearing* good readers and teachers."—*Douay note, 1633. 1816.*

"If they (the heretics) say, 'It is written,' that is the voice of the *devil* speaking in his members."—*Cardinal Hosius: De Expressio Dei Verbo. Poole's Dialogues. 1839.*

19. "For example of necessary traditions—the sign of the crosse, praying towards the east, the words spoken at the elevation of the Eucharist, the halloving of the font, blessing of the oile, exorcismes of the party to be baptized. What Scriptures taught these and such like? None, truly; al coming of secret and silent tradition."—*Douay note, 2 Thess. ii. 15.*

20. "Heart of Mary, *unstained with original sin*, pray for us."—*Liturgy of the Heart of Mary Liguori.*

"Whilst we have been born in original sin, Mary, by a privilege granted to her alone, *was conceived free from every stain of original sin*."—*Pastoral of the Romish Primate of Ireland, August, 1850.*

21. "Good works do truly deserve eternal life; and whosoever holds the contrary is accursed."—*Trid. sess. vi. cap. xvi. et can. 32.*

22. "Whoever shall affirm that we can by no means make satisfaction to God for our sins, let him be accursed."—*Trent. sess. xiv. can. 13.*

"But after He had offered one sacrifice, for ever sat down on the right hand of God."—*Heb. x. 12.*

23. "I have trodden the wine-press alone, and of the Gentiles there is not a man with me."—*Isa. lxiii. 3. Douay version.*

"There is one God, and one Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus."—*1 Tim. ii. 5.*

"We have an Advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous."—*1 John ii. 1.*

"I am the way, the truth, and the life: no man cometh unto the Father but by me."—*John xiv. 6.*

"There is none other name given among men, whereby we must be saved."—*Acts iv. 12.*

24. "All power is given unto me (Jesus) in heaven and in earth."—*Matt. xviii. 18.*

"The Father loveth the Son, and hath given all things into his hand."—*John iii. 35.*

25. "The blood of Jesus Christ his Son cleanseth us from all sin."—*1 John i. 7. Douay.*

"Wherefore He is able also, to save them to the uttermost that come unto God by Him."—*Heb. vii. 25.*

26. "For this is my blood of the New Testament, which is shed for many for the remission of sins. But I say unto you, I will not drink henceforth of this FRUIT OF THE VINE," &c.—*Matt. xxvi. 28, 29.*

"For as often as ye eat this BREAD and drink this cup, ye do show the Lord's death till He come."—*1 Cor. xi. 26.*

The wine after consecration is still called the fruit of the vine, and the cup; and the bread is also called bread.

"Because thou wilt not leave my soul in hell, neither wilt thou suffer thine HOLY ONE to see CORRUPTION."—*Acts ii. 27.*

"He seeing this before spake of the resurrection of Christ, that His soul was not left in hell, neither did His flesh see CORRUPTION."—*Acts ii. 31.*

27. "Let no man deceive you by any means; for that day shall not come

"O miracle! He that sitteth with the Father in heaven above is handled of men beneath."—*Douay note, Acts i. 2.*

23. "True, Lord, there was no MAN with thee, but there was a WOMAN with thee."—*In Martiali, Ann. 1493. Quoted in Poole's Dialogues, p. 108. 1839.*

To the Virgin Mary: "Receive our praises, obtaine our requestes, for thou art the special hope of sinners; by thee we hope for pardon of our sinnes, because of her intercession for us, whereby she is our refuge, our advocate," &c.—*Douay note on Acts i. 14.*

"General salvation is procured to all mankind by mediation of the B. V. Marie."—*Douay note on Esther ix. 1. 1633.*

24. "Hail, Mary, lady and mistress of the world, to whom all power has been given both in heaven and in earth."—*The Sacred Heart, p. 206.*

25. "The fire of purgatory, in which the souls of just men are cleansed by a temporary punishment."—*Cat. Council of Trent, p. 59.*

26. "The words of consecration accomplish three things; first, that the true and real body of Christ, the same that was born of the Virgin, is rendered present in the Holy Eucharist; second, that no substance of the elements remain in the sacrament. The substance of the bread and wine is so changed into the body and blood of our Lord, that they ALTOGETHER CEASE TO BE the substance of bread and wine."—*Cat. Council of Trent, p. 212.*

"If something poisonous have touched the consecrated Host, let it be preserved in the tabernacle in a separate place until the species be CORRUPTED; and when CORRUPTED, then let it be thrown into the sacarium."—*Roman Missal, published by Coyne, Dublin. 1822.*

27. "The Divinity of Christ and of God (in respect of us) depends upon

THE BIBLE.

except there come a falling away first, and that man of sin be revealed, the son of perdition, who opposeth and exalteth himself above all that is called God or that is worshipped; so that he as God sitteth in the temple of God, showing himself that he is God."—*2 Thess. ii. 3, 4.*

THE CHURCH OF ROME.

the authority of the Pope."—*Triplicatio Contra Whitak. c. 17. Quoted in Poole's Dialogues, p. 66. 1839.*

"If the Pope should *err* in forbidding virtues and commanding vices, the church were bound to believe vices to be good, and virtues bad, unless she would sin against conscience."—*Bell, De Pont. lib. iv. c. 5. Ibid.*

28. In conclusion, we think that the comparison between the teaching of the Bible and that of the Romish Church fully establishes our position, that by her "traditions" and "interpretations," she teaches doctrines and commands practices which are contrary to the plain teaching of the Holy Scriptures; and that, therefore, the "Catholic Rule of Faith is" not "*true*." We, of course, except the Bible; but respecting the Apocrypha, "unwritten traditions," and the "interpretations" of these by the Romish Church, we believe that the evidence brought forward in proof of their *fallibility* of that church, and of her *erroneous* teachings, proves, beyond a doubt, that the latter portion of her "Rule of Faith" is not of Divine authority, being nothing more than the opinions and commandments of men.

THEOPHYLACT.

Philosophy.

IS THE POETRY OF TENNYSON AS HEALTHY IN ITS TENDENCIES AS THAT OF LONGFELLOW?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

LORD BACON has said, "The world being in proportion inferior to the soul, there is, agreeable to the spirit of man, a more ample greatness, a more exact goodness, and a more absolute variety than can be found in the nature of things. Therefore, because true history hath not in its acts or events that magnitude, that justness, poesy feigneth acts and events greater, and more heroic, and endureth them; so that poetry serveth to magnanimity, and conferreth therewith morality and delectation. And, therefore, was it ever thought to have some participation of divineness, *because it doth raise and erect the mind, by submitting the shows of things to the desires of the mind*; whereas reason doth buckle and bow the mind unto the nature of things." This definition of the nature and work of poetry by one of the most subtle and far-seeing philosophers, may be applied as a test in a discussion upon the moral tendencies

of the teachings of Tennyson and Longfellow. The question fully recognizes the value of poetry, and hence relieves the disputants from the labour of defending it from the utilitarian, who deems it veriest idleness to contend for a superiority in that which he regards as fit only for the weakest pastime. The affirmative writers in the present debate admit the claims of Longfellow, as a poet alike pure, lofty, and moral, but contend that Tennyson stands equally high, if not above him. Although the previous affirmative writers have cheerfully conceded this, their opponents have not at present clearly defined what their own estimate includes. In allowing that the American is one of the most popular poets of the present, we believe that is rather against than for him in the question at issue, since we contend that his popularity is the effect of characteristics in which he unfavourably compares with our Laureate. One of Longfellow's most intimate friends (Mr. R. W. Griswold), in introducing an edition of his works, says, "These poems have that naturalness which commends them alike to the rude and the cultivated. Yet he seems to lack a certain freshness and creative energy necessary to poets of the highest order." This we take to be a fair estimate, and have looked in vain through the negative articles for proof of higher power and moral strength to justify his being placed above Tennyson, from whom he as essentially differs in teaching as in style.

Longfellow's poetry is entirely that of the commonplace, even in his most meritorious performances; there is the easy flow of thought and graceful symbolism which readily commends itself to every one's mind, for the sentiments are such as float in the popular brain, rather than the profound intuitional utterance of the highest poetry. This lack may be expressed in the words of a recent reviewer, who says, "There is none of the intensely delicate and surprising touches which the greatest poets use, and which, like the scent of May blossom, seems to place us at once amid long-forgotten sights and sounds."* Holding that his advocates have advanced no higher claims than those admitted by their opponents, we may justifiably conclude our premises admitted, and thence turn to the objections they so strenuously urge against Tennyson, qualified as they are by frank concessions, which, if logically and fairly carried to their issue, would decide the question against themselves. They allow Tennyson to have the greatest depth, breadth, and subtlety, and yet deny his *equality*; hence considering superficialism to be mentally and morally healthy: they grant his poetry is of a loftier cast, more thought-laden, yet deny to it "practical" power; hence arguing that truth, however majestically displayed, is powerless unless "directly" applied, and that he who "aspires to direct the current of men's thoughts" is not equal to him who didactically aims to "stimulate their actions," thus setting mere action above thought, which must be the life of all right, earnest, manly work.

* *National Review*, No. 15, Art. "Longfellow."

The reasons of the opposition to Tennyson, shown by the negative writers, are most vague and unsatisfactory; by one writer they are chiefly confined to the use of such epithets as "morbid and mystical," while another speaks of his poetry as "overwrought, cloudy, melancholy, and deficient in earnestness and vigour;" and a third insinuates that were he less abstruse and metaphysical, more "lifelike, hearty, and fraternal," he would wield a magic power, crowned as he is with such genius. To reply strictly and explicitly to such charges would narrow the debate, and altogether rob it of its true value, as was so ably proved in the last affirmative article. Indeed, we opine that the course already taken on both sides is wise, for though the articles may appear to be made up of special pleading, an exposition of the grounds on which preference is decided, appears the most suitable means of giving the best evidence for guidance of judgment. Not that it would be difficult to take the charges brought against Tennyson and disprove them by copious quotations from his poems, or to place the works of the two poets side by side, and demonstrate that for whatever excellence there is in Longfellow, there are precious things far more glorious in Tennyson. To place several of their pieces in juxtaposition would be valuable mental exercise, as well as conducing to a just appreciation of both; especially if such comparison has due regard to their chronological position, so that early should be pitted against early, and mature against its compeer. Taking the "April Day," "Autumn," "Winter Woods," "Sunrise," "Spirit of Poetry," "Anti-Slavery Poems," "The Bridge," "Old Clock," "Arrow and Song," "The Builders," &c., of Longfellow, together with the "Arabian Nights," "Ode to Memory," "The Poet," "Circumstance," "Miller's Daughter," "May Queen," "Death of Old Year," "Gardener's Daughter," "Golden Year," "Godiva," "Two Voices," &c., of Tennyson, or "Evangeline" and "Locksley Hall," "The Spanish Student" and "The Princess," "The Voices of the Night," and "In Memoriam," or the "Song of Hiawatha" and "Miles Standish," together with "Idylls of the King;" the result of such a critical study would be conducive to the strengthening of Tennyson's claim to the first place.

It is a much-disputed point whether progress in civilization is destructive of poetry and its influence; and whether that external assimilation and seeming distinction of individualism, which some of the deepest thinkers deplore as an inevitable result, is to leave no room for poetry to rule as of yore. But we have yet to learn that the antagonism exists elsewhere than in the minds of those who imagine it, between that ideal excellence which seems in the progress of science and knowledge ever nearer to attainment, and the spiritual tendencies of man's unchanging nature. If the external world in relation to each unit of the vast humanity, is losing its speciality; we may be sure the outgrowth can only be a deeper, fuller, richer development of the internal being of each and all; and hence it may be that the mission of the poet in the future shall far

transcend the glory he has had in the past. Inasmuch as some faint indications seem to suggest that we may be living in an era which is to see the beginning of new casts of thought and new growth in spiritual life, we deem the position and relation of Tennyson to our times one of great importance, since he must be admitted to wear the laureate's crown in spiritual poetry, he alone having succeeded in transfiguring the outward and material by an infusion of the hidden life.

To appreciate truly Tennyson's poetry, and ascertain how far he fulfils what Bacon lays down as the work of the true poet, it is imperative that we consider the purposes developed in his works, as only by so doing is it possible rightly to estimate what the question at issue terms their "healthy tendency." He, unlike most poets, from the commencement of his work set before him a regular progress and development which could only ripen slowly; for he resolved not to rely upon the passionate utterances of genius alone for his power to sway men, but sought to infuse that genius into artistic and refined language, and so to secure an effect reaching alike the taste, imagination, intellect, and affections. So great and wondrous an ideal could only be slowly and painfully wrought out, and hence the great value of his poems regarded as the biography of a mind which sets high excellence from the first before it, but comes gradually to see that point after point has to be altered and given up, and that a loftier and more blessed standard can alone satisfy the unquenched craving of the poet's soul.

His earlier poems are mere pictorial efforts; here the poet's ideal is firm, exquisite, gorgeous, colouring with little sympathy with the life pulsing in the wide world; still they are worth consideration as indications of that marvellous word-painting afterwards associated with such noble sentiments, and the polish and beauty of which are still dwelt upon in the structure of his later works. In "The Poet" he gave proofs that already the fire was kindled which anon was to leap so high heavenward; in the quiet flow of "Circumstance," we have the promise of that analytical power he has since wielded with a master's hand. His collected edition of 1842 at once placed him on the proud eminence of the poet of his country and age; and though he is still struggling to a loftier height, his songs are now full of a rich life, flowing on amid more than the old vigour and beauty of versification. He is not yet perfect; there are still the taints of what our negative friends term "morbidly and mysticism." And why? Because he is not content to balance every light and shade, and, like Longfellow, utter didactic songs, each of which shall have its practical and utilitarian value consequent on its very triteness. He has not yet found his resting-place; he utters life's riddles, but has no solutions to offer; hence, if judged by an arbitrary standard, he is non-understandable and mystical in this series of his works. "Locksley Hall" is loaded with thoughts of most invigorating and soul-stirring power. Such, for instance, as,—

"Yet I doubt not through the ages one increasing purpose runs,
And the thoughts of men are widened with the process of the suns."

Again :—

"Knowledge comes, but wisdom lingers, and he bears a laden breast,
Full of sad experience, moving towards the stillness of his rest."

"Men, my brothers, men the workers, ever reaping something new,
That which they have done but earnest of the things that they shall do."

"Not in vain the distance beacons. Forward, forward let us range,
Let the great world spin for ever down the ringing grooves of change;
Through the shadow of the globe we sweep into the younger day:
Better fifty years of Europe than a cycle of Cathay."

Despite the wild passion of this poem, we feel there is deepest, richest, healthiest life throbbing through it; the poet has insight almost inspired to look through and beyond all the fierce doubt and struggle of his era; and to see a future radiant with glory, for he sees a present in which a will works that is subduing all things to itself, and evolving a blessed godlike *oneness* out of all the divers aims and ends of man. In the classical poems of this series, where he seems most removed from the sympathies of his contemporaries, a careful review will bring out the proof that he has placed them there, not so much as studies in the antique as analyses of character, applicable alike to all time. His "Ulysses" and "Cenone" are laden with wisdom and sentiment, as he declares that

"Self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-control,
These three alone lead life to sovereign power."

Scattered among this series there were, however, a number of pieces which at first sight seemed so destitute of any moral power for good, if accepted without antidote, that they have served all those who could not understand Tennyson's teaching as a whole, as a constant drawback with which they justify their verdict that his tendency is unhealthy. The "Lotos-eaters" may be taken as a specimen of this class; they have been ably characterized as "studies by the artist in one colour." The poet has not yet reached his highest region; he is still struggling; and with the restlessness there ever and anon comes deep yearning for rest and fixity of being.

This seeming melancholy is a proof of the depth and intensity of his mind, which no easy commonplaces respecting the mystery of life can satisfy; and must not he who has felt deepest be always the truest and best teacher? Why have the Psalms of David such marvellous aptitude to teach all generations, but that they are the fullest expressions of the experience of one of the deepest and most poetic minds the world has known? So, if, in some of his works, Tennyson has only stated the need, this of itself is not a small thing; nor is it morbid or unhealthy to proclaim that the soul

will not, cannot be satisfied with the material, that, because, as Bacon says, "It has a more ample greatness;" it is ever crying, "Give, give."

Taking the collected pieces as a whole, we challenge comparison with Longfellow to show wherein he has more health in the tone and tendency of his poetry than Tennyson; for in the minor pieces or ballads of the latter there lives a power most marked; we need hardly refer to the "Gardener's Daughter," the "Miller's Daughter," "Clara Vere de Vere," the "Lord of Burleigh," as proofs of this; for even in the quaint conceits of the "Day Dream" we read such lines as these:—

"To sleep through terms of mighty wars,
And wake on science grown to move,
On secrets of the brain, the stars,
As wild as aught of fairy love;
And all that else the years will show,
The Poet-forms of stronger hours,
The vast Republics that may grow,
The Federations and the Powers;
Titanic forces, taking birth
In divers seasons, divers climes."

But it is objected by our opponents that Tennyson is not fraternal and warm-hearted; that his sympathies are with some far-off romance which attracts his notice, rather than the every-day life around him; we reply that to admit him to be a great and true poet, and then expect his genius to be "cribbed, cabined, and confined" by our notions, is to contradict all nature, which will bestow its gifts in its own way. We believe that the poet whose teachings have to be brought out as hidden gems will be more useful to his fellows than he who aims directly to stimulate them. We have little faith in what is termed practical poetry, which is ever striving to reach men through giving expression to their ordinary thoughts, rather than influencing them by glorious examples. Nor is Tennyson's devotion to the romance of Arthur the idle and fruitless thing some would fain persuade us; to him his hero is no myth of the past, but a living exemplar who has ever his message to all men; for, in his earlier devotion to him, as in "*Morte d'Arthur*," he tells us,—

"Arthur is come again: he cannot die;
Come again, and thrice as fair;
Come with all good things, and war shall be no more."

Arthur, too, was an image for all time; through the poem just noticed he answers some of the querulous lamentations of the present about the past, when he makes the grand old king in his last words say,—

"The old order changeth, yielding place to new,
And God fulfils himself in many ways,
Lest one good custom should corrupt the world."

And he adds,—

“More things are wrought by prayer than this world dreams of.”

Our opponents have disputed the Laureate's claim to healthy teaching on the ground of a lack of earnestness and vigour; they have asked for a counterpart of the “Psalm of Life” and “Excelsior,” and have affirmed they exist not in Tennyson's poems; they must surely have forgotten those wondrous political lyrics which have been before men for years, in which there breathes a wisdom unmatched by anything Longfellow has yet given to the world. In them political philosophy has been wedded most happily to the poetic form; for the poet has no shallow love of country and friends; he dwells there, rather than in more gorgeous regions, because

“It is the land that freemen till,
That sober-suited Freedom chose,
The land where, girt with friends or foes,
A man may speak the thing he will.

“A land of settled government,
A land of just and old renown,
Where Freedom broadens slowly down
From precedent to precedent.”

Hence he glories in his great position as a modern citizen in such a land, and sings:—

“Of old sat Freedom on the heights,
The thunders breaking at her feet;
Above her shook the starry lights,
She heard the torrents meet.

“There in her place she did rejoice,
Self-gathered in her prophet mind;
But fragments of her mighty voice
Came rolling on the wind.

“Then step't she down thro' town and
field,
To mingle with the human race,
And part by part to men reveal'd
The fulness of her face.

“Grave mother of majestic works,
From her isle-altar gazing down,
Who, God-like, grasps the triple forks,
And, King-like, wears the crown.

“Her open eyes desire the truth;
The wisdom of a thousand years
Is in them. May perpetual youth
Keep dry their light from tears;

“That her fair form may stand and shine,
Make bright our days, and light our
dreams,
Turning to scorn, with lips divine,
The falsehood of extremes!”

But in the longer poem, “Love thou thy land,” there is a majestic display of power which has seldom been equalled. In it he probes the want and need of his age, the lack of reverent heed for and consistency to truth, which too greatly marks the knowledge of the time.

“Make knowledge circle with the winds,
But let her herald, Reverence, fly
Before her, to whatever sky
Bear seed of men, and growth of minds.”

Every verse might be quoted to show how full of ripest wisdom and experience it is; the warning against working for place; depending on mere watchwords; the blessed trust that the right shall not always be won through blood,—

"Certa'n, if knowledge bring the sword,
That knowledge takes the sword away;"

and finally, the marvellous close in which the result of all the ages' strife and work is declared,—

"To-morrow yet would reap to-day,
As we bear blossom of the dead;
Earn well the thrifty montha, nor wed
Raw Haste, half-sister to Delay."

The next era in the development of Tennyson's mind is that marked by "The Princess." He has reached a certain position where the fierceness of the old struggle is past, and as yet the new problems before him are not started. He has now taken that place which, amid all subsequent variations, he holds firmly, as the poet of woman; he has seen that the relation of the sexes, their mutual power and influence, is one perplexing enigma, which presses especially on the present era, and hence he essays some solution of it, knowing that in so doing he is also doing most for man. The result of his study is summed in that magnificent passage, commencing,—

"For woman is not undevelop't man, but diverse."

Having completed this task, he next appears before us in a totally new phase of being; the mystery of death has opened up before him the whole problem of human existence; there is now an end to the even flow and philosophic spirit of "The Princess;" questions deep, vast, awful in their significance, press his spirit; he has lost communion with one of earth's fairest growths, a young man of *such* powers, that those who knew him best, tell us Tennyson in nowise has overdrawn or idolized his character, when in those matchless lines he describes him as

"Heart affluence in discursive talk
From household fountains never dry,
The critic clearness of an eye
That saw through all the Muses' walk;

"Seraphic intellect, and force
To throw the doubts of man;
Impassioned logic, which outran
The hearer in its fiery course.

"High nature, amorous of the good,
But touched with no ascetic gloom,

And passion pure in snowy bloom
Through all the years of April blood.

"A love of freedom rarely felt,
Of freedom in her regal seat
Of England; not the schoolboy heat.
The blind hysterics of the Celt.

"And manhood fused with female grace
In such a sort, the child would twine
A trustful hand, unasked, in thine,
And find his comfort in thy face." *

* For a review of the privately published works of A. H. Hallam, see the *North British Review*, in Vol. for 1852.

This poem, libelled as morbid and melancholy, has about it a glory which of itself would establish the claim of Tennyson to healthiest power; there is first the crushing sense of sorrow, blinding the spirit by its agony to all else; next the stage of terrible doubt, as to what the issue of such sorrow shall be, both to him who feels it, and to him who is removed. In this stage he forces his way through darkest doubt, into fullest and richest sunlight, where he sees the spiritual glory of the universe, and gives forth sentiments at once sublime in their mental, as they are most truthful in their religious aspect. He has found the truth, not in any abstract form, but in its glorified impersonation, as the "Strong Son of God, Immortal Love;" hence he can say,—

"If e'er when faith had fall'n asleep,
I heard a voice, 'Believe no more,'
And heard an ever-breaking shore
That tumbled in the Godless deep;

"A warmth within the breast would melt
The freezing reason's colder part,
And like a man in wrath, the heart
Stood up and answered, 'I have felt.'"

Compared with Longfellow's "Footsteps of Angels," this work will fully establish the claim of our Laureate to as high, if not a higher place in the literature of the heart.

The publication of "In Memoriam" indicated that its author was once more roused to action, and was pluming his wings for further flight; which he soon proved by the issue of that much-maligned and misunderstood tragedy "Maud," of which we have a most excellent estimate in a recent periodical, the writer observing: *—"The blending of styles in it shows at least one thing, that the poet has reached a stand-point from which he can disregard that mere outward beauty, that smooth and rich melody, which seemed the chief object of his earliest works. He has found there is something higher than beauty, and that is truth."

Unsatisfactory as seemed the progress of the poet indicated by "Maud," there was demonstrated by it, as by "The Princess," an aim and ideal which he had set before himself to reach and fulfil, and what Bacon intimates by "Poesy feigneth acts and events greater and more heroic than in history."

High ideals wrought out into beautiful and glorious forms, and clothed as to appeal to all the parts of man's nature, being the great need of our race; and the mission of the poet being, in his matured strength, to supply such need; we wonder not finally to find Tennyson, in all the greatness and goodness of his experience, turning again to those old romantic springs where his earlier steps had been directed, and from the rich, national legends of Arthur and his knights and ladies, creating those poems which are only

now beginning to be understood. In our previous remarks, we have had to regard Tennyson and his teaching as comparatively incomplete, not because there was any inherent want, but that such high promise and aim was in them displayed, that we could not but be left after their study in the attitude of anticipation of other and fuller utterances. So much has been and is being said on the wondrous power manifested in the "Idylls of the King," that we feel that there is little need here to expatiate either on their beauty or tendency; suffice to say, we have in them more than a fulfilment of the great promise their author had previously given; his artistic power is richer and fuller, his social wisdom more matured, his old devotion to the aspects of womanhood further developed, and withal a deep spiritual and religious insight into the power and requirements of our nature, which leave the careful student with but one conclusion, that a true national poet is giving expression to heart-views on the greatest of themes, under the sweetest guise of ancient myth and romance.

Superficial as our estimate and criticism is, we yet hope thoughts have been hinted at, which, if fairly carried to a conclusion, will induce all candid students of the question under debate, unhesitatingly to give an affirmative reply to it, and so admit to his true place the Greatheart who teaches his age that it should have unswerving trust in

"That God which ever lives and loves,
One God, one law, one element,
And one far-off Divine event,
To which the whole creation moves."

ANGLO-SAXON.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

POETA nascitur, non fit. Such is the ancient dictum, and recent times and experiences tend to establish more firmly its truthfulness.

A modern poet has beautifully expressed this idea in a Christian form, telling us that

"Poetry is itself a thing of God;
He made His prophets poets, and the more
We feel of poetry do we become
Like God in love and power—under makers."

We have read the previous portions of this debate with much pleasure, and although the inherent interest of the question itself were sufficient to command the careful attention of all interested in the healthy character of English literature, the admirable essays given by previous writers have gathered around the question additional pleasures, and not the least is our present pleasure of participating in the friendly conflict upon the points at issue. We were much pleased with the pro-Tennyson paper of B. S., p. 241, *et seq.*; and

we regret that we could not find in it any application to the healthiness or contrary tendencies of either poet; indeed, B. S. himself has some conviction of its want of connection with the subject, for he says, p. 249, "We fear that some of our readers may think that we have wandered from our professed theme, and treated them to a very dry discussion." 'Tis true he had wandered from his theme. Yet had the question been the poet and his work, or the nature of poetry and the character of the poet in its widest sense, so as to include all poets and all poetry, the paper of B. S. would have been far from dry and uninteresting; but so far as its applicability to the tendencies of Tennyson's or Longfellow's poetry is concerned, it is dry, uninteresting, and completely *hors de combat*. Our aim is, by the terms of the debate, limited to one point,—the comparative healthiness of the poetry of our two authors. The form in which it is proposed necessarily implies that both are great poets,—accomplished masters of the musical concatenation of our English vocabulary. It is not for us to discuss which is the most happy in his choice of measures with which to beautify his work. The mechanical part of poetry, so to speak, is admitted to be in the hands of two highly accomplished masterly artists. Indeed, it were an absurdity to apply the comparative terms healthy or unhealthy to the mere orderly collocation of melodious sounds.

It is alleged that a certain order or arrangement of sounds may produce joy or sadness, love or hatred, and many shades of these principal passions or emotions of the mind; but if we narrowly search into the springs or motive powers in which these emotions have their source, we shall find them rather in some subjectivity of the individual, some ideas existing in the mind of the individual which are in accord or discord with the objective sounds impinging upon his sensorium, through the medium of the sense of hearing, and that the efficient cause does not reside in the objective sounds themselves. Were the cause of these emotions purely objective, no variation could possibly be experienced in their effects; and a purely uniform taste and rule of criticism must prevail throughout the whole family of man. Thus the uncivilized and barbarous savage and the most cultivated poet and musician would be equally moved by the same order of sounds, and equally good judges of purity and beauty in poetry and music, the absurdity of which is at once apparent. We might here dismiss the entire paper of B. S. in the April number of the *Controversialist*, as fully and fairly refuted, and proved to be unconnected with the question at issue; but *ex sui oro* we hope to show the fallacy of his advocacy of Tennyson. *En passant* we may notice one of many contradictions to be found in the papers of B. S. On p. 243 he says,—“The poet, though he may convey information, and may argue or persuade, always aims at intellectual pleasure.” Then, in the succeeding sentence, he continues, speaking of poetry, the work of the poet, “It is a species of composition which has for its object the creation of intellectual pleasure, by addressing primarily the imagination and feelings

rather than the intellect." Here are two assertions of a contrary character, one asserting that poetry is addressed to the intellect, and the other that it is not addressed to the intellect. What confidence can be placed in conclusions drawn from such a course of reasoning?

Throughout the first paper of B. S. he has laboured to show that "*as a poet, the poet's object is to give us intellectual pleasure, and to do so in metrical or musical language. As a man highly endowed, his object ought to be to make this poetic power tend to the doing good and increasing of wisdom.*" In these words we have the sum of B. S.'s philosophy; as a poet, excellence consists in power to communicate intellectual pleasure. Now, our present concern is with these two authors as poets. B. S. gives us the *dictum*, that as such they must be judged by their power to communicate intellectual pleasure. Man being a moral agent, the influence of one man or one mind upon another must be judged as to its healthiness or unhealthiness by moral considerations alone, not by intellectual pleasures; in fact, the terms healthy and unhealthy are perfectly inapplicable to man in any question of this kind, excepting only as to his moral nature; to suppose the contrary is absurd. Let us try to conceive of joy or sorrow, love or hatred, or any secondary emotion, being capable of production as intellectual pleasures, and we find that it is only so far as such passions or emotions are morally right that they are pleasures of an healthy character. It is then a fallacy for B. S. to assume that he is right in judging Tennyson to be more healthy in the tendencies of his poetry, because, as he alleges, it gives more intellectual pleasure. Moreover, B. S. affirms that the poet,—that is, Tennyson,—"*as a man highly endowed, his object ought to be to make his poetic power tend to the doing of good and increasing of wisdom.*" Here B. S. makes the healthy tendencies of his poetry to consist not in his work as a poet, but in his nature as a man highly endowed,—another fallacy, evidencing that B. S. has thought and argued quite foreign from the question in debate.

B. S. having been at considerable pains, as shown in the passages to which we have referred, to prove that as a poet intellectual pleasure is the true test of healthy tendency and excellency in his poetry, he proceeds, in his second paper, p. 395, to remark,—"*It is our duty now, therefore, to judge between Longfellow and Tennyson as poets or metrical artists, whose first object is to gain our ear with the melody of their words, to fill the imagination with the beauty and grandeur of the creations of their genius, to wield our passions and emotions, and to engage the mind with their subtle thoughts.* Having thus gauged their power of influence, we shall have next to ascertain the way in which they have used that power; for all resulting moral influence is a combination of the active power and moral quality of the influence actually exerted. With reference to the first point, the comparative merits of Tennyson and Longfellow as poets, our present share in such a comparison may be

dismissed *currente calamo*. . . . But, in the present case, we have merely to do with the conclusion to be drawn from such a comparison."

Surely the *sang froid* with which B. S. treats his readers is most remarkable. After having laboured through about thirteen pages to make an intellectual comparison of our two authors, he says plainly it has nothing to do with the present question at all, although very interesting *per se*, and consequently it may be dismissed *currente calamo*.

B. S. says, p. 398,—“We have therefore arrived at the conclusion that, metrically, artistically, and intellectually, Tennyson is the greater. In fact, his poetic faculties and mental endowments place him above Longfellow.” This decision we hold to be an affirmative reply to the question in debate, but B. S. has also said, p. 395,—“We shall have to ascertain the way in which they have used that (poetic) power; for all resulting moral influence is a combination of the active power and moral quality of the influence actually exerted;” and at the same time he dismisses with a “flying pen” the metrical, artistical, and intellectual comparison of the two poets; thus in one sentence making an intellectual comparison the subject of debate; in another, dismissing this mode of handling the question; in a third, claiming the moral mode of treating it; and in a fourth, arriving at the conclusion that the debate has been proved affirmatively for Tennyson, on intellectual and artistic grounds. Really such logical versatility entitles B. S. to more than chameleon honours, and we doubt not the readers of this serial will accord them with acclamation.

Space forbids our entering at further length into an analysis of the fallacies of B. S. Having indicated a few of them, we place them before the reader as a chart to guide him through the shoals and quicksands of false logic and rhetoric exhibited by that writer. In conclusion, we cannot refrain from referring to the definition of poetry, given by “L'Ouvrier,” p. 403, as the correct canon by which to judge of the comparative merits of the two poets, in the form that question is given for our consideration in this debate.

Having shown that B. S. has not proved Tennyson to be the most healthy in the tendency of his poetry, we by implication prove that Longfellow's poetry is the most healthy. *Verbum sat sapienti*.

DELTA.

History.

WAS JOAN OF ARC AN IMPOSTOR?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

THE consideration of a question like this is full of interest to all students of history, as well as to all lovers of the wild and marvellous. In inquiring into the pretensions and in endeavouring to

estimate the character of Joan of Arc, we have not only to do with her individually, but with the circumstances by which she was surrounded, and with the age in which she lived. It is difficult, under ordinary circumstances, to discover the mainspring motives even of those who are associated with us in common enterprises and in everyday life: how far more difficult, then, must it be rightly to estimate the character and conduct of those who lived in distant ages and in foreign lands! And of all persons who have figured in history, few have been the subject of so much controversy as "the Maid of Orleans." It has been, therefore, with great interest that we have perused the articles in this serial on the question, "Was Joan of Arc an impostor?"

In taking part in this discussion, it is important distinctly to understand the meaning of the principal terms employed, and we therefore naturally inquire, "What is understood by the word impostor?" "L'Ouvrier," in his opening affirmative article, declares his belief that Joan was an impostor, "or one who pretended to that which was not, *quod erat demonstrandum*." G. A. H. E., the opening negative writer, declares, in dictionary phrase, that "an impostor is a deceiver." Thus far all is clear; but "Bennett," the second negative writer, now steps forth to darken "counsel by words without knowledge." To the inquiry, "What is an imposition?" he replies, "an acted or unacted lie;" and therefore an impostor is one who speaks or acts out a falsehood. But "Bennett," seeing that this definition will not support the position he is anxious to take, attempts to improve upon it, and goes on to say, "Deception, so as to render the deceiver amenable, cannot be perpetrated unconsciously, and in the fact that he *knows* he *deceives* lies the *guilt* of the *action*." What this reference to amenability or guilt has to do with the real question at issue we are at a loss to imagine, although we quite understand the purpose our friend wishes it to serve. But he proceeds to observe,—“To form a true case of imposition, fully carried out, the impostor must be cognizant that he is falsifying the facts, while the party imposed upon believes that the truth is being communicated; and that this state of consciousness is the effect of representations made by the deceiving party.” According to this theory, truth is subjective, rather than objective; and has little reference to any existences or varied relationships, or eternal realities! The moment, therefore, that a man believes an error, it loses all its evil, and thus the blind emissaries of falsehood become the glorious apostles of truth! Thus our friend "Bennett" wishes to take under his kindly care those weak ones who first having imposed upon them, succeed in deluding others; and begs that they may not be considered as *impostors*, lest it should wound their feelings, or those of their dupes!

The question now naturally arises, What were the pretensions of Joan of Arc, and in what way did she seek to impose upon her followers? And we answer—By declaring that she held intercourse with angelic beings, and that she had received Divine authority and

power to accomplish certain objects. "From the age of thirteen or fourteen, Jeanne d'Arc was subject to frequent hallucinations of the organs of sight, hearing, and smell. Luminous trains of surpassing brilliancy, and visions of angels, were seen by her at noon-day. Strange voices were heard by her when she imagined she was quite alone; and fragrant odours were perceived by her when some of her spiritual visitors made their appearance. She had communication and councils with angels; visits from the archangel Michael, the angel Gabriel, St. Catherine, and St. Marguerite."*

"Jeanne d'Arc, by her own account (to her judges), had reached her thirteenth year, when she heard, for the first time, the voice (*la voix*) which announced to her that France would be saved by her!"†

She solemnly asserted and steadfastly maintained that those angelic beings frequently appeared to her, and spoke to her; that she saw them, not with the eyes of the imagination, but with her corporal eyes; that she only acted in conformity with their counsels; that she had never said nor undertaken anything of importance without their directions.

Now, are these statements true or are they false? or, in other words, was Joan an impostor? In the words of the "Imperial Dictionary," "a religious impostor may be one who assumes the character of a preacher without authority; or *one who falsely pretends to an extraordinary commission from heaven.*" The latter was Joan's case, and hence our verdict is against her. The coolness with which our opponents dispose of Joan's claims to the supernatural is certainly amusing. G. A. H. E. says, "she began to fancy that she saw visions, and "Bennett" boldly declares that she was "self-deceived." Alas! poor Joan, as appropriate now thy prayer might be, "Save me from my friends," as it once was, "Deliver me from my enemies."

Here we feel we might without impropriety close our remarks, were there not some who still believe that "the *pucelle*" derived her inspirations from God; and as it is possible that some such may be among our readers, we will briefly state the reasons which lead us to the opposite conclusion.

I. We reject much that is recorded of Joan of Arc. Our opponents do the same. The two negative writers in this debate have each given a brief outline of her career, but they take care to omit some of the records respecting her, the statements in which are as well attested as many they have endorsed. In this they remind us of the old woman who is reported to have said, "Well, son John, and what wonderful things did you meet with all the time you were at sea?" "Oh! mother," replied John, "I saw many strange things." "Tell us all about them," replied his mother, "for I long to hear your adventures." "Well, then," said John, "as we were sailing over the Line, what do you think we saw?" "I can't imagine," replied his mother. "Well, we saw a fish rise out of the sea, and

* Madden, "Phantasmata," vol. ii. p. 26.

† Quicherat, "Aperçus Nouveaux," p. 1.

fly over our ship!" "Oh! John! John! what a liar you are!" said his mother, shaking her head, and smiling incredulously. "True as death!" said John; "and we saw still more wonderful things than that." "Let us hear them," said his mother, shaking her head again; "and tell the truth, John, if you can." "Believe it, or believe it not, as you please," replied her son; "but as we were sailing up the Red Sea, our captain thought he should like some fish for dinner; so he told us to throw our nets, and catch some." "Well," inquired his mother, seeing that he paused in his story. "Well," rejoined her son, "we *did* throw them, and, at the very first haul, we brought up a chariot wheel, made all of gold, and inlaid with diamonds!" "Lord bless us!" said his mother; "and what did the captain say?" "Why, he said it was one of the wheels of Pharaoh's chariot, that had lain in the Red Sea ever since that wicked king was drowned, with all his host, while pursuing the Israelites." "Well, well," said his mother, lifting up her hands in admiration; "now that's very possible, and I think the captain was a very sensible man. Tell me such stories as *that*, and I'll believe you!; but never talk to me of such things as flying fish! No, no, John; such stories won't go down with me, I can assure you." In many respects our opponents appear to resemble the old lady, for they are ready to credit only that which their previous reading has prepared them for, and they ignore such "well attested" statements as the following:—One of her contemporaries, Percival Sieur de Boulourmak, in a letter to the Duke of Milan, written June 13th, 1429, says, that at her birth "an extraordinary and unaccountable exultation was manifested throughout the village. The people ran from house to house rejoicing, they knew not why, and "*se demandaient ce qu'il y avait de nouveaux*." Another contemporary, "*Le Bourgeois de Paris*," says, "The cocks crew with unusual vehemence on this occasion, and there was something too in the time that was remarkable—it was the night of the Epiphany of our Lord. And when she was a little girl, the birds of the woods and the fields came when she called them to eat the bread out of her lap!" During the time Joan of Arc was at the town of Lagne-sur-Marne we are gravely told that "the corpse of a still-born infant was brought into the church. Some young women of the town came there when the *pucelle* was at her devotions, and begged the latter to join them in their prayers that God might restore the infant to life, in order that it might be baptized. Jeanne joined them in their prayers. Happily, after praying some time, the infant yawned several times, made some movement, returned, it is stated, to its natural colour, and was baptized, but died shortly after." If, as we presume, the majority of the supporters of Joan of Arc will reject these statements as fabulous, they must not be surprised if we do the same with all that are not consistent in themselves, or in harmony with the general experience of mankind.

II. Joan of Arc frequently acted inconsistently with her assumed Divine mission. She was unsuccessful in many of her later enter-

prises; she failed in them where success was not only confidently expected but boldly predicted by her. During her captivity in the fortress of Beaurevoir she leaped from the summit of that tower, a height not much under sixty feet, and death therefore being more probable than deliverance. And finally, in the hope of escaping death, she signed a retraction, in which she accuses herself of having acted in violation of the sacred Scriptures and the laws of the church, of having simulated apparitions, to have done wrong in assuming man's attire, and adopting the profession of arms.*

III. There was nothing in the military exploits of Joan of Arc that cannot be accounted for on rational principles. When we remember the age in which she lived, the ignorance of the people, the superstitious feelings which her assumed character therefore excited, we see nothing in her successes to surprise us. That it was this that excited the enthusiasm of her followers, and struck terror into her foes, the negative writers in this debate frankly acknowledge; and on the latter point the evidence of our historian Hume is conclusive. Speaking of the English army, he says,—“Men enlisted slowly or soon deserted, by reason of the wonderful accounts which had reached England of *the magic and sorcery and diabolical power of the Maid of Orleans.*”†

IV. The claims of Joan of Arc to supernatural guidance are seldom admitted by those best qualified to form a judgment. To the honour of the French nation let it be said that she was never regarded as a saint by them. Voltaire in his writings reduced her memory to the lowest level. The Abbé Langlet Fresnoy, in his “*Histoire de Jeanne D'Arc,*” says—“To think that this girl had visions, apparitions, and revelations, I do not at all believe. I abandon this pious belief to persons of a less stubborn turn of mind than mine. But for these apparitions I substitute an interior persuasion, a reflective meditation, which strikes, which animates, and strongly agitates the imagination; and it is the effort of this last faculty which often represents to us as real, objects which are simple images which we picture to ourselves.” Shakespeare, that great discernor of human character, paints her in the blackest colours, and designates her

“A goodly prize, fit for the devil's grace.”

We might, did time and space permit, go on to speak of other impostors, who put forth similar claims to those of Joan of Arc; and of some who, after her execution, personified her, and were declared by her own brothers to be their sister Joan. Such facts as these show the credulity of the age, and account for the ready acceptance given to marvellous stories and monstrous pretensions; but we close in the full belief that sufficient has been advanced by us to support the views of “*L'Ouvrier*” and S. F. T., and to prove that Joan was an impostor.

A. J.

* Quicherat, “*Procès,*” t. i. p. 447.

† “*History of England,*” by Hume, ch. xx. regn. Henry VI. A.D. 1429.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

IN writing of the motives which influenced the great of bygone days, it is very necessary to bring, if possible, before the "mind's eye," a picture of things as they then existed.

"L'Ouvrier" has so ably painted the picture, that we are prepared, for the most part, to endorse his sketch, although we do not, from the same premises, draw like conclusions.

France *was* divided by contending factions; the people *were* enveloped in "the thick darkness of superstition and ignorance;" and they would, no doubt, hail with delight anything calculated to give peace to "their troubled and wasted countries;" and when the desolation had reached its height,—when it seemed necessary to strike but one blow to paralyze and destroy the power of France, —a deliverer arose in the simple peasant maid, Joan of Arc. Was she an impostor? Most unhesitatingly we answer—No.

Before proceeding to demonstrate this, let us glean a few particulars of her life.

Born in Domremi, of peasant parents, she shared in their rustic labours, receiving no other education than the lessons of simple piety. "The district was remarkable for the simplicity of manners and devotion of the people, but not less so for superstition, and the prevalent belief in visions and supernatural appearances." The curse of faction had reached even to that remote district, and the children of Domremi, which was Armagnac, used to pelt with stones those of the next village, which was Bourguignon.

The news of the cruel war that was desolating France was brought by the passing traveller to the quiet marches of Lorraine. Joan, who was famed for her piety, heard these tales of horror, and the miseries of the land became mixed with her dreams of heaven. She spent much of her time among the hills, tending flocks, and musing in solitude over the wondrous legends of saints and virgin martyrs. There was an old prophecy that France, after being ruined by a wicked woman, should be restored by a spotless virgin. It required no great stretch of imagination to fix the character of the destroyer on Queen Isabella. Joan believed herself called to be the virgin deliverer. "Her ardent imagination (says 'L'Ouvrier') converted the thoughts and desires of her heart into suggestions from a higher spiritual sphere;" and yet he concludes by branding her an impostor!

"An imposition ('Bennett' has well said) is not an accident, but an idea; something thought of and brought to bear upon the accident." The impostor must be aware she is deceiving, or she is not an impostor: now "L'Ouvrier" tacitly consents to her *believing in her mission*, but objects to the idea that she was inspired. Granting she was not inspired, we would ask, if she believed herself to be commanded by heaven, was she an impostor? We think not. She might be self-deceived, but not knowingly a deceiver, and, therefore, not an impostor.

"Joan was possessed naturally of an ardent temperament, and needed only an incentive to develop her powers. Patriotism was the incentive which did this. She saw some and heard more of her country's ills. Being of a pious character, no doubt she prayed to the saints that these wrongs might be avenged. Being of a highly imaginative disposition, and surrounded as she was by all that would conduce to its development, she fancied she had Divine communications; she thought much about them, dreamed of them, and at last they became to her as realized facts. She told them to others, and they disbelieved her, but the very sincerity of her own belief made her persevere, and finally succeed in performing that which she believed herself commanded to do."

Is there anything of the impostor to be found in such conduct as this, or rather is there not here patriotism exhibited to our gaze? Because she was *not* "born to blush unseen," conclude ye that she was an impostor? Then say all are impostors who believe they are able to help a suffering country, and who, although they be weak, yet by perseverance do it. One is as logical as the other?

We are not among those who believe her to have been inspired, but we think we may fairly assume that she implicitly believed herself so to be; that she had no intention to deceive, but that she wished to perform the mission to free her country, which she believed God had confided to her charge. A monomaniac she may have been, and it would be both logical and charitable to suppose her one, but not an impostor.

The following positions have been held by most modern historians:—1. "That there was no supernatural agency in the case, though Joan thoroughly believed that there was. 2. That her heated imagination, acted upon by the miseries of France, by current superstitions, and aided by a peculiar temperament of body, raised the visions she saw, and the voices she heard. 3. That her object was pure and glorious, entitling her in all ages to the name of a patriot and liberator. 4. That there was no previous coalition between Joan and King Charles, or between her and any of the King's friends, though some of the latter wisely determined to make the most of a delusion in which they themselves never believed."

We know that Monstrelet, Du Raillan, and other French historians, brand her as an impostor, and that Voltaire's clever but indecent burlesque of the "*Pucelle*," is against her, but the French, who seem incapable of separating her fanaticism and insanity from her patriotism, or conceiving that she could not be the dupe of her own heated imagination, have generally been rather ungrateful to Joan.

"L'Ouvrier" closes by saying, "Joan of Arc was an impostor, or one who pretended to that which was not."

The writers of the two affirmative articles seem to rest upon this argument,—*because she was not inspired, therefore she was an impostor.* We take it, the question is not, Was Joan of Arc inspired? but,

"Was Joan of Arc an impostor?" i.e., Was she *knowingly* a deceiver? And we say every circumstance of her life goes to prove that she was not an impostor, but that she was imposed on—self-deceived.

S. F. T. says, "We need not go beyond the bounds of our own country to recite the adventures of similar impostors," and then gives, as examples, Lambert Simnel and Parkin. With all deference to S. F. T., we contend the cases are not analogous.

Lambert Simnel well knew he was lying; he did not believe himself what he was represented to be; he did not think a higher Power was using him as an instrument. Ambition was his motive power, and the hope of a crown that which sustained his imposture. The same argument will apply to Parkin. How different the case of Joan of Arc! When the siege of Orleans had been raised, and the King had been crowned at Rheims, she believed her mission fulfilled, and desired to retire to her birthplace, with no reward save that which a good conscience afforded, for having done what she considered her duty.

Happy had it been for her, if she could have followed the bent of her inclination! Far brighter would have shone the page of France's history! But, no; the patriot and liberator must still lead on to victory, and at last be rewarded by a horrible and ignominious death. Men of the country which she had delivered would one day be ready to find her guilty of being a "heretic, apostate, and idolater," and condemn her to be burnt.

Among the black spots in the history of France, this remains indelible,—a foul libel on Christianity, civilization, and humanity.

She was burnt; and the gentle maid's soul took its departure to the realms of the blest, murmuring, as it left its tenement of clay, the name of Jesus, her Redeemer.

W. H. P.

The Essayist.

GIOVANNI BATTISTA NICCOLINI,

THE PATRIOT-POET OF FLORENCE.

ON the 20th of April, Victor Emmanuel, King of Sardinia, received from the hands of its author a presentation copy of a tragedy, prescribed some seventeen years ago by every sovereign State of Italy. The compliments of a monarch rang and sounded sweetly strange in the ears of the poet, whose heartiest welcome from the powers that be had hitherto been—a curse. The author bore the weight of eighty winters on his head. He was Italy's greatest living tragic writer—Niccolini—and the book was—"Arnoldo da Brescia." Are we wrong in supposing that our readers would like to know something of this

man and of this book—the patriot-dramatist of Florence, and his most marked and most remarkable production? We fancy not; and in this, to us, pleasing fancy we shall proceed to tell what we know. Should there be any imperfection of details, some other writer may perchance supply our errors of omission—of our sins of commission we shall, of course, bear the sole blame.

In the city of Daate, within hearing of the hum of Arno's waters, in Florence, where

"Repose
 Angeh's, Alfieri's bones; and his,
 The starry Galileo's, with his woes;
 Where Macehiavelli's earth returned to whence it rose,"—

Niccolini—a worthy inheritor of the glory of its ancient time—was born in 1780. His boyhood was passed among whisperings of Reform in his own country, and the sounds of Revolution from France. He was but a youth when the troops of Napoleon marched into Italy, when the Republic was acknowledged by his sovereign, and excommunicated by the Pope. Scarcely a year of manhood had been passed before the Italian Republic was proclaimed; and the year thereafter, 1803, Alfieri—the founder of the noble and masculine-spirited drama of modern Italy, severe, simple, rigid, and classical—died, and had his dust laid to rest within the church of Santa Croce. At this time Niccolini was a student in the celebrated university of Florence, founded in 1438, where he became an illustrious humanist, and gained some repute as a Greek scholar. In 1805, Italy became a kingdom, of which Napoleon I. wore the crown; and Niccolini, as well as others, became dazzled—if not deceived—by the splendour of the cometic career of that great military despot. In 1811 the King of Rome was born; and in the same year Niccolini—fresh from his collegiate draughts from the vintages of Greek and Roman learning—made his earliest effort on the stage in the tragedy of "Polyxena"—a work which, in grand simplicity and purity of conception, in classic unity of action, in intense power, pathos, and sentiment, in exquisite antiqueness, has had few rivals among the first attempts of modern dramatists.

The plot is trite, yet highly wrought by simple agencies. Polyxena, daughter of Priam, in the division of the captives taken at Troy, falls to the lot of Pyrrhus, her father's murderer, as Cassandra does to Agamemnon. Pyrrhus loves her, and is loved by her; but the gods have decreed that the Greeks shall not return to their native land, till one of the daughters of Priam has been sacrificed by him who is nearest and dearest. Piety and love strive for mastery; and at last the *dénouement* is accomplished by Polyxena, ashamed of her love, precipitating herself upon the sword which Pyrrhus has uplifted to strike the prophet Calchas. Destiny is appeased; and the curtain falls. Twice thereafter did he adopt those subjects which Italy has resolved to consider fitted to the tragic muse—classical events—in his "Medea," and "Ino e Temisto;" but a higher purpose took

possession of his soul, and he determined "*celebrare domestica facta*"—to find in the national history, and even in his own time, a topic for the stage. Allegory is a figure of rhetoric with which, perforce, the Italians are familiarized; and there are few hearts and minds that do not beat and think behind a veil. This masquerade of thought is in Italy considered legitimate and laudable; for the *spy* is abroad instead of the schoolmaster, and the superintendence of the State is widely and actively exercised. After the capture of Paris, and the fall of Napoleon, Niccolini produced the tragedy of "Nabucco" (Nebuchadnezzar), and under the forms of Persian life and Scriptural history dramaticized in reality the times of the Revolution and the Empire. Nabucco represents Napoleon; Aspene, Caulaincourt; Arsace, Carnôt; Mitranes, chief of the Magi, Pope Pius VII.; Vasti, the Empress-Mother; and Amiti, Maria Louisa. Of the scenes, Babelle means Paris; and the "King's Palace" is St. Cloud. The period of this dramatic Napoleoniad is the interval between the battle of Leipsic, 1813, and the capture of Paris, 1814. There are many passages of moment in this play, *e. g.*:—Amiti says of the war between Darius (who is the representative of the Austrian Emperor) and Nabucco:—

" In me each prayer
Is sin: I must be now a faithless wife,
Or else a loveless child."

Nabucco asserts of Mitranes:—

" I can nor slay this pontiff nor revere him.
He has been too submissive for respect;
And yet much too resistant for contempt."

Arsace tells Nabucco in the Senate-hall,—

" I, who in the ranks
Have fought, have seen thee general and soldier,
And on the field of battle have admired
As at a God in arms;—enthroned I hate thee."

Like most historic plays, this is rather a succession of scenes than a regularly consecrated and united whole; but the cunning deceptiveness of reproducing the present in the past is well kept up.

Other national subjects Niccolini chooses. This time from mediæval history. The plot of one is taken from the conspiracy against the French, known as the Sicilian Vespers, under the leadership of *Giovanni di Procida* (1225—1302) from whom the play takes its title. Collusive allusion is here also artfully employed to advocate Italianism and nationalization. The student of Italian history will easily guess the subject and style of "*Antonio Foscari*" and "*Ludovico Sforza*," in both of which there are splendid passages and noble thoughts. These dramas made his fame even amid the memories of Alfieri, and beside the competitive efforts of Monti, Pellico, Foscolo, and Manzoni, disciples of the same school, using history for much the

same end as he—the regeneration of Italy,—and were found by their countrymen to be worthy of becoming sharers in the applause accorded to the efforts of genuine genius.

Shortly after the production of those fruits of study and patriotism. Niccolini was chosen a member of the Academy of La Crusca, and in 1821 delivered an eloquent and elegant address on the occasion of his reception. From this *discorso* we shall give one (translated) sentence, which may be useful, viz.:—"Let our writers employ, above all, clear, determinate words, understood by all, spoken and written by many; let them avoid pedantry and eschew licentiousness; let the rules of our language be unto them as a bridle to guide, not as fetters to enslave; let us avoid the errors of our fathers of the previous century—who bestowed all their attention on the subjects about which they wrote, and not on the words in which they clothed their ideas; as well as the copious verbosity of others, by which it has been observed that the patrimony of human knowledge has not been enriched by one single thought."

A man of weighty speech, of known ability, great learning, and spreading reputation, when a professorship (of history, we think) became vacant in the Academy of Arts, it was little wonder that Niccolini should be appointed to the post. For some time he devoted himself studiously to historical pursuits, and at last determined on claiming a new position in the literature of his country as a historian. He chose as his theme the House of Hohenstauffen, the imperial family of Austria. He laboured long, carefully, and vigorously at this work, but had the ill fortune to be forestalled, in 1841, by Raumer, a German writer of European repute, who took a view widely differing from that of Niccolini—whose work was not published till five years thereafter. In the meanwhile he did not lag in his literary labours. Induced by the criticisms of the *Edinburgh Review*, and the opinion of Lord Byron, to read the splendidly gloomy tragedy of Shelley—"The Cenci,"—he conceived the idea of translating it into Italian. It is, he says, not translated with the timid fidelity of an interpreter, but rather imitated with the daring freedom of a poet. By so doing, he certainly brought that grand, strong drama into greater conformity with classic models; but we cannot believe he has improved it. It is tamed and toned down to a most un-Shelley-like decorum and dulness. The Spinozism of Shelley did not please Niccolini, whose philosophy was more Christian as well as more Dantean.

A Greek play, entitled *Agamennone*, was also prepared, and a discourse on Greek and Italian tragedy was proceeded with, though these were not published till 1844. In the play he is all himself, and in the *discorso* he does not confine himself merely to his text, but branches off into critical disquisitions upon the modern school of the Romantics, and protests against the tendencies of literature indicated by Victor Hugo's "Marion Delorme" and "Lucrece Borgia," Eugene Sue's "Mysteries of Paris," &c., as proving not only the need for a high classical standard and ideal, but also that the imitation of

evil always outstrips the example, as on the contrary the endeavour to equal the good falls short of its aim.

When the ripe age of sixty-three had been attained, the veteran in a happy moment found a subject suitable to his genius, to his time, and to the taste of his countrymen. Mediæval history again afforded him the curtain behind yet through which he might once more

"Show the very age and body of the time,
Its form and pressure."

In 1843 the work was finished, printed at Marseilles, put into circulation, and in a few weeks upwards of three thousand copies were disposed of in Florence alone. Rome and Austria were both aghast, and a thrill shook the Vatican and quivered up through the throne of the Hapsburgs. That work was *Arnoldo da Brescia*, the work which, but a few weeks ago, its author, frail with age, but stout of heart, presented during a high-festival week in his old-storied native city, to the soldier King of Sardinia, while being welcomed by the joy of thousands to his new dominions. It was *then* (1843) at once and rigorously prohibited throughout Italy and Roman Catholic Christendom. The Grand Duke of Tuscany, Leopold II., nominally joined in the proscription, but really connived at its circulation, and Niccolini became the admiration of his townsmen, the delight of his friends, and the abhorrence of the Jesuits. A lick-spittle toady offered his services to Leopold to write down the drama, but he was answered only—yet fittingly—by the silence of contempt. Notices of the work and the sensation it created were sent abroad through many lands, and Niccolini's fame, widening its circle, became European.

The plot of this play is laid in the pontificate (1154-9) of Adrian IV.—Nicholas Breakspere—the only Englishman who ever sat upon the papal chair. While undeniably a historic drama, the time is so fitly chosen that the mere interpretation of the events then passing raises in the heart of the modern Italian an echo of the thoughts and aspirations therein expressed, and stirs and animates to wish, if not to effort, for nationalization. The style is energetic and noble, the plot is simple, and the characters are distinctly drawn, yet with a dash of double meaning which is well kept up, and gives it, to an Italian, an additional charm and an unspeakable beauty.

Arnoldo—a reformer—endeavours to animate the Romans to the resistance of both Pope and Emperor, and to choose rather to become a republican nation. Adrian would gladly but unavailingly gain over Arnoldo to his party. This failing, he forms a hollow truce with the Emperor, and as one of the pledges of the new-born affection between the Holy Father and his most beloved son in God, Adrian asks the capture of Arnoldo. The Emperor delivers him to the prefect of Rome, and he is endunged and slain. This bald outline gives but a faint idea of the power and art of the play. Nor could we well by extract prove the intense interest of

the writing without overstretching the limits of our space, but one or two sentences may be quoted (translated) as specimens rather than as samples. The Pope is called by Arnaldo—

“Tyrant of Time and of Eternity,
Who on the earth usurps Christ's place, and dares—
His foot in the abyss, his head in heaven—
To thunder—impious—forth, ‘The world is mine.’”

In his prison he claims prophetic light, and grandly says:—

“I see the Lombard nations pledge their faith,
And twenty cities, with one heart, unroll
One common standard amid war and flame.
The band of Death prostrate implore God's aid,
And Heaven has heard the oath brave hearts have sworn,
While tyrants pale at the dread sound. I see
His troops around a proud one fall, and then
His standard by strong hands is ta'en. To earth—
Once but a footway for his haughty march—
He sinks, and mid the general carnage seeks
Safety in flight. Beyond the Alps they fly,
Those Germans; and the insatiate eagle trails
Its beak in dust, while o'er their spoil elate,
Enfranchised Italy looks up and smiles.”

Addressing the Pope, in reference to his assertion that he reigns independent of peoples, and is the unseen ruler of the universe, Arnaldo says:—

“Thou dost deceive thyself, oh, Adrian!
The terror of Rome's thunder fades and dies.
Reason unknits the bonds thou'dst aye maintain;
She'll break them, were she but completely roused.
Already human thought has so rebelled,
Thou canst not quell it. Christ calls to thought,
As to the sick man once, ‘Arise and walk!’
'Twill trample thee if thou wilt not go on.
The world has other truths than those proclaimed
From altars; nor will brook a fane which hides
Heaven from its gaze, though fondly seeking it.
Thou wast a shepherd once, become a father now.”

Such are a few of the brave and telling words contained in this magnificent tragedy, even in a weak transfusion into our common English speech. How much more powerful and effective must they be in the copious, spiritual, flexible language of the author! The finest translation is but as a plaster cast from a marble statue. It will at once be seen that Niccolini's tragedies must have had a causative efficacy in bringing about the changes now taking place in Italy. If it be possible to

“Cast, to-day,
A seed into the earth, and it shall bear thee
Flowers such as waved in the Egyptian hair
Of Pharaoh's daughter,”

how can it be otherwise than that the seed-thoughts of a patriot-poet must produce thoughts like in kind to his? It has surely been so in Niccolini's case, else he would scarcely have been chosen as the poet to whom the first word of appreciation of his country's literature was spoken when Florence took holiday to welcome as their king the most popular continental sovereign of our day.

Our readers will perceive that we know more of Niccolini's books than of the man; nay, that we know the man only, or at least mostly, through his books: but we believe our estimate of the literary influence of this author is not overcharged when we say that he is a worthy continuator of the nationalizing influences, *per la gloria e regenerazione d'Italia*, begun by Dante, and passed on from poet to poet, like the light of the torch of truth, which shines the more it is shaken.

There must be hope for Italy while its peoples reverence and cherish Niccolini for his genius, his gifts, his efforts, and his aims.

R. M. A.

The Reviewer.

Exeter Hall Lectures to Young Men. Thirteenth Series. 1860.
London: Nisbet and Co., Berners Street.

THIS volume of lectures is in every respect equal, and in many respects superior, to its excellent predecessors. Apparently without any intention on the part of the lecturers, the subjects selected are of so varied a character, that it would be difficult to find a man who would not be pleased with several of them.

History and biography—those never-failing reservoirs for lecturers—are largely drawn upon, while subjects of a more decidedly religious bearing, and others relating to social ethics, form the staple of this interesting volume. Without being invidious, we think the lecture on “Blaise Pascal,” by Dr. Goulburn, particularly deserving of commendation.

We confidently recommend this volume as likely to be useful to our readers, especially to those who have not much time to spare, and, consequently, none to lose.

The Teacher; his Books, and How to Read Them. A Lecture.
By W. H. GROSER, F.G.S. Sunday School Union, 56, Old Bailey, E.C.

THE advantage of practice over theory is here exemplified in a clear and well-written tractate on an important subject. Although the author is a practical man, he is by no means insensible to the charms of a highly-finished style; and his remarks will, consequently, be read with pleasure as well as profit. He says:—“There are four great libraries in which we may read,—Revelation,

with its golden lines; Nature, with her pictured pages; Literature, with its gaudy bindings; and the chequered folios of Human Life. These are the libraries which the teacher may consult, and grow in knowledge and in wisdom thereby." The subjects, however, upon which he more particularly treats are Reading and Observation. His hints on each of these divisions are sage and pointed, and comprise many valuable suggestions for the intelligent study of the sacred volume. We can express no better wish for the Sunday school cause than that this lecture may be read by ever teacher throughout the country.

England and Missions. By the Rev. F. BOSWORTH, M.A. London: H. J. Tresidder, Ave Maria Lane, E.C.

THIS little work will be found to be a valuable manual of missionary enterprise during the last 100 years. It is written in an easy and intelligent style, and is evidently the result of much research. The object of the author appears to be to invite Christians everywhere to realize their responsibilities in this matter, and to keep pace with the growing demands made upon them for their sympathy and support, in this important sphere of the church's work. The catholic sentiments of the writer, and the neat appearance of the book, are calculated to secure it wide circulation and extensive usefulness.

Inquiry into the Original Language of St. Matthew's Gospel; with Relative Discussions on the Language of Palestine in the time of Christ, and on the Origin of the Gospels. By the Rev. ALEXANDER ROBERTS, M.A. London: S. Bagster and Sons.

THIS is an inquiry which at first sight would seem to be interesting and even possible only to the well-equipped critical student of the Bible; and as it has been carried on, men not qualified by sound knowledge of the sacred languages have been prevented from taking part in it; but the author of the present work has treated the question in so cogent and pleasing a manner, and withal so simply, that none need fear to enter upon it, and all may promise themselves instruction, satisfaction, and delight, in accepting Mr. Roberts as their guide into this important and long-contested region of Scripture criticism. Our author, in his preface, would seem almost to restrict this inquiry, on account of its difficulty, to the learned; but we must repeat that he has handled this hard matter so ably, and has brought it home to every Christian as a vital interest, that all who love the pure Word of God may be refreshed and strengthened by following his argument: and this he has maintained with so little use of Hebrew, Greek, or Latin, that all may see its force. But we will give his own words as to the question itself and its difficulties:—

"Every one at all conversant with Biblical studies knows how keenly the question respecting the original language of St. Matthew's Gospel has been discussed, and how diverse are the conclusions which have been formed regarding it. The question is, indeed, one which is beset with peculiar difficulties, and which demands

no ordinary patience and reflection from those who enter on its consideration. But with all its perplexities, it is a question which must be faced by every critical student of Scripture. It meets him at the very threshold of the New Testament; and he soon perceives that it is not only first in the order in which it occurs, but first, also, in many respects, in the importance which belongs to it. As will fully appear in the following pages, it is an inquiry of the very gravest practical importance. It involves in its settlement some very momentous consequences; and it requires, therefore, not only to be investigated with earnestness, but with a solemn feeling of responsibility and reverence."

That it is "an inquiry of the very gravest practical importance" is thus shown:—If the Gospel of St. Matthew were originally written in Hebrew, then we possess but a *translation*, which we have no means of comparing with the pretended Hebrew original, it being irretrievably lost; and no person being known *ever* to have seen it,—the supposed translator, also, being utterly unknown, and his *version*, in its rendering of quotations from the Old Testament, and its explication of Hebrew customs, &c., being manifestly modified according to his own judgment, the Gospel as we now have it in the Greek cannot be looked upon as inspired, in the highest sense of that word,—and the fact that this *translation*, on insufficient grounds, has been received into the canon, induces some distrust of that authority and universal testimony which have always been considered as decisive of the question of canonicity.

Mr. Roberts commences by giving the opinions that have been held as to the original language of this Gospel. These are three: first, that it was Hebrew only; second, that it was Greek only; third, that it was both Hebrew and Greek. Each of these has a large body of distinguished scholars as its advocates. Our author contends for the "Greek only," and convincingly has he shown that not only is it the safest, but also the only tenable position. He bases his conclusion on *evidence* alone, which, as he says, is alone admissible in questions of this nature. He demands, too, that the *whole evidence* be taken, and that the *internal* should have precedence of the *external*. These principles and methods cannot but commend themselves to every thoughtful reader. Our author then shows, from historical testimony, and from the fact that seven or eight mostly unlettered Jews wrote the other gospels and the epistles to Jews and others in the *Greek* tongue, that Greek must have been the language most generally understood and used throughout Palestine in the time of our Lord and His disciples, and hence infers the extreme likelihood that Matthew also wrote in Greek. This is confirmed by comparison of this Gospel with those of Mark and Luke; our author showing, that on his supposition, the remarkable *coincidences* and *differences* in these three Gospels are accounted for naturally and completely, and that on no other hypothesis have they been satisfactorily disposed of, though several efforts at reconciliation have been made. We have, then, displayed the many difficulties and vast confusion in which they involve themselves who endeavour to account for the origin of the first three Gospels on the supposition of a Urevangelium or original Aramaic

Gospel, or that the Evangelists copied from one another. We have exhibited the famous hypothesis first proposed by Eichhorn, improved by Bishop Marsh, and finally elaborated by Eichhorn again. We must confess that the prolixity and profundity of this scheme are of themselves sufficient to condemn it, and that it is quite a relief to turn from it and other like speculations to our author's very simple but comprehensive and sufficient hypothesis. It is this: "The Lord Jesus Christ SPOKE IN GREEK, and the Evangelists independently narrated His actions and reported His discourses IN THE SAME LANGUAGE which He had Himself employed." This position is made good; and when our author proceeds to notice the occasional use by our Lord of Syro-Chaldaic expressions, which have been hastily seized upon by some as proofs that He usually spoke in this tongue, he shows how naturally this would occur in perfect consistency with the fact that the Saviour's usual language was Greek. He modestly suggests, too, the probable inducements which may have led our Lord in the several instances to recur to the *old* tongue. These suggestions are worthy and pleasing.

That Matthew's Gospel bears no marks in itself of being a translation, but, on the contrary, has every appearance of being an original, and that *all internal* evidence that can be brought to bear on this question is in favour of this, is clearly shown; ample *external* evidence is also adduced that the Greek Gospel was received as genuine close upon the times of the Apostles. After all this, the question may be put in wonder, "What ground can there be for maintaining a contrary hypothesis?" All that can be urged is from *external* evidence alone, and this, when examined, proves to be of a very meagre character. Eusebius, in his History, quotes a saying of Papius, Bishop of Hierapolis, in Phrygia, in the early part of the second century, to the effect that Matthew wrote his Gospel in Hebrew. This saying Mr. Roberts ably criticizes, and shows it to have scarcely any value, especially when it is remembered that it is the saying of one whom Eusebius himself characterizes as *σφόδρα σμικρὸς τὸν νοῦν*: but Papius, being one of the most ancient Fathers, was revered by all who followed him, and his opinion too easily received without question; so that, in truth, the array of testimonies to the fact that this Gospel was originally Hebrew can honestly be reduced to that of a single writer, and he a man "of very poor ability." Mr. Roberts notices, too, Dr. Cureton's much-paraded Syriac Gospels, and shows that they are in all probability a mere copy of the Greek. In his remarks on Dr. Cureton's unguarded professions and assertions we entirely concur.

We sincerely thank Mr. Roberts for throwing so much light on this vexed question. We have derived much pleasure and confidence from reading his book. With him we rejoice and are comforted in the belief that we have the "*ipsissima verba*" of our gracious Lord. We heartily commend his book to all who have heard of this question, and who wish to know assuredly what is the true Word of God.

H. G.

Poetic Section.

BRITISH POETRY.

IN very childhood our estimate of right and wrong, of moral beauty and deformity, is based mainly on our knowledge gleaned from the fields of child-lore. This lore, so attractive and so powerful, embraces exciting rhymes of valiant little giant-killers, of loving little babes, and most loving little redbreasts; of enthralling Cinderellas, of detestable Bluebeards, of simple, trustful, but most basely-deceived little Ridinghoods.

Shipwreck and Robinson Crusoe; Utopia and the men of Lilliput; voyages round the world; encounters with cannibals; and improbable combats with impossible dragons, griffins, and goblins, gather round the standard of our fluttering imagination.

As we grow older, David and Goliath are our wonder, and Joseph and his brethren become our chiefest study, and the injunction, "See that ye fall not out by the way," is, like the Caliph Vathek's terrible eye, full of strange, mysterious, and prophetic meaning; our unfledged passions move uneasily, longing to leave the nest and pierce the cloud.

The way is the grand mystery. Always uncertain, always unseen, always attractive. Oh, child-heart! hope's pure palace! cease not to look thus hopefully into futurity. The way may be, at times, through terrible darkness; thou mayest have to endure the baptism of sorrow, and drink the cup of disappointment; but the way has an end—and its end is PEACE.

By-and-bye **THE WORLD** is our study—the great, wide world unveils. With an eye already growing accustomed to the glare of the footlights, tinsel, and rouge, we gradually lose sight of the fancies that held us in fairy thrall, and at last our reflections are gathered from the world *as it is*, ripe, unmasked, matured. Then, as actors in the great drama, we feel that to play our part well we must study well the plot.

Just so is it with literature. First, the wonderful, the altogether unreal, the wildly imaginative, is unfolded. Then the observant, coupled with exaggeration, and varnished with the ideal. Lastly, the true, the unmasked, the reflective, the dramatic.

In the period of ballad poetry, England had arrived at the second stage of literary development. Greece and Rome rose by the same gradations. We are only a higher development of them. Our history is but another slide which Time is swiftly passing through his magic lamp. The light is stronger *because the sky is clearer*; the colours are more pure, because living water, not stagnant, is mixed with them; the subject is more real, because wisdom is more universal;

but the slide moves on, and what *we are* will be the "have been" of some far-off essayist, who shall reflectively examine the painting, as it hangs dust-endowed in the hall of history.

Emerging from the second period of our national poetic life, the period of minstrels and ballads, we come upon the drama, with its crowd of immortal names. Once men's passions were put in chains by skilful master-hands, men acknowledged the service done by immortalizing the doers.

Whilst Poetry led a vagrant life, and went about, poor girl! with a ballad as her only garment, men admired and adored, but never protected her. When she seized the crown and grasped the sceptre, winning and ruling the smiles and tears of throbbing hearts, then Poesy was acknowledged, and her servants held in high repute.

Ballads are the wild songs of our forest nooks and our primrose banks. The drama and its fellows are the organ melodies of our costly cathedral. *There* we sit by the soft-flowing stream, under the shade of leafy wilderness, and dream of beauty and love, of nature and her minstrelsy. Here we stand beside the altar, and above the dead,

" Whose swords are rust,
Whose bodies dust,
And whose souls are with the Lord, we trust,"

and we think of man's devices and heaven's gifts.

The fourteenth century will ever be considered the English Homeric age, because of the man who made it brilliant,—Chaucer, the father of English poetry. "He acquires his right to that title, not only on the ground of being our earliest poet, but because the foundations he laid still support the fabric of our poetical literature, and will outlast the vicissitudes of taste and language."

He wrote five hundred years ago, without a national literature to learn from, before books were printed, and before men cared or hoped to read; and still he stands immovable; whilst others, with greater advantages, have since written, and they with their writings are in dead darkness.

From his poetry we learn of a state of society without modern parallel. Moreover, his strong intellect was well employed to *our* advantage. His was the era in which the Norman and Saxon races became fixed; the language was then discriminately arranged and sifted by him, and, in his "Tales," stereotyped imperishably.

Gower, the friend of Chaucer, although a poet of the same era, is far from being of the same power. His "*Confessio Amantis*," or "Confession of Love," is dull and dreamy. If penances were fashionable, it would be worse than solitary confinement to be condemned to read within a given period this most unreadable antiquity.

Chaucer, well for his fame, wrote as purely, and with as much polish, as he could; and although his "Tales" were admired by contemporary and succeeding scholars, yet not till centuries after were they diffused as they ought to have been. Reading was

a luxury only attainable to the rich, therefore long written poems were sealed to the many. Some means must soon arise to spread knowledge, for the minstrels and troubadours, having suffered ignominy and reverses, were becoming scarce, and so a new race of *literati* appeared with the dawn of the sixteenth century, — the dramatists.

The art of Poetry was no longer to be confined to the feudal hall, with its retained minstrel, but according to the inevitable law of progression, was about to take a stride which should eventually lead to the highest developments of her splendour.

Men should *hear*, if they could not read. Oral teaching should instruct those who cared not to, or could not, receive book instruction.

Oratory was then about to establish a purpose, and to earn a fame, which for a time should obtain followers innumerable. Dramatic teaching, from the stage, pulpit, and platform, holds even now a high place among THE POWERS of literature. Is it not possible that, in a not far off futurity, men shall cease to worship oratory, and be their own philosophers—getting knowledge from others, seeking wisdom in themselves; painting their own ideals, and aiming at individual, manly perfection. “Speech is silvern; silence is golden.”

The first dramatist was Nicholas Udall. His first work a pageant exhibited by the Mayor and citizens of London to celebrate the entrance of Anne Boleyn into the city, after her marriage; a pageant perhaps equal in glitter, pantomimic mummery, and meaningless adoration, to our nineteenth century Lord Mayor's Show.

The first regular English comedy was his play called “Ralp Roister Doister,” a rollicking composition for a churchman and courtier. He was rewarded for his services to religion by presentation to a stall at Windsor in 1551. Died 1556.

Ralp Roister Doister, the hero of the comedy, sings a song, the refrain of which, although afterwards used by Shakespeare, is not a fashionable one in our time. The song is worth reading.

“I MUN BE MARRIED A SUNDAY.

“I mun be married a Sunday;
I mun be married a Sunday;
Who soever shall come that way,
I mun be married a Sunday.

“Roister Doister is my name;
Roister Doister is my name;
A lusty brute I am the same.
I mun be married a Sunday.

“Christian Custance have I found;
Christian Custance have I found;
A widow worth a thousand pounds.
I mun be married a Sunday.

“Custance is as sweet as honey;
Custance is as sweet as honey;
I her lamb, and she my coney.
I mun be married a Sunday.

“When we shall make our wedding
feast,
When we shall make our wedding
feast,
There shall be cheer for man and beast.
I mun be married a Sunday.
I mun be married a Sunday.”

The hero quarrels with his Custance, and cries,

"Master Roister Doister will go straight home and die;"

and in a crude sonnet, called the "Psalmodie of the Rejected Lover," he, with some poetic and some strong matter-of-fact feeling; gives direction for his own funeral "*Dirige*." He will go darkling to his grave.

"Neque lux, neque crux, nisi solum clink,
Never genman so went towards heaven, I think.
Yet, sirs, as ye will the bliss of heaven win,
When he cometh to the grave, lay him softly in;
And all men take heed, by this one gentleman,
How you set your love upon an unkind woman;
For these women be all such mad peevish elves,
They will not be won, except it please themselves.
But, in faith, Custance, if ever ye come in hell,
Maister Roister Doister shall serve you as well."

As a favourite, John Heywood followed Udall. According to the "Book of Payments," Henry the Eighth took him into his service as a player on the virginal. The song of "The Green Willow," which gave refrains to so many songs in subsequent times, is the best in his works.

"All a green willow, willow,
All a green willow is my garland.

"Alas! by what means may I make ye to know
The unkindness for kindness that to me doth grow?
That one who most kind love on me should bestow,
Most unkind unkindness to me she doth show.
For all a green willow is my garland!

"To have love, and hold love, where love is so sped,
Oh, delicate food to the lover so fed!
From love won, to love lost, where lovers be led,
Oh! desperate dolor, the lover is dead!
For all a green willow is his garland!

"She said she did love me, and would love me still;
She swore above all men I had her good will;
She said, and she swore, she would my will fulfill:
The promise all good, the performance all ill;
For all a green willow is my garland.

"Now, woe with the willow, and woe with the wight
That windeth willow, willow garland to dight!
That dole dealt in allmys is all amiss quite,
Where lovers are beggars for allmys in sight.
No lover doth beg for this willow garland.

"Of this willow garland the burden seems small;
 But my break-neck burden I may it well call;
 Like the sow of lead on my head it doth fall;
 Break head, and break neck, back, bones, brain, heart, and all,
 All parts pressed in pieces.

"Too ill for her, I think, I best things may be had.
 Too good for me, thinketh she, things being most bad.
 All I do present her that may make her glad;
 All she doth present me that may make me sad:
 This equity have I with this willow garland.

"Could I forget thee, as thou canst forget me,
 That were my sound fault, which cannot, nor shall be;
 Though thou, like the soaring hawk, every way flee,
 I will be the turtle still steadfast to thee.
 And patiently wear this willow garland.

"All ye that have had love, and have my like wrong,
 My like truth and patience plant still ye among.
 When feminine fancies for new love do long,
 Old love cannot hold them, new love is so strong.
 For all, &c."

F. G.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS TO WHICH ANSWERS ARE SOLICITED.

92. Will some of your numerous readers kindly inform me where I may obtain any information respecting a secret society which once existed in Germany, called the *Vehme Gerichte*?—PONTIFEX.

93. Where can I obtain an accurate account of the Gypsies, their origin, history, language, &c.?—JESSE.

94. Would one of the readers of the *British Controversialist* be kind enough to inform me what are the best and cheapest works I can get (adapted for self-instruction), to obtain a knowledge of the English language and arithmetic?—J.

95. What is the best plan to be adopted in studying English history and the Evidences of Christianity?—J.

96. Can any reader of the *British Controversialist* refer me to any peri-

odical containing an account of the Rev. J. C. Smith, who died about three years ago in Glasgow? He was editor of the *Family Herald*, and wrote an able work on "The Divine Drama of History and Civilization."—JESSE.

97. Could any of your readers inform me of any books on Bookbinding, the tools required for it, and their prices, or any other information that might be useful on the subject?—P. M.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

76. *Banking*.—Every information attainable on banks, &c., can be had in the admirable work of Henry Dunning Macleod (Longmans), entitled, "A Dictionary of Political Economy." "Banks and Banking" is the title of a fair work by Gilbert. A French "Dictionnaire de Politiques Economiques" is issued by Delau.—N.

77. *The meaning of some expressions*

occurring in the "*Laird of Logan*."—*Seatu* is a denomination acquired from a provincial colloquialism for "Seet then," used by the Paisley "bodies." *Sneddon* was once the Pall Mall of Paisley. *Sawney* is a diminution of Alexander, at one time a common Christian name. *Bim* is merely the French word "well." A *cock Laird* is a coxcomb; one who struts like that majestic bird whose harem occupies the manure field. For *Lismahago* read Smollett's "Humphrey Clinker." *As a tub does a whale* evidently means *not at all*.—RODERICK RANDOM.

79. A person's "grammatical difficulty" may be accounted for, though perhaps not explained. The English—unlike the people of the Continent—not only never obtrude, but even refrain, wherever possible, from bringing into notice—the *sexual* idea. The small remnant of vocables denoting difference of gender by difference of termination or of word is being more and more departed from; many of those words given in common grammars are obsolete, more obsolescent. The word *person* (like the Latin word *homo*, which includes both *vir* and *mulier*) is not a neuter noun, but is used in meaning indifferently of either or both sexes, and in accordance with this use the pronoun must (where possible) be made to agree with it in gender and number; and where this is impossible, that gender—the masculine, which includes the other within it as a *sub-species*—is employed. The difficulty, though externally grammatical, is intrinsically moral, and depends on the reluctance of the English to *sexualize* ideas. This desire to keep the notion of sex out of sight is the cause of the indefiniteness of expression employed. The rule followed by scholars is that employed in writing Latin; viz., "If the substantive used denote living beings of different genders, the pronoun takes the gender of the masculine." The same rule holds in Greek also; and seems to have been generally adopted as the best practical solution which could be obtained.—R. M. A.

80. *History of the Popes*.—Ranke's "History of the Popes of XVth and XVIth Centuries;" Eiseler's "Manual of Church History;" "Gibbon," Milman's "History of Christianity."—S. W.

81. *The best edition of Shakespeare's complete works* I consider to be that of Dyce, which is published by Russell Smith, price £6.—T. W.

To determine the reply, the use intended ought to be known. Knight's "*Pictorial*," £3, is a good popular book; so is "Staunton's" (Routledge), £2 12s. The text only can be had in Griffin's popular Shakespeare for 7s. 6d. Critical editions are numerous, and confusing—Halliwell, Dyce, Wheeler, Singer, Collier, &c.—and are costly.—TEN.

82. *Encyclopædias*.—The *Britannica* is most complete; the *Metropolitana* is fullest; the former, 22 vols., one guinea each; the latter, 30 vols. (originally 59 parts, at a guinea), in cloth at £21: Black, *Edinburgh*; Griffin, *London*.—R. M. A.

83. *The Japanese Language*.—In reply to "Marcus," who asks, "Can I procure a grammar and dictionary of the Japanese language?" I beg to say, that as only a few characters have yet been collected, a friend will doubtless have to wait many years before he will be able to obtain that which he is seeking.—J. E. F.

84 and 38, vol. ii. *French Serials*.—The *Indépendance Belge* is edited by Prof. MASSON, of Harrow; the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, and Lamartine's *Entretiens*, are to be readily had by subscription, though not published in England.—R. M. A.

87. *Interesting Works on the English Language*.—Trench's "Study of Words," and "English Past and Present," 4s. 6d. each. Craik's "English Language," 3s. 6d.; Latham's "English Language," 18s.; Hoare's "English Roots," 4s. 6d.; Neil's "Rhetoric," 4s. 6d.—P. Q.

88. *The Bampton Lecture* owes its origin to the Rev. John Bampton, who, in his "last will and testament," says:—"I give and bequeath my lands and estates to the chancellor, masters, and

scholars of the University of Oxford for ever, to have and to hold all and singular the said lands or estates upon trust, and to the intents and purposes hereinafter mentioned; that is to say, I will and appoint that the vice-chancellor of the University of Oxford for the time being shall take and receive all the rents, issues, and profits thereof, and (after all taxes, reparations, and necessary deductions made) that he pay all the remainder to the endowment of eight Divinity Lecture Sermons, to be established for ever in the said University, and to be performed in the manner following:

"I direct and appoint that, upon the first Tuesday in Easter Term, a lecturer be yearly chosen by the heads of colleges only, and by no others, in the room adjoining the printing house, between the hours of ten in the morning and two in the afternoon, to preach eight Divinity Lecture Sermons the year following, at St. Mary's in Oxford, between the commencement of the last month in Lent Term and the end of the third week in Act Term.

"Also, I direct and appoint that the eight Divinity Lecture Sermons shall be preached upon either of the following subjects, to confirm and establish the Christian faith, and to confute all heretics and schismatics:—Upon the Divine authority of the Holy Scriptures; upon the authority of the writings of the Primitive Fathers, as to the faith and practice of the Primitive Church; upon the Divinity of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ; upon the Divinity of the Holy Ghost; upon the Articles of the Christian Faith, as comprehended in the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds.

"Also I direct that thirty copies of the eight Divinity Lecture Sermons shall be always printed within two months after they are each preached, and one copy shall be given to the chancellor of the University, and one copy to the head of every College, and one copy to the Mayor of the city of Oxford, and one copy to be put into the Bodleian Library; and the expense of printing

them shall be paid out of the revenue of the land or estates given for establishing the Divinity Lecture Sermons; and the preacher shall not be paid, nor be entitled to the revenue, before they are printed.

"Also, I direct and appoint that no person shall be qualified to preach the Divinity Lecture Sermons, unless he hath taken the degree of Master of Arts at least in one of the two Universities of Oxford or Cambridge; and that the same person shall never preach the Divinity Lecture Sermons twice."

The following are the titles of the Lectures, and the names of the lecturers, for several recent years:—

1851.—"The Communion of Saints: an Attempt to Illustrate the True Principles of Christian Union." By H. B. Wilson, B.D., late Fellow and Tutor of St. John's College.

1852.—"The Natural History of Infidelity and Superstition, in Contrast with Christian Faith." By J. E. Riddle, M.A., of St. Edmund's Hall.

1854.—"New Testament Millenarianism; or, the Kingdom and Coming of Christ, as taught by Himself and His Apostles." By the Hon. and Rev. S. Waldegrave, M.A., late Fellow of All Souls' College.

1855.—"The Absence of Precision in the Formularies of the Church of England Scriptural, and Suitable to a State of Probation." By J. Ernest Bode, M.A., late Student of Christ Church, Oxford.

1857.—"Christian Faith Comprehensive, not Partial; Definite, not Uncertain." By W. E. Jelf, B.D., late Censor of Christ Church.

1858.—"The Limits of Religious Thought Examined." By H. L. Mansel, B.D., late Fellow of St. John's College, Oxford.

1859.—"The Historical Evidences of the Truth of the Scripture Record stated anew, with Special Reference to the Doubts and Discoveries of Modern Times." By George Rawlinson, M.A., late Fellow and Tutor of Exeter College.—C. A.

The Topic.

OUGHT GOVERNMENT TO APPOINT OFFICIAL AUDITORS TO EXAMINE THE ACCOUNTS OF ALL PUBLIC BODIES?

AFFIRMATIVE.

The recent failures of large banking and other companies, entailing misery and ruin upon thousands of families, prove the necessity of some means being employed to prevent the recurrence of such calamities. Those who have read the very able pamphlet on the perils of policy-holders, by William Carpenter, Esq., will acquiesce in the statement that, as things at present exist, no dependence can be placed on the safety of any company, however imposing its appearance, and specious its statement of accounts. I certainly think, that if Government auditors were appointed, it would remedy this uncertainty, and would greatly benefit those companies who are on a really sound basis, and whose accounts would bear examination, and the public at large, who would, according to the information yielded by such a scrutiny, be in a position to support the good, and reject the doubtful; and, as a natural consequence, no company could then exist on which dependence could not be placed.

—J. C.

Looking, during the past few years, to the large number of cases of fraud, and embezzlement of the funds of building societies and other public companies, in whose welfare the working community of England have now obtained a deep interest, and whose hard earnings, by the dishonesty of an individual, may at once be swept away, and themselves and families reduced to penury and wretchedness—for the Government to appoint official auditors, whose duty should be the examination of the accounts of all public bodies, thus checking rash speculation, and misappropriation of funds by treasurers and other officers, and thus certifying

that they were conducted upon safe and permanent principles, would not only be conferring a benefit upon the working man, in securing his earnings from the crafty and designing speculatist, but upon the community at large, in protecting public property.—J. R. B.

It will be a happy day for England when Government appoints auditors to examine the books and accounts of public companies and other bodies. Such an appointment would save many from loss, perhaps ruin.

The advantages of such an appointment, if managed in a proper manner, would show themselves, firstly, by putting a stop to the large system of embezzlement that has lately been carried on by clerks, secretaries and others; and, secondly, by informing the public of the real state of the funds of the various companies, whether their capital is what they state it to be, and would thus forewarn of ruinous insolvency, bringing to light the whole of the so-called "bubble" schemes. For these reasons, Government should give the matter their serious consideration.—F. S. M.

In a large majority of instances the supervision of boards of directors has proved no barrier to fraudulent proceedings on the part of the officials of public companies; on the contrary, the existence of such boards has tended rather to promote speculations, on account of the mere routine manner in which their duties are discharged. The system of auditing the accounts of public companies at present carried on is extremely defective; in fact, it is more an approval *in globo* than an examination in detail. It is time, therefore, that some effectual means were devised to prevent the repetition of our Redpath,

Knighting, and Pullinger frauds. The appointment, by Government, of official auditors of competent skill and large experience, at good salaries, whose sole duty would be the proper examination of public companies' accounts, appears to us to be the best remedy. Such a plan would place those accounts under the eyes of gentlemen unconnected officially with the company or its *employés*, and therefore unfettered in the discharge of their simple duty. The result would be effective auditing, and the restoration of public confidence, now much shaken, in the management of public bodies. Means should be taken to make public the names of such companies, at present existing, as were willing to come under the inspection of the Government auditor; and no act for the formation of a new company should be passed without a clause to the like effect. The salaries and expenses of the auditors should be paid out of a fund to be made up out of a certain amount, to be levied from each company deriving the benefit of their services. Britain is essentially a commercial country; and one of the strongest bulwarks of a commercial people is integrity in all their dealings. It is the duty of the Government to maintain inviolate the *bona fide* character of our public companies, either by restrictive or assisting measures; and, since its interference seems best calculated to do what the ordinary plan is evidently unable to effect properly, we think the appointment of such gentlemen as have been proposed, by Government, is a duty it owes no less to the shareholders than to the country at large.—G. H. S.

The gigantic frauds and embezzlements that have been perpetrated during the last few years have not only shaken the confidence of the commercial world to its very centre in all kinds of joint stock companies, but has proved to a demonstration that the machinery by which the mercantile transactions of these public bodies are conducted is very deceptive and incomplete, or that the discrepancies arise from the culpable

negligence of those whose duty it is to examine, direct, and control; and the result is that the public have been victimized, owing to their entire ignorance of the internal condition and financial position of these companies. For these grievances as yet there has been no redress; for these crying evils no antidote has been found. We have only to refer to the embezzlements of Robson, Redpath, and Pullinger, and to the wholesale frauds and systematic plundering by the directors of the Tipperary and British Banks, to furnish abundant evidence in support of the foregoing statement.

The advantages of insuring both life and property is acknowledged and appreciated by many; but, on the other hand, there are thousands who, while acknowledging the necessity and benefit to be derived from insuring their property against accidents by fire, and their own lives against sudden death, yet refuse to insure because they have no means of accurately knowing the financial state of insurance companies, and therefore prefer running the risk of losing their property, or of leaving their offspring dependent upon the bounty of others, rather than trust to the fair promise of a company which, perhaps, time may prove to be nothing but a floating bubble. These are evils of no small magnitude, affecting the present welfare and future prosperity of all classes of the community, and to remedy which, if it be possible, is the high prerogative and imperative duty of Government.

It may be urged by the opponents of this scheme that inquisitorial examination of accounts by the Government would be vexatious and unnecessary. Such objections might with reason be raised by private firms; but in the case of public bodies no such argument could legitimately be advanced, as this minute scrutiny would take place in the name of and for the benefit of the public. It may be said that a great evil would result from the examinations of the accounts of these public bodies to them-

selves by their exact position being known at a time of great financial embarrassment, by which they would lose prestige and credit, which might ultimately involve them in ruin. Granted it be so, this inconvenience is so small when compared with the numerous and deplorable evils which result from the present insecure system, that it may very appropriately be designated infinitesimal. As things stand now, we have falsified returns, fictitious balance sheets, dividends out of paid-up capital, ruinous speculations, embezzlements of almost fabulous sums, by which a few enrich themselves, to entail on thousands indigence, starvation, and death. For these reasons, we say, that in appointing official auditors to examine the accounts of all public bodies the Government would not exceed, but only exercise, its legitimate legislative and constitutional functions.—PEN AND INK.

Viewing this subject in its moral tendency, and in all its bearings, we opine that no subject of greater importance can be advanced for discussion. Whenever the sinews of industry become injured from any external violence committed with a view to fraudulent design, prosperity puts on the garb of sorrow, and continues to droop and wail till the stimulus of revivification be again applied. Whatever shocks credit is productive of serious inconvenience, frequently becoming a serious calamity, and not unfrequently deteriorating the national reputation, which should be sedulously protected on every side.

No subsequent acts of candour can redeem the forfeited pledge. If ever the *fides* of a person be chargeable with betrayal, its redemption is a matter of contingency, approaching to impossibility. Dishonesty appears in so many garbs of diverse aspect, that no cautionary provisions have yet been found,—however stringent and scrutinizing,—to provide an effectual remedy: and the subject deserves the special notice of Parliament. When we instance the perpetration of wrongs against justice and public faith by Fauntleroy,

Stephenson, Remington and Co., Davidson and Gordon, Rufford, George Hudson (of railway notoriety), Strahan and Paul, Robson (the scrip speculator), Redpath, and the last great felon, Pullinger, and a host of others charged with delinquencies of lesser magnitude, we think our readers will agree with us that the time has arrived to warrant legislation on the subject.

The violation of the terms of a deed of indemnity hardly ever gives such a power as will facilitate the execution of the laws of retaliation in all their bearings; in fact, the prosecution of a fraudulent offender against common honesty in our courts of criminal justice is seldom if ever recuperatively applicable to the true merits of the case. Every functionary, having opportunities to commit deeds of peculation, ought to be debarred from entering into any schemes of speculation whatever; and whenever one so situated should be discovered to be so engaged, his retention of office should at once be a *legal impossibility*. Too frequently do the race-course and the gambling table become the concomitants of the basest crimes, varied in hue, covering enormous sums, and extending over a series of years. Yet such offences against good morals and common honesty would have been detected, and their lamentable results avoided, had there been a *public auditor*.

We would earnestly urge upon Parliament the expediency of either establishing a board of commissioners for auditing the accounts of public bodies, or extending the jurisdiction of some standing commission, so as to have supervision over such accounts; and we think the majority of our readers will join us in this.—S. F. T.

NEGATIVE.

There is a great tendency in the present day to look to Government for the performance of work which clearly lies beyond its province. Government is now expected to educate our children; to inspect our dwellings; to prevent the

adulteration of our food; and it is even gravely suggested that it should examine our banking accounts, and audit the books of all our public companies! Why this new work should be allotted to our rulers, we are at a loss to imagine. It surely cannot be because they so diligently perform their ordinary duties, and so promptly and efficiently attend to everything which they take in hand!—X.

Although greater care is certainly wanting in keeping and auditing the accounts of both public and private companies, it is only needed by those who have funds invested therein; but if these companies were inspected by Government, it would increase our national expenses, and thus the poor would have to assist in guarding the purses of the opulent. If the members of gas, railway, banking, and such companies, can or will not mind their affairs in this respect, the needy ought not to assist them.—SUNLKY WOOD.

Self-preservation is said to be the first law of nature, and self-love is certainly the strongest principle in the human breast. We may, therefore, safely leave to them the protection of the pecuniary interests of our fortunate neighbours, and not trouble our legislators with it.—C.

If Government were to appoint official auditors, an expense would be entailed upon the country, which ought to be borne only by the parties directly benefited, and to make the public bodies themselves pay for the services performed, would be to turn the Government into a jobbing office. Either all must pay, or one department of our constitution keep a staff of officers for hire. But the question arises—Have we any precedents whereby it might be proven that the servants of Government are noted for their ability? Unless they are superior in the requisite qualities to private individuals, the difficulty would not be obviated. The superior qualifications are rarely found in Government offices, principally on account of the system pursued in the

selection of servants. Influence is the great element of success on such occasions, and merit is left in the background; a booby may easily obtain a good situation by the assistance of a member of Parliament, while a man of worth, with only his own aptitude for business to befriend him, is scarcely, if ever, recognized. If Government officials are, as a body, incompetent, it would be absurd to place the auditing of a joint-stock bank, or any other institution, in their hands. The Circumlocution Office may at present be borne with, but to connect it with the establishments of enterprising mercantile firms, would clog their machinery, and saturate the atmosphere of the counting-house with the air of official routine. Instead of expensive, incompetent official auditors, let the public accountant, on whose energetic performance of duty depends his respectability, meet the difficulty.—RONALDO.

After some consideration, I am of opinion that the appointment of such officers as are suggested by this question can be dispensed with. Embezzlements happen from want of *proper* care and oversight. It has been, wrongly, the custom for many auditors, hitherto, to treat their duties as *formal*, without calling for and examining vouchers, and obtaining sufficient evidence. It is true that this has often arisen from feelings of delicacy towards those whose accounts are to be checked, and from a dislike to appear suspicious; but henceforward, auditors *must* act more business-like; and if *proper* care and oversight be strictly pursued by them, embezzlements and fraud would then be quite as effectually prevented, as if the Government were to appoint officially. I form this opinion on the ground, chiefly, that public officers are not, *as a matter of course*, more cautious than private individuals. It is true that the situations would benefit some lucky persons, who may chance to fill them; but that embezzlements would then be *stopped*, is quite another thing, and, in my judgment, extremely doubtful.

ful. At all events, if it can be proved that official auditors ought to be appointed, they should be liable to punishment, if their duties are so neglected as to leave a door open for embezzlements or fraud being committed; otherwise, what would be the *real use* of Government interference?—TNEJBOR.

Every one will admit that there is at present a great necessity for a stricter supervision of the actions of men in positions of public trust; but it is very doubtful if auditors appointed by Government would accomplish so much as a good system of supervision, exercised by able officers appointed by a company itself. This is easily seen in the last great case which came before the public, in which the simplest check would have proved effectual in stopping those defalcations which, on being discovered, so astonished the public. Moreover, the interference of Government, in a mere matter of business of this kind, would not be well received by those whom it would be intended to benefit, as may be easily perceived by looking at other matters of a similar kind.

If the checks which are provided for the safety of public companies against fraud were duly enforced, and the prevailing carelessness was effectually shaken off, we should hear less of Robsons, Redpaths, and Pullingers.—OFFICIAL.

"Not yet," we would say. The recent and oft recurring embezzlements are certainly alarming; but still we think the Government ought not to interfere until the public petition for protection against frauds. We shall be glad when such a step is taken, but let the public risk their money as long as they choose; perhaps when all their cash is in the possession of fraudulent accountants, &c., they will be fully alive to the danger they are in without the shelter of Government. It is a sad thing if honest men are so scarce that the legislature must appoint official auditors to examine the accounts of all public bodies; such a proposition casts

a slur over the whole profession,—a slur for which there is too good a ground. We think, however, that until the English people ask Government for official auditors, such officials should not be appointed.—BETA.

Is our commercial morality then sunk so low? Is integrity so rare a virtue in our public mercantile men? Have the people, whose word was formerly as good as their bond, degenerated so far that censors must watch over their actions, and the lash of the law be required to confine them to the path of rectitude? Such are the ideas suggested by this month's Topic. But instead of following this train of thought, let us consider the utility of the plan proposed. Will it afford greater security to public bodies against embezzlement by their *employés*, or will it protect the public more efficiently against the dishonest schemes of any such bodies themselves? If so, the commercial community would, we have little doubt, be glad to avail themselves of its assistance; none are more desirous than they to protect their interests, and they are equally concerned with the general public to expose the black sheep that may exist among them. But if, as we believe, novelty is its only recommendation,—if it offers no better means of attaining the end in view than is already possessed, it is likely to lull into a false security, and ought certainly to be rejected. We do not see what powers of penetration Government officials can possess beyond private individuals, or how they are better proof against false books and forged documents. As a preventive of fraud, the plan can effect little. The dread which some may suppose an annual inspection of accounts by a Government auditor should inspire, could have little influence upon any defaulter who runs the risk of detection through other means during the rest of the year. Even as a plan for discovering embezzlement it seems no better. The examination of any recent systematic fraud upon a public company by

its official will show that the plan adopted by the culprit was the result of a perfect knowledge of the system pursued in the establishment, which he must have studied for his purpose, and detected a —, perhaps its *only* weak point. When such fraudulent practices are continued for years without exciting the suspicion of other officials, and when balances are made and published too, and then the discovery happens quite accidentally, what likelihood is there of good resulting from the visits — few and far between — of an auditor who comes to certify all to be right,—not surely with the expectation

of finding anything wrong? With respect to the imposition practised on the public by rotten companies, it could do no service. These keep their accounts right enough, but their debtors are men of straw, and their assets consequently visions. Let directors be responsible for reports published by them, and severely punishable if they misrepresent anything, and let the public insist on regular reports; let defaulting officials be more smartly dealt with, and no tickets of leave in future thrust into their hands, then we shall more rarely hear of flagrant breaches of trust. —

The Societies' Section.

THE LITERARY SOCIETIES OF DUBLIN.

It is unfortunate that no authentic history of Ireland previous to the eighteenth century exists, through the pages of which might be traced the early dawn and spread of education, as a system, among the inhabitants of the large towns in the provinces, and more especially of the metropolis itself. That educational pursuits engaged the attention of our ancestors at a very early period, and that literary institutions of some kind existed, not only in Dublin, but throughout the country, more than two centuries ago, seems perfectly plain from the records which have reached us, mutilated and one-sided though they be. The founding of Trinity College in Dublin, under a charter from Queen Elizabeth, in 1591, and its opening for the instruction of students in 1593, seems, however, to afford us the only reliable starting-point from which to date the formation of anything approaching the character of a literary institution in our city. Within the precincts of "Trinity" learning was cultivated, and a taste fostered among the upper classes of the community, which, in the year 1622, induced the Roman Catholic inhabitants of the city to

establish a university of their own, in the classic neighbourhood of Back Lane. This rival institution, however, was but short-lived; for, in 1632, we find it was closed by order of the Government, and its premises granted to Trinity College. From that time till the year 1731 we cannot find traces of any literary institution in Dublin distinct from "Trinity;" but on the 23rd of June in that year, "The Royal Dublin Society" was founded. This is the oldest institution of the kind in the three kingdoms. It was incorporated by royal charter on the 2nd of April, 1750, upwards of a century ago. Although in strictness not perhaps entitled to rank among the "literary" societies of our city,—for it was established at first "to promote husbandry and other useful arts and sciences in Ireland,"—its field of operations has been so much extended of late years, that we feel justified in placing "The Royal Dublin Society" in the place of honour in this paper. For a long time after its incorporation a grant of £500 a year was made to its funds from the privy purse; and up to the present time, a special amount is annually allocated

to its use out of the national fund. It occupies a very prominent position among the literary and scientific institutions of the country, and enjoys no mean repute in the world at large. The crowned head of England for the time being is its patron, and the Viceroy of Ireland its president. Under its auspices meetings are held monthly, and, at periods of the year, weekly, for the discussion of subjects connected with practical science and art; and lectures (free) by paid professors are delivered, from time to time, on natural philosophy, natural science, chemistry, &c. Attached to the society is a magnificent library of upwards of 27,000 volumes; and also an agricultural and a natural history museum, all open to the public. The botanical gardens at Glasnevin also belong to the same body. During the two visits of the members of "The British Association" to Dublin, this society acted the part of their host, and its rooms formed the arena for their many interesting meetings. The members are elected by ballot, and pay an entrance fee of £3 3s., and an annual subscription of £2 2s. Life members pay one sum of £21. On the roll of this society are men whose names are household words in the paths of literature, science, and art.

The next society which we notice is "The Royal Irish Academy," founded and incorporated on the 28th of January, 1786, "for promoting the study of science, polite literature, and antiquities." The operations of this institution have been most valuable in collecting and epitomizing much interesting and important information with regard to ancient Irish learning and art; and not the least important result of its labours is the formation of a museum of Irish antiquities, which, under the able direction of Surgeon Wilde, has lately been catalogued and intelligently classified. Meetings are held in connection with the institute from time to time, at which papers bearing upon matters in the peculiar province of the academy are read and discussed, and such of them

as are deemed worthy are published in the proceedings. Many of these papers have formed most valuable additions to our national literature, and have awakened in the minds of the general public a great desire to still further investigate the long-buried treasures, literary and artistic, of our native land. The "academy" ranks among its members many well-known talented men, of whom we shall but mention Dr. P. trie, the exponent of the Round Tower mystery, and Eugene Curry, the celebrated Irish scholar.

Passing over "The Geological Society" and "The Dublin Natural History Society," which are both founded for specific branches of knowledge suggested by their name, we meet "The Dublin Statistical Society," which is of comparatively recent birth, but has succeeded thus early in gaining a good position in our city. Just at present its attention seems to be energetically devoted to the amelioration of the condition of the bakers of the metropolis. Many of its members are sincere and well-known philanthropists, who have succeeded in investing a page or two of *figures* with an interest for the public mind altogether unknown some years back. Its meetings are open to the public, and many of the papers read at them treat of highly important topics intimately connected with the social prosperity of our country.

In the precincts of "old Trinity" two institutions flourish, which we may briefly glance at. One is "The College Historical Society," and the other, "The University Philo-sophical Society." The former is rather a noted institution in the annals of our city; for in troublesome times, before the Union, it was the nursery in which rebellious sentiments were first enunciated by many an after well-known individual. Occasionally its proceedings appear to have gone beyond the limits of either law or order; for, in 1794, we find its doors were closed for a considerable time by the authorities of the college. At the meetings of this society, many of Ireland's most cele-

brated speakers have first given evidence of their oratorical powers, and developed their debating capabilities. Its meetings are held every Wednesday evening, and frequently the discussions are very ably maintained. None but students of the university of a certain literary rank are admitted as members.

Dublin can boast of an "Oratorical and Literary Society," and a "Legal and Historical Debating Society" also. At a meeting held in connection with the former, some few weeks since, we heard a very excellent paper read, on "Living Essayists," which, if taken as a sample of the capabilities of the members generally, would reflect much credit upon their literary attainments. The Right Hon. Joseph Napier, ex-Lord Chancellor of Ireland, is president of this and of "The College Historical Society." The subjects dealt with at "The Legal and Historical Debating Society" are chiefly on legal topics, and none but members of the bar are admitted to the privileges of membership in it. It is an exceedingly useful preparatory school for the professional man, and, as such, is largely made use of by would-be chancellors, &c.

The "Oratorical Society" meets every Friday, and the "Legal" one every Thursday evening, at eight o'clock, in their rooms, Upper Sackville Street.

We can but name "The Social Enquiry Society," and "The Celtic or Irish Historical and Literary Association," inasmuch as we, until recently, never heard of their existence in our city. Their objects, judging from their titles, are excellent, but their operations are, we anticipate, limited.

Our city boasts a "Mechanics' Institution" also, but the fact of its existence has long since faded away from the minds of the more intelligent citizens. Like almost all other institutions of its kind, it has failed in the objects for which it was founded, and is the lounge of every class but that of the mechanic. If a well-stocked news-room, largely pervaded, as some think, by a *religio-politico* atmosphere, and a very miscel-

laneous library, entitle a building to the epithet "Institute," certainly that in Lower Abbey Street has earned it well. Its management lately has undergone some improvement, but still needs a touch of Lord John Russell's *reforming* wand!

"The Young Men's Christian Association" appears among us as a flourishing tree, although but of about a dozen years' growth. It is established on the same basis as that in London, and its operations are carried on by similar agencies. Annually a course of lectures is delivered in connection with the association, which is attended by large numbers of young men especially. Heretofore, the lecturers on these occasions have been all public, well-known, well-tried men, and most of their papers have been published. It might form a matter of consideration with the committee, however, whether, in future, it would not add much to the interest felt in these proceedings, if some one or two of the *members* were selected as lecturers. We know that many of them are quite equal to the duty, and we are certain that some of them would give a much more pleasing and instructive address than many of the public lecturers have done. The experiment might be worth the trial, at any rate. A well-selected library and a comfortable reading-room in Middle Abbey Street form useful adjuncts to the machinery of the association.

Besides the societies which we have named, there are some fourteen or fifteen Young Men's Societies in Dublin, all, with one exception, we believe, connected with some of the congregations in the city. A few days since, that in connection with the Union Chapel, Abbey Street, which *claims* to be the oldest of these societies, held its annual meeting in the Metropolitan Hall;—we say "*claims*," because there seems reason to believe that the statement is not strictly correct, though we cannot ourselves see anything very important in the point. Recently, a course of lectures in connection with this society was delivered—

by members only—and we believe all of them were very well attended.

The operations of all these Young Men's Societies are alike, to a great extent. Their meetings are held weekly, and their programmes prepared quarterly. Subjects in literature, science, and religion are brought before the members in the form of essays or debates, and the proceedings are opened and closed with prayer. The pastor of the congregation is president, and the members, from among their own number, elect a secretary and treasurer. The majority of the meetings are well attended, and the papers read at them often very creditable productions. The members, being in general young men engaged in mercantile or commercial houses in the city, do not claim any high position in the literary world, but they feel that connection with such associations aids them in their literary progress and home studies. All these associations are based upon the foundation of Gospel truth, and seek, while improving the mental powers, to develop the moral faculties of their members. Their influence in a city such as Dublin is very great, but would be much more tangible if means were adopted to unite them all in one bond of fellowship and brotherhood, though still pursuing each its independent course. Why should not they be as offshoots from the Christian Association? At present they have no unity of action, and, indeed, almost no community of feeling; and the result naturally is, that their influence is limited towards what it might be. One of these societies, some few years since, endeavoured to amalgamate them all under one common banner, and make them branches of the central Christian Association. but, with one or two exceptions, its suggestions were but coldly received. We hope, however, such an amalgamation may yet be carried out.

We mentioned that all these societies but one existed in connection with some congregation, — than one is, "The Literary and Commercial Association,"

Eustace Street. This society was originally in connection with the Mary's Abbey congregation, but for several years has existed as an independent body. It has not found the election of a president essential to its prosperity, and its management is therefore entirely in the hands of its own members. About fifteen months since prizes were offered for the best essays upon the subject of "Competitive Examinations," written by members; and since then two other competitions have taken place, one upon the subject of "The adaptation of the Gospel to the wants and conditions of all men" (a notice of which appeared in this magazine), and the other, only now decided, upon the subject of "The best safeguards for a young man." The adjudicators have spoken very favourably of the papers sent in, and the competition has awakened a great interest in the minds of the members themselves. We are not aware of any other society of the kind which has yet adopted the prize essay scheme.

The Roman Catholics have of late established a young men's society in connection with their own body, which, however, lays no claim to the character of a "literary" association. The fact of their establishment of it, however, shows the benefits resulting from the operations of the various Christian societies in the city. Their influence must have been great, when it was deemed advisable to start a monster rival institution to counteract their hal- lowing tendencies.

In conclusion, we would say that we regard the existence of so many of those simple young men's societies in our city as one of the most healthy and encouraging signs of our times. We have belonged to one of them for many years, and have experienced great benefits arising, mentally and morally, from our connection with it. Their exercises tend to cultivate a habit of thought, a charity of feeling, and a facility of utterance, which are one and all, now-a-days, almost essential to our temporal progress; and they at the same time

recognize to the fullest extent the evanescent character of all mental knowledge, when not based upon that knowledge which appeals to our higher and nobler being. They are shields of protection to their members, if used aright, against many of the snares which beset their daily path in a city such as ours, and ought to receive the support and aid of all who desire to see

our young men living evidences of the Christian faith, and living examples of Christian character. Their standing in a literary point of view may be far inferior to many of the societies we have named, but in their place and generation they may accomplish quite as much for the advancement of their members.—G. H. S.

LITERARY NOTES.

James Aikman, bookseller, author of "A History of Scotland," &c., died in Edinburgh on May 21st, aged 61.

Professor John Lizars, editor of "Anatomical Plates," and author of several physiological works, expired at Edinburgh, 21st May.

The French Emperor is emulous of many fames. He is said now to be engaged in composing "A Life of Julius Cæsar." Is this because he was engaged in the invasion of Britain?

S. G. Goodrich, author of 170 works, under the *nom de plume* of Peter Parley, is dead. He was born in Aug. 1793, and was, therefore, nearly sixty-seven years of age.

"Laconics, by Chatham," is to be the title of a work formed out of materials discovered in MSS., in his handwriting, recently.

The first volume of Lamartine's complete works is to be delivered to British subscribers on 1st July.

Webster's "Speller" is reported to have a circulation of a million copies per annum.

Two humourists are to have additional memoirs of them published—Hood and Jerrold. The letters of the former, and the Browning Papers of the other, are the works which filial affection is to place before the public.

A new Latin-English Dictionary, by Rev. J. T. White and Rev. J. E. Riddle, in one octavo volume, is expected to be ready for issue in the autumn.

Johnson's "Rasselas," adapted for students preparing for the several middle class examinations, is in the press; edited by Rev. John Hunter, M.A.

John Veitch, Esq., translator of Descartes' "Method" and "Meditations," and sub-editor of the lectures of Sir William Hamilton on Metaphysics and Logic, has been appointed Professor of Logic in the University of St. Andrews, N.B., as successor to the late William Spalding.

Mr. Herzen is compiling a translation of the Bible into popular, instead of ecclesiastical Russ.

"The New Revolution; or, the Napoleonic Policy in Europe," by R. H. Paterson, Esq., editor of the *Press*, is likely to be a work of much value and insight. His papers on foreign policy in *Blackwood*, have long borne the marks of intimate knowledge and keen reasoning.

The concluding volume of the late Mrs. Jameson's "Legendary Art," "The Life of Christ and John the Baptist," is to be edited by Lady Eastlake.

Messrs. Routledge have become proprietors of the copyright of "Men of the Time."

Lamartine is ailing.

Messrs. Griffin announce for August a work containing 1000 sketches of eminent living personages, to be entitled "Contemporary Biography."

George Payne Rainsford James, perhaps the most voluminous novelist of our age, the possessor of an almost Calderonic power of plot, and of a most prolific genius, whose first novel, "Richelieu," is now thirty-two years before the public, expired at Venice on the 9th ult., aged 60.

An eligible site in St. Paul's has been got for a full length statue of Henry Hallam.

Epoch Men.

ADAM SMITH.—SCIENTIFIC POLITICS.

"The work of Adam Smith so far transcended all the writings of his predecessors, as to give him the fame and merits of a founder."—*Sir G. C. Lewis.*

"Smith is the most original writer that Scotland has produced for a century and a half. Of political economy he was truly the father."—*Jouffroy.*

"Adam Smith, the father of political science."—*Morell.*

"The 'Wealth of Nations' may truly be said to have founded the science of political economy."—*Lord Brougham.*

WEALTH is the fine old word which our Saxon ancestors used as the name of the sum of those things which conduce to or produce the *weal*—the well-being of man. The science of wealth ought to be, in its widest and its true signification, a systematic exposition of the means of obtaining human happiness; and political economy, in its most advanced form, ought to be a collected digest of all those laws by which the genuine prosperity of nations is or may become possible. True prosperity consists in the actual possession, by all and each, of the largest and purest amount of the most certain and enduring happiness; and the problem which the scientific politician requires to solve is—how to supply mankind at large with the greatest possible quantity of the means and agencies of happiness, so distributed as to be most conducive to the present and future, the personal and the relative, well-being of man. As the mechanism of social life becomes more complex, this problem becomes more intricate and bewildering; the manifold combinations and inter-relations of men and methods of production, distribution, and consumption, so exhibit themselves on the surface of society, that we are apt to lose sight of the inner springs of all these outward movements, and so fail to perceive the incidence of simple reasonings upon those apparently complex facts. The depth of insight which penetrates beneath the mere shadowed and tinted surface of phenomena, and perceives in the multiplicity of their complexities the self-same subjects for analysis, as in the most simple and ordinary forms of the contribution to and the distribution of happiness, constitutes the merit of the politician, and is the power by which he is able to show the means of, or to suggest the laws for, the maximization of human happiness.

So vast a theme as this, however, unrolls a mass of speculation too extensive by far to be treated of with particularity and advantage, and in practice it has been found advisable to relegate many of the multifarious discussions involved in an investigation into the causes of prosperity to separate departments of study, such as jurisprudence, administrative legislation, ethics, police, &c. This desire for simplification has led, if not misled, men from the consideration of the laws which regulate the supply of happiness or true prosperity to the investigation of the causes which operate and co-operate in the production, accumulation, distribution, and consumption of *wealth*—not in its original and ideal signification, but in its derived and material one—as a synonym, not for happiness, but for riches,—the agent of attainment, not the object of search. Wealth, in *this* sense, is the name employed to denote all those articles or products which are necessary, useful, or agreeable, and are possessed of an exchangeable value, *i. e.*,—are the results, in some degree, of the industry of man. In fact, wealth might be strictly and truly defined as labour and its products, or the means of acquiring them. Labour, mental, moral, or physical, imparts exchangeability to the materials among which man is placed, and is, therefore, in reality the very tap-root of wealth, of which *money* is merely the symbol.

Of political economy, in this sense, the nations of antiquity had no idea. Politics—the science of government—they had made in some measure the subject of study. Hippodamus of Meletus was a speculative politician; Socrates a practical one. Xenophon had a political object in writing the “Cyropedia;” Plato, in his “Republic” and “Laws,” gives us an exposition of his views on statecraft. In Aristotle’s “Politics” we have an elaborate investigation into the principles and practices of government; and Zeno, the Stoic, advocated a world-wide communism. Cicero strove to apply the Platonic politics to Roman affairs. Of any treatise having for its special object the consideration of the material causes which affect the prosperity of nations, we have no trace. The opulence of one nation was sought by the impoverishment of another, not by an increase in the sum total of production; and slavery, in ancient times, supplied the place of machinery in ours.

History, so far as it touches on domestic life at all, is a record of the continual struggles of those who desire to labour, and reap its fruits for themselves, and those who wish others to labour for them. Monarchy, military force, feudality, monachism, ecclesiasticism, &c., are names denotive, in part, of the irreproductive consumption of labour. Borough-right, civic charters, monopolies, patents, &c., are names given to means employed, in part, for the security of industry in a proportion of the results of labour. The maritime laws of Barcelona, about the middle of the eleventh century, were other securities gained by industry from the hands of power. “The running to and fro on the face of the earth,” occasioned by the Crusades, increased the means of diffusing wealth, and led greatly

to the development of commerce. Consuls, factories, parliaments, states-general, &c., came prominently into use, and wealth arrogated to itself a place and a power in the state. The Italian republics had early learned the worth of commerce, and had acquired, through its means, a magnificent prosperity. Compters and exchanges were fashioned into utility by them, and they first saw the need of labour for the enrichment of man. Commerce, without production, was impossible, and without commerce they could neither maintain their credit nor their grandeur. Growing demands stimulated production, and industry was encouraged, besides being, as it was called, *protected*. It is ever so,—

“Vaulting ambition doth o'erleap herself,
And fall on the other side.”

The system which gave them greatness, fettered industry elsewhere, and consequently lessened the possibility of exchanges. In the hands of an oligarchy its commerce declined. America was discovered; the precious metals became abundant, and money (coin) was plentiful, but impoverishing. Here was a paradox the vulgar could not comprehend, for (what they called) riches produced poverty. In Italy, Davanzati, Serra, Bandini, Montanas, Broggia, Carli, Verri, Beccaria, Vasco, Galiani, Genovesi, &c., have written on the subject of money with, for their time, much judiciousness, lucidity, and originality. Holland, through Grotius and Vattel, contributed to the adjustment of international law, and through Jacob Vanderlint, to the knowledge of the true worth of money. France supplies, in speculations upon money, trade, and labour, the names of Sully, Fénelon, Forbonnais, Melon, Gournay, Quesnay, Colbert, &c.; while in our own country, Thomas Mun, Mr. Asgill, Sir Josiah Child, Sir William Petty, Sir Dudley North, Sir Matthew Decker, Mr. Massie, Mr. Nicholas Barbon, are some of those who directed their studies to monetary science.

Mr. Fortrey, John Locke, &c., directed attention to the fallacy of regarding money (coin) as anything else than a commodity, to the necessity for industry, to the laws of commerce, to the need*for facilities of exchange, and for the desirableness of recognizing money as the representative of labour, as worthy of a place in the management of affairs. All these tentatives towards the establishment of a *science of value* originated in the felt wants of men. A policy grounded on a false theory of value was destructive to effort and enterprise, and productive of indescribable misery. Yet all the activities of men were stirring for an outlet. Risk even ran into rashness. The splendid but visionary projects of the once famous John Law had found a public ready and anxious to seize upon any source of profit which would bring their money into use. The wide-spread bankruptcy, in which they ended, set speculation on the rack to learn the true secrets of money and taxation. The eagerness with which the East India Company was formed, Paterson's

Darien scheme was patronized, the South African Company was set up, and the instantaneous readiness with which the starting stocks of the Bank of England and the Bank of Scotland were subscribed, are further evidences of the extraordinary eagerness for the employment of capital and the attainment of profit, for the acquisition of wealth and the conveniences and luxuries it can provide. All these experiments in exchangeability, in the distribution of the supplies of one nation, so as to gain the products of the industry of another, must have given occasion for a large expenditure of thought on the means of enrichment and the mode of effecting—best, easiest, and quickest—the increase of wealth. The problem was one of paramount importance, and a solution was eagerly sought. Singularly enough, it was in one of the poorest, and, at that time, one of the least mercantile nations of Europe that the nearest approximation to the truth was found; and that a safe basis was laid for securing the true prosperity of nations and of individuals—so far as they are parts of one community. Turgot, Condorcet, and Mirabeau, *Ami des hommes* (father of Mirabeau, “Swallower of formulas,” as Carlyle calls him), were engaged on this subject. Montesquieu, by the confession of Maupertius, did not include in his plan “*cette partie essentielle qui regarde les commerce, les finances, la population; science si nouvelle parmi nous, qu’elle n’y a encore point de nom. C’est chez nos Voisins qu’elle est née.*” Adam Smith first gave this science a systematic form, and so became its founder.

Adam Smith was born, on 5th June, 1723, in the town of Kirkcaldy, on the shore of the Frith of Forth, in the county of Fife, Scotland. His father was a native of Aberdeenshire, a writer to the Signet in Edinburgh, private secretary to the Earl of Loudon (while Chief Secretary of State for Scotland and Keeper of the Great Seal), Clerk to the Councils of War in Scotland, and Comptroller of the Customs at Kirkcaldy. His mother was Margaret Douglas, daughter of Mr. Douglas, of Strathenrie, a small estate in the neighbourhood of Leslie, in Fifeshire. The wedded life of his parents was short. He was the only fruit of their union, and his father, whose name he bore—died some months before the birth of his son. The education of the posthumous, fatherless child fell entirely upon his mother, a woman of exemplary life, singular intelligence, and affectionate fidelity. He was, during infancy, delicate and weakly, and was, therefore, considerably indulged. One day, while visiting his uncle at Strathenrie, he was stolen by gipsies. By a lucky accident he was missed, sought for, and at last found in the vagrants’ temporary settlement in Leslie Wood. He was educated at the grammar school of Kirkcaldy, then taught by a person of great ability—Mr. David Millar. Smith was noticeable, even during his school-days, for a passionate love of books. At the age of fourteen, he matriculated in the University of Glasgow. Here he studied the literature of Greece and Rome, mathematics, natural philosophy, and logic. In 1740, he went to Balliol College,

Oxford, as Bursar, on Snell's foundation (instituted 1688), on the nomination of the University, with an allowance of £90 per annum, tenable for ten years. Three of his professors during his Glasgow student years were George Ross, an elegant Latin scholar; Robert Simson, the eminent mathematician; and Francis Hutcheson, the moralist. It gives us a high opinion of the precocious development of Smith's powers to know that the sage who systematized the theories of Butler and Shaftesbury regarding the moral sense, recommended him to David Hume as a person of sufficient discrimination to comprehend, and of sufficient merit to be worthy of receiving, a presentation copy of Hume's "Treatise of Human Nature," and that, too, before he had completed his seventeenth year. This copy was afterwards seized, in a sudden midnight visitation, by the authorities of Oxford, and he was reprimanded by the "heads" for possessing and studying it. The impression made on him by Oxford life does not on the whole appear to have been very favourable, as we may see in reading "The Wealth of Nations," book v. chap. i. article 2. He remained at Balliol College seven years, but he does not appear to have performed more than the mere routine of duty demanded from students, and to have devoted himself more to the study of polite literature, the modern languages, and philosophic speculation, than to the attainment of collegiate excellence in the branches of education prescribed in the *curriculum*. He was intended for the Episcopal Church; but his own tastes did not incline in that direction, and, contrary to the prudent wishes of his friends, he left Oxford, and returned to Kirkcaldy, determined upon cultivating literature, in the hope that some of the moderate competences which Scotland then afforded might fall to his lot.

For two years Smith quietly settled down—to think. In 1748, he presented his literary claims to the Society of Edinburgh, and under the patronage of Henry Home, Lord Kames, read a course of lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. During session 1750-51 he was Professor of Logic in the University of Glasgow; but was transferred by next session to the chair of Moral Philosophy, vacant by the death of Dr. Craigie, the immediate successor of his own instructor, Francis Hutcheson. The latter situation he held for twelve years; as candidates for the former, among others, there appeared David Hume and Edmund Burke, but the successorship was conferred on a Mr. Clow. One of Smith's pupils—John Millar, afterwards Professor of Law in the University of Glasgow—supplied Professor Dugald Stuart, the earliest biographer of Smith, with an interesting account of his method of teaching, from which we make the following excerpt regarding the logical training he pursued:—"After exhibiting a general view of the powers of the mind, and explaining so much of the ancient logic as was requisite to gratify curiosity with respect to an artificial method of reasoning which had once occupied the universal attention of the learned, he dedicated all the rest of his time to the delivery of a system of rhetoric and *belles lettres*." It is quite evident that this plan, though some-

what too servilely adhered to by his successors, in deference to his great reputation, was merely a temporary means of accommodating his duties to the exigencies arising from an appointment made too late in the year to allow of adequate preparation, and that he used his Edinburgh lectures as an *exc* to lessen the laboriousness of the task of preparing for a class so onerous. It is not likely that, had he continued Professor of Logic, he would have adhered to this plan. It is, in fact, a palpable practical *ignoratio elenchi*—an attaining of an irrelevant conclusion by shifting ground. His course on Moral Philosophy was better planned and more thoroughly worked out. It treated—I. Of Natural Theology, under the two divisions—(a) the nature and attributes of God; (b) the religious faculties in man. II. Ethics, or Personal Morality. III. Justice, or Public Morality. IV. Expediency; or the best means capable of being employed to increase public and personal happiness, prosperity, and power. The chief thoughts included under Part II. were reproduced in his celebrated work on the “Moral Sentiments;” and those of Part IV. were developed into the “Wealth of Nations.” Parts I. and III. were never published in any other form than orally, though the tenor of his speculations on the latter of these points may be regarded as pretty fairly before us in the “Historical View of the English Government,” and other works of Professor Millar, who, in fact, attained his chair mainly through the influence of Kames, Smith, and Hume.

Smith's mode of descanting on morals was not only original, but attractive; his “reputation as a professor was accordingly raised very high:” “those branches of science which he taught became fashionable,” “and his opinions were the chief topics of discussion in clubs and literary societies.” They had occupied his mind during a series of years, and their germs had been noted by himself in the quiet of Kirkcaldy, and were extended by an amanuensis during his stay (1748—1750) in Edinburgh. They were, however, only publicly and professorially taught subsequently to 1752. Hutcheson, Hume, and Kames, had stricken the fire from the flint; but the fire had been latent, and they had hit on the right material. They gave the impulse; but the results are all and truly his own. He gained from them the initiative touch, but he made and kept a path for himself.

During a great portion of his life he was a martyr to hypochondria; an inveterate scurvy, and a singular nervile disease, which caused his head to shake spasmodically, slightly impeding his speech, and occasioned several peculiarities of manner. While a student in Balliol, the repute of Berkeley's “Siris,”—a treatise on the virtues of tar-water,—reached him, and he placed himself under the prescribed regimen—with little permanent benefit, however. We can scarcely doubt that the other works of that learned, reflective, and pious bishop had also then attracted his notice. We are inclined to believe that Smith must have been the person who interested the philosopher of Cloyne in the projected folio publication of Plato by

the printers Foulis, undertaken about 1751, shortly after his advent in Glasgow. About the same time, the literary and philosophical society of the western metropolis of Scotland was instituted, and in it Smith read those essays on "Taste, Composition, and the History of Philosophy," which he had prepared while holding the lectureship on Rhetoric in the legal capital. Dr. Robert Watson, author of a "History of Philip II. of Spain," continued on the same plan the course of prelections on literature which Smith had begun in Edinburgh; and when Watson was appointed Professor of Logic and Rhetoric in St. Salvador's College, St. Andrew's, Dr. Hugh Blair took up the same theme in those "Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres" on which his fame chiefly rests, and which led to the establishment of the Regius professorship on that subject in Edinburgh University. It is pleasing to think that Smith proved his friendliness to his successors by unmistakeable services, *e. g.*, permitting the use of his MS. prelections to Dr. Blair, as he acknowledges in a note to his XVIIIth Lecture. The noblest minds are least chary of their claims to fame, and most communicative of those thoughts which, in the aftertime, change manners, laws, and institutions. But that frank freedom from an all-absorbing selfishness ought not to reach the length of supine indifference to truth; and hence, in 1755, Adam Smith drew up an abstract of his teachings, begun in 1748, and written out for him by an amanuensis during 1749, to show that, though he might have been forestalled in absolute publication, his opinions had been the genuine results of his own independent speculations.

In the same year (1755) an effort was made to establish, in Edinburgh, a periodical of a higher literary tone and of a more original character, than those then published. It assumed the name—since much more popularized—*The Edinburgh Review*, and was issued twice. Among its contributors were Robertson, the historian; Blair, the rhetorician; Russell, the naturalist; Home, the dramatist; Wedderburn, afterwards Lord Loughborough; Jardine (editor, I think), a clergyman; Smith, and other members of the *Poker Club* in Edinburgh—so called from its usefulness in stirring into manifest activity the intellect of its members. Singular enough, Hume was neither a contributor to its pages, nor in the secret of its origin. Its projectors were afraid of his good nature. Unless it were a review of Hume's "Essays," written during his college years (of which sight has been lost), the contributions made to this periodical were the earliest which Smith gave to the press. They consisted of—1st, a "criticism of Dr. Samuel Johnson's 'Dictionary'" (then just published), a paper of great merit, in which, while admitting the laborious talent exhibited in that important work, he objects to the want of classification in the explanations, and its deficiency in acute analysis and discrimination; 2nd, a letter to the editors, advocating an extension of the original scheme—which confined the criticisms to works issued in Scotland—and giving, in the course of his argument, under the guise of illustration, an

account of the literature of the continent at that time. The composition of these pieces is ingenious and elegant, and the work altogether fair for its time; but the Church rose in arms, militant against this organ of Philosophy, and the light was put out for a season.

The opportunity of expounding his opinions in the scattered form which gives immediate applicability to thought having thus been taken away, Smith seems to have determined upon making an effort to fix his ideas in the minds of men by an authoritative exposition, in preference to trusting his views and reputation to the notes of his students or the memory of hearers. With the intention of trying his foot on ground as yet but seldom trodden by Scottish thinkers, he reproduced, in the form of a book, the greater part of the doctrines contained in the second or ethical portion of his professional course of lectures, with the title of "The Theory of Moral Sentiments." This work was issued early in 1759. While it was in the press, a scheme was set on foot for buying out the interest of Mr. (afterwards Dr.) John Stevenson, Professor of Rational or Instrumental Philosophy,—i. e., Logic,—in favour of Smith, and of arranging for the successorship to his chair, in Glasgow, of Mr. (afterwards Dr.) Adam Ferguson. He did not, however, feel inclined to pay £1,200 for Stevenson's reversion, and the plan was not proceeded with. At this time we infer from a postscript in one of Hume's letters to him on this subject,—viz., "Lord Milton can, with his finger, stop the foul mouths of the roarers against heresy,"—that he was lying somewhat under the suspicions of the Church; naturally enough excited by his intimacy with Kames, Hume, Home, Carlyle, Ferguson, Jardine, &c., against whom an indefatigable crusade had been waged by a party at whose head figured the burly veteran of the Presbytery, the Rev. George Anderson.

"In the early part of Mr. Smith's life," says Professor Dugald Stewart, "it is well known to his friends that he was, for several years, attached to a young lady of great beauty and accomplishments. How far his addresses were favourably received, or what the circumstances were which prevented their union, I have not been able to learn; but I believe it is pretty certain, that after this disappointment he laid aside all thoughts of marriage. The lady to whom I allude died also unmarried. She survived Mr. Smith a considerable number of years, and was alive long after the publication of the first edition of this memoir (1793). I had the pleasure of seeing her when she was turned of eighty, and she still retained evident traces of her former beauty. The powers of her understanding and the gaiety of her person seemed to have suffered nothing from the hand of Time." It is not easy to guess at the facts of a subject so studiously concealed, yet as among the arguments employed by Hume to induce Smith to take up his quarters in Edinburgh, we find the following *arch*-allurement—"I had a letter from Miss Hepburn, where she regrets very much that you are settled at Glasgow, and that we had the chance of seeing you so

seldom ;" and as this is the only lady mentioned in their correspondence, we can scarcely be far from the mark, under the circumstances, if we conclude that Miss Hepburn was the *affiancée* from whom, by some freak of time, circumstance, temper, or temperament, he either was, or became, estranged. Did he at this time really believe that "the loss of a leg may generally be regarded as a more real calamity than the loss of a mistress"?* or was this only a spirit of ill humour jerked forth as a retaliative in a quarrel? Or, was his expressed preference for "the gaiety of Ovid and the gallantry of Horace" over "the grave, pedantic, and long-sentenced love of Cowley and Petrarch,† the cause or the effect of the unsympathizing celibacy of this pair of excellent people—in whom, it would seem, the light of love never died, though its heat decayed—else why their unwedded lives? We know not. It seems a mystery of the passions. Is his portrait of a prudent man, in the "Theory of Moral Sentiments, part vi. sec. i., intended for a study in autobiography,—is it Smith's ideal of himself at this time? It bears in many points the appearance of being, as the painters say, "a study from life." But we have digressed; let us return.

Hume, then resident in London, greeted "The Theory of Moral Sentiments" heartily; and so early as 12th April, 1759, posted a pleasantly tantalizing, good-humoured, and kindly letter announcing its success. We can only afford space for one or two brief excerpts—in which the spice is omitted—about the book, viz.,—"I give you thanks for the agreeable present of your "Theory." Wedderburn and I made presents of our copies to such of our acquaintances as we thought good judges and proper to spread the reputation of the book. I sent one to the Duke of Argyle [Archibald, 3rd duke]; Lord Lyttleton [the poet and historian]; Horace Walpole [of Strawberry Hill]; Soame Jennyns [author of "The Art of Dancing," and "Inquiry into the Nature and Origin of Evil," &c.], and Burke, an Irish gentleman who wrote lately a very pretty treatise "On the Sublime [and the Beautiful]." Millar [bookseller in the Strand] desired my permission to send one in your name to Dr. Warburton [author of "The Divine Legation of Moses," and just then raised to the see of Gloucester]. . . . I proceed to inform you that your book has been very unfortunate, for the public seem disposed to applaud it extremely. It was looked for by the foolish people with some impatience; and the mob of *litterati* are beginning already to be very loud in its praises. Three bishops called yesterday at Millar's shop in order to buy copies and to ask questions about the author. . . . Millar exults, and brags that two-thirds of the edition are already sold, and that he is now sure of success. . . . Charles Townshend, who passes for the cleverest fellow in England, is so taken with the performance, that he said to Oswald [M.P. for the Kirkcaldy burghs] he would put the Duke of Buc-

* "Theory of Moral Sentiments," part i. sec. 2, chap. i.

† *Ibid.* i. 2, ii.

cleugh under the author's care, and would make it worth his while to accept of that charge."* On 29th May Hume writes to Dr. Robertson, "Our friend Smith is very successful here;"† and on 28th July he forwards additional gratifying notices of the sensation his book had created, referring at the same time to the preparation of a *second* edition.‡ This success was not only pleasing but profitable, both immediately and in its results; nor was it undeserved.

"The Theory of Moral Sentiments" is a work at once ingenious, comprehensive, and original, rich in accurate observation, and remarkable for its acute analysis of facts and feelings. It is a repertory of statements and ideas of the greatest value to students of human nature. No intelligent reader can close its pages without being struck with the grace of his style, the delicate keenness of his thought, the singular felicity of his expositions of the workings of human thought and passion, the elegance of his method of reasoning, and the stimulant healthiness of his tone. It is hardly likely that any one will now coincide with him in his "Theory," but few can fail to be delighted with the skill, clearness, feeling, and eloquence of this first great systematic investigator of man's sympathetic nature. A very brief abstract will be sufficient to put the reader in possession of the leading thoughts in the treatise; but no *résumé* can touch the harp of the heart so thrillingly as in some of its finer toned passages the "Theory" succeeds in doing.

Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury, first introduced into the language of philosophy the term *moral sense*; Bishop Butler's, "Sermons" are implicitly, though not professedly, based upon that same idea, namely, the existence in the very core and centre of man's nature of an innate regulative moral sense,—conscience; and Francis Hutcheson (whose pupil Smith was) gave the theory of the moral sense its ultimate scientific development. These were all revolts against the selfish system of Hobbes, which decreed that enjoyment was the directive law of life. But "an ingenious and agreeable philosopher" had since arisen, whom Smith justly characterizes as one "who joins the greatest depth of thought to the greatest elegance of expression, and possesses the singular and happy talent of treating the abstrusest subjects not only with the most perfect perspicuity, but with the most lively eloquence." This was Hume. His *punctum essentiale* was utility. Against this conclusion Smith's "Theory" was the earliest reaction. He says,—"How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature which interest him in the fortunes of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it." "To denote this fellow-feeling with any passion whatever,"—he uses the term sympathy—which "enlivens joy and alleviates grief." We

* Burton's "Life of Hume," vol. ii. p. 57.

† *Ibid.* vol. ii. p. 55.

‡ *Ibid.* vol. ii. p. 59.

sympathize, admire, and approve of what we feel to be right, and we feel that to be right with which others sympathize. Propriety excites our sympathy instinctively and at once, and hence is the standard of moral goodness. The best actions excite universal and unmingled sympathy, and in the proportionate degree in which our actions fail to attain the instinctive, pure, and exceptionless sympathy of our fellows, our acts are wanting in true goodness. The fundamental maxim of morals is, then,—Act so that all men—or at least the greatest possible number of men—may sympathize with you. Experience indicates the kind and degree of conduct and sentiment with which men sympathize; this experience, when generalized into rules, forms the moral code from which we derive our sense of duty, and by reference to which we judge of merit and demerit. Prudence is virtue, and beneficence is the most genuine prudence, not because it is *useful* only, but because it commands and obtains the widest and the most unequivocal sympathy. Of course the above sentences are little more than the scaffolding of that great temple of moral science which Smith reared. Its pictured walls, its traceried pillars, its illumined windows, its arched dome, are gone. Not even a model—which the above outline is far from being—could give any adequate idea of its grace, grandeur, elevating tendency, and exquisite ratiocination,—“Naught but itself can be its parallel.”

It will at once be seen that this theory is vitiated by the omission of several links in the chain of thought; and, by not carrying analysis to its ultimate bound, the true conclusion is not reached; for, 1st, if sympathy is the *motive* of action, and if from our experience of the emotions excited in us, and inferred to be similarly educed in others, we deduce rules for our moral life, it is evident that in the last resource we come to Reason as the lawgiver of morality, and erect it into the unchangeable sovereign of our affections or feelings; and, 2nd, if we depend for our inducements to and our rules for moral conduct on the sympathy of others, our capacity for leading or even comprehending a moral life would be proportioned to the amount of our intercourse with men,—annihilated in solitude, minimized in the country, and maximized in the city. This all experience contradicts. But the feeling of *right* in the human soul has a source far higher than the current level of society, and a rule that transcends the mere inductions of man's conduct to man; and men would not have given a name to *conscience*, or realized—and almost *personalized*—it, unless they had felt that a sanctioning power did indeed exist within them, whose decisions were of a higher authority than the observation, systematization, and generalization of the phenomena of action. The motive and the emotive powers of the soul derive direction and energy from a main-stream, of which sympathy is only an affluent. It often happens that the affluent troubles the main-stream, and seeks to turn it into new channels; but it is always resistant, even when at length for the time being overpowered. Who are

martyrs, patriots, missionaries, epoch-creators in general, but men who have bent the whole energy of their natures to the working out of some grand moral aim, in which they condemn the current sympathy of their age and country, stem its onflow, and bring it back at length into the channel of *right*? Are not reform and virtue words which signify an energetic striving to withstand the lower and commoner sympathies of our nature, and of the sphere in which we move; a protest against the levelling of our actions to the merely possible and plausible, and an uprising into the higher elements of being? Sympathy is a blessed thing, but it is not that which leads to our being ever-blessed, not that to which our *last* appeal must be made. The foundation of the stately temple is unsound, and few worshippers have mingled with the admiring crowds its novelty and elegance drew to it.

The scales of some minds are too fine, too nicely adjusted for common purposes;—diamond scales will not do for weighing wool. Very refined, very ingenious, very philosophical minds, are all too scrupulous weighers: their scales turn with the millionth of a grain, and are all, from some cause, subject to the defect of indecision. They see too well how much can be said on both sides of a question. There is a sort of philosophical doubt, arising from enlargement of the understanding, quite different from the irresolution of character which is caused by infirmity of will; and when once some of these over scrupulous weighers come to a balance, that instant they become most wilful. After excessive indecision they perhaps start suddenly to a rash action.—*Edgeworth.*

Perhaps the leading distinction of superior intellect is a power of compression; a faculty which pre-supposes that of generalization. A subordinate understanding never perceives more than certain fragments or mutilated portions of a subject,—surveying the field of thought as a landscape through a tube.—*W. B. Clulow.*

Self-delusion is ever averse from inquiry, though by inquiry alone can the charm be dissolved.—*Dr. Parr.*

Compilation is a task of far greater difficulty than the production of what is original: though there is no comparison between their intellectual merit or their praise, whatever may be the case as to their respective utility. It is in literature as in life; the most laborious departments are the most necessary, yet often the least appreciated or lucrative.—*W. B. Clulow.*

Conclusions from partial reasoning often, perhaps always, make more difficulties than they remove.—*W. Danby.*

It is only by comparison that we can judge of anything: absolute knowledge is not given us to possess; the knowledge of truth, especially of the highest truth, must be progressive: let us then not quarrel with the slowness of our progress, or with the imperfection of our convictions; but doing what we can to improve them, let us wait with patience for their final accomplishment.—*W. Danby.*

Religion.

IS THE CATHOLIC RULE OF FAITH TRUE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

I SHALL assume that I am arguing, not with infidels, but with persons who profess some form of Christianity. And that I may not be accused of begging the question, I would remind my readers that as much was granted to Protestants in the preceding debate. We pointed out the difficulties which a Protestant must encounter in proving his Rule of Faith; but allowed it to be taken for granted that the New Testament was a true record, so far as it went, of the sayings and doings of our Lord and His apostles. The inspiration of that book was not disputed; but we endeavoured to show that the grounds upon which a Protestant believes it were fallacious.

It is worthy of remark, that the teaching of the Catholic Church is *positive*. She attacks nothing that has gone before, for the simple reason, that she dates the commencement of her creed centuries before that of any other church or sect. The heresies that have arisen have been condemned by her as soon as they appeared. Protestantism, on the contrary, is—as its very name imports—a protest against certain opinions which existed before it. The celebrated Edmund Burke has said that Protestantism is “a mere negation;” than which a truer description could not be given.

As some of the affirmative writers in the last debate do not appear to have read the negative articles with much attention; and as the writer of the first negative article in the present has quoted several texts which have been already refuted, I trust I shall be excused if, in my present article, I repeat some of the texts and arguments previously made use of.

The Catholic Rule has been described by “Ignatius” as consisting of the *whole* word of God; viz., Holy Scripture, and Divine tradition.

The term Church is usually understood to signify either a place in which Christians meet together for the worship of God,—a local association of Christians under proper government (as the Church of Ephesus, &c.),—or the whole Christian society, the Head of which is Jesus Christ.*

The existence of a body called Christians is a matter of history, notorious to the world. The Christians were well known, from the

* “Theophylact” has confused the three meanings of the word most lamentably in his opening article.

time of their Founder, as believers in peculiar doctrines never before heard of; as offerers of sacrifices to a God, of whose name Rome was then ignorant; and were, under various emperors, the constant mark for cruelty and fanaticism. That they were believers in certain tenets, now branded by Protestants as corrupt, may be easily gathered from their own writings, the writings of their heathen enemies, and the records they have left us in the catacombs. That they had bishops to rule over them, priests to offer the eucharistic sacrifice, and to perform the various functions still exercised by the priesthood,—deacons to assist at the altar and in the church, and to distribute the alms; and that there existed at Rome a bishop who governed the whole Church,—appointed bishops, and sent forth missionaries,—are all facts which history, whether Christian or pagan, will amply testify.

I shall, therefore, proceed to show that the authority upon which a Catholic believes in Christianity is founded upon truth; and that the Church, whose Rule of Faith we are now discussing, is the true Church, and, in consequence, teaches us the true faith.

In the previous debate we showed that Scripture alone is insufficient to direct us in matters of religion; and that those who profess to be guided by its dictates alone are, in reality, only following their own opinions, ostensibly based upon that book. That Scripture, by itself, is sufficient to direct us, *if interpreted rightly*, no one will pretend to dispute. The question is, What is the right interpretation? Who is to assure us that the meaning we put upon certain texts is correct? Protestants have no such guiding power among themselves, as their innumerable and irreconcilable divisions testify. The actual Protestant Rule of Faith is private interpretation, in contradistinction to the authoritative interpretation of the Catholic Church. The Church founds her interpretation upon the Holy Scriptures, and upon the true interpretation of them as delivered by the apostles to the fathers, who left the truth as a sacred deposit entrusted to the Church, which we believe to be immediately and constantly under the guidance and protection of the Holy Spirit.

I shall, therefore, point out some of the texts referring to the Rule of Faith, and the promises made for the perpetuity of it.

Before our Lord visited this earth as our Redeemer, the Almighty had made many promises of a church which was to take the place of the Jewish, and was to embrace not only the favoured nation, but all people. As the gorgeous magnificence of the temple was substituted for the beautiful but far inferior tabernacle, so the church which the Son of God was to found was, in turn, to supplant the entire Jewish dispensation. It was promised that Christ "should teach us His ways," and we should "walk in His paths."* No weapon formed against the Church should prosper; and every tongue which resisted her she should condemn;† and that the

* Isa. ii. 3.

† Isa. liv. 17.

nation and kingdom which would not serve her should perish.* "She was not to be ashamed nor confounded; for she should not be put to shame."† And God further promises that He will make her an "ETERNAL excellence:"‡ and in the same chapter He says, "Thou shalt call thy walls *salvation*; the Lord shall be unto thee an *everlasting* light, thy sun shall go down *no more*, and thy moon shall be *no more* diminished" (ver. 18). Again, she is called "a *crown of glory: delight of the Almighty*;"§ and a promise is made that God would direct their work in truth, and would make an *everlasting* covenant with them;|| and added to these are the following:—"There shall come a Redeemer unto Zion, and to them that shall return from iniquity in Jacob. As for me, this is my covenant with them: *My spirit which is in thee, and my words that I have put in thy mouth*, shall not depart out of thy mouth, nor out of the mouth of thy seed, nor out of the mouth of thy seed's seed, *from henceforth and for ever*."¶ "I will set my sanctuary in the midst of them for evermore."** And that, in the time of Christ, "the eyes of the blind shall be opened, and a highway shall be there, and it shall be called the way of holiness . . . so that fools shall not err therein."††

Now, it will be observed that in the Protestant Bible the above texts are, by the headings of the chapters, referred to the Church of Christ. In the Catholic Bible it is the same. How is it, then, that any difficulty arises in ascertaining what body, styling itself a Church, tallies most closely with the Church described in the prophecies?‡‡ These texts undeniably point to some visible body, unmistakeably apparent to the eyes of all mankind. A Protestant "Church" does not exist. Protestantism is a mere conglomeration of hostile elements. But there is a church claiming to be the only true one, which declares that those texts apply to her, and to her alone. The Catholic Church has always consistently affirmed that, besides her, there is no true church; that she alone is the depository of the promises of the Founder, and that she alone can point with unfailling and undoubted certainty to the long line of teachers, from Peter downwards to Pius IX. She dates her existence, not from any "Reformation," nor does she claim for herself a heretical sect appearing now and then in the course of fifteen centuries. She has been a prominent object in the eyes of the world, whether in the days of Nero or Caligula, of Pepin or Charlemagne, of Henry VIII. or Victoria. Such as she is now, so was she in the first ages,—a visible Church,—never hidden, though often overclouded.

When our Saviour came upon earth, He came "not to destroy" the dispensation which His Father had given to the Jews, but "to fulfil it." The Christian was to take the place of the Jewish law, but was to be a continuation and development of it,—not its

* Isa. lx. 12.

† Isa. liv. 4.

‡ Isa. lx. 15.

§ Isa. lxii. 3.

|| Isa. lxi. 8.

¶ Isa. lix. 20.

** Ezek. xxxvii. 24.

†† Isa. xxxv. 5.

‡‡ I have only selected the above texts from a vast number I had marked for quotation, as I have no desire to trespass on the Editor's kindness.

destroyer. The priesthood and the sacrifice were not to be swept away, but the offering was to be that which they had before only offered in type. The altars were still to stand in the magnificent temple,* and He himself set us the example of frequenting the Church at stated hours for prayer. He speaks of His own Church several times. He declares that it is "to be founded upon a rock," which name He bestows upon the disciple who was to be the head and key-stone of it, and that "the gates of hell should not prevail against it." He compares it to a city set upon a hill, which could not be hid; it is the light of the world; a grain of mustard-seed growing up to an immense tree; and His promises to sustain it are many and frequent. He bestows upon His apostles the office of teachers; He gives to them powers second only to His own; He sends them forth into the world armed with His Spirit, and renders them invincible by His own might.

The apostles were chosen by our Lord from among the rest of mankind. Their number was peculiar—twelve—agreeing with the number of the Jewish tribes. To them were made certain promises, viz., that our Lord "would be with them *all days, for ever*;"† that when He was no more visible to them, He "would send the Paraclete, who should abide with them *for ever*;"‡ and they are sent forth by our Lord to "teach *all nations*."

When Judas, by his sin, lost his apostleship, the remaining eleven met together and elected a successor in his place. This, be it remembered, was *after* the ascension of our Lord. As these promises of the perpetual presence of Christ were made to those whom he sent to teach, the practice of the apostles in appointing successors shows clearly that they conceived the promises as extending to the chief teachers of the church, call them apostles, bishops, patriarchs, or whatever name you will. The promises were that He would be with them for ever. As they were not to live for ever, the words are unintelligible, unless they refer also to those who were to succeed them. That the apostles understood it in this sense may be inferred from the fact of their appointing bishops, to whom the care of the new churches was committed. When, then, a point of doctrine was disputed, reference was made to the bishops, who decided the matter for the Church. Thus, when a dispute once arose upon the subject of circumcision, a conference of bishops was held at Jerusalem, where the matter was settled.§ We do not read that the Bible was referred to; but as the decree of the Council declared that the Holy Ghost concurred in its decisions, we may safely conclude that the promise to be with the apostles extended also to their successors, for we are distinctly told that S. Paul, Titus, and Barnabas, were there, and the promise was not given to each of them personally.||

* It will be remembered that the destruction of Jerusalem and its temple was in consequence of the Jews' rejection of our Lord. See S. Luke xxi.; S. Matt. xxiii., &c.

† S. Matt. xxviii. 20.

‡ S. John xvi. 16.

§ Gal. ii.

|| Acts xv. 24; Gal. ii. 1.

The teachers were sent by the apostles to the early churches, precisely as our Lord sent the apostles, only the apostles were not sent to any special place. These teachers were set over the churches, as in the case of Titus, the first Bishop of Crete,* and of Timothy, Bishop of Ephesus.† The Hebrews are told to “obey their prelates, and submit themselves to them, as they watch for their souls, “as they that must give account;”‡ and S. Paul tells the bishops of the Church of Ephesus to take heed to themselves, and to the whole flock, whence the Holy Ghost had placed them bishops to rule the Church of God.§

If, then, a succession of teachers be proved, and it be admitted that the promises, which were to last for ever, were intended to extend to the bishops of the nineteenth century, as well as those of the first, it necessarily follows that to those bishops we must have recourse in matters of doubt upon any point of our faith. They alone are able to settle the canon of Scripture;—they alone can inform us of the true interpretation of it;—and they alone can tell us what is necessary for salvation. And these things they do tell us; and it rests with ourselves to accept or reject their teaching.

If the Church, which these bishops represent, be the true Church of Christ, it will possess the fourfold work of Unity, Catholicity, Holiness, and Apostolicity.

I. And is it not *one*? Has Christ’s earnest desire that His Church “might be one, even as He and His Father are one,” come to nought?¶ Is it no longer necessary for Christians to “continue in one mind,”¶ as in the days of the apostles? Are we no longer to “avoid them that cause divisions contrary to the faith we have learned from” apostolic teachers?*** S. Paul adjures the Corinthians to speak the same thing, and to have no divisions among them, but to be perfectly joined together in the same mind and the same judgment.†† Does the “one faith” which S. Paul puts on an equality with “one Lord, and one God and Father over all,”†† no longer exist? Is there no longer “one fold and one Shepherd?”§§ or are there Wesleyan, Independent, and Baptist folds possessing separate shepherds?

Protestants are certainly forced to strange extremes, when they fly in the face of Scripture itself, and declare unity of no importance. The Catholic Church, the unfailing object of the attacks of her enemies, constantly holds before the face of her children the necessity of remaining in one mind, and of holding fast “the faith once delivered to the saints,” and to avoid all novelties in religion, whether propounded by Luther, Voltaire, or Joe Smith.

* Titus i. 6.

† Tim. i. 3.

‡ Heb. xiii. 17. Although “prelates,” in the Protestant version, is translated, “Them that rule over you,” it does not destroy the meaning, which is sufficiently demonstrated by the context.

§ Acts xx. 28.

¶ S. John xvii. 21.

¶ Acts iv. 32.

** Rom. xvi. 17.

†† 1 Cor. i. 10.

†† Ephes. iv. 5, 6.

§§ S. John x. 16.

In the Catholic Church, unity is its very heart and soul. No adverse teaching anywhere exists in her. She alone, of all professed Christian bodies, is not "a house divided against herself." Truth is one; and it is, therefore, impossible to wander from the unity of truth, without falling into error. It is the oneness of Catholic truth which has held the Church together for nineteen centuries; and as unity is impossible amongst Protestants, they are carrying their divisions to the fullest extent, and rushing into the arms of rationalism and infidelity.

II. The Catholic Church is holy,—in her doctrine, in her pastors, and in her children. It may seem invidious to speak in this manner, but I will avoid any comparisons. The Church teaches her children the truth of the doctrines of Almighty God, and by every means strives to induce them to follow the humility, the faith, and loving charity which must fit them for their eternal home. The clergy are, as a body, remarkable for their devotion and patient ministering to the spiritual wants of the laity; while the latter are always looked upon by Protestants as being very "strict." No doubt my Protestant readers will bear me out in this.

It will be no reply to this to say that many Catholics, both clerical and lay,—even some of the popes themselves,—have been guilty of great sins; as although the Church invites her children to practise holiness, it has not, of course, the power to compel. It is left, as God leaves our own salvation in our own hands, to accept or reject it as we think proper. The tares and the wheat must still grow together until the harvest, when they will be separated.

III. The Church is catholic, that is, universal. The apostles were sent to teach all nations, to preach the Gospel to every creature, and the Church consequently embraces all nations; her religion is professed in every country on the face of the earth; and this can be said of no other religion whatever. The Catholic Church has held firmly to her doctrines, and always professed the same faith, while those who taught otherwise have been separated from her and condemned. As Arius and his followers started an heretical novelty, and were all excommunicated by the Church, so was Luther, when his new-born religion first made its appearance.

I have no desire to quarrel with the Church of England, which assumes the title of Catholic. I doubt not that many in that body would be glad to get rid not only of the name, but also of the creeds which contain it; but the assumption of the name Catholic is in the face of facts.

IV. The Church is apostolical, deriving her doctrines from the apostles, and tracing her spiritual descent with undoubted clearness from them. Her creeds are apostolic; her services and even ceremonies are from the same fountain-head.

That the traditions forming part of the Rule of Faith of the Catholic Church are warranted by Scripture, I will proceed to show as briefly as possible.

Our Lord commissioned His apostles to "go and teach all

nations all things, whatsoever He had commanded them."* He sent them, "even as His Father had sent Him,"† and invested them with an authority which teachers sent by God must always possess. There was no mention made of any written code which was to remain in their place when they were dead: and that the apostles themselves believed that a book was not entirely requisite is sufficiently proved by their own conduct in not committing to writing much of our Lord's teaching, and by the fact that the Christians were fully instructed in the doctrines of Christianity, and their churches thoroughly organized, before a line was ever addressed to them.

We accordingly find S. Paul writing to one of the bishops to "keep by the Holy Ghost which dwelleth in thee, that good thing which was committed to thee;"‡ and "the things that thou hast heard of me among many witnesses, the same commit thou to others, who shall be able to teach others also."§ He commands the Thessalonians to "stand fast, and hold the traditions which ye have been taught, whether by word or by our epistle;"|| showing most clearly that they had learnt some things of S. Paul that he had never committed to writing. He commands them also to withdraw from every brother who walked disorderly, and not after the traditions which he had received of the apostles.¶

S. Peter writes his second epistle "by way of remembrance, that they may be mindful of the commandment of the apostles of the Lord."**

S. John, "having many things to write, would not with pen and ink, but trusted shortly to come" to the person whom he addresses, "when he would speak face to face."†† S. Paul also, after redressing some disorders in the Church at Corinth, says he will set "the rest in order when he comes."‡‡

Is there, then, nothing in any of these texts to warrant us in believing that what forms the unwritten word of God, that is, the tradition of the Church, committed to her care by the apostles themselves, is of equal authority with what its authors have recorded in the pages of the New Testament? Was what S. Paul imparted to the churches by "word" of less value than what he taught "by epistle"? Or did inspiration leave S. John when he wrote no more, preferring to "speak face to face"?

If oral teaching was the divinely appointed means of acquainting mankind with the truths of Christianity in the first century, why are the same means to be repudiated and condemned by modern Anti-Catholic theologians? Protestants do not argue in the same fashion when the laws of the country are called in question. If the meaning of an Act of Parliament is doubted of, to whom do we resort,—popular opinion, or the properly appointed expounders of

* S. Matt. xxviii. 20.

§ 2 Tim. ii. 2.

** 2 Pet. iii. 1, 2.

† S. John xx. 21.

|| 2 Thess. ii. 15.

†† 2 John i. 12.

‡ 2 Tim. i. 14.

¶ 2 Thess. iii. 6.

‡‡ 1 Cor. xi. 34.

the law,—the judges? It may be said that the law which judges explain and decide is of human origin, and cannot, therefore, be compared to that of God. But this is only making matters worse; for if you deny the existence of a tribunal appointed by the Almighty to explain this law, you allow every illiterate person to arrogate to himself the office of teacher, and are forced to admit, upon your own principles, that his explanations of contested passages may be of equal truth, and are of equal authority with your own.

S. Paul declares that God “appointed some teachers;” who appoints the Protestant teachers? He further asks,—“How can they preach unless they be sent?” and we still ask the question.

“Theophylact” has endeavoured to show that S. Peter was not the head of the apostles, nor the rock of the Church. This has nothing to do with the question. The primacy of S. Peter might form the subject of a separate debate, but it certainly is not the Catholic Rule of Faith. Nor do Catholics, as he seems to think, believe in the personal infallibility of the Pope. There have been Popes, we all know, who were a disgrace to religion. But the Pope does not constitute the Church any more than the Archbishop of Canterbury constitutes the Anglican Church. Christ prayed for Judas in common with the rest of the apostles, and no doubt bestowed miraculous powers upon him, but that did not prevent his crime. So also with S. Peter, about whose faith our Lord was so solicitous, who was one of the earliest apostles and the chief amongst them, even he denied our Lord. No personal infallibility was promised to S. Peter, nor to any other apostle, but to the Church, which our Lord declared He would be with “all days, even unto the end of the world.”

As I have written my article without using those texts which “Theophylact” conceives Catholics rely upon to prove their Rule of Faith, it is hardly necessary for me to notice them.

If his second proposition be true, viz., that Catholics believe many things directly contrary to the teaching of the Bible, it is certainly true that Rome has fallen into grievous and awful error.

“Theophylact” will find that most of the texts he brings forward to support this portion of his argument have been quoted in the preceding debate, and replied to. With respect to his manner of placing in opposite columns the teaching of Scripture and the teaching of the Church, I will only remark that it would be easy not only to place Protestant opinions in juxtaposition with texts of Scripture, but also to torture Scripture into the same apparent contradictions.

But it is a work of great labour, and has nothing to do with the present question, to discuss, as “Theophylact” has attempted to do, the supremacy, transubstantiation, and various other doctrines of the Catholic Church. He must not be surprised, therefore, if I pass over his formidable array of texts and notes from the Douay Bible and other sources.

I have endeavoured to show the grounds upon which the Catholic

Rule of Faith rests,—the Scripture authorities, both from the Old and New Testaments; and I leave the question for the present for the consideration of all who may feel that the truth is of any importance, and earnestly hope that they may be induced to give the whole subject a full and impartial inquiry. GREGORY.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

THE readers of the *British Controversialist* will, doubtless, sympathize with our expression of disappointment at the nature of the first affirmative article on the question, "Is the Catholic Rule of Faith true?" The duty devolving upon Romanists undertaking the discussion is, obviously, the *defence* of this proposition. Unquestionably, the position taken by Rome should be first stated, that each debater may know, from authentic sources, what that position is; and having done this, "Ignatius" ought to have placed before us, if not all the arguments in proof, yet an outline of the arguments usually adduced in support. Instead of this, he tells us in a note, what is obvious enough in the article itself, that "it must be borne in mind that" he is "merely *stating* the Catholic doctrine, and not *proving* it; this will be done by others" (page 16). It is always easier to attack than to defend,—to destroy than to build. A vulgar labourer can pull a house down, give him but pickaxe, and spade, and wheelbarrow; but it is only an experienced builder and skilled workman that can erect a goodly edifice. In the former discussion, our opponents have done their best to cavil and object; and now that we look for arguments, we have a mere "statement," and bare "explanation," while the "defence" is postponed *sine die*. Depend upon it, the arguments in this discussion, as in the former one, will consist chiefly in attacking the opposite side—not in proving what abler hands, since the times of Luther and Chillingworth, have never *attempted* to prove. Since "Ignatius" has contented himself with a bare statement, he cannot fairly complain if, for the present, we meet it with another bare statement,—that the Rule of Faith he has laid down is neither true, nor capable of the appearance of a defence. With a pertinacity worthy of a better cause, he and his party have reiterated baseless assertions, again and again. It has been most interesting to notice how oblivious they have contrived to be of the reasoning of their opponents, and how completely they have changed the *British Controversialist* into a Roman Catholic caviller, for the time being.

If they have shown little faith in the arguments on their side, there is no lack of evidence of a disposition to draw largely upon the sympathies of the reader. Their case is truly a hard one. "It is impossible," complains "Gregory," "to test the correctness of this writer's ('Lex Scripta's') quotations from the Fathers, as he does not give a single reference throughout, except to some work of the Rev. W. Goode. It is really too much to expect us to refer to works of this nature, even when written by eminent Protestants"

(page 390). From rare and old books, not to be found, except in the expensive libraries of some collegiate institution, or in the British Museum, extracts are freely made—as for example, on page 18,—but a book of the day, to be had for a few shillings, or to be borrowed from any respectable library, is beyond the reach of our opponents. The clumsiness of such an evasion will appear, if our readers will consider what it must cost a person to possess a complete set of the Christian Fathers, which “Gregory” wishes us to believe he is ready to consult, if we would but give him the necessary references. On a very moderate calculation, a sum from £150 to £200 is the price of these works. A man must have something more than a smattering of the Greek and Latin tongues to understand their involved sentences, to catch their obscure allusions, and to reconcile the contradictions not only between the statements of the different writers of contending schools, but between the statements of the same author. For the execution of this laborious task, a period of some twenty years has been assigned as not too long for a man—and there are few such—who, with his classical attainments, combines great mental endowments.

On a review of the discussion on the Protestant Rule of Faith, it is gratifying to observe that none of the writers on the affirmative side have had the humiliating task of retracting a rash statement, or of apologizing for the errors of his party. Truth is consistent, and its defence is simple; error is inconsistent, and its defenders have to advance, and retreat, and cover their defeat as well as they can. The Roman Catholic writers have had to back out of untenable positions, with the ill grace of those who are confuted, but are unwilling to confess to a defeat. “Gregory,” for example, apologizes for his extremely rash assertion that to diverge from the meaning of the Scriptures is not heresy (page 21), by stating, “I certainly did not mean to imply what the faulty construction of the sentence conveys” (page 389). This writer of confessedly bad grammar endeavours to improve the sense of a clause in “A Layman’s” article, with what success will presently appear. J. H. again comes to the rescue of his friend, by stating, “I should hardly think that ‘Gregory’ meant to say that there were no translations at all, when every one knows that the contrary is the fact” (page 240). Let the reader be at the pains to turn to page 19, and he will commend rather the generosity than the good sense of the apologist. These pretended blunders happen only when the arguments of their opponents are felt to be too damaging to be entirely ignored. We will here content ourselves with another specimen. “Gregory” tells us that “Lex Scripta” “sets language at defiance by asserting that ‘authority’ here (in Augustine, quoted page 300) means ‘testimony.’ I,” he continues, “should like a reference to a dictionary which gives such a definition. If devoid of truth, it certainly has the charm of novelty” (page 390). The confidence with which this reference is courted looks like a wish that the reader may take “Gregory’s” notion of English words without the

trouble of consulting a dictionary. Every one who has the slightest knowledge of current and commonplace words knows that "testimony" is one of the usual significations of the word "authority." One has only to reflect upon the drift of the extract in question, to perceive that Augustine uses it in this sense. Conceding to our opponent that this Father was a Roman Catholic, it follows that he acknowledged the "authority" of only the See of Rome. When, therefore, he advises one in doubt about the canon of the New Testament to receive "the authority of as many Catholic churches as possible," he could mean nothing more than their testimony to the fact of the canonicity of any controverted document. Apart, however, from this unanswerable argument, let our opponent turn to the "Imperial Dictionary," or to Webster's (London, 1831), where he will read that one of the usual senses of the word "authority," is "*testimony, witness, or the person who testifies,*" &c. To prevent a repetition of the evasion, "it is too much to expect us to refer to works of this nature" (page 390), we will cite a much cheaper work, "Walker's Dictionary" (Nelson's edition), where "Gregory" will find the meanings given of "authority" are, "legal powers; influences, credit; power, rule; support, countenance; *testimony, credibility.*" Let not any one suppose that in exposing such paltry evasions of the main point in discussion, we are descending from the dignity of fair controversy. We crave a little credit for acquaintance with the tactics of Rome, and we assure the uninformed that her common practice is by such evasions to endeavour to throw dust into the eyes of those whom she would beguile into error.

Another observation which I have to make is, that the reader should be on his guard against appeals to his good nature. "Gregory" congratulates himself that "unguarded expressions" have escaped only from his opponents (page 382), and complains that he has been charged "with puerility, sophistry, feebleness, and so on" (page 391). In the very next sentence he uses harsher terms than any of which he complains:—"I am glad to see that no such contemptible personalities have disfigured the affirmative side" (page 391). The eagerness of this abuse is seen in the haste with which he wrote the sentence. He writes "affirmative" when he meant "negative." Some of the remarks of "Lex Scripta" are not very "intelligible;" one of his arguments is "very lame" (page 387), and he is recommended to apply to "the first Protestant child he meets" for enlightenment. Poor "Gregory" "experienced no little difficulty in extracting this much from the mass of verbiage and angry sneering of which 'Lex Scripta's' article is composed" (page 390). Such "contemptible personalities" come with no good grace from one who whines and abuses in the same breath. We do not complain of abuse; we hail it as an evidence of feeling on his part that, as arguments fail him, he must resort to the sympathies of the reader. For our part, we have ever respected a man the more whose consciousness of *honesty* will not suffer him to repress an outburst of indignation when one writer, having made a rash

assertion, looks to another to deny that he meant what no one can doubt he did mean. When a man, with blandness of manner, plots against all that is sacred or dear to British Christians, we respect him less, and dread him more, than a rough and noisy foe. We claim the privilege of an occasional laugh at nonsense, though at the risk of a charge of "angry sneering." We assert the right of calling things by their proper names, undeterred by the charge of discourtesy or intolerance. But of all things, the most distasteful to us is the practice of abusing and whimpering in the same breath. On this ground, it is to be hoped that "A Layman," when he ventures to write another article, *nine* pages in length, will cease to complain (pages 166—167) that "Clement" exceeded the limit assigned by the Editor of *six* pages.

Another preliminary observation, of some importance, is that Roman Catholicism is frequently defended by a cry of injustice. "Ignatius" opens the present discussion by observing that, "on any other subject than the Catholic Church, men's sense of shame is enough, generally, to keep them from talking at random. But the critics of our religion have an advantage peculiarly their own, in the deep ignorance of the public whom they address. Their statements pass current in England, because the generality of people are about as wise as themselves" (pages 13, 14). From no other country does there issue such a host of annual visitors to the lands of Popery as from England. No other people have so many relations residing in those lands of superstition as the British. For either business or convenience, multitudes of the British live in Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Austria, in Gibraltar, and Malta, and Madeira, —where Popery throws off the masks it wears in England. To talk of British ignorance of Romanism, is rash in the extreme. Without going abroad, we may, any day, see in the Irish what "Ignatius" is so anxious to deny, namely, that "Papists deliberately offer to the Blessed Virgin the honour due to God alone; — that they believe they will be saved by works only," &c. (page 14). It is true that he qualifies his disclaimer by restricting it to men of "education and acquirements;" but this, so far from being a recommendation, is that very feature of which Protestants so loudly complain. Rome dares not offer to Englishmen what she instils into the Irish. She dare not experiment upon our credulity with the miracles with which she deludes the Neapolitans. Conceding, however, for argument's sake, that the English are as ignorant as they are represented by "Ignatius," we ask whether the English, under Wycliffe, and later Reformers, had no personal experience of the nature of Roman Catholicism? Were they, who were bred and born Papists, as ignorant as their Protestant descendants? Why did they freely shed their blood to throw off the yoke of the "Blessed Virgin"? Not to go so far back in the history of men's experience of Roman Catholicism, we ask, Are the Irish in Ulster, the French in Paris, the Germans in Austria, "put down, because there are on every side others with information and good sense

enough to expose them" (page 14), when they become ignorant "critics" of the religion of their native land? Nay, if we may judge from the following instance, it will appear that "*Lex Scripta*" really knows more of the doctrines of Romanism than "Gregory," who writes in its defence, wishes it to be thought he knows. In reference to an allusion to "indulgences to sin," which we "suppose Rome gives to her followers," "Gregory" thus writes in a note on page 391:—"He really should inform himself a little better of what Catholicism consists, before he ventures to attack it; but he, doubtless, thinks that 'where ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly to be wise.'" Thus do Romanists meet with a denial the charge of encouraging immorality by their pernicious doctrines. But the worth of such denials may usually be tested by a reference to some other document, or, as in this case, by turning to another part of the same document. For example, on page 15 of the former debate, this very "Gregory" tells us that Protestants prefer discussing "transubstantiation or indulgences" to the "Rule of Faith," "for the simple reason, that one is much easier than the other; since they do possess some documentary evidence respecting the former, while they are totally destitute of any Divine proofs of the latter." Here he admits that we have *documentary evidence for indulgences*, and there he tells us of our ignorance on the subject.

The present discussion is opened with the characteristic ingratitude of Rome. We are informed that "to misrepresent Catholics in this country is no difficult matter, for all ears are ready to drink in the abuse, and equally deaf to the defence" (p. 14). This assertion is made in the pages of the *British Controversialist*, which have been thrown open to the defenders of the system, and is addressed to a class of readers ever anxious to hear both sides of every question. In no purely Popish country would a Roman Catholic periodical invite discussion on religion. Here for now seven months we have been patiently listening to the advocates of Rome, and they turn round upon us with the charge of being "deaf" to its defence.

We regret to see that "Ignatius" reiterates the assertion of "Gregory," that to consult the early Fathers on the authorship and canon of the New Testament is to give up the Rule of Faith (p. 390). In his opinion we are "driven to deny the all-sufficiency of the Bible, and to allow that on the question of the canon of Holy Scripture we must have recourse to the testimony of the ancient churches" (p. 13). In this sentence two things are linked together which have no connection in the nature of things,—first, the all-sufficiency of the Bible, "and" the appeal to the testimony of the early churches. No man in his senses can think that it is the opinion of Protestants that the Bible can tell us what the Fathers thought of it. It would be necessary to suppose it endowed with the faculties and organs of a human being before one can dream of its being "*all-sufficient*," or sufficient at all in such a matter. We repeat, that no candid and intelligent debater can really hold that,

unless the Scriptures can inform us of what the ecclesiastical historian can alone communicate, they do not and cannot constitute our only Rule of Faith. If "Gregory" and "Ignatius" have any respect for their character, let them cease to reiterate such an absurd statement. What we are willing to attribute to the heat of controversy, and the prejudices of Romanism, must in future be regarded as proof of a determination to misunderstand and mislead. Let the reader notice the premises and the conclusion of "Ignatius." The premises are, the necessity of appealing to the early churches to know in what book, or in what number of books, we are to find the Christian doctrines and practices. From this necessity his inference is, *therefore*, "The Bible cannot instruct us on all points of Christian doctrine and practice" (p. 13). The endeavour to ascertain what is our Rule of Faith and practice is thus represented as abandoning that rule. A charitable construction of the pertinacity with which this absurdity is reiterated is already difficult, and will become impossible ere long. As confusion here is the triumph of error, and clearness of ideas is the triumph of truth, we shall devote the remainder of this article to the arguing and illustrating of this simple proposition, that to appeal to historical evidence, that is, to the writings of the Fathers, to ascertain the canon and authorship of the New Testament, is not abandoning the position that the Bible, and the Bible alone, is the Christian Rule of Faith and practice.

The *authorship* of the New Testament is a historical *fact*, which, like all other facts, is to be proved by *testimony*. The *nature* of the contents, or the *meaning* of any part of the New Testament, is a matter of *opinion*, which, like all other opinions, is to be proved by our *reason and common sense*, to which the word of God is invariably addressed. The former, in the absence of a standing miracle, is ascertained by an appeal to history; the latter is the result of attention to the Bible itself, and, in Protestant communities, to the Bible *alone*. To this, however, the Romanist and Tractarian object, declaring that we must appeal to the Fathers, not only for their testimony to the *fact*, but to the *opinion* of the early churches as to the *meaning* which should be attached to the words of Scripture. Now the question at issue is as simple as it can be, and is the point to be proved or disproved. The great object of Roman Catholic writers has been to mystify this plain question, and our great object is to expose their attempts at mystification. On pages 299—302 we have argued it at length, and all that we need do in this article is to add an illustration.

Let the readers of the *British Controversialist*, then, resolve themselves into a jury, with its editor as the judge. We shall bring into this court of appeal the article signed by a person whose monogram is "Layman," and which occupies pages 164—173. We raise two questions on that article; first, is the signature of the author *bonâ fide*? Is that signature genuine, or is it a forgery? Now this is a simple question of *fact*,—a fact of authorship, and is to be

determined by cross-questioning witnesses. The second question about to be raised is not of facts, but of an *opinion* as to the real meaning of a controverted clause in that article, which is as follows:—"I, too, would say to a Protestant, 'Search the Scriptures,' for they testify of the Church and her Divine Head, and which, if you reject your prejudices, 'the traditions of men,' will lead you into its fold" (p. 169). "Lex Scripta" accuses the writer of this clause with, first, two grammatical blunders; and, secondly, with tergiversation. To defend "A Layman," "Gregory" is employed as one of the witnesses. The first thing to be decided is, did the person who signs himself "A Layman" really write the third negative article containing this clause? The judge, as Editor of the *British Controversialist*, declares that there can be no question on the genuineness of the signature, producing the manuscript in evidence, and from a reference to p. 390, lines 21—29, showing that witness "Gregory" also swears to the authorship. The first question,—a question of fact—of authorship, is thus settled. But mark, this witness "Gregory," in attesting the authorship of the article, volunteers his *opinion* also of the *meaning* of the controverted clause. Listen. "Lex Scripta" "has laid hold of an expression of 'A Layman,' and wears it threadbare" (p. 390). Here the judge very properly stops the loquacious and impertinent witness, and informs him that, in giving evidence to the fact of authorship, he must leave out the offensive words, "thread-bare." The article of "Lex Scripta" is before the court, and the jury is empanelled to pronounce upon matters of *opinion*, and can decide for itself. The witness has sworn to the authorship, and must withdraw; but if he has anything to add, it must be evidence and not opinions. The judge, moreover, advises him to recall his insulting expressions, and to be more cautious for the future. Witness "Gregory" proceeds to address the judge, amid the cries of "Turn him out!—turn him out!" issuing from some of the ill-mannered spectators in the court. After silence has been restored, the witness is heard to say, "The word 'which' sufficiently points out, to any one conversant with English grammar, what the 'Layman' refers to" (p. 390). The judge again interposes, saying, "*That* is not the point for you to decide, it is the business of the jury to see to that. I have given you an opportunity to mend your manners, and you have availed yourself of it to make an insulting allusion to the grammar of 'Lex Scripta.'" Unabashed witness "Gregory" adds,—“For the benefit of such individuals as 'Lex Scripta' it would be as well, perhaps,”—(here the reporter calls attention to the hesitation and confusion of mind with which the witness uttered the word *perhaps*)—"to have put 'the traditions' of men within brackets" (p. 390). The judge now orders "Gregory" to be removed from the witness-box, and to be kept in "the lock-up" through the night for contempt of court. In summing up the evidence, the judge speaks as follows:—"Of the two points raised, the first has been proved, namely, that the third negative article bears the *bonâ fide* signature of the person

known as 'A Layman.' The second point is one of opinion, which the jury have now to decide. The jury must be careful to dismiss from their minds the opinions volunteered by the witness 'Gregory.' His opinion is inadmissible in court. Free from the bias of extraneous influences, you, gentlemen, will now withdraw and consider your verdict on the meaning and design of the controversial clause in the document which has been submitted to you this day. The design of the clause, as it stands, is, after the best consideration in my power, I am sorry to say, an intention to mislead, by perverting the sacred words of Scripture. It is faulty as a sentence judged by the ordinary rules of grammar. The words 'her' and 'it' leave one in considerable doubt whether the Roman Catholic Church is of the feminine or of the neuter gender in the opinion of the writer. If, again, the word 'which' refers to the Scriptures as calculated to lead men without prejudices into that fold, an honest or at least sensible man would have introduced the phrase 'the traditions of men.' It has been argued by counsel, that if the phrase be put within brackets, all ambiguity will disappear; but the suggestion simply shifts the confusion of ideas from one part of the clause to another. With the proposed amendment, the clause reads as follows:—"I, too, would say to a Protestant the same words, "Search the Scriptures," for they testify of the Church and her Divine Head, and which, if you will reject your prejudices ("the traditions of men"), will lead you into its fold." The proposed alteration makes the *traditions of men* synonymous with the *prejudices of the Protestant*, which, to say nothing of the absurdity of the idea, there is no evidence in the whole article of 'A Layman' to show was the meaning of the author." The jury, having retired for two minutes, return with the verdict in favour of "La Scripta."

To apply the above illustration, all that the reader has to do is to substitute the apostles and evangelists in place of "A Layman"; the writings of the New Testament in place of the third negative article; the early Fathers and the ecclesiastical historian Eusebius in place of the witness "Gregory"; and the Protestant public in the place of the editor and the readers of the *British Controversialist*. The first question raised is the genuineness and authenticity of the New Testament Scriptures, and the number of books that should constitute the sacred canon. The witnesses to these facts are the early Fathers. From documentary evidence it is proved beyond doubt that the New Testament, as it now stands, is what it purports to be, the whole written revelation of Christ and the Holy Spirit. Having obtained this testimony from the only competent witnesses that exist, we have, in these particulars, done with the Fathers. Now, at this stage of the inquiry the Roman Catholics step in and declare that the *opinion* of those witnesses is absolutely necessary, to know in what sense particular passages in Scripture were used and should be understood. To this the Protestant decidedly objects. He says, No; we have the Bible, grammars, and dictionaries; we

have eyes, and reason, and common sense; we have the text and the commentary; and we can judge whether God, in giving us a Rule of Faith and practice, did or did not intend those rules to be intelligible to mankind. No doubt it is interesting and instructive to learn how different Fathers interpreted different passages of Scripture. But we know that they not only contradict one another, but each one contradicts himself on matters of mere *opinion*. They are men like ourselves, and erred as we are liable. Their *opinion*, therefore, is not authoritative. We can prove they were honest men, and their *testimony to facts*, which we know from other sources were matters of public notoriety, we unhesitatingly receive.

We close our article by observing, that this course is not giving up our Rule of Faith. The reiteration of this absurd representation is simply an unwilling confession that the arguments advanced in the former discussion are unanswerable. Attempts have been repeated to mystify this plain question, and we have been forced to repeat the arguments, and add an illustration. Let each of our readers see to it, that he will have an answer in arguments and not mere assertions, to the statement that in appealing to the early Fathers as witnesses, for their *testimony to historical facts*, we do not abandon our Rule of Faith, namely, that the Bible, and the Bible alone, is the religion of Protestants. LEX SCRIPTA.

Philosophy.

IS THE POETRY OF TENNYSON AS HEALTHY IN ITS TENDENCIES AS THAT OF LONGFELLOW?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

It now becomes our duty to review the course of debate upon this interesting topic, and to reply to the articles which have been put forward by our opponents. The task, so far as a *reply* is concerned, might be disposed of summarily and in few words. We believe that our readers will almost unanimously admit that, whatever the real merits and true solution of the question at issue, and whatever the literary value of the different essays upon it which have appeared in these pages—anything like an attempt at relevant argument and reasoning has been entirely confined to the *affirmative* side of the debate. The writers on the negative side seem to have written under a depressing consciousness that there was little to be said in behalf of the opinions they undertook to maintain. Their whole tone is apologetic, tame, and spiritless, where it is not purely *negative*. Their few arguments are nothing more than feints,—a show of reasoning on false issues, raised apparently in order to divert the attention. Whenever they venture to approach the

real question directly, they at once sink from argument to assertion. They push forward their own individual preferences with an engaging air of simplicity and innocence, that at once reminds us of the old rhyme,—

“ I do not like thee, Dr. Fell;
The reason why I cannot tell;
But this I know full well,
I do not like thee, Dr. Fell.”

To such a mode of argumentation, or rather to such a substitute for argument, we of course are not, in strict logic, bound to make any reply. Preferences, unless based on analysis, thought, and reasoning, can only be regarded as personal idiosyncracies and instincts of mind; and with these we have no concern in debate,—*de gustibus non est disputandum*. In the same way, when our opponents praise Tennyson highly, and Longfellow more highly, or, like “L'Ouvrier,” praise Longfellow, and roundly assert in a concluding paragraph that Tennyson has not the qualities for which Longfellow is praised; and when they proceed to ask us to accept this fancy painting as logical proof, or axiomatic truth needing no proof,—when, in short, they require of us to judge the two poets, not by a comparison of their merits, but by the eulogiums passed upon them, we might fairly remain silent. At best, a series of assertions cannot, as of right, demand any more specific reply than a general denial. As between our coadjutors and ourselves on the one side, and our opponents on the other, we might treat the debate as already at an end. If, indeed, victory alone were the aim of the literary encounters in these pages, we certainly should adopt this course. We should feel that we were wasting our efforts, so fighting as one that beateth the air, contending with opponents whose only aim is to evade us. The great value and mission of this Magazine, however, we believe to be the education it affords us in thinking justly and reasoning soundly, in tracing up the sophistries and fallacies which our minds are so apt either to lose themselves in when searching for the true and the right, or to take refuge in when confronted by unwelcome convictions. While, therefore, there may be no logical necessity for a reply, we may find moral and mental instruction in replicatory criticism. Our antagonists number amongst them names whose earnest and honest belief in the opinions they from time to time defend is beyond a shadow of doubt; it must, therefore, be instructive even to ourselves to investigate and criticize that which they have written, under the delusion that it was sound and pertinent reasoning. To this, then, conjointly with the endeavour to strengthen the affirmative side of the debate, we now address our efforts.

We have already pointed out that “Edmund” and H. G. actually change the subject of debate from an inquiry into the “healthy tendencies” of Tennyson’s and Longfellow’s poetry to a mere comparison of their “effect on the masses,” and their “influence for

good on the popular mind." Even then, to take advantage of this change, they have to assume that popularity is a proof of influence exerted by that which is popular. Herein is a marvellous medley of absurdity and of confusion in thought and ideas. Preference and admiration for a thing are treated as equivalent to active influence exerted by it. Area of extent over which influence may be exerted is put for intensity of effect in each individual case; and quantity is regarded as identical with, or at least as the measure of, quality and moral power. Tendency is assumed to be the same as effect! It is astonishing that such fallacies could be put forward. On such assumptions every principle of common sense would be upset. We should have to estimate the "healthy tendency" of everything by its tendency to gravitate, lodge, and diffuse itself amongst the most numerous classes. If dangerous disease seized upon us, and baffled the family doctor, we must not go to the eminent men of the profession, but to the parish doctor, who has ten times as many patients. If our property is in jeopardy, the advice of a retired Lord Chancellor should be forsaken, for that of any pettifogger who has a string of clients around his doors. The *Family Herald* may be doing, and we believe is doing, good, in winning the lower classes from the perusal of "Mysteries" and other immoral and mischievous publications, to a class of reading which is untainted with vice or irreligion, if not very instructive and elevating. But are we, on account of its enormous circulation, to be told that it is the *best* periodical for each of us individually,—that it would produce a healthier result on our mental and spiritual nature than the perusal of half-a-dozen of our best quarterly reviews and the *British Controversialist*, with *Macmillan's Magazine* and *Fraser* to boot. Or, to take an illustration from poetical literature; shall we pronounce "Oh, Susannah!" and "Lucy Neal" to be among the *chefs-d'œuvre* of love-songs, and of a healthier tendency than Burns' "Ae Fond Kiss" and "Mary Morrison"? Must we really estimate "Cheer Boys, Cheer," or "The Roast Beef of Old England," as worth more than Campbell's magnificent and heart-stirring national lyrics? Will "Edmund" and H. G. tell us that "Rule Britannia," and "The Red, White, and Blue," teach a healthier, higher patriotism and political wisdom than are to be found in those subtle, deep-thoughted, and large-hearted lyrics of Tennyson's, to which we alluded in a former paper, and which our friend "Anglo-Saxon" has quoted and so ably criticized (*supra*, pp. 33, 34)? But we waste space in dwelling on this aspect of the attempt made to change the debate to one on popularity. We must refer to our former remarks (pp. 392—394).

While we have shown the folly committed by "Edmund" and H. G., however, the illustrations we have given naturally suggest that the probable conclusions to be drawn from the fact of Longfellow's poetry appealing to a wider circle than that addressed by Tennyson, will, if logically traced out, throw some light upon our theme. Instead, therefore, of confusing and interchanging totally

distinct ideas as our opponents have done, let us endeavour to ascertain the relationship of mere popularity to literature. Remembering what human nature is,—ever prone to the practical and the present, to the neglect of that which is of higher import, the spiritual and future,—ever recoiling from the labour of thought and the burden of responsibility, and choosing by preference the beaten paths of habit,—not so much wanting in vigour and power of action as in perseverance and willingness,—comparatively seldom sinning from sheer ignorance, but from evil inclinations, or through fickleness of purpose or faintness of heart,—seeing and approving that which is good, but following that which is evil; can we do otherwise than suspect that popularity is an indication of that which is pleasant and commonplace, of the trite and obvious in the common course of life and events? Longfellow's poetry is doubtless calculated to strike the mind readily, and to excite enthusiasm, especially amongst numbers. He is so clear, plain, and practical, that we do not need to stop and think; he is so spirited in utterance that we catch the momentary fire of enthusiasm. He tells us old truths which we have always known, and which we generally acknowledge; we therefore "lend him our ears" at once, and assent to what he says. He tells us common things, and tells them perhaps better than they have ever been told before; so we again assent to his matter, and applaud his manner. Are we wiser? Certainly not. Are we *much* better—*permanently* better? It is hard to imagine so. We have not even been shown a new view or a new relationship of an old truth; we have only got it embalmed in amber. Take a man who believes in a future state, and who has often heard that solemn, tremendous query, "What shall it profit a man, if he should gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?"—If that man is still careless, if he trifles away life without regarding its value and importance, can we, can any one, believe that he will be aroused and renovated by being told that

"Life is real, life is earnest,
And the grave is not its goal;
Dust thou art, to dust returnest,
Was not spoken of the soul."

If a man has become worse than lethargic—despondent, perplexed, and sceptical, will such a verse restore his faith? No! we admire the verse because it puts our usual belief into a terser, plainer, more musical shape than before. It arouses approbation and enthusiasm in an audience. We need and probably can find no better or more telling quotations for the lecture-room than Longfellow can supply. But is this all mankind need? Is it enough to draw from us a round of applause for that we already know, and habitually disregard, and to arouse a mere passing impulse of admiration? The truth is, that man is already too much a creature of impulse. The most melancholy class amongst us is the impulsive class, the class whom we often term "thoroughly

goodhearted," and describe as "nobody's enemies but their own"—people who are tender-hearted and well-meaning, open to every good and generous impulse, yet, alas! quite as open to the influence of temptation—miserably weak in principle, and wholly wanting in moral firmness. If we depend upon impulse, our characters will assuredly be such that we cannot depend upon ourselves, and those around us will feel they cannot calculate upon us. Social enthusiasm has its place and its uses, but we might almost dispense with it, if we only cultivated individual resolve, purpose, and firmness. We want adequate and permanent *motives* and springs of action dwelling within us, and not a mere temporary impress and excitement occasionally moving us from without. We need that our moral nature should be placed under influences which will combine with it, become a part of it, and thus tend to make it self-acting. Now this very want we believe is to be found in Tennyson. He can tell us a common truth as plainly, forcibly, and musically, as Longfellow; but if he does so, he at the same time places it in a new light and relationship, so that we see it in connection with human nature, and feel it as a part of our own consciousness, in such a manner that it has all the force of a living motive instead of an abstract truth. He tells us,—

"Howe'er it be, it seems to me,
'Tis only noble to be good;
Kind hearts are more than coronets,
And simple faith than Norman blood."

Longfellow has nothing to surpass the plainness, earnestness, terseness, and beauty of this verse. But Tennyson employs it not as a mere precept. He paints before us the haughty, high-born Lady Clara, "the daughter of a hundred earls." We see her snares; we learn—"some certain truths of her," till we feel deeply how little birth can atone for heartlessness and wrong. There she stands before us, humbled, for even "her pride is yet no mate for his"—the "foolish yeoman" whom she sought to snare; humbled, and worse than humbled, scorned with such scorn as only a Tennyson can embody at once in thought, in words, and in music. She, forsooth, is told that despite her wealth,—

"You are not one to be desired,"

that despite her ancestral honours—

"A simple maiden in her flower,
Is worth a hundred coats-of-arms."

The "foolish yeoman," as he calls himself, can tell her, face to face,—

"For were you queen of all that is,
I could not stoop to such a mind."

Even darker charges are hurled:—"the guilt of blood is at your door." We have studied this picture of human life, the nature and

results of two sins little regarded—the pride of birth and coquetry. With what personal force does the mocking appeal thus come!—

“Trust me, Clara Vere de Vere,
From you blue heavens above us bent,
The grand old gardener and his wife
Smile at the claims of long descent.”

What power in that phrase—“the grand old gardener”! Then, as the verse we originally quoted occurs, how it comes home to the very heart’s core! How the “Howe’er it be”—the semblance of a doubt thrown in—intensifies the effect. But this is not enough for the poet. Goodness, kindness, faith—how are these to be sought and gained? The lesson is yet too bare, the truth even still too abstract for effect. The source of the sin is pointed out, and then the path of penitence suited to the case. The tone is changed. The verse no longer commences with the mocking, scornful “*Lady Clara Vere de Vere*,” nor with the plain, stern “Clara Vere de Vere” of the later verses: there is now a tone of pity mingling with the softened strain:—

“Clara,—Clara Vere de Vere,
If time be heavy on your hands,
Are there no beggars at your gate,
Nor any poor about your lands?
Oh! teach the orphan-boy to read,
Or teach the orphan-girl to sew,
Pray Heaven for a human heart,
And let the foolish yeoman go.”

We have thus criticized and dwelt on this little poem, not because we regard it as one of Tennyson’s finest productions, but as affording a comparison and contrast to Longfellow in his chosen style and character. We have here all those characteristics on which the advocates of Longfellow ring such continual changes, while we have much that is not to be met with in the writings of the American poet. The lesson is presented to us in such a form that we become identified with the dramatic circumstances with which it is linked. The wrong, the folly, the scorn and shame, the grand moral lesson applicable to and deducible from the case, the secret source of the crime, and the path of restoration and of moral cure, become, as it were, a part of our own experience. The lesson thus becomes engrained. The superiority of this to mere didactic directness is too evident to need enforcing.

It is plain, then, that Tennyson is superior to Longfellow when they meet on common ground. If he is less popular than his brother poet, it is because he has other aims and purposes, and pursues a different path. What is that different path? Our opponents admit that the two poets are equally pure in morals, that Tennyson is the greater artist, the deeper, subtler, and more refined thinker. There is no escape, therefore, from the conclusion, that the superior popularity, *i. e.*, the wider circle, reached by Longfellow is owing to

the fact, that his genius and powers are inferior. Unless, therefore, we are prepared to assert that culture and elevation of imagination and mind are unhealthy; that shallowness, triteness, and superficiality are morally and spiritually more powerful and beneficial than deep reflection and thought; and that the greater the artist the less his power to teach us wisely and well,—we must inevitably look upon this question of the relative popularity of the two poets in question as one which, when thoroughly sifted, becomes conclusive in favour of Tennyson.

We have just used the terms *shallowness* and *superficiality*. We have already expressed our hearty admiration of Longfellow, and therefore, when we use these terms, it will, of course, be understood that we are pushing our argument to its ultimate consequences, and, as applied to the case before us, are speaking *relatively*, and not *absolutely*. Our opponents truly describe Longfellow as "simple," "earnest," "at home in the activities of life," and "in the common course of events." They cannot put forward higher claims for him, and try to balance matters by declaring Tennyson "morbid," "melancholic," "mystical," "metaphysical," &c. Let us examine these points. Longfellow never attempts to solve or to throw any light upon the deeper and darker problems of individual or social existence, but confines himself to the obvious and outward phases of life. Tennyson, on the other hand, is ever at grapple with our darkest doubts and sorest trials, with the deep things of the soul and of society. The one looks wholly at the material and present, or speaks of the hereafter simply as the trusting, happy child speaks of the unknown. The other glances far back into the past, and forwards into the future. The one will talk pleasantly with us by the way, cheer us when somewhat weary with the heat and burden of the day, sing to us and teach us simple lessons as we tarry at the house Beautiful. The other (as has been so happily said by "Anglo-Saxon") is our Great-heart—our friend, interpreter, guide, and guard. He will accompany us through the valley of the Shadow of Death, if our path lies through it. If "groanings are heard," "the ground shakes," and the "pilgrims are afraid," Great-heart will encourage them. It is not He who raises these dangers. "The pit and the great darkness are there." Maul, a giant, lurks in a cave by the path, and it may be that "the giant and Mr. Great-heart must fight." The contest may terrify us as we watch it, but is it not better to endure this terror than to risk the fate of Heedless? Is it wise to be terrified by the epithets "mystical" and "metaphysical" (vol. iii. p. 405)? Shall we join "L'Ouvrier," "Edmund," and H. G., in shrinking from every attempt to meddle with doubts and questions, and in trying to forget that such things exist? Let us take a lesson from old John Bunyan, and his imitable allegory. The pilgrims, "being come to *By-path stile*," sat down and consulted whether they should attack Giant Despair. "So one said one thing, and another said the contrary. One questioned if it was lawful to go upon unconsecrated ground;

another said, they might; but Mr. Great-heart said, I will attempt the taking away of his life, and the demolishing of Doubting Castle. So they left the women in the road, and with them Mr. Feeble-mind and Mr. Ready-to-halt, with his crutches, to be their guard. So Mr. Great-heart, Old Honest, and the four young men, went to go up to Doubting Castle, to look for Giant Despair. Then fought they for their lives, and Giant Despair was brought down to the ground, and was very loth to die, but *Great-heart was the death of him*. Then fell they to demolishing Doubting Castle. They were seven days in destroying of that." The allegory is true to the letter, in the present instance. Because Tennyson turns out of the main road, crosses By-path stile, and goes to combat the giant, and to demolish Doubting Castle, the Ready-to-halts and Feeble-minds cry out against him, and tarry behind. When they tell us that Longfellow is so "simple" in his teaching, we reply that the failings, weaknesses, trials, temptations, sorrows, wants, and destiny of mankind are *not* simple,—that human nature is too deeply complex in itself—that life and consciousness are environed with mystery. He who can grapple with these difficulties, who can show sympathy with us when passing through them, and throw a light, however faint, which may cheer and guide us, is doing a great and holy work. His poems have the highest value that uninspired literature can have, and their tendency is the most healthy and beneficial possible. There is an infinite difference between Great-heart slaying Despair, and Prudence playing to the pilgrims in the Interpreter's house "on a pair of excellent virginals," and "turning *what they had seen* into an excellent song."

Be it remembered, too, that in its place, Tennyson can paint the purest, simplest, trusting faith. Look how exquisitely "life-like," tender, and true, the opening of the "Miller's Daughter,"—"I see the wealthy miller yet." Aye! and he is painted with the vividness of breathing life, in a picture never surpassed in the whole range of literature. But a shade falls across the speaker's mind; the old man is numbered with the dead; they have sorrowed over his grave, and yet—

"His memory scarce can make me sad."

No! but it suggests a deeper loss when that happy marriage union between the speaker and his sole listener shall be dissolved by death. Shall he utter the thought? He hesitates:—

"Yet fill my glass;—give me one kiss."

And now the whole must be outspoken, for in such love there are no concealments, no joys, and no regrets unshared:—

"My own sweet Alice, we must die."

Why should it be? Why should such affection be sundered,—such a chord be rent, such a sorrow be inevitable? The mystery is dark

—too deep for answer;—but the loving heart is strong in child-like faith and trust. What it knows not now, it shall know hereafter:—

“There’s somewhat in the world amiss
Shall be unriddled by and by;
 There’s somewhat flows to us in life,
 But more is taken quite away.
 Pray, Alice, pray my darling wife,
 That we may die the selfsame day.”

Here is no melancholy, no mysticism, no metaphysics, and no *evasion*. One of life’s mysteries and deepest trials is fairly met, frankly acknowledged, and exquisitely treated. An equal parallel from Longfellow cannot be produced. We have again a proof that Tennyson is superior to his brother poet in his own special vein. We see that while the latter confines himself to a single phase of human life and experience—the outward, sentimental, gentle, and tender,—the former deals with life in *all* its phases, and the soul in *all* its moods.

There are many interesting points, all conclusive in favour of Tennyson, to which we might advert; we can only allude to two. There is that gradual development of power, and moral plan and purpose, that unity of design and progressive teaching, which marks Tennyson’s successive works. It is with great pleasure that we refer on this point to the admirable essay of our most able ally, “Anglo-Saxon” (*supra*, pp. 33—36). Nothing of this kind is to be found in Longfellow. His last long poem (“Miles Standish”) has less of moral teaching than almost any of its predecessors. “Hiawatha” is only a picture,—it has no pretence to teaching.

Again, Longfellow is the poet-moralist of everyday life and society. His allusions to Christianity are frequent, but we cannot speak of him as a Christian teacher. Plato, Aristotle, and Seneca, would teach us all he teaches us; for it is morality alone that is necessary for everyday outward life and intercourse. But we claim for Tennyson the higher honour, and the better office, of a great Christian thinker and teacher. He is, in an especial manner, the poet of the inner spiritual life of man of the age, and, as such, he has embodied in his work not the form and vocabulary, but the essence and spirit of Christianity. We have already (vol. iii. p. 461) pointed out that the very Gospel of Christ—redeeming love—is taught in beautiful allegory in “Guinevre.” The theme is too large to discuss farther now. Both “Anglo-Saxon” (pp. 34, 35, *supra*) and ourselves (vol. iii., p. 401—402) have briefly touched on the spirituality and deep Christianity of “In Memoriam,” where the wail of sorrow swells into the anthem of faith. Is there anything more sublime than the description there given of the struggle? True, it leaves—as the human intellect must to the end of time leave—many dark riddles unsolved; but it is a grand lesson when we watch a great and glorious soul, which, when foiled in the attempt to *know*, rests confident in *faith*, and even recognizes in these mysteries—

"The world's great *altar-stairs*,
That slope *through darkness* up to God."

That, surely, is christian faith in its highest form. We might give many other illustrations,—the "Vision of Sin," the "Two Voices," and others;—we will confine ourselves to one. What is the "Palace of Art" but a modern Ecclesiastes—teaching us the curse which falls upon selfish pride of intellect, the vanity of all earthly joys and possessions, and their emptiness—the impossibility that the things of sense and powers of mind can fill the whole soul? Never was "lordly pleasure house" so wondrously imagined and described; never was the misery of self-sufficient and self-deceiving soul so vividly presented—misery deepening fearfully, until—

"She howled aloud, 'I am on fire within!
There comes no murmur of reply!
What is it that will take away my sin,
And save me lest I die?'"

"So when four years were wholly finished,
She threw her royal robes away;
'Make me a cottage in the vale,' she said,
'Where I may mourn and PRAY.'"

Have we such teaching in Longfellow? Emphatically we say, "No."

We have now fully answered every assertion and argument which has been, either directly or by implication, brought against Tennyson by "Edmund," H. G., and "L'Ouvrier," and have, at the same time, done something to strengthen our own case. We cannot, however, forbear calling especial attention to the article of our veteran opponent, "L'Ouvrier." Skilled as he is in controversy, he professes to settle the present debate in three pages. We have a definition of poetry which, by the way, applies equally to painting, to the highest class of prose fiction, biography, to music, sculpture, and the fine arts generally. We are told that poetry is "the blushing forth of transcendent truth and beauty," and that Longfellow is simple, earnest, nature-like, &c., whence it appears that transcendency is something like equivalent to ordinary! Poetry delights "in beauty and sublimity," and Longfellow's peculiarity is "beauty rather than sublimity." This is the mode of proving Longfellow to be more healthy in his influence than Tennyson! "L'Ouvrier" defines a great poet; asserts Longfellow to answer to *half* his definition; never utters a word about Tennyson, and then cries out, *q. e. d.* He next praises Longfellow (vol. iii. p. 403); and we assent to all he says, merely adding, but "greater than all this is Tennyson." We have given reasons for saying so, and "L'Ouvrier" has not given reasons for denying it. We have then a comment on the "Psalm of Life," but nothing to hint that Tennyson has not done as well; whereas we have shown that in the same vein he can do better. A criticism on "Excelsior" follows. It is "the out-

spoken feeling of the century." We admit that it is so. It is an admirable picture, but it is *not* a lesson. Taken by itself, every stanza suggests "whither?" and "why?" There is self-sacrifice without a purpose. When he has planted his banner on the snow-crowned height, he has gained a barren victory, and must perish alone, or wearily retrace the downward path. As a painting of energy overcoming difficulty, the poem is beyond all praise,—it is nothing more. "L'Ouvrier" next points us to the wooing of "Hiawatha." Does he mean to say there is anything really uncommon, unless it be in the association of such delicacy and purity with the loves of a youth with "painted face" and "flaunting feathers," and a maiden whose home is an Indian wigwam? It is really preposterous to suppose that the quotations he gives us are sufficient to prove Longfellow a greater teacher than he who has written "Dora," "Love and Duty," "The Gardener's Daughter," "The Miller's Daughter," "The Lady Clare," "The Lord of Burleigh," and "Maud." One half suspects that the real "L'Ouvrier" has been caricatured by some one who has stolen his *nom de plume*. The next theme of praise is, however, little better. "Miles Standish" is set up for admiration, as a healthy model, beyond all that Tennyson ever wrote! Why, the hero, John Alden, strong enough in generosity to go and woo his heart's beloved for another, is yet foolish enough not to attempt any explanation either with his friend or his lover! He tamely submits to reproaches of treachery on one side, and remains stolidly silent, in spite of declarations of love, on the other. He resolves to make the misery of all three perpetual by running away, and looks to the "green churchyard" as the sole solution of his troubles. If this be "natural" it is a very weak and contradictory specimen of nature. Again, "L'Ouvrier" speaks of "the retiring modesty of the heroine." Now it may not be a moral duty to act like Juliet, who—

"never told her love;
But let concealment, like a worm i' the bud,
Feed on her damask cheek;"

but we really cannot congratulate the young lady who—

"Said, in a tremulous voice, 'Why don't you speak for yourself, John?'"

on her peculiarly retiring disposition. Priscilla was anything but bashful in the way of making advances, and urging her love upon one who had not declared himself her lover. Was it leap-year? or did she wear a scarlet petticoat? Truly "L'Ouvrier" is not happy in his selections.

We now turn, in conclusion, to pluck a crow with our particularly three-cornered friend, "Delta." "Having shown," he says (page 39), "that B. S. has not proved Tennyson to be the most healthy in the tendency of his poetry, we by implication prove that Longfellow's poetry is the most healthy." B. S. respectfully declines the honour

put upon him. He is *not* the greatest logician, nor the most eminent critic now living, and, therefore, when *he* fails to establish a proposition, it does *not* follow, "by implication," that everybody else would fail, and that the converse of the proposition is true. Surely an essay, concluding with such an absurd "implication" as that just quoted, might be very fairly reviewed and dismissed in a sentence—"the end thereof is foolishness." If "Delta" *has* convicted B. S. of "false logic and rhetoric," he has not advanced Longfellow's claims one whit. For anything that appears from his article, Tennyson may have written a metrical treatise on the quadrature of the circle, and Longfellow be the author of the "Loves of the Triangles." We cannot gather whether "Delta" ever read either poet. B. S. supports Tennyson; B. S. argues badly; therefore Longfellow's poetry is the more healthy. Surely, of the two, "Delta" must be a worse logician than B. S.

The truth is, "Delta's" article is a personal controversy with B. S., and, with the reader's leave, shall be briefly answered as such. "Delta" accuses B. S. of "contradictions," &c. Surely he is not the man to make this charge, for he tells us (page 36), "we were pleased with the paper of B. S.;" that he thinks the said paper is "far from dry and uninteresting" (page 37); and yet that it is full of "contradictions," "contrary assertions," "false logic and rhetoric," and "fallacies," and one in which no "confidence can be placed." May not B. S. justly reply, *Tu quoque*, when thus assailed by a writer who takes pleasure and interest where he finds neither confidence nor reason? But to the contradictions he finds. He says (page 37) that the debate is limited "to the comparative healthiness of the poetry of our two authors," and that "*this form*" of the question "implies that both are great poets,—accomplished masters of the musical concatenation of words." Then, if healthiness implies a great poet of great musical skill, *a fortiori*, the greater the poet, and the greater his musical skill, the healthier will be his poetry. Yet, because B. S. argues instead of "implying," "Delta" turns round and contradicts his own implication, in order to condemn B. S.'s argument. "It is not for us to discuss" which poet has the greater metrical power, &c., &c. "Delta" proceeds (p. 37) to prove that the emotions produced by word music are subjective in their origin and not objective. Of course, all *emotions* must be subjective, for they are states of our being. B. S. never denied so obvious a truth; nay, he even incidentally mentioned it (vol. iii. pp. 243, 244, and 248). "Delta" next (p. 37) quotes two sentences to show that B. S. first asserts and then denies that poetry addresses the intellect. The assumed contradiction exists in one sentence, where B. S. says that the object of poetry "is the creation of intellectual pleasure, by addressing primarily the imagination and feelings rather than the intellect." B. S. regrets that, writing under circumstances which allowed him no time for revision, this clumsy expression escaped attention. He ought to have used another adjective. He meant, as the sentence shows, to point out the

pleasures which are not of the bodily senses merely, but emotional, spiritual, or soul pleasures. He used "intellectual" as we do in saying, "Man is a physical and intellectual being," i. e., as a generic term for all our non-material faculties. He admits his error frankly. The intellect, properly so called, is capable of neither pain nor pleasure. B. S., however, did not print intellectual in *italics*, as "Delta" has been compelled to do in order to add colour to his objection; nor does he believe that one reader in fifty has misunderstood his meaning. He pleads guilty (at the bar of small criticism) of a verbal carelessness; reminding "Delta" that his Latin, *ex sui oro*, would stand small chance, either etymologically or syntactically, before the same tribunal. In his next paragraph (p. 38) "Delta" carefully argues that "man, being a moral agent," the healthiness or otherwise of human influence must be judged "by moral considerations only," and states that B. S. "is at considerable pains" to show that "as a poet, intellectual [i. e. spiritual] pleasure is the true test of healthy tendency." B. S. does *not* argue anything of the kind. He argues (vol. iii. p. 245), that (spiritual) "pleasure cannot be refined and permanent without being moral." He declares (vol. iii. pp. 246, 247) that while "the *secret and source* of a poet's influence" lies in his being "a minister to our pleasures, still the "amount of his influence for good," i. e., its healthiness, depends "on the *way* he exercises his powers, and the *thoughts* he invests with the graces of poetry." In other words, B. S. said that the power to please decides the relative power, greatness, and influence of a poet; and that "having thus gauged the power of influence" of each of two poets, we must next ascertain *how* they used it, in order to determine the relative healthiness of their works; for, he adds, "all *resulting* moral influence is a combination of the active power and moral quality of the influence actually exerted." "Delta" finds here "contradictions" and "fallacies," "chameleon versatility," &c. It is just as if we said, "The sanitary value of a medical drug is the result of (1) its power, and (2) its quality." "Delta" would interpose,—"No: sanitary value does not depend on power, for poisons are powerful," and when the sentence was finished, he would turn round and say,—"There! you said it was power, and now you say it is quality; you contradict yourself." If "Delta" *will* blunder thus, if he really *cannot* put two ideas together to form a third, if he *will* regard combination as the same as contradiction, B. S. is not to blame. He can only say with Coleridge, *Intelligenda non intellectum adfero*. "Delta" then (p. 39) speaks of B. S.'s *sang froid* in dismissing the intellectual comparison between Tennyson and Longfellow, as poets, *currente calamo*. He forgets that the "flying pen" nevertheless devotes two pages to a brief review of Tennyson's metrical power as compared with that of Longfellow. Moreover, when B. S. wrote his first paper, arguing that it was necessary to the debate to determine which was the greater poet, he could not foresee that his opponents would admit the metrical, artistic, and intellectual superiority of

Tennyson; when he found this to be the fact, he naturally thought he need not prove at length that which opponents even granted,—that he might fairly quote their admissions, and pass on *currente calamo*. "Delta" finally, in the second paragraph of p. 39, strings his objections together in a firstly, secondly, thirdly, and fourthly. They gain no new force by this repetition, and, therefore, need no further notice. We think the corners of our triangular friend have now been so far rubbed down, that he will fit into a round hole of the smallest dimensions.

With sincere acknowledgments to C. B. N. and to "Anglo-Saxon" for the powerful support rendered in their essays, and apologizing for the many imperfections in our own treatment of the great theme, we now make our bow. The issue and the verdict are with the readers. Let them judge. B. S.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

IN the opening article of this debate we stated our reasons for taking the negative side. We then endeavoured to show upon what grounds our decision in favour of Longfellow was based. We did not claim for him higher rank as a Poet, or assert that, as a thinker, he was superior to Tennyson. On the contrary, it was frankly admitted that he would not well bear the comparison, either for "depth of imagination, or breadth of view; for delicacy of diction, or subtlety of thought." In only one respect did we consider him to be entitled to a higher place, that being *the healthier tendencies of his poems*.

By the question itself we are limited to this one point. It is not asked which is the greater poet? but which exercises the better influence? We think it is altogether irrelevant to the present discussion, which has to do with the effect of their writings *only*, to give an elaborate essay upon the nature of poetry itself, or a rhapsody upon the music of verse.

We are aware our opponents think otherwise, and object to be confined within the narrow boundaries assigned to them. B. S., indeed, says that, "considered *per se*, the attempt to determine whether Tennyson or Longfellow exerts the healthier influence on the mind is all but valueless" (p. 392); and is of opinion that we might as well occupy our time by discussing "the relative alimentary value of beef and mutton." Notwithstanding, B. S. has thought fit to occupy eighteen or nineteen pages in a debate which has professedly no other object than the one he ridicules. He maintains, also, that the inquiries to which his first article was devoted were absolutely necessary; and persisting in regarding the question as one involving an accurate estimate of the relative poetic power of Tennyson and Longfellow, devotes the greater part of his second to prove what he acknowledges his opponents have never disputed, viz., that Tennyson is the greater of the two. On p. 392 he tells us, "We might as well pretend to have a geometry without definitions, and a system of algebra without the foundation idea of quantity, as

to judge between the influence of two poets, without ever settling in our own mind what poetry is; how it is to be judged; and how its effects are to be estimated." To have made the analogy complete, he should have said, "We cannot judge between the *influence* of two poets without settling in our own mind what *influence* is."

Influence is felt, and does not depend for its power upon our understanding how it is exerted. There is in this a confusion of ideas which runs all through his article. To say that we cannot appreciate the influence of a poet without first clearly defining what poetry is, its nature and office, is as absurd as to say we cannot be swayed by the eloquence of a speaker without understanding oratory; or be knocked down by a pugilist without being acquainted with the laws of boxing.

Does B. S. imagine that, without a correct theory, it would be impossible for a poor seamstress to feel the pathos of the "Song of a Shirt?" Will he deny that an "unfortunate" might recognize the tender humanity of the "Bridge of Sighs" without having read his article in the April number?

Passing from this, B. S. attacks H. G. for making his own experience a test of the influence of Tennyson and Longfellow. At first sight this may seem a fallacious ground upon which to rest our verdict; but it is not so. Do we not make ourselves the standard by which we judge of the feelings of others? We know only so much of our neighbour's heart as we have learnt from our own. That which moves us we expect to exert a corresponding power over our fellows.

If, therefore, we are conscious of a strengthening, elevating influence in a man's works, we have some reason for supposing a similar effect is produced upon all who read them. Of course, not absolutely the same; it will be modified or increased, according to the nature upon which it operates; but our hearts are, in their larger characteristics, so fashioned alike, that whatsoever is true, lovely, and of good report, reaches all who are not degraded or debased.

B. S. objects to the fact of Longfellow's influence being more extensive than that of Tennyson being urged as a point in his favour; and in opposing this argument, takes occasion to insinuate that it is only from want of intellect that any prefer the former. That he feels somewhat contemptuous towards those who do, may be inferred from his query on page 395, where, speaking of a comparison between them, as to the way in which they have used their power, he asks:—"Can any one doubt what must and will be the unanimous verdict of every person *competent* to form an opinion?" We do not think that the number of persons influenced by either one or the other determines the question. We would not settle it by universal suffrage,—the same objection applying to that principle in things literary as in things political,—that for the right use of it, education and taste are required, which all do not possess. But still we consider the fact that Longfellow does gain

a wider audience, even among those who have the requisites for a right judgment, ought to be allowed some weight. Besides, there is reason to doubt the *healthiness* of that which has nothing in common with the generality, and makes for itself, by its own exclusiveness, a narrow circle. And this we think to be the case, in some degree, with Tennyson's poetry.

But we pass on to notice a remark of B. S., in which he endeavours to ward off the argument which has been derived from the mystical, uncertain, indistinct teaching of his favourite poet, by declaring that "The aim of a poet is not direct teaching; and the more closely he attempts this, the more prosaic he will be" (page 398). We partly agree with B. S. as regards the aim of most poets, but would remind him again that it is not the poet's aim, but his influence, we are discussing. He goes on, however, to say what we cannot agree with:—"No great poet has ever professed to be catechist and lecturer to humanity." Does B. S. mean to say that Isaiah, and the author of Job, were not great poets? Perhaps, in accordance with his definition on page 243, he will deny that their writings are poetry at all, as they are usually printed as prose.

In a previous article we expressed ourselves in doubt as to the influence of "*Maud*," inasmuch as it contains fantastic passages, which, if accepted from so high a poet as his own convictions, would be very detrimental. To this, B. S. replies, "that it is the very nature of dramatic writing that we should find the truth and the conclusions in the result of the whole. Did Shakespeare believe with Hamlet, or not? Did he mean to say he would have killed Desdemona?" &c. (page 400.) This, instead of being a conclusive answer, is an argument on our side. B. S. thinks we ought to find the truth in the result of the whole. Our objection to "*Maud*" was, that after a careful reading of the whole, it was difficult to know what Tennyson intended it to teach. No such difficulty exists with regard to the plays of Shakespeare or the poems of Milton, which B. S. refers to. In them it is apparent with whom the sympathy of the poet goes; but in Tennyson's "*Maud*" it is not. If B. S. had not felt this, he might have more effectually replied to our stricture by explaining that most perplexing poem, or he might have had recourse to his dictum,—"*The aim of the poet is not direct teaching.*" In this case it certainly is not.

We offer the above remarks in reply to the most important objections that have been brought forward to our view of the question. There are others which would have been noticed, if space permitted; but we hope enough has been said on both sides to place the question before the impartial reader, to whose judgment we confidently leave the decision.

EDMUND.

History.

WAS JOAN OF ARC AN IMPOSTOR?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

CHALLAMEL, in his *History of France*, affirms that Joan of Arc was simply in the state of hallucination; or, in other words, a self-deluded automaniac, acting upon the superstitious tendencies of friends and foes by the power of pretended spiritual communications, the offspring of her own delirious flights of fancy.

We refer to the closing sentences of our opening paper, (p. 328, vol. iii. New Series) as indicating the true position of this question. We there say, that "Joan of Arc claimed to have received authority and power from intercourse with a supernatural being she calls St. Michael, by which she achieved deeds of daring which any ordinary mortal, possessing equal energy of character, might have successfully accomplished without such supernatural assistance; while the existence and appearance of that personage is grave matter for doubt,—in fact, is nowhere proven. Therefore, Joan of Arc was an impostor, or one who pretended to that which was not." In disproof of this position not one argument or valid reason has been assigned by our opponents, as we now proceed to show.

G. A. H. E., p. 330, gives, as the first test of her supernatural powers, the address she makes to Charles in his disguise; a feat, we imagine, readily performed by any one perfectly unskilled in court life. Where is the person of either sex in our own land, who would not readily recognize our beloved Queen and her worthy Consort in any assembly, however dressed, especially if that interview were chosen in the royal presence chamber? But G. A. H. E., on this occasion, puts into the lips of Joan this remarkable language:—"Most noble Lord Dauphin, I am Joan, the maid sent in behalf of God to aid you in your kingdom; and, by His command, I announce to you that you shall be crowned in the city of Rheims, and shall become His lieutenant in the kingdom of France." Again he says, p. 331, when she was examined by the doctors of theology, she addressed them:—"I know neither A nor B, but I am commanded by my voices, in behalf of the King of Heaven, to raise the siege of Orleans, and to crown the dauphin at Rheims;" and after the course of events had shown the accomplishment of these promises, not by any superhuman means, but by the vigorous efforts of the soldiers, excited to emulate her bravery, all of which was perfectly natural and human, she is made (p. 332) to say, "I wish that the gentle king would allow me to return towards my father and mother, keep my flocks and herds as before, and do all things as I was wont to do."

Upon these speeches of Joan our friend, G. A. H. E., assumes

that she was not an impostor. If such could be a truly valid reason, then success in the achievement of any bold promise of a rash nature, where the name of God is invoked by the villain or visionary, would be proof positive of merit, and entitle the cut-throat and the maniac to canonization. Beyond the speeches and the assumption, G. A. H. E. offers no argument. Lest the rhetoric with which these assumptions and speeches are placed before the reader should have magnified them beyond their real worth, we will offer a few remarks on the speeches, to show the fallacy of the assumption, and, by consequence, the unsound logic of our friendly opponent.

Joan, in these speeches, claimed—1st. To have been sent by God; 2ndly. To have been endowed with supernatural power; 3rdly. To prophecy that the dauphin should be crowned by herself in the city of Rheims; and, 4thly. She acknowledged *the king's authority only* to limit or continue the work to which, as she alleged, she had been commanded by God.

We may fairly assume that these speeches are really and truthfully Joan's own, as G. A. H. E., her advocate, affirms; to suppose otherwise, were to make that writer guilty of literary suicide—guilty of putting into the lips of his heroine words she had not uttered, merely to make her the object of ridicule. Respecting her claim to the Divine mission, we have only her own assertion; if further evidence were in existence, surely G. A. H. E. would have produced it, in her support. Such being the case, that this claim rests on her unsupported assertion, we would inquire, Do the circumstances of the case render the direct interference of God, and the special revelation of that interference to an ignorant and obscure female, probable, necessary, or wise, as having relation to the moral government and providential arrangements of an all-wise, beneficent Deity? We submit this question seriously to the thoughtful reader, and would suggest, that to our mind it appears little short of the most daring impiety of which a human being can be guilty, to assume a Divine commission, or to affirm that another has rightly and truthfully assumed a Divine commission, under such questionable circumstances. It must be remembered, as S. F. T. has shown, p. 408, that all Europe was the theatre of impostures of a kindred nature for ages, to most of which none but candidates for Bethlehem Hospital would give the least credence. It is true—

“ God moves in a mysterious way
His wonders to perform;”

but all His works show unmistakeable signs of skill, wisdom, and adaptability of means to the required end. Let it not be objected that God has sent His servants in times past to work His wonders in the earth, and why not in the case of Joan? But in every truly Divine mission there is evidence above and beyond the mere assertion of the person sent. God is more apparent in the mission than the instrument chosen for the work; in fact, the finger of God is seen tracing upon the wall the work He is accomplishing, and the

person sent is entirely lost in the awful presence of the wonderful working of God himself. It matters not, as we shall subsequently see, to object that Joan believed herself to be the messenger of God; the facts adduced by our opponents conclusively prove the assumption of Joan to be daring blasphemy.

Let us be understood as speaking seriously. We feel strongly, and the importance of the principle involved should make every professing Christian to think, feel, and speak firmly, forcibly, and with great care. It is an awful thing to make God the foster-father to all our daring wishes and desires, or to approve of and idolize our fellow-mortal for daring to speak as God's mouthpiece, and act as His instrument irreverently and falsely.

She claimed supernatural powers. Her assertions surely can entitle her to no credence in this respect; the tendency of her daring, united to the superstitious influence her pretensions exercised in her favour, were the efficient causes of her success, and are to be accounted for by the well-recognized principles of psychological science, without supernatural assistance. She assumed to be sent by God, and endowed with supernatural powers for a specific object; the superstitious ignorance of the people induced them to receive her according to her pretensions; they believed in her mission; that belief created confidence, gave fresh vigour to their efforts; they expected success, and worked with hearty goodwill to achieve that success: the result was perfectly natural, and they succeeded. An entirely different series of circumstances resulted from her pretensions in their influence upon the minds of her foes: in the former case, confidence of success was produced; but in the latter, superstitious dread of her supernatural power, and of her assumed Divine mission, induced timidity, fear, terror, weakness, and expected defeat. Hence defeat was realized to one party and success gained by the other—the sole causes being, what is termed in military language the relative strength or weakness of the *morale* of the contending armies, superinduced by the pretensions of Joan. The whole, so far from being proof of supernatural power, is simply a psychological fact, the result of a natural law.

She is made by G. A. H. E. to say that she was “commanded on behalf of the King of Heaven to crown the king at Rheims.” This implies one of two things; either she was to crown the king with her own hands, or to cause him to be crowned as a result of her supernatural power. The king was crowned by the archbishop, therefore she did not crown the king with her own hands; and we have seen that nothing of a supernatural character was manifested in the successes of the French army, nor in the defeats of the English army; therefore the coronation of the king was a result of military success and State policy, neither of which were supernatural, however much they might have been brought about by Joan's conduct and assumptions. At the outset of her public career she alleges the command of Heaven to the work, and yet she is made

by G. A. H. E. to accord the power to the king, either to continue, limit, or even entirely to terminate her Divine mission. These are positions as contradictory as language can express. God commands to a mission; and yet the person sent appeals to a fellow being for permission to forsake the mission of God: this fact stamps the whole of Joan's pretensions as the grossest imposition it is possible for the ingenuity of man to invent.

We shall now offer a few observations on the chief arguments of subsequent writers:—"Bennett" says that imposition is "an acted or unacted lie;" and a deceiver is "he that *knows* he *deceives*," and in this lies the *guilt* of the *action*." And W. H. P. observes, "The impostor must be aware she is deceiving, or she is not an impostor." In the first place, we shall show the impossibility of Joan having been self-deceived; and secondly, that self-deception does not relieve the impostor of her guilt. She represents herself, or at least is represented by her advocates in this debate, as having had authority from heaven, as being commissioned by God, as instructed and authorized by voices or spiritual agencies. Now we have seen by the facts of history that these assertions of hers have only her own authority to support them; no one else was cognizant of them. We have also seen that supernatural communications were not only very improbable, but about this time many extraordinary deceptions were popular, which none but Bedlamites would now believe; pretension to supernatural power and spiritual communications appear then to have been a superstitious idiosyncrasy of the age. Going still further, we have seen that all the phenomena attending the history of Joan, public and private, are to be accounted for by known psychological laws. Aggregating these facts as cumulative evidence, we are convinced of the impossibility of Joan being self-deceived; self-deception, even if practicable, could not be a valid relief from the guilt of imposition or the successful deception of others. Truth is objective as a thing extraneous to humanity; a fact is a fact, whether we believe it to be as another represents it or not. The fact or falsity in question now is simply this:—Was Joan inspired, commissioned, or commanded by God, by heaven, by St. Michael, or by spiritual voices, to accomplish a certain work, or not? If she was, she was not an impostor, and the *onus probandi* that she was divinely authorized lay upon our opponents, and so far from having accomplished their task, we find them confessing, in the words of W. H. P., that "she was not inspired." Hence, out of the mouths of her own advocates is Joan condemned as an impostor, verifying the old adage, "Save her from her friends, from her foes she could defend herself." Our opponents having confessed to the falsity of Joan, they prove her an impostor, her self-deception notwithstanding. Could we believe that self-deception were no imposture, according to our opponents, then Joan was a lying self-deceiver, worthy of canonization for the success of her deception, because there is no midway between the two extremes: if Joan was not an impostor, she was a

martyred saint, and worthy of the highest admiration. If self-deception makes the lie a truth when communicated to others, then every monomaniac and half-witted imbecile is worthy of our highest esteem and most reverential regard, and every crazy inmate of our lunatic asylums, who believes himself or herself to be a monarch, is worthy of all the homage due to royalty. The egregious absurdity of the thing is so glaring, that we are almost persuaded we are removed back to the fifteenth century, or else that we have, by the suggestion of this debate, exhumed the fossilized remains of the dark ages and given life to them; but as we have no relish for the fate of Frankenstein, we have brought them to the touchstone of truth, and have exhibited them to the logic and reason of the British Controversialists, who will, doubtless, consign all such antiquated superstitions and stolid logic as exhibited by the pro-Joanites to the limbo of oblivion, *in secula seculorum*. *Requiescat in pace.*

Thus, when Joan and her mission are stripped of the gorgeous pageantry of State-craft, denuded of the sepulchral ceremonies of priestcraft, and forsaken by the paraphernalia of military glory, they become a miserable patch of filthy rags, the blackest blasphemy ever conceived by the polluted mind of the monkish visionary in the dark ages of ignorance and superstition.

Upon these premises we feel ourselves warranted in pronouncing Joan of Arc an impostor.

L'OUVRIER.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

THE story of Joan of Arc is one of those of which we are permitted to know only a portion of the facts; and it is the absence of the details requisite to form a complete memoir which constitutes the difficulty we have to encounter in the consideration of such a question as the present. In this instance, however, we know sufficient to enable us to arrive at definite and sensible conclusions; and though several incidents in the narrative at first sight bear a somewhat contradictory appearance, we submit that a careful and candid investigation will show them to be perfectly reconcileable. As an illustration, it will be observed, in contrast to our statement, that at the time Joan was first impressed with the idea of the "visions," she was engaged in attending to the domestic concerns of her parents, or in guarding the flocks which belonged to them. "L'Ouvrier" states she was employed as servant at an inn; and, from being accustomed in such capacity to ride the horses of the guests to water, she learnt the art of horsemanship. The real facts are these:—At the period of which we write, the greater part of France was distracted by the faction which arose upon the death of Charles VI., between the Armagnacs, as the adherents of the rightful heir to the throne were called, and the Burgundians, or those who espoused the cause of the rival aspirant for the regency, John, Duke of Burgundy. The inhabitants of the village where Joan resided belonged to the royalist party; and upon one occasion

"a party of Burgundian cavalry drove them with their families and flocks from their peaceful homes, and compelled them to take refuge elsewhere. The family of Arc found shelter in an hostelry at Neufchateau, a town which, belonging to the Duke of Lorraine, was safe from aggression. Here they remained fifteen days, during which it is just probable that Joan, as some return for the hospitality and protection afforded, assisted, as is supposed; and this conjecture is the only foundation for the story of Joan having been servant at an inn, a statement first made by a chronicler of the Burgundian faction," and always repeated (when used at all) in the same vindictive spirit which originally prompted the record.

The chief embarrassment with our opponents seem to have had has been in deciding the first, perhaps the main point, involved in the discussion, viz., the meaning of the term "impostor." The simple definition of the great lexicographer, with which we started, appears to have been rejected in favour of a more elaborate interpretation; and we cannot help remarking the fact in each case, that the more laboured the description is, the more abstruse and obscure is the explanation. Thus, A. J. transcribes the words of the *Imperial Dictionary*, evidently believing it a greater authority than Johnson, *especially when the sentence is italicized*; but we think he might have avoided the trouble, for the quotation does not serve him at all. Joan of Arc was certainly not a religious "impostor;" her object was rather a political than a religious one; neither did she "falsely pretend to an extraordinary commission from heaven," as we hope to prove satisfactorily, before we finish.

"L'Ouvrier" tells us (p. 326), that it was "the feeling of true patriotism which fired her indignation against the enemies of her country;" and yet he closes his article by declaring (p. 328) that "Joan of Arc was an impostor." Did any one ever hear of a PATRIOTIC IMPOSTOR before? The mere thought is absurd; the very words are ludicrous in their connection; and yet this is the substance of the opening affirmative paper. "An impostor," animated with "the feeling of true patriotism," would be a special novelty at any time; how much more so in an age when, generally speaking, men were intent only on extending their own individual power, increasing their own individual wealth, or contributing to their own personal pleasures, and when this episode stands prominently forward, as at once the brightest and blackest spot, on one of the darkest pages of French history.

In continuation of the argument, it may be interesting to look for a moment at the character and career of a *real* impostor,—one, too, whose performances are to be found related in the same annals as those which record the achievements of Joan of Arc. We refer to Law, the originator of the Mississippi scheme. Here was a man, a notoriously professed gambler, who, having wasted the best part of his life, and the whole of his means, in a reckless and uninterrupted course of dissipation, sought by means of a monstrous swindle to enrich himself at the expense of his victims. Was this

"the feeling of true patriotism"? Was he so actuated when he propounded his bubble contrivances for replenishing an empty exchequer, but by which only his own position, for the time being, was improved, while thousands were ruined, and the national debt of France augmented one-half? How different is the opposite case. The private character of Joan was unimpeachable from the moment when she entered upon the scene of action until she quitted it for ever. The propositions she submitted to the government of the day were designed for the benefit of the country, and were eminently successful. The "filthy lucre," which was the idol of Law, had no charms for the Maid; and the honours and rewards which he coveted were spurned by her. Is it difficult to decide, then, which was the patriot, and which the impostor?

But this is not the only inconsistency which the reasoning of "L'Ouvrier" exhibits. In the last paragraph of the paper contributed by him he endeavours to make out a case against the Maid, by doubting, or affecting to doubt, the existence of any such personage as St. Michael, and, perforce, the improbability of his having appeared to her. He then goes on to argue that, unless her friends prove such existence, that Joan must *of necessity* be guilty of imposition. We would, however, remind "L'Ouvrier" that Joan spoke more of Saints Catherine and Margaret than of St. Michael; and we think it would be equally logical for us to require "L'Ouvrier" to show that Joan never did have "visions," as for us to be called upon to prove that she was so favoured. Indeed, he might just as rationally demand a proof of the angel's appearance to Balaam's ass—both statements resting upon much the same kind of evidence, the only difference being that one event is recorded in ancient, and the other in modern history: and we all know there are some persons who quite as conscientiously disbelieve the one testimony as the other.

Further, if Joan of Arc is to be denounced as an impostor, because she believed in "visions" and supernatural agencies, some of the greatest names in the history of the world must bear a similar imputation. The great Napoleon believed in "a star;" and his nephew is so far susceptible in this respect, that we are told he goes to war for "an idea." Lord Castlereagh relates that a fire spirit once appeared to him in a bedroom of a noble mansion; and Socrates had a demon as his adviser. Ignatius Loyola, whom the sternest Protestant would not call a weak man, saw the Trinity in Unity on the steps of the church of St. Dominic, communed with the Virgin Mary, and beheld the Saviour with mortal eyes. Are we then to deny the right to indulge in similar fancies, if so disposed, to a simple village maiden, living at a time of which "the thick darkness of superstition and ignorance was the true characteristic," whose chief knowledge was a slight acquaintance with the elements of the Catholic faith, and the essence of whose religious belief was the worship of saints?

We will now show the distinction between our heroine and "one

who falsely pretended to an extraordinary commission from heaven"—we mean Joanna Southcott—for the particular edification of A. J.

Joanna Southcott imposed upon the people by selling them a sort of certificate, which they were led to believe would secure their eternal salvation; and she further rendered herself amenable to the italicized argument of our friend, by representing that she was the ordained mother of the Shiloh promised to Jacob, whose birth was arranged to take place at midnight of the 19th October, 1814, but which event, it is hardly necessary to say, never came to pass. Did Joan of Arc practise any such deceptions? Did she make capital out of those by whom she was surrounded? Did she promise anything which was not fully accomplished? There is but one answer that can be given to these questions, and which, when given, if nothing else could be said in her behalf, ought at once to relieve her of any such epithet as that which has been associated with her name.

Lastly, we turn to the article of S. F. T., who mentions Lambert Simnel and Perkin Warbeck as "similar impostors" to the individual for whom we are concerned; but we really do not see what is gained by the relation of their exploits, for there is not so much as a shadow of a coincidence between the two, or rather we should say, the three cases; and we might almost content ourselves with repeating the very words of S. F. T., in demonstration of the fact. Thus he says, "Lambert Simnel was set up to counterfeit the Earl of Warwick." Was Joan of Arc "set up to counterfeit" anybody? And again, "Perkin was selected to personate the Duke of York." Was Joan of Arc "selected to personate" anybody?

Simnel and Warbeck, as S. F. T. indeed tells us, were the tools of certain parties who had an interest in the success of the schemes in which these youths, *for their own advantage*, respectively took part; but is there anything "similar" in the other case? Joan of Arc knew no patrons, and expected no patrimony. On the contrary, she forsook friends to find enemies; she left a happy home to become ultimately the inmate of a loathsome dungeon; she relinquished comfort, to become wretched; she renounced life, to die a martyr. Can this be said of the others? and if not, may we inquire where the "similarity" exists, upon which S. F. T. based his argument?

We will trespass no further, and therefore merely add, that we trust we have said sufficient to insure a verdict in our favour.

G. A. H. E.

I consider there is a certain quantity of distempered brain in the world, which, though sure to manifest itself in some way, is often checked and diverted, or prevented from attaining its ultimate effects, by the variety of absurd opinions that, in one department or another, are always to be met with or invented. The mad humour which used to be absorbed by the dreams of alchemy, witchcraft, astrology, and other exploded chimeras of the dark ages, is as rife as ever, only expended on newer and less imaginative follies.—*W. B. Clulow.*

The Essayist.

SHAKESPEARE FACTS, FANCIES, FORGERIES, AND FABRICATIONS.

"What is your substance, whereof are you made,
That millions of strange shadows on you tend?
Since every one hath, every one, one shade,
And you, *but one*, can every shadow lend.—*Shakespeare's Sonnets*, 53.

INTRODUCTION.

SHAKESPEARE! There is conjuration and mighty magic in the name, and there is mystery about the *man*. The place of his birth is a shrine for pilgrim feet, and Stratford-upon-Avon holds the dust of her (and England's) noblest intellectual son. Yet of this man, who "was not for an age, but for all time," fewer memorials are preserved than of almost any of Britain's mighty minstrels. Far away, in the time-distance of five centuries ago, "Old Dan. Chaucer" shows himself as a reality, and no myth,—

"Singing he was, or floyting alle the day;
He was as fresche as is the moneth of May."

Dunbar, Gawin Douglas, and Sir David Lyndsay, appear in literary history lifelike and solid. Surrey and Wyatt are known, both in biography and romance. Sydney and Spenser are palpable and substantial figures in the *tableaux* of their age. The personality and "the very form and pressure" of many of the Elizabethan sages—Raleigh, Fairfax, Daniel, Drayton, Marlowe, Chapman, Middleton, Jonson, &c., are known to the most casual readers of biography; yet here is *one*—the greatest—of whom it has been remarked, "'*He lived*' is almost all that can be said."

We remember the vividness with which the thought of this self-forgetfulness, and as it were, spirit-like impalpability, shone on us as we stood in the chancel of Stratford Church—the church in which he was baptized, in which he worshipped, where he mourned, and in which he lies "so sepulchred,"

"That kings, for such a tomb, might wish to die;"—

saw before us the bust that "was for gentle Shakespeare cut;" and beheld the grave which held all that was mortal of him who was "not one, but all mankind's epitome." A dear friend accompanied us,—one whom a connection with the *British Controversialist* first, and now long and fast, made ours,—and we recall the singular feeling with which we, almost simultaneously, remarked how difficult it was to realize Shakespeare in all the breadth, power, and geniality of his nature, as "a visible presence" among men: he seems so much more like an impersonality, a shape, a shade, a force, a voice, than as a form shrouded in a "muddy vesture of decay," and as moving amid the casualties of time and space, possessed of all the attributes of man. And yet we had read, with some care,

the abounding biographies of Avon's bard, and knew almost by heart those items of his life which research had rescued from among Time's "alms for Oblivion;" we had conned his precious pages with a lover's ardour and a student's zeal, and could not bear to think of him as one whose "soul was like a star, and dwelt apart" from human friendships, interests, aims, and cares. We were anxious to bring a feeling of his *humanity* into our souls, and to realize the period when

"Mellifluous Shakespeare, whose enchanting quill
Commanded mirth or passion, was but *Will*."

We thought then, as we have often done since, of the remarks of Hallam,—“Of William Shakespeare, whom . . . we *seem* to know better than any human writer, it may be truly said that we scarcely know anything. We see him—so far as we do see him—not in himself, but in a reflex image; . . . to us he is scarcely a determined person, a substantial reality, the *man* Shakespeare. . . . All that insatiable curiosity and unwearied diligence have hitherto detected about Shakespeare serves rather to disappoint and perplex us than to furnish the slightest illustration of his character.”* We repeat, with a sigh, the curt summarization of Steevens, “All that is known, with any degree of certainty, concerning Shakespeare is, that he was born at Stratford-upon-Avon, married, and had children there; went to London, where he commenced actor, and wrote poems and plays; returned to Stratford, made his will, died, and was buried;” and we were compelled to re-express the ejaculation of Carlyle, “How much in Shakespeare lies hid—his sorrows, his silent struggles, known to himself; much that was not known at all, not speakable at all; like roots, like sap and forces, working underground!” Then we cast our thoughts from the brief, gossiping, uncritical “Life,” prefixed to Rowe’s “Shakespeare,” 1709, to the *side-lighted*, picturesque, synchronized, though somewhat highly-coloured and imaginative, biography of Charles Knight; and recollecting the researches of Malone, Dyce, Drake, Collier, Hunter, Bell, De Quincey, Wheler, Halliwell, &c., came to the conclusion that it might be possible, by an exercise of discriminating criticism, to attain some more decided and realizable notions of the great dramatist than we at that time possessed. With the view of attempting this, we some years ago re-read a considerable amount of Shakespearean literature, taking notes as we proceeded; but other tasks, at that time, prevented the fulfilment of our design, and for awhile these notes have been laid past in a limbo of those interrupted or unfinished attempts which have now and again created excitement

“In the quick forge and working house of thought.”

Our collection of references is dispersed into the libraries from which they were selected, and we are now in a retired nook of a village where the means of extended literary research are sparse and scant; and

* “Literature of Europe,” vol. ii. p. 175.

"When to the sessions of sweet, silent thought,
I summon up remembrance of things past,
I sigh the lack of many a thing I sought."

The recent discussions concerning Shakespere have revived the idea relinquished then, and we have resolved to sketch out our plan and lay it before our readers. The necessity for brevity laid upon us in this department of this serial will materially interfere with the literary execution of our design; but it will have this advantage, that it will make our outline occupy a compass much narrower than we originally contemplated, and will therefore, perhaps, lessen its tedium to our readers, though it will certainly increase our labour. The accommodation of our original view to the exigencies of the present state of opinion among Shakesperean critics and readers will necessitate a remodelment of our materials, a special arrangement of the topics of our research, and an extension of our subject itself. With this view we have selected the words contained in the title of our paper, as in our opinion inclusive of all that we shall require to consider. We make no pretensions to originality of research; we have no "new facts" to reveal; no fresh materials to bring into the argument. We intend only such a reconstruction of that which is already known as by its method may lead us to feel the *human* in Shakespere's character; as may bring him before us as a man; as may show him somewhat in his habit as he lived; and, by an appeal to chronology, prove that, though we know too little to satisfy our insatiable curiosity, we do really know more than is commonly believed. The vagrant manner in which dates have hitherto wandered here and there, in the pages of professed biographers, has been quite mystifying. If it is only by "applying this to that, and so to so," that a memoir can be constructed, it will surely be well that these should be placed in their natural order; for then and thus may we most likely break the spell

"That does in vile misprison shackle up"

our thoughts of Shakespere, and bring out the man as well as the dramatist. Let us try.

I.—SHAKESPERE'S ANCESTRY.

"Honours best thrive

When rather from our acts we them derive,
Than our foregoers."—*All's Well that Ends Well*.

I. *Paternal*. "Breakspear, Shakespear, and the like," says Verstegan, in his "Restitution of Decayed Intelligence" [Antwerp, 1605], "have been surnames imposed upon the first bearers of them for valour and feats of arms." Bosworth field on the 22nd August, 1485, beheld the first of the Tudor dynasty proclaimed—"King Henry the Seventh." Shortly after this, Henry began to enrich, with possessions and goods, according to their desert and merit,

those who had then aided him. "For his faithful and approved service to the late most prudent prince, King Henry VII., of famous memory," *probably* Richard Shakespere, of Snitterfield, near Stratford-on-Avon, "was advanced and rewarded with lands and tenements given to him in those parts of Warwickshire." He had two sons *at least*, Henry and John. The latter—born, *perhaps*, about 1530—became resident in Henley Street, Stratford, prior to 29th April, 1552. In that street, on 2nd October, 1556, he bought the copyhold of a house and garden, as well as that of a house in Greenhill Street, having a garden and a croft—i. e., a small piece of pasture or tillage land—attached to it. A man of business, too, was he then; for on 17th June, 1556, he was sued at court as a *glover*, and on 19th November he impleaded a neighbour for unjustly detaining 18 quarters of barley. Aubrey says he "was a butcher;" Rowe, that he was "a considerable dealer in wool." In 1557 he was a burgess, a member of the corporation (for a charter had been granted to Stratford in 1553), and, by choice of the court-leet, ale-taster for the borough, "sworn to look to the assize and goodness of bread, or ale, or beer," within its precincts. In that year (or early in the next?) he married; for "Joan Shakespere, daughter to John Shakespere," was baptized on 15th September, 1558.

II. *Maternal*. The groom of the chamber to Henry VII. was Robert Arden, a scion of a family of the highest antiquity in Warwickshire. His son, also named Robert, had by his *first* wife a family—at any rate, of seven daughters; of whom Mary was the youngest. "John Shakespere, having married the daughter and one of the heirs of Robert Arden, of Willmecote, in the parish of Aston Cauntlow," became under the will of the said Robert Arden, dated 24th November, 1556, possessed of "land in Willmecote, called Asbies," as well as of the property in Snitterfield, on which his father had been reared.

The Ardens and Shakesperes were naturally brought together, and the rising burgess of Stratford seems not to have advanced unadmitted claims to the hand of the heiress of Asbies, whose father had died in December, 1556. After this event, if we suffer rather more than a year to elapse, we may *fancy* that on or about Christmas, 1557, John Shakespere and Mary Arden, suitably attired and attended, arrived in (*say?*) Aston Cauntlow parish church, with full intent that then and there

"All sanctimonious ceremonies may
With full and holy rite be ministered."

And that, no opposition being offered to their union, having plighted the full assurance of their faith, the ceremony of their compact was duly solemnized, so that, shortly afterwards, Henley Street was musical for many a merry hour.

The young couple *may* have had a goodly round of visitings to do and to get; and though the world was disturbed by wars, they

seemed to enjoy both peace and prosperity at that time. In 1558, John Shakespere was one of the four constables of Stratford, an office then always held by chosen burgess, and in that year also, as we have said, Joan Shakespere was born. Rising in municipal dignity, in 1559 he became an assessor—an official whose duty it was to fix and determine the fines leviable for offences against the bye-laws of the borough. In 1560 it is *probable* his daughter Joan—named after Mrs. Shakesperes [*eldest?*] sister—died. He was one of the municipal chamberlains in 1561. On 2nd December, 1562, his daughter Margaret was baptised; and on 30th April, 1563, she was buried. In 1564 he was a member of the Common-hall of Stratford, and to an important document of that hall in that year, he did, (as Charles Knight thinks) in *writing*, affix his name. In that same year, his eldest and world-famous son was born—WILLIAM SHAKESPERE.

II. SHAKESPERE'S BOYHOOD AND YOUTH.

"This jewel in the world."—*Cymbeline*.

The circumstances of a child's parents, and the conditions of life around him, so influence his position, prospects, and progress, as to form a full justification, in all *constructive* memoirs, for taking these as basis of inference regarding the *probabilities* of a person's career. Indeed, the circumstances of the parents are the conditioning causes of many of the mental, personal, and social sufferings and exertions of their children, and no complete view of the formative principles of any man's life can be obtained unless we know the environments of his earlier years. For these reasons, as well as in defect of personal anecdote and gossip, the biographers of Shakespere have expended great industry and employed singular care in acquiring, from every accessible source, information regarding the Shakespere family, during the youth of William, their son, in the belief that thence they may infer, with tolerable certainty, the special influences which operated on the destiny of the mighty dramatist. In this, however, they have only been partially successful. The following is, as nearly as possible, a chronological summary of the chief matters that have been learned, and of the deductions sought to be drawn from them, as premises, viz. :—

1564. In the Stratford register of *baptisms*, under date 26th April, appears the entry [in *incorrect* Latin], "William, son of John Shakespere." As it was customary in these days to baptize as early as convenient,* a *tradition* that he was born on the 23rd (equal to 5th May, new style), has been generally acquiesced in, especially as it was put into substantive form by the Rev. Joseph Greene, master of the Stratford Free School, *about* a century after his death, and seems to be confirmed, or at least to be implied (as is generally understood), by the inscription on his monument.

* Edward Alleyn, the player, founder of Dulwich College, was baptized the day after his birth; Oliver Cromwell, *four*, and John Milton, *eleven*.

Little more than two months elapsed before the beat of the hearts of the twice-bereft parents was quickened with anxiety for the life of their eldest son, and now only child; for the plague was in Stratford, and from June 30th to December 31st, the angel of death was busy. Of its inhabitants, 238 perished in that time. No Shakespeare occupies *that* death-list. "Shakespeare's home—his boyhood's home," and his birthplace, has never, we believe, been matter of *dispute*. An undisturbed *tradition* points out *that* house in Henley Street, which is now the property of the *British nation*, as the place in which life dawned upon him. Frequent donations to the poor of the borough *seem* to prove that the Shakespeares were, at the time of his birth, thankfully enjoying prosperity, were kindly-hearted, and likely, therefore, to be popular among their townfolk.

1565. In this year John Shakespeare was elected one of the *fourteen* aldermen of Stratford.

1566. His second son, Gilbert, was baptized on 13th October, 1566; and at Michaelmas,

1566, John Shakespeare, in two precepts of the Stratford Court of Record, of this year's date, appears as the surety of Richard Hathaway.

1568, he was promoted to the office of borough or high bailiff.

1569. In this year, the Queen's players and the Earl of Worcester's players visited Stratford, and performed in it. The former received nine shillings and the latter twelve pence out of the town's fund for their entertainment. John Shakespeare's third daughter, named after her eldest sister (dead) Joan, was baptized on 15th April, 1569; while in

1570, he held the tenancy, under Wm. Clopton, of Ingon Meadow, "a parcel of land" of 14 acres in extent, for which, with its appurtenances, he paid an annual rent of £8.

1571. In 1571 he attained the highest civic dignity by being chosen chief alderman, and thus, in the punctilious age of Queen Elizabeth, became entitled to the respectful appellation, which he afterwards gets in the parish registers, of (Mr.) *Magister*; for "all titles of honour appear to have been originally names of office," and that word primarily signifies a man who rules, governs, or directs either men or businesses.

In 1482, Thomas Jolyffe left lands to the Guild of the Holy Cross of Stratford-upon-Avon, provided that they "should find a priest fit and able in knowledge to teach grammar freely to all scholars coming to the school in the said town to him, taking nothing of the scholars for their teaching." That guild was dissolved at the Reformation, and its lands fell to the king. When, however, the town was incorporated, the Charter ordained "that the *free* grammar school for the *instruction* and *education* of boys and youth there should be thereafter kept up and maintained as theretofore it used to be." The preliminary qualifications for admission were—residence in the town, being *seven* years of age, and being able to read.

It is therefore held as reasonably probable that, in 1571—the year in which Roger Ascham's "Schoolmaster" was published—Chief-Alderman Shakespeare's eldest son, *being able to read*, had his name enrolled by the then master, Thomas Hunt, also curate of Luddington, as a pupil of the town free grammar-school. School-hours were then lengthy, from daylight till dark in winter, and from six to six in summer, with suitable meal-intervals and play-hours. We are to *suppose* Master William Shakespeare, with "his satchel and shining morning face," wending his way daily to the grammar-school, which then meant a seminary in which instruction was given in Latin [and Greek, French, and Italian?]. The early instruction was oral, and dealt chiefly with the inflections of the eight parts of speech, the formation of simple sentences, and the engrossing of these neatly in note-books. *Æsop*, Terence, Virgil, Cicero, Sallust, or Cæsar, accompanied with the repetition and application of Lily's Syntax, Horace, and Ovid, with conversational exercises, according to Donatus and Valla, usually finished the school curriculum. *If* Greek,—Lucan, Aristophanes, Homer, and Xenophon, in this order, were generally the authors. French and Italian were taught by and in conversations.

The drill of a free grammar-school in the country, presided over by Curate Hunt, or Thomas Jenkins, his successor (of which of these was Holofernes a caricature?), could not equip a pupil with learning like that acquired in the ancient City of Westminster School under Camden—who, by the bye, became master therein in 1571. Ben Jonson's "small Latin and less Greek" is therefore to be taken not only *cum grano salis* as referring to points on which he prided himself, but as also implying the *almost* necessary inferiority of rural to civic training in institutions so different in their appointments, and therefore as somewhat resembling Chaucer's jesting saying about French, "After ye maner of Stratford-atte-Bowe." Aubrey says he "understood Latin pretty well," but his is only hearsay evidence. On 28th Sept., 1571, the year of his chief magistracy, Mr. John Shakespeare's fourth daughter, Anne, was baptized.

1573. Richard, *third* son of Mr. John Shakespeare, was baptized 11th March, 1573. "The Earl of Leicester's players" received in 1573 from the Chamberlain of Stratford the sum of six shillings and eightpence; and next year,

1574, the same official pays "my lord of Warwick's players" seventeen shillings, and the Earl of Worcester's players five shillings and seven pence.

1575. Two freehold houses in Henley Street were bought by John Shakespeare during the year 1575. In the summer of that same year, Queen Elizabeth made her grand historical visit to Kenilworth Castle, and enjoyed the "princely pleasures" which her unworthy favourite the Earl of Leicester had prepared for her reception, and to enliven her stay. As William Shakespeare was then about twelve years of age; his father, apparently, in good

circumstances;—Kenilworth is only thirteen miles distant from Stratford; and crowds from all mid-England were collected by the gorgeous spectacles and pageantry with which the Queen was welcomed,—it is *probable* (as Percy, in his “Reliques,” 1765, suggests) that he was a spectator of the costly magic of those festivities, and that he lighted the torch of his imagination at the blaze that shone around her Majesty while there.

1577. In this year, Mr. John Shakespere *begins* to be irregular in his attendance at the meetings of the corporation; and has one-half of his borough taxes remitted by consent of the municipality. He is reported by Dettrick, Garter King of Arms, to have had in this year a pattern of his *arms* blazoned for him by Clarence Cooke, though he did not *bear* them till after 1597.

1578. John Shakespere and Mary, his wife, mortgage the “land in Wilmesote called Asbies,” to a relative (?) named Edmund Lambert, for £40, on condition that it should revert to them if repaid before Michaelmas Day, 1580. In 1578, and on 19th Nov. of that same year, it is arranged in the corporation books that John Shakespere and Robert Bratt, in regard to a levy of fourpence a week for relief of the poor, “shall not be taxed to pay anything;” and it has farther been found that in this year the aforesaid Edmund Lambert was security for a debt of £5 due to Mr. Roger Sadler, of Stratford, by Mr. John Shakespere. It *seems*, too, that about this time the interests held in the tenements at Snitterfield were parted with. During this year, it is generally *assumed* that William Shakespere left or was withdrawn from school.

1579. The sum, three shillings and fourpence, levied upon John Shakespere by the *borough* of Stratford, in 1579, for the furnishing “of pikemen, billmen, and archers,” is entered on the corporation books as “unpaid and unaccounted for;” yet, in a deed of the same date, he is designated a *yeoman*. This, however, did not keep the woe of death from his hearth; for “Anne, daughter to John Shakespere,” was buried on 4th July, 1579. A John Shakespere resided in this year, and up till, if not beyond, 1583, in Clifford,—a pretty village about two miles from Stratford-on-Avon,—and we may *suppose* that this was the late alderman of that borough.

The above facts have given rise to two hypotheses of very opposing natures; *first*, that of Malone, and the greater part of the biographers of Shakespere—supported so far, if not indeed suggested, by tradition—that the prosperity of John Shakespere had suffered a decline; and, *second*, that advanced by Charles Knight, that he had turned his attention more towards agriculture at this time, was living less in the *borough*, though still dwelling in the *parish*, and therefore paying his rents and bearing his burdens in the latter, though holding property in the former. “The lands of Bishopston and Welcombe, of the purchase of which by William Shakespere we have no record,” and which he disposes of in his will under the designation of his *inheritance*, Knight *supposes* to be the lands purchased at this period. We have no account of the disposal of the

properties in Henley Street, and it is difficult to imagine their being held by a person justly indebted to the corporation, or insolvent, or "depending" (as Malone has it) "rather on the credit of others than his own." But the registry of the Court of Record at Stratford from 1569 to 1585 is wanting, and research has as yet been vainly expended in attempting to make up the deficiency. We certainly incline to Knight's hypothesis as highly plausible, and as fully accounting not only for the apparent financial difficulties of the family, but also for the withdrawal of William from school—on account of the distance, and difficulty of attending, as well as for the vagueness and general inaccuracy of the village traditions regarding him.

In 1579, the players of Lord Strange and those of the Countess of Essex held dramatic entertainments in Stratford, in the hall of the guild, under the patronage of the bailiff.

1580. The players of the Earl of Derby visited Stratford, and there exhibited as well as they could the transactions of human passion, "set out with sweetness of words, fitness of epithets, with metaphors, allegories, hyperboles, amphibologies, similitudes, with phrases so picked, so pure, so proper with action, so smooth, so lively, so wanton," as to gratify their audience. On "May 3rd, 1580; Edmund, son to Mr. John Shakespere," was baptized; and in "A Book of the Names and Dwelling-Places of the Gentlemen and Freeholders in the County of Warwick, 1580," John Shakespere, of Stratford-on-Avon, in the hundred of Barlichway, has a place. On or before the 29th September (Michaelmas) of this year, in the matter of the mortgage of Asbies, the money in discharge thereof was duly tendered and refused, unless other moneys in which they were indebted to the mortgagee were also paid—at least, so John and Mary Shakespere declare in Chancery, 1597.

On and after leaving school, what did William Shakespere become? Seven attorneys practised in Stratford during his youth—did he ply the "the trade of *Noverius*" in an apprenticeship with one of them? as has been guessed to be implied in a sarcastic quip printed by Thomas Nashe in Greene's "*Menaphon*," 1589; did he exercise his "father's trade"? and was that—as Aubrey, 1680, says—a butcher? Or was this Shakespere—as a clerk above eighty years old, that showed the church of Stratford to one Dowdall, 1668, affirmed—"bound apprentice to a butcher," but "run from his master to London"? It is now regarded as *all but proven* that Mr. John Shakespere was *not* a butcher to business, but rather in some sort a glover, woolstapler, sheepmaster, and agriculturist—as Knight has it, "a small rural capitalist,"—and it is *very probable* that William, his eldest son, should take a share in the conduct of his affairs, especially as he seems to have been somewhat of an arithmetician and penman. In this capacity he might even kill a calf, yea, "doe it in a high stile and make a speech;" and that the love of the marvellous and the indistinctness of tradition—if Shakespere spent his youth out of the *borough* of Stratford, all the more

likely to be wrong—had so transformed the story. During his leisure, how did he disport himself? Did he,

“Under the shade of melancholy boughs,
Lose and neglect the creeping hours of Time.”

Did he, with wise studiousness, “chewing the food of sweet and bitter fancies,” “observe all qualities with a learned spirit,” and note for after use the phenomena of Nature and the acts of men; or did he, “like a wilful youth, pursue a life unprofitably gay,” spending his “time in the fencing schools and dancing schools, in stealing deer and conies, in hunting the hare and wooing girls”? Or can we fancy him—as Aubrey tells, on the authority of a Mr. Beeston—as one who “had been in his younger years a schoolmaster in the country,” and whose

“Study had made him very lean,
And pale, and leaden-eyed”?

We cannot well decide. The tradition regarding the deer-stealing somewhere and at some time—even though it could be proven that Charlecote was not “an enclosed ground royally licensed,” and that Sir Thomas Lucy was not likely to accost any one with a Sirrah, “you have beaten my men, killed my deer, and broke open my lodge,”—cannot be pooh-poohed out of the way. It seems to be a myth, with a basis of truth. Neither the ingenuity of De Quincey, nor the palpable wishing-cap reasoning of Knight, can quite rub off the original likelihood of the tradition, nor otherwise account for the co-linking of Lucy and Shallow in the thoughts of men to “be laughed at” for all time. The ballad, we *believe*, is a forgery of a later date than the age of Shakespere, and we cannot think that *this* could be the reason for his early and abrupt departure from his native town. Mutual offence may have been given and gotten without going quite so far as that, and the player-proprietor may in after years have had a cold shoulder from Sir Thomas, which would not lessen his sense of wrong, or incline him to forget and forgive. That he was a schoolmaster, we would fain believe; but that has little support except from the tradition that he taught some of the actors elocution and the arts of stage-management; that he was studiously observant, requires no proof; and that he occupied himself in wooing, and that right early too, becomes both manifest and prominent on documentary evidences. An old intimacy subsisted between the Shakesperes and the Hathaways, and these ties were drawn more closely together by William on the one part, and Anne on the other, at wakes and fairs and fireside pleasantries, until “love’s feeling” began to grow in both. With this eventful crisis, the *youth* of William Shakespere closes and the responsibilities of *manhood* are undertaken, and a new chapter may fitly be devoted to the latter time and its concerns.

S. N.

The Topic.

WAS THE HOUSE OF LORDS JUSTIFIED IN PREVENTING THE REPEAL OF THE PAPER DUTY?

AFFIRMATIVE.

The chief powers vested in the House of Commons are those of imposing taxes and voting money for the public service. Bills for these purposes can only originate in that house, and the Lords may not make any alterations in them, but they have the undoubted right of *veto* by that ancient and fundamental clause in our constitution which ordains that nothing shall become law unless it first has the sanction of the three estates of the realm. And the popular twaddle recently got up about the *aggression of the Lords* (?) is so much ignorant nonsense, for why send a Bill up at all, if the Lords had not the power to reject it?—RHOS.

The unseemly wrangle now agitating the country is merely a party dodge. The Cabinet receives a very justifiable snub, and immediately the outsiders set up a clamour that we are no longer taxed by our representatives in the Commons, but by those hereditary noodles, the Lords. This is simply absurd. How stands the case? A tax exists on paper. An inglorious but too clever budgetmonger says, "I'll have it off." The Lords say, "Don't be in a hurry, we'll see if we can spare it;" and the result is, they reject the Bill for its repeal. They don't thereby impose a fresh tax upon the people, but only withhold their consent from a Bill which seeks to release the people from a light and equitable tax, which has hitherto been paid without a murmur.—A.

Mr. Editor,—I appeal to you to defend the Lords on this question, because of the analogous position which they hold to your own as editor of this Magazine. An article is sent to you; you think it will not answer, and reject

it. A bill is sent to the Lords, and for the same reason they do likewise. Would any right-minded man attempt to get up a scandalous agitation amongst the contributors against the editor? I am happy to say, they all know better. And I maintain that the only point of difference in my analogy consists in the fact, that you have the power to alter or amend an article, which the Lords have not. I trust, therefore, you will not place a "*thorn in your editorial cushion*" by subscribing to any such revolutionary nonsense under the guise of popular reform.—U. V.

Much after-dinner claptrap has lately been volunteered by used up *anti-rifle corps ranters*, who, forsooth, imagine they will intimidate the tyrannical Lords, and themselves repeal the paper duty. A very *Bright* idea, truly. Let all such remember—before they quote the men who delivered our country from the second Stuart—that a tyrannical House of *Commons* is not altogether unheard of in history, and that any attempt to knock up the House of Lords must fail, so long as they act in a constitutional manner. Such men dishonour the constitution they affect to defend, and would make it out that the House of Lords is a gigantic bugbear, having certainly "a local habitation and a name," but as to power, powerless.—TOWYN.

In the opinion of superficial observers, the House of Lords has lately, by its repeal of the paper duty, placed itself in rather an anomalous position; but, if we consider the case more attentively, we shall find that it has acted not only constitutionally, but (perhaps unwittingly) with great foresight. It has acted constitutionally, in so far as it is

convened for the very purpose of approving or passing its veto upon any bill which may have received the sanction of the Commons; and if it generally allows bills approved by the Commons to pass, it is not thereby debarred from exercising its prerogative.

We are told by the agitators for the repeal that this is a tax upon knowledge, and, therefore, ought at once to be abolished; and we are treated to a large amount of statistical information, which goes principally to prove that Government derives a considerable portion of the public revenue through this tax. Now, even if this tax were so grievous to be borne, is this the time to diminish the revenue, when our expenditure is very great, and is daily increasing? But do we in reality feel this tax to be a burden? The public, at least, we think, may answer that it is not, and would much rather continue to buy its books at the present low prices, than submit to the infliction of an increased income-tax.—TOUJOURS PRET.

Any bill to become law must receive the sanction of the three estates of the realm, "the Commons, the Lords, and the Crown," and each of these have the power to refuse their assent to any bill whatsoever; it being one of the laws of our constitution that there is no power in this country without check or control. Although the Lords have not the right to originate or amend money bills, yet they have the power to reject them. It was in accordance with this law that they refused to repeal the paper duty; and if in their opinion the present was an unsuitable time for taking off that duty, they were perfectly justified in not giving such a bill their sanction.—ARISTOCRAT.

The House of Lords have the power to reject money bills, though powerless to originate or even amend them. If not, why send them up to receive their lordships' assent? Do they not form part of the constitution? and is not their sanction necessary before any bill can become law? Therefore, with-

holding it is not a breach of constitutional usage; and in the face of a large deficit in the revenue this year, they very properly refused their assent to repeal the paper duty. Forming as they do the Upper House of Legislation, and acting as a check on the Commons, they only exercised a right which they possessed, by the course they took on this question.—TRUE BLUE.

Little, very little is required by the mere partisan debater to enable him to vindicate his own party, and vilify all who oppose it; one plausible argument, a single fact, which, when isolated presents an imposing appearance, is sufficient for the construction of a defence eked out by means of flashy rhetoric, and frothy declamation. Thus every demagogue, great or small, whether addressing the honourable members of St. Stephen's, or haranguing some illustrious coterie of St. Giles', points with an air of triumph to the fact that it is the undoubted and sole right of the Commons to grant all supplies and regulate the purposes to which they must be applied; and then, shutting his eyes to the fact, equally undoubted and well-known, that the Peers possess the power of assenting to or rejecting every bill submitted to them, denounces them for simply exercising this right, as gigantic innovators, underminers of the constitution, and invaders of the people's liberty. Yet, we make bold to say, that if an aggressive spirit has been exhibited by either House, it has been by the Lower one. Fusty, musty records, extending for centuries back, have been overhauled and scrutinized, that some precedent might be discovered which should establish its supremacy in financial matters, and declare its power to dictate to the Lords; but nowhere could such precedent be found; everywhere did the same rebuke meet those who wished to overstep their bounds, "thus far and no further." On the principles we have mentioned, the defence of each house respectively rests. They appear to clash, and may cause some to suspend

judgment on the question, but a little reflection will dispel any doubts that exist regarding the propriety of the Lords possessing such a privilege.

Though the history of the House of Commons does not illustrate the truth of the adage, that knowledge is power, it certainly affords a strong proof of the potency of wealth. The necessities of the first Edward gave to it its present form, and the requirements of succeeding monarchs confirmed and extended its rights. Its influence being thus entirely attributable to the power it possessed over supplies, it was only in keeping with what may be termed constitutional practice that it should have afterwards secured to itself the right of *originating* all money bills; by this means it could not be coerced into conceding grants, if it respected and adhered to its privileges; and though the King and Lords united in passing a money bill, when it came to the Commons it was rejected, on the simple ground that it did not begin with themselves. Their power was thus effectually secured, without giving to them an undue influence in the State; and their privilege, so far from being anomalous or singular, as some people think, corresponds to the power belonging to the Upper House, that bills affecting the rights of the peerage must originate in the Lords, and cannot be altered by the Commons. Again, every one who regards the constitution of this country must be struck by the system of checks pervading it; maintaining a perfect equilibrium throughout the varied and complex machinery; rendering every single part dependent upon some other; and restraining all from the abusive exercise of the powers entrusted to them. Grant, however, to the Commons the right of levying taxes by their own vote exclusively, or compel the Lords to give an unvarying assent to all money bills submitted to them, and you destroy this harmonious order, rendering the Lower House not one of three equal estates, but the dictatorship of the country. The first object of a

ministry would be to conciliate them, knowing that, possessed of their favour, the second estate of the realm might be ignored. The executive then could levy war, and the Commons raise the needful supplies, despite the utmost effort of the Lords to the contrary. As it is, the constitutional aspect of this question we have treated as far as space permits, but it must be remembered that the desirability of the repeal of the paper duty is acknowledged on all sides, though its opportuneness is at present open to doubt.—OLIVIER.

The mere question of the repeal of the paper duty becomes one of minor importance when compared with the vital principle involved in its rejection by the House of Lords, namely, the power of that house to reject money bills. Their constitutional power to reject such bills was so conclusively established by the venerable Lord Lyndhurst, in his memorable speech during the important debate on the second reading of the bill, by the long list of precedents he brought forward, extending over a period of 200 years, and embracing all kinds of money bills, some for the repeal of excise duties, and others for imposing fresh taxes, that it would be presumptuous on my part to attempt to add anything to his conclusive arguments; suffice it to say, that shortly after the bill was rejected by the House of Lords, a committee was appointed to examine the journals of the House of Lords for precedents where money bills had been rejected by that house. That committee has completed its labours, and drawn up and presented its report, which confirms the opinion of the noble Lord just mentioned, and acknowledges the power of the House of Lords to reject money bills. That the House of Lords has not the power to originate or alter a money bill is distinctly stated in a resolution passed in the House of Commons in 1678; but at the same time it also acknowledges that they have the power to reject a money bill, as will be seen from the latter part of the last

clause.—“That as kings and queens must receive all or leave all such aids, gifts, or grants, so must the House of Lords reject all or pass all.” The mere fact of sending the bill up to the House of Lords to obtain their sanction, indirectly confirms their power to reject it. If they are compelled to pass all kinds of money bills in obedience to the command of the Commons, they no longer remain an independent and responsible branch of the constitution, but mere dependents on the Lower House to sanction and approve its policy, and carry out its whims and fancies, which would for ever destroy that independent action and wholesome check which both houses, according to the constitution, are empowered to exercise over the transactions of each other. But our opponents tell us that the exercise of this power by the House of Lords would be indirectly imposing a tax on the people, independent of the consent of the House of Commons: such an inference is unwarrantable and erroneous, as the tax in question was originally imposed by the Lower House, and the only question involved in its rejection of the bill for its repeal by the House of Lords is the time when it will be *expedient* and *politic* to abolish it. If, as our opponents affirm, the rejection of this bill by the House of Lords is virtually taxing the people, then by the same parity of reasoning the passing of it would have been to remit taxation. The fallacy of such reasoning must be apparent to all. Having proved that the House of Lords has the constitutional right to reject this bill, the question naturally arises,—did they, in the exercise of that power, act prudently and judiciously? After calm deliberation of the whole of the circumstances, we must confess we think they did. It will be remembered that the bill was not opposed because the repeal was not desirable—that was readily acknowledged,—but because it was premature. Mr. Gladstone, in repealing it, would have us believe he was acting on the great principles of the financial policy of

Sir Robert Peel (nothing could be more erroneous). When Sir R. Peel reduced taxation, it was upon articles the lowering of the price of which tended greatly to increase their consumption, so that the burden of taxation might press less heavily on the toiling masses of this country, without impoverishing the exchequer; and when he repealed taxation, it was when he had a surplus to dispose of and not a deficit to meet. The income-tax was this year to be reduced, if not abolished; and the war duties on tea and sugar were to be taken off; but the sacred promises given by the Chancellor of the Exchequer have been broken, to enable him to repeal the tax on paper, which, we are told, is burdensome and oppressive; and so, no doubt, are all taxes, according to those who have to *pay them*.
—PEN AND INK.

NEGATIVE.

I maintain that the House of Lords has overstepped proper bounds in the course it has pursued. The resolutions passed by the House of Commons on Friday evening, 6th July, can, I think, be regarded as nothing more than patching up the dispute for the sake of peace. I dissent from the views of Mr. Bright upon most parliamentary matters; still, we can occasionally catch a thought worth noticing from the sayings of those with whom we usually disagree. On the present topic I have done so, by adopting a sentiment expressed by Mr. Bright, in his speech in the House of Commons, on the evening referred to. “Above all (he observes), I implore the House never to abate one jot or tittle of their just privileges, whether assailed by the House of Lords, or any other power; ever bearing in mind that the maintenance of those privileges is the best and only safeguard for the liberties of the nation.” England’s glory, and England’s happiness, consists in the fact that we have a House of Lords and a House of Commons. It would be the downfall of our glory if the House of Lords ceased to exist. Both have rights

and privileges which must be watched and maintained; and one house must not intrude upon the other.—**TNEJBOR.**

The desirability of repealing the paper duty even the Lords themselves will admit. They allege, however, that the present state of the exchequer will not permit it: but how can that be? The Chancellor of the Exchequer, in order to meet the deficiency caused by its repeal, levied an extra income-tax. Their only ground, therefore, is their very questionable right to continue a tax in defiance of the representatives of the people, and so take upon themselves the responsibility of taxing the nation.—**J. S. F.**

It is, we think, the duty of our legislators to do all in their power to promote the welfare of the nation, socially and morally, by removing all obstacles to free trade. It is their duty, also, to encourage the progress of a healthy literature, unfettered and unbound, which will do more to promote the moral welfare of the people than years of legislation. This duty, we think, the House of Lords has disregarded, in preventing the repeal of the paper duty; and our reasons are manifold. In the first place, leaving literature for the moment out of the question, the tax hinders trade, and prevents the growth of a manufacture which would give remunerative employment to thousands. Everything of a fibrous nature, we are told, might and would be used in the manufacture of paper, if it were not for the obstructions placed upon it by law; and it appears, from a statement made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that there are sixty-nine trades into which paper enters largely as an article of manufacture. To encourage this manufacture, the duty should have been repealed. But again, it appears that the tax operates in an oppressive manner upon the publications read by the middle and lower classes particularly. "The paper duty," says the Chancellor, "is not only bad in its effects, but it is untenable." It is bad in its effects, by pre-empting trade, and encumbering the

circulation of our bibles, tracts, periodicals, newspapers, &c. Its repeal would be a great stimulus to the spread of gospel truth, and to the dissemination of cheap, wholesome literature among the working classes. For the same reason, it is untenable. It has been urged, that the repeal of the taxes on knowledge would entail a loss to the revenue of £1,000,000 per annum; but, granting this, are there are no other commodities that might be taxed, to make up the deficiency?—**J. S.**

The House of Lords can no more be justified in refusing to repeal the paper duty, than can Louis Napoleon be justified in occupying Rome with French troops, against the general wish of its inhabitants. The second estate of the country has degenerated into a mere sham; the day of its greatness is past. Of far greater moment to them is the triumph of party, or the perpetuation of the obsolete rights of their order, than cheap paper and the blessings of extended commerce. It is only by obstructive acts that the country is favoured with their legislation at all. In general, the spirit of their deliberation partakes more of the middle ages, when peers were everything, and the people their slaves and servants, than of the enlightenment of the nineteenth century. The extorting of Magna Charta from King John by the ancestors of our present House of Lords has been extolled as a measure conferring and recognizing the rights and liberties of the people; but it was "a" for their ain haun they fought," while the mass of the people were as little cared for as the cattle they herded. If any act of theirs can be justified, it must be on the ground of self-interest; their last crowning one, in relation to the paper duty, must stand in the same category.—**M. W.**

Justified in taxing the means of education, restricting the diffusion of knowledge and intelligence, and continuing a restrictive and depressing impost, which weighs heavily upon many branches of trade and manufacture?

Certainly not. And under whatever light the conduct of the Lords is viewed, it is evident that they were actuated by the most injudicious, narrow-minded, and unjustifiable motives; for instead of assenting to one of the most liberal, enlightened, and progressive measures of the session, they checked and obstructed its course in such a manner as proved they were influenced more with a spirit of peevishness than a desire for the true interests of the country. But, with ostensible regard for the financial necessities of the Government (of which they have no official knowledge, as they are never consulted, and, therefore, are not responsible for providing), they resolved to continue the obnoxious tax, without the consent of the House of Commons or the Crown,—nay, in direct opposition to the intention and vote of the Commons, who alone have absolute power to determine the mode and amount of the taxation which shall be imposed upon the people. It will be generally admitted, we believe, that the House of Lords has a constitutional power of rejecting money bills; but has the Commons ever succumbed to that power, and allowed a great tax to be levied without the sanction of their authority? Never, in any instance. The House of Commons has always resumed the consideration of bills thus rejected by the Lords, pronounced anew its own independent decision, and either sent back, for the assent of the Lords, the rejected bill in its original or in some modified form; for it is plain that if the Lords cannot begin a tax, if they cannot increase or abate one, yet if they may prolong a tax, by refusing their assent to its repeal, when the Commons have voted that repeal, and provided a substitute, then the “fundamental and inherent right” of the Commons to an absolute control over taxation and supply is destroyed, and an innovation and encroachment without precedent initiated, which it is the duty of the House of Commons to repel by an immediate and energetic assertion and

vindication of its rights and privileges.
—J. M.

Deriving my arguments from the report of the debate in the House of Commons upon this important subject, I have no hesitation in asserting that the House of Lords was not justified in preventing the repeal of the paper duty. The House of Commons alone possesses the right to impose and repeal taxes upon the people, and has on previous occasions successfully resisted the attempted innovations of the Upper House upon its rights in amending money bills passed through it. It is nearly five centuries since the Lords last attempted to usurp the constitutional privileges of the Commons in a manner somewhat resembling the present attempt; and if the talented and noble Chancellor of the Exchequer pursues the course he has declared he will take, then the present unjustifiable and obnoxious interposition of the Lords will be as triumphantly defeated. To conclude, if the Lords were justified in preventing the Commons from repealing or imposing taxes, it would be a complete overthrow of the constitution of the country.—J. C.

The repeal of the paper duty could not but be beneficial to the majority of the British public. The only means of knowledge a working man can command are those of self-education. Self-education can only be gained by books, coupled with observation. The cheaper books are, the wider will be its spread; and cheap books can only be had by taking away the duty from the manufacture of paper. The tax is a tax upon education, and as such its repeal ought not to be hindered; for this reason alone, the Lords are not justified in the course they have taken. In the report of the committee of the House of Commons appointed to investigate the legality of the Lords' proceedings, we find that, although they searched for precedents as far back as the year 1628, there has not been a single instance of the Commons introducing a bill, either for the taxation of the nation or for the repeal

of any tax, which the Lords have opposed, but it has eventually passed in spite of opposition. In 1640, the Lords requested the Commons to confer with them as to granting supplies to the king; but the Commons felt insulted at such a suggestion; they thought it a breach of their privileges, and indignantly refused to confer; and in 1689, the Lords amended a bill as to the duty on tea, coffee, &c., but the Commons refused to agree to their amendment, saying, "That they had always taken it as their undoubted right that in all aids given to the king by the Commons, the Lords ought not in any way to interfere in altering the same." The Commons carried the day.

The Lords sometimes suggested amendments in the seventeenth century, to which the Commons consented, but not to any alteration of a substantial character. The rule generally has been, that when the Lords amend, the Commons either postpone the consideration of the bill, or disagree, and by so doing invite the reconsideration of the Lords; or they lay aside the bill without further notice, and bring in a fresh bill. The same principles apply equally to the repeal as to the imposition of a tax. The Commons allow no alteration, except as to errors resulting from oversight.—F. S. M.

The recent decision of the House of Lords on the paper duty was neither justified by constitutional usage, nor by a wish, on their part, to save the country from a deficiency of the revenue. It was a virtual defiance of the representatives of the nation—an undue interference with the privileges of the House of Commons. The Lords formed their decision on the possible deficiency of the revenue, and claim for themselves, by their adverse vote, the merit of having saved the country from pecuniary difficulties. It has been truly said, that they are a "House of Incurables;" every measure, having for its aim the extension of the liberty of the subject, by throwing down the barriers to progress, has received from them the most determined opposition. The jus-

tification of an act must, to a great extent, depend on the necessity for it. In the debate in the House of Lords on the paper duty, it never was clearly shown whether the necessities of the revenue warranted them in retaining the tax; while it has been demonstrated, and even admitted by its opponents, that the tax was a disgrace, and ought no longer to limit, by its action, the extension of knowledge among the people. The Commons, in their lukewarmness, have been mainly instrumental in giving the Lords encouragement to take the course they have done. If the House of Commons had done their duty,—had they shown one spark of spirit,—the Lords would never have attempted the unjustifiable deed. So long as the Lords can get a chance, they will not lose their opportunity of throwing every impediment in the way of justifiable reform, and retarding by every means in their power all measures tending to raise the condition or to improve the intellect of the great mass of the people. No measure embodying those principles but has on each occasion been forced from them by a stormy and almost general agitation. The three great measures of this century,—Catholic Emancipation, the Reform Bill, and the Repeal of the Corn Laws, were wrung from them only when the country was standing on the verge of a revolution. They have succeeded in the present case in defeating the best measure of the session; and though the effect of the defeat may be slightly apparent, still it is another proof of the obstructive character and unjustifiable hindrance of the House of Lords in all that tends to our progress, both in a commercial and a political point of view. The breaking down of these privileges, which to a great extent have been usurped by them since the days of barbarism, may not be far distant; the day may soon arrive when the anomaly of a House of Lords, retarding the growth and stifling the life-current of a nation, from a too rigid adherence to the forms and usages of the past, will be numbered with the things that were.

If they wish to preserve their present privileges intact, let them legislate in a large spirit, commensurate with the requirements of the age, and their name will shine to latest posterity, honoured and respected, and the "last of the Barons" will not be extinct till the "crack of doom."—D. R. R.

The question of privilege that has arisen between the two branches of the legislative body of Great Britain would have produced other consequences, had the reins of government been in other hands than Palmerston's. The examination of the journals of the House of Lords clearly testifies that their act was countenanced by precedent, so far back as the *retrospective examination* has reached. Although in the constitutional rights of Parliament the lords possess no power to originate measures calculated to impose taxes on the people, yet their veto is clearly recognized on constitutional grounds. The jealousy with which the Commons have invariably watched over the jurisdiction of the Upper House has been great on all occasions, as manifested by the Committee's report thereon. The Commons have their seats from the people, and they have, in our estimation, the right to impose, alter, amend, or repeal such acts and statutes as may appear offensive to the people, their constituents, who are the replenishers of the royal treasury, and the authors of England's greatness. But to set aside entirely the baronial jurisdiction would be too flagrant an invasion upon the sacred rights of freedom. The different expression given to sentiment in both houses seems to perplex us to such a degree, that we must confess ourselves in a *dilemma*; nevertheless, we will take the course pointed out by our own judgment. Although we award to the Lords the right of veto in bills of this description, yet under such circumstances as attended the one recently rejected, they were not justified in the course they adopted. It must be borne in mind that the bill in question was a portion of the scheme which provides the supply for the year; and a

substitute had been passed by the Lords, consequently the sacrifice of a *million and a half of revenue* would not have been a dead loss to the Crown. The additional penny in the income-tax had been previously discussed and passed, and the subsequent opposition and defeat of the paper duty repeal bill gave the reproach of inconsistency to the Lords' decision. The *governing power* of the Lower House is of great consequence to the public, and is founded on *constitutional and political* bases. But to enter into minute detail would extend the limits of our article beyond the allowed bounds; consequently we must direct the attention of our *inquisitive* readers to the parliamentary reports, particularly to the oration delivered by the Premier on the 5th of July.

In giving a summary of our synopsis, we will emphatically pronounce against the decision of the House of Lords in arresting the progress of the paper duty repeal bill, and say that such opposition to the measure was *not justifiable on political grounds*.—S. F. T.

Never was a more practical and important question asked of a *self-governing* nation than the present one. It is impossible to perceive that importance and significance, unless the constitution of the House of Lords is borne in mind. The chief characteristic of that body appears to me to be *irresponsibility*. Were they the *elected* of the people, what earthly objection could there be to their decision being taken upon money bills, as it would be but the voice of the people speaking through its representatives (if elected by a free people)? But the contrary being the case, their interference can only be interpreted to be the vilest of all despotism, which, if persisted in, must produce the rapid destruction of the House of Lords. Legally, they had a right to say *no*, but constitutionally, or customarily, they possessed not the right, paradoxical as it appears. Such unfortunate anomalies too often come under the notice of a student of the English constitution. The Queen herself can create peers from chimney-sweeps; but would not

the Lords themselves inform her erring Majesty that such conduct was *unusual* and *unconstitutional*. Again, Her Majesty has the full power of refusing her assent to all bills sent from either house of legislation; but such conduct would be regarded by her loyal subjects as an innovation and a breach of the constitution. Should the Lords not revise their decision, they will be the tax imposers to the extent of a million and a quarter this year. The House of Commons have repealed the paper duty, and, practically, the non-elective Lords have re-imposed it. What schoolboy is there in England that has not been taught, even by the most conservative of schoolmasters, that the power of imposing taxes was the *exclusive* right of the Commons? and a reference to the books of our school days will prove that till 1860 such was the universal opinion. But apart from the constitutional view, there were abundant reasons why the paper duty repeal bill should not be rejected. Its universal oppression, its difficulty of collection, its financial unsoundness, its condemnation by the House of Commons (expressed in Milner Gibson's resolution), its injurious effects upon beneficial knowledge, were sufficient reasons why such a beneficial measure should become the law of the land. When you remember, that from childhood to old age, man is constantly using the article, you see the desirability of it being free. When we think that every boy, whose neglected education has been caused by its expense, can throw a share of responsibility upon the shoulders of the Government, for taxing his instruction and copy books: when we find that a self-governing people have declared their unwillingness to have a *gag* put upon their *intelligence* and knowledge:—spontaneous and universal must be the verdict, that the House of Lords was not justified in preventing the repeal of the paper duties.—R. B. S.

The committee appointed by the House of Commons to search into precedents have proved beyond doubt that

the House of Lords had no previous precedent to justify their vote against the repeal of the paper duty; and that for the last five hundred years it has been the right of the Commons to control everything relating to the finances of this country, it being one of the fundamental principles on which the constitution of England is founded, that all Englishmen do (through their representatives) tax themselves, holding them responsible for all acts committed in the Commons House of Parliament; for representation and taxation belong to the people, and are inseparable. Lord Chatham says, "The taxes are a voluntary gift and grant of the Commons alone. In legislation the three estates of the realm are alike concerned; but the concurrence of the Peers and the Crown to a tax is only necessary to clothe it with the form of a law." Therefore, the House of Lords, being an irresponsible body, have no right, not so much as to meddle with matters of supply, which properly belong to the Commons, and which Mr. Pym declared in 1640 had been "not shaken by one precedent for 300 years," and this privilege has ever been firmly held by the representatives of the people against any encroachment on this power by the Lords. In times past they have been worthy of the confidence reposed in them, and have made many noble and magnanimous efforts to maintain this principle inviolate. By their vote the Lords committed a breach of the constitutional usage of England, and encroached on the proper functions of the Commons. Shall we, then, allow them in 1860 to make a precedent which, at some future time, will most assuredly be turned to the detriment of this great country, and the true interests of its inhabitants? If so, we prove ourselves unworthy children of great and noble ancestors, who would have sacrificed all things rather than give up this privilege, which is the vital element of our constitution, and, by the law of our land, the just and inherent right of the people.—S. T. W.

LITERARY NOTES.

Jules Gerard, the famous lion hunter, whose story acquired such a success lately, has been put at the head of an *authorized* National Rifle Association in France.

The "Encyclopédie du XIX. Siècle," a record of contemporaneous events, has reached its 55th vol.

M. Horn's "Annuaire International du Crédit Public," containing the statistics of the world in 1859, has just been issued.

Mr. T. D. Hardy, of the Record Office, is preparing a pamphlet on the Collier-Shakespeare question.

The Day is the title of a newly projected liberal conservative London penny paper.

The Shakespeare Committee of Stratford-on-Avon appeal to the public for aid to relieve them from the liabilities incurred in the restoration, &c., of Shakespeare's house, in the belief that Mr. John Shakespeare's bequest and annuity would be forthcoming for their liquidation.

The Northumbrian poet, Robert Story, expired on the 7th ult., at Battersea, near London, aged 63.

The late Professor Austin's "Province of Jurisprudence" is to be edited by his widow.

The Ashmolean collection of MSS. has been removed to the Bodleian Library.

Robert Brough, dramatic author, and comic *littérateur*, died 26th of June, aged 32.

A monument to the memory of James Hogg, the Ettrick Shepherd, was inaugurated by Henry Glassford Bell, Esq., a poet of some repute, and one of the sheriffs of Lanarkshire. It is situated upon a knoll of ground on the banks "of lone St. Mary's silent Lake," by a roadside which Wordsworth, and Hogg, and Scott traversed in company.

Routledge is to issue a new vol. of "Gerald Massey's Poems."

G. H. Von Schubert, the natural philosopher, and *schellingist*, died on

July 1st, at Langsorn, near Munich, aged 60. He has written an autobiography.

Some Irish scholars are engaged in compiling a Dictionary of the old native Irish language.

The Messrs. Blackwood are just publishing the late Sir William Hamilton's long-expected lectures on Metaphysics, edited by Mansel and Veitch.

Messrs. Fullerton and Co., of Edinburgh, propose to issue by subscription, in a series of eight volumes, the posthumous works of the Rev. Ralph Wardlaw, the late well-known congregational minister, of Glasgow, to be edited by his son, the Rev. J. S. Wardlaw.

"Lectures, chiefly on Subjects relating to the Use and Management of Literary, Scientific, and Mechanics' Institutes," is the interesting title of a work about to be published by Messrs. Bosworth and Harrison.

The Messrs. Longman are on the point of publishing the new and some time expected contribution to the Collier Controversy, "Collier, Coleridge, and Shakespeare: a Review," by the author of "Literary Cookery," who, we need scarcely tell the initiated, is Dr. Ingleby, of Birmingham. The mention of Coleridge in the title, marks the aim of a section of Dr. Ingleby's review.

Mr. John Camden Hotten, of Piccadilly, appears not only as a publisher, but as editor, furnishing an introduction and notes to the first English translation of "The Book of Vagabonds and Beggars, with a Vocabulary of their Language," said to have been "edited by Martin Luther, in the year 1528." Is this latter sentence quite correct? The great Reformer was a voluminous writer, but we never heard before of this somewhat anomalous exercise of his pen.

The scattered metrical effusions of the late lamented Mr. R. B. Brough, are, it is said, to be collected for publication by his friend, Mr. John Hollingshead.

Epoch Men.

ADAM SMITH.—SCIENTIFIC POLITICS.

"The 'Treatise on the Law of War and Peace,' the 'Essay on the Human Understanding,' 'The Spirit of Laws,' and the 'Inquiry into the Causes of the Wealth of Nations,' are the works which have most directly influenced the general opinion of Europe during the two last centuries. They are also the most conspicuous landmarks in the progress of the sciences to which they relate."—*Sir James Macintosh.*

A SECOND edition of "The Theory of Moral Sentiments" was called for within the year. Smith spent the greater part of his summer vacation in preparing it, and in revising his college lectures, which, by this publication, he was able to condense in the third and extend considerably in the fourth parts. To this revised edition of the "Theory," Smith annexed a "Dissertation on the Origin of Languages,"—most probably a portion of the lectures on Rhetoric delivered in Edinburgh—a theoretical or conjectural account of the manner and causes to which languages may have owed their beginning and development. It is more admirably ingenious than sound. It is an attempt to show by what means, in accordance with the known principles of the human mind, the first rude efforts of man might have progressed from a less to a more symmetrical system of signs for the interpretation of human thought, until that highly complicated machinery of expression which is now used—or rather, which was in use among the ancients—acquired the perfection, effectiveness, and polish which it now displays. It was a specimen of a style of investigation to which he was prone, which his logical intellect loved to pursue, and which may, if judiciously followed, often lead to valuable results; though it may not prove that it *was* so, it may suffice to explain how it *may have been*, and so may gratify the mind at the same time that it gives a standard of reference, when congenial matters arise in the course of research, which may be employed to facilitate inquiry, and so help in the attainment of a solution of the matter under consideration. The admirers of his work on *Morals* were many, though his proselytes are few; and his tract on *Language* is far more pleasing in its manner than trustworthy in its matter.

In 1762, the Senate of the University of Glasgow, in acknowledgment of his talents, the ability of his lectures on jurisprudence, and

the advantages which his name and fame had conferred on that institution, unanimously conferred on him the degree of LL.D. In October, 1763, Hume, then Under-Secretary of Legation in Paris, writes to inform Smith that the Baron d'Holbach (patron of the Encyclopædists, and author of a "System of Nature") had told him, "there was one under his eye that was translating your 'Theory of Moral Sentiments,' and desired me to inform you of it." The translation here referred to was published, with the title "Metaphysics of the Soul," at Paris in 1764; it was executed by M. A. Eidous (1710 to 1780), a friend of Diderot's. Baron Grimm, however, says, "It met with little success in Paris."

About the close of 1763, the Right Hon. Charles Townshend's resolution ripened into action. He had married Caroline, the daughter and heiress of John, 2nd duke of Argyll and Greenwich; widow of Francis Earl of Dalkeith, who, having predeceased his father, Francis, 2nd duke of Buccleugh, left her with the care of a son, Henry, and a daughter, Frances. This Henry, born 1748, became titular Duke of Buccleugh on the demise of his grandfather in 1751. On the re-marriage of his mother, Charles Townshend became his guardian; and as he was about to make "the grand tour," for the completion of his studies by seeing life in different countries, and so becoming acquainted with the customs and languages of other lands, Charles Townshend—desirous of providing him with the most improving companionship, guardianship, and tutorage combined—offered Adam Smith most handsome terms present and prospective if he would undertake the superintendence of the young duke, his step-son, on his travels. Smith accepted the charge, and early in 1764 met the young Duke of Buccleugh in London, and set off with him, in March, to Paris. Here they remained only about a fortnight, and then proceeded to take up their residence for eighteen months in Toulouse. From Paris he forwarded to the Rector of the University of Glasgow (Dr. Leechman) a formal note of demission of his professorship.* The office was declared vacant, and in the college minutes an entry, of which the following is an extract, was made:—"The University cannot help expressing their sincere regret at the removal of Dr. Smith, whose distinguished probity and amiable qualities procured him the esteem and affection of his colleagues; and whose uncommon genius, great abilities, and extensive learning, did so much honour to this society; his elegant and ingenious 'Theory of Moral Sentiments' having recommended him to the esteem of men of taste and literature throughout Europe. His happy talent in illustrating abstract subjects, and faithful assiduity in communicating useful knowledge, distinguished him as a professor, and at once afforded

* We have been told, that Dr. Smith, before leaving the University, appointed an assistant, at his own expense, to read out the course of Lectures for the Session, and that he returned each student his whole fee for the year. They were unwilling to take it; but he insisted on it as a matter of conscience with him.

the greatest pleasure and the most important instruction to the youth under his care." Dr. Thomas Reid's "Inquiry into the Human Mind," published in 1764, led to his appointment to the professorship Smith left; and the retiring professor's wish, "that whoever is my successor may not only do credit to the office by his abilities, but be a comfort to the very excellent men with whom he is likely to spend his life, by the probity of his heart and the goodness of his temper," was granted.

Toulouse, at the time of Smith's residence in it, was the seat of a Parliament, with the principal members of which Smith lived on intimate terms, and so became fully acquainted with the internal policy of France, its modes and objects. On leaving the city of the *Jeux Floraux*, Smith and his pupil took an extensive tour through the south of France to Geneva, the capital of Switzerland. About Christmas, 1765, they returned to Paris, and remained in that city till the following October. Here, through Hume's influence, he was introduced into the selectest circles of society. Among those whose acquaintance he enjoyed may be mentioned Helvetius, author of "De l'Esprit;" Marmontel, whose so called "Moral Tales" are so much purer in style than in matter; D'Alembert, astronomer and mathematician, author of the "Discours Préliminaire" to the Encyclopædia; Necker, the financier; Quesnay, the economist; and Turgot, his disciple, a statesman of far-seeing views; Morellet, the critic and publicist; Baron D'Holbach, author of "The System of Nature;" the Duke of Rochefoucauld, grandson of the author of the "Maxims," &c. His intimacy with these men was very close, and his friendship for some of them warm. The impression made upon Smith's mind by the Duke of Rochefoucauld's friendliness may be in some measure estimated by the fact that he omitted a severe animadversion against his grandfather's principles from the later editions of "The Theory of Moral Sentiments;" while the influence exerted by Smith on him is traceable in his intention to have translated the Scotchman's work—had he not been forestalled, and by a letter of date 1778, in which, while transmitting a new edition of the "Maxims" to his friend, he apologizes for the tenets they maintain. Turgot and Smith, we gather from Hume's correspondence, were sincere and mutual friends, though there is no extant proof of their having kept up a voluminous interchange of thoughts, as was at one time supposed.

So great was Smith's respect for Quesnay that he intended to dedicate "The Wealth of Nations" to him; but the great economist died (1774) while it was passing slowly through the press. From a letter published in the Abbé Morellet's "Mémoires," we learn that Smith spoke French very ill, and that the chief topics of his conversation were banking, commerce, and finance. Smith at the same time had the *entrée* to and mixed freely in the *salon* life of Paris, in the suite of Mesdames Riccoboni (authoress of "Ernestine," &c.) and De Boufflers, and of Mademoiselle Rianecourt, so that he had every opportunity of becoming familiar with the social customs

and economics of France, and of widening his experience by the teachings of society.

Dr. Smith and the Duke of Buccleugh (who was then twenty years of age) returned to London in October, 1766, and there their connection as tutor and pupil ceased, after having been nearly three years in each other's company, "without," says the Duke, in a letter to Professor Dugald Stewart, "the slightest disagreement or coolness: on my part, with every advantage that could be expected from the society of such a man. We continued to live in friendship till the hour of his death; and I shall always remain with the impression of having lost a friend whom I loved and respected, not only for his great talents but for every private virtue." Smith shortly afterwards returned to his mother's house at Kirkcaldy, and there passed his time for nearly ten years, broken only at intervals by visits to Edinburgh and journeys to London, for the purpose of collecting authoritative information, or making references about the objects of his research. "My business here," he writes to Hume, June 7th, 1767, "is study, in which I have been very deeply engaged for about a month past. My amusements are long solitary walks by the seaside. You may judge how I spend my time. I feel myself, however, extremely happy, comfortable, and contented. I never was, perhaps, more so in all my life."

Dr. Smith had written to Hume from Toulouse on 5th July, 1764, saying:—"The life which I led at Glasgow was a pleasurable dissipated life in comparison of that which I lead here. *I have begun to write a book* in order to pass away the time; you may believe I have very little to do." The book here referred to, as just begun, was in all likelihood "The Wealth of Nations," and it was this same book that for years formed the serious occupation of his life.

The Duke of Buccleugh, shortly before completing his majority, married, in 1767, Elizabeth, daughter of George, Duke Montague; and during the earliest weeks of their married life, Smith was an honoured guest at Dalkeith House, as we know from a letter to Hume, of date September 18th, 1767.

About the year 1768, Smith became acquainted with Franklin, and he afterwards grew deeply interested in American affairs. Morellet, on 15th May, 1769, forwarded to Hume a prospectus of "A New Dictionary of Commerce," and requested him to distribute them among his friends, naming among others Smith, Franklin, and Principal Robertson, the historian. This Hume undertook to do. It was probably through Franklin that Smith acquired the accurate and extensive information relative to America which the "Wealth of Nations" displays. Hume, from James Court, Edinburgh, where he resided after his retirement from official political life, invites Smith to visit him for a little, saying, "I want to know what you have been doing, and propose to exact a rigorous account of the method in which you have employed yourself during your retreat." Smith most likely went, and enjoyed the aid and advice of his friend. Several letters of this year (1769) to Lord Hailes

(Sir David Dalrymple, the historian and legist) give us glimpses of his pursuits:—"I should *now* (March 5th, 1769) be extremely obliged to your lordship if you would send me the papers you mention upon the prices of provisions in former times. . . I have read law entirely with a view to form some general notion of the great outlines of the plan according to which justice has been administered in different ages and countries." A week later, he communicates his views on the prices of silver to the same learned personage. On February 6th, 1770, we find Hume writing, "What is the meaning of this, dear Smith, which we hear, that you are not to be above a day or two on your passage to London?" From which we may infer he intended to go, and suppose that he went, to the metropolis. He was at home in January, 1772; but from Hume's letters to him, June 27th, 1772, and Nov. 23rd, 1772, we learn that he had been in London the greater part of that year. In the former, Hume communicates to Smith the news of the extraordinary state of monetary affairs for which Scotland was in that year remarkable; and in the latter he says, "Come hither for some weeks about Christmas; dissipate yourself a little; return to Kirkcaldy; finish your work before autumn; go to London; print it; return and settle in this town, which suits your *studious independent* turn, even better than London." We presume he took the first part of this advice; for in the spring of 1773, before setting out from Scotland for London, where he intended a longer than usual stay, he wrote the following letter to Hume:—

"Edinburgh, April 16th, 1773.

"My dear Friend,—As I have left the care of all my literary papers to you, I must tell you that, except those which I carry along with me, there are none worth the publication but a few fragments of a great work, which contains a history of the astronomical systems that were successively in fashion down to the time of Des Cartes. Whether that might not be published as a fragment of an intended juvenile work, I leave to your judgment; though I begin to suspect that there is more refinement than solidity in some parts of it. This little work you will find in a thin folio paper in my back room. All the other loose papers which you will find in that desk, or within the glass folding doors of a bureau in my bedroom, together with about eighteen thin folio books, which you will likewise find within the same glass folding doors, I desire may be destroyed without any examination. Unless I die very suddenly, I shall take care that the papers I carry with me shall be sent to you.—I am ever, my dear friend, most faithfully yours,

"ADAM SMITH."

Hume corresponded with him several times during 1773 and 1774. He seems to have been living chiefly in London during those years, superintending his book's passage through the press. Early in 1776, "The Wealth of Nations" was published. Hume, on the 8th February, 1776, says: "By all accounts, *your book has been printed long ago*; yet it has never been so much as advertised. What is the reason? If you wait till the fate of America be decided, you may wait long. By all accounts, you intend to settle with us this spring. Yet we hear no more of it. What is the reason? Your chamber in

my house is always unoccupied. I am always at home. I expect you to land here." Hume had not long to wait for a copy. He was at this time in ill-health; but he brisks up on receiving his friend's book, and writes off in high glee thus:—"Euge! Belle. Dear Mr. Smith, —I am much pleased with your performance; and the perusal of it has taken me from a state of great anxiety. It was a work of so much expectation, by yourself, by your friends, and by the public, that I trembled for its appearance; but am now much relieved. . . It has depth and solidity and acuteness, and is so much illustrated by curious facts that it must, at last, take the public attention. It is probably much improved by your last abode in London." The enthusiastic congratulations of his friends poured in upon him fast and manifold; and so far, at least, the reception of his book was favourable. By 1781 it had reached a second edition; and a French translation (by Abbé Blavet) of it was published in Paris; this may be taken as an indication of the value set upon it by his continental friends. Before his death it had been translated into the languages of most of the nations of Europe. Upon this work,—"perhaps," says Sir James Macintosh, "the only book which produced an immediate, general, and irrevocable change in some of the most important parts of the legislation of all civilized nations,"—the great name of Adam Smith rests, and rests securely. "In a few years it began to alter laws and treaties; and has made its way, throughout the convulsions of revolution and conquest, to a due ascendant over the minds of men, with far less than the average obstructions of prejudice and clamour, which choke the channels through which truth flows into practice."*

Few works so ill bear abridgment. The beauty of its style, the wonderful variety of illustrative examples, the immense and multifarious mass of statistical matter and historical reference or allusion, the wide stretch of thought, rising into pure philosophy and stooping to discuss the price of pins,—make it impossible to produce any adequate estimate of the merit of this book—in some measure, it might almost be said, the creed and decalogue of a certain class of politicians: but, as in the case of the "Theory of Moral Sentiments," we shall endeavour to bring into the prominence of one thread of thought the leading principle which permeates the whole, and so give an idea of its quality, and—let us hope—an aid to the study of it.

As an *Organon* of social science, the "Wealth of Nations" is not quite complete, although it has a topical and logical compactness in its main elements that is almost wonderful. The Copernicus of political economy, the Columbus of free trade, the Lavoisier of the science of wealth, the Bacon of mercantile induction, like his types, left some labour for others to perform, some errors for others to correct. His great work was liker the "Critique of Pure Reason," than the Logic of

* Sir James Macintosh's "Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy," prefixed to "Encyclopædia Britannica," p. 353.

Aristotle—it was a work by which the foundation-stones of a building were laid, not one in which the work was finished and perfected. The grand fundamental principles of economics, so conscientiously and far-seeing established by Adam Smith, are, even yet, imperfectly understood, and still less perfectly applied. It might be well if the world would listen to this great-thoughted man, and strive to comprehend the living spirit rather than the killing letter of his system. If observation and experience, analyzed by reason, expounded by a wise logic, with a rare discretion and an abounding wealth of historic illustration, can charm and inform the mind, this instauration of economic philosophy cannot fail to be a book rarely valued by a thinker. If, in the comprehensive sagacity of his own mind, he has left some dissertations seemingly unlinked to the great and firmly-knit chain of his general reasoning, it is because he has given his readers credit for being able and willing to think for themselves, not from his incapacity to adjust them into oneness.

If we endeavour to trace the line of thought along through the vast series of his speculations—each interesting and all excellent—we shall leave much in his work unnoticed; but then we shall, perhaps, pioneer some sterling mind through the apparent perplexities of the favourite digressions of Smith, and enable him to see, in the electric light of reason, that flashes along the main line of his thought, that the seeming pathlessness is, after all, a well-arranged avenue, bringing into view all the attractive sights within vision on the way to the chief structure, towards which we press. Labour is the source of wealth, the original purchase-money paid for all things. Everything coveted by man is either the produce of labour, or acquires more or less of its desirability from labour; and that quantity of labour which is expended in bringing it within the catalogue of desirable and attainable things is its real value, whatever its accidental one may be. To minimize labour and maximize production is the great task of man. Labour is best minimized by intelligence, and production best maximized by intelligent industry. Industry is best and most intelligent, in itself, when all the power of one's mind can be given to such a portion of the great cycle of labour involved in production, as may be at once and easily performed; and hence labour is minimized, and production maximized, by careful subdivision and arrangement. The *real* value of any man's labour—of whatever kind—is a due and competent portion of the necessities, comforts, conveniences, and luxuries of life, in the state and station of society in which he lives. Its *accidental* value may be more or less, according to the exigencies of the times. That the *accidental* should be brought as nearly as possible to the *real* value of labour, every external restriction should be removed, by which justice is impeded or equity destroyed. The true policy of man is freedom in every act and circumstance of life, if it be governed by justice and restrained by charity. Wages, profits, rents, &c.—every form of defining any man's share in the good things of life, for which his labour has been given as an equiva-

lent—are, in reality, subject to the same law, and are regulated by the same principle, unless interfered with by ill-judged political or social measures. Capital is stored labour; and Taxation is the charge or per-centage levied by the State for protecting society in its ordinary forms of ongoing, so that, as far as possible, the laws of natural right may become the laws of nations, and of the individuals who compose them. This seems to us the true statement of the prime thought of the book, apart from its sectional or special teachings. Formally, the work is divided into five parts, in which are discussed—*first*, the causes of the formation, increase, and decline of national wealth, and the rules by which it becomes diffused throughout society; *second*, the nature and results of capital; *third*, the forms, modes, and changes in national wealth; *fourth*, the influences, for good or evil, of political and social doctrines; and *fifth*, the nature of revenue and the laws of taxation. This bald and meagre free-hand outline of the work can convey no adequate notion of the masterly disquisitions which bestud it; the noble tone of morals which pervades it; the relishable honesty of controversy which characterizes it; the clear, methodical, judicious, and luminous reasoning in which its doctrines are explained; and the kindly keenness of thought with which it pleads for the poor to the rich, by showing that, in most instances, the accidents of life have been more powerful in their case than their own real and genuine efforts to do their part. It is true there are errors in this book;—were it otherwise, would it be a *human* work? It is true there are omissions;—what mind, not indeed divine, can compass the whole circumference of even the simplest truth? It is true there are some overstrained reasonings;—but who has dwelt long upon a theme without being somewhat biassed in his view of it? It is true that society has changed since it was written; that sentiments are now surging in the State of which he knew nothing; that forms of industry and methods of production have sprung into existence of which he had no conception. What then; is it not the inevitable fate of man to be ever outmarched by his successors? Read carefully, with a wise caution and a cautious scepticism, Smith's work is, in itself, a vast contribution to the "Wealth of Nations," which, if attended to, would raise man much in dignity, wealth, power,—in one word—*happiness*. So let it be read.

The greater part of the two years succeeding the publication of that work which Lord Brougham describes as having "the extraordinary merit of showing in what way economical reasoning should be conducted,—with a constant recourse to the general principles of human nature, and a distrust of all empirical details, though with a due attention to ascertained facts of a general and not a topical or accidental class"—Dr. Smith spent in London. Hume appointed Smith his literary executor, giving him full power over all his papers and works, except the "Dialogues on Natural Religion." Smith resolved not to edit that work, and told Hume so, and he made other arrangements, without, however, cancelling a donation of

\$200, which was to be paid to Smith immediately after the publication of that work. On Hume's death his brother paid the bequest, but Smith refused to accept of it, because he had not fulfilled the conditions of the grant. Hearing that Hume's illness had assumed a serious aspect, John Home, the dramatist, and Adam Smith, set out from London to see him: they met him, by chance, on his way to Bath *via* London, at Morpeth, in Northumberland, on April 23rd, 1776. By agreement Smith went to Scotland, and Hume accompanied his friend and relative to London; whence, on his arrival, Hume wrote to Smith, May 3rd, 1776, regarding his hesitance about the "Dialogues," and informed him,—“I find the town very full of your book, which meets with general approbation.” Smith agreed to superintend a new edition of Hume's works, then in the press; and it was subsequently published in 1777.

Hume grew worse, and returned to Edinburgh, where he met his friends, Lord Elibank, Dr. Blair, Dr. Black, Professor Ferguson, John Home, and Adam Smith, at dinner on July 4th, 1776, to bid farewell to him who had been the chief ornament of Scottish literature in his age. Smith remained with him to see that he was cared for, till Hume, unwilling to wrench his friend's heart with grief, suggested that he should take rest and relief in Kirkcaldy, on the assurance that he would be called when the dangerous hour came near, and that Dr. Black would keep him regularly informed of the progress of the malady. On Aug. 25th, 1776, Hume died; and Smith saw him laid in his chosen grave, in a corner of the Calton Hill of Edinburgh. Scarcely had the earth been shovelled on him, before venomous calumny assailed the memory of the philosopher, historian, and moralist; and Smith, yet saddened by his loss, was required to deny the puerile tales of death-bed remorse, which some well-meaning people were foolish enough to circulate. This denial was embodied in a beautiful and touching narrative-letter, addressed to Mr. Strahan, printer, containing an account of Hume's illness and death, appended to the characteristic memoir entitled, “My own Life,” which the historian left among his MSS. This effectually silenced the traducers of his friend's fame on that point; but they turned their rancour on Smith himself, and resented his generous zeal by accusing him of a sceptical indifference to things sacred. Dr. Horne, bishop of Norwich, whose “Commentary on the Psalms” is so great a treasure in theological literature, assailed Smith in a letter much more conspicuous for subtle irony, dexterous theologic weapon-handling, than Christian charity or candour. To these attacks on himself Smith never replied. Dr. Samuel Johnson, it is said, resented this defence of his dead friend's memory, at a Mr. Dilly's table, so keenly as to call Smith a liar, a title which Smith, according to report, capped with an epithet quite as opprobrious, and left the room in which the lexicographer sat. This story, disagreeable, if not improbable in its details, is related in the *Edinburgh Review*, No. 175, and in the “Life of Wilberforce.” That it is “founded on fact” is certain. Boswell relates a similar

incident as having occurred at Mr. Strahan's. Several years afterwards, when Dr. Johnson was maintaining the superiority of rhyme over blank verse, Boswell remarked, that he had heard Adam Smith enforce the same opinion in his lectures when he was a student at Glasgow. "Sir," said Johnson, "Smith and I *once* met, and we did not much take to each other, but if I had known that the dog loved rhyme as much as you say he does, sir, I should have hugged him." And yet, while living in London, Smith enjoyed a fair share of literary reputation, was a member of the Literary Club, and in an address presented to the members of that body—published in the *Annual Register*, 1776—is mentioned as follows:—

"If I have thoughts and can't express 'em,
Gibbon shall teach me how to dress 'em,
In words select and terse;
Jones teach me modesty and Greek,
Smith *how to think*, Burke how to speak,
And Beaulieu to converse."

In 1778, Smith, at the unsolicited request of the Duke of Buccleugh, was appointed one of the Commissioners of Customs in Scotland, and removed to Edinburgh, where he spent, for the most part, the remaining years of his life. In the same year, Lord Kames, while preparing the third edition of his "Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion," felt it necessary to review and oppose the opinions of Smith, and forwarded to his opponent a copy of those parts of the work (part i. chap. ix.) which contained the intended strictures; and Smith, in returning the sheets, observes, "Nothing can be more perfectly friendly and polite than the terms in which you express yourself with regard to me; and I should be extremely ill-tempered if I could make the slightest opposition to their publication. I am no doubt extremely sorry to find myself of a different opinion, both from so able a judge of the subject and of so old and good a friend;—but differences of this kind are unavoidable; and besides, *Partium contentioibus respublica crescit*."

Hereafter, the trivial but incessant and irksome routine of official duty exhausted his spirits; weighed on his attention, and he ceased to cultivate letters except as an amusement for his leisure, or as the agent for giving animation and interest to conversation. He shrunk from the arduous task of completing the round of his speculations as he originally intended, by giving "an account of the general principles of law and government, and of the different revolutions they have undergone in the different ages and periods of society—not only in what concerns justice, but in what concerns police, revenue, and arms, and whatever else is the object of law." Neither did he feel himself competent to conduct the researches necessary to enable him to compose a "Treatise on the Republics of Greece and Rome," which formed one of his early plans. A few years of leisure, retirement, competence, and health might have enabled him

* "Theory of Moral Sentiments," part xvii. sect. 4.

to fulfil the grand designs of his life. But Smith, with the capacity of a legislator, was quartered on the customs, and the world lost a theory of jurisprudence, that George III. might have an inland revenue officer, and perhaps (P) the Duke of Buccleugh be free from a pensioner. Shortly after he had issued the third edition of "The Wealth of Nations," Dr. Smith's mother died, in 1784. This was a bereavement he felt sorely. In 1787, he was chosen Lord Rector of the University of Glasgow, a token of fame than which no other, he says, "could have given me so much real satisfaction." It is traditionally related that he failed in being able to address his students on the installation day.

In 1788, his niece and housekeeper, Miss Douglass, died, and "all that he ever knew of the endearments of a family" life were thus taken away from him. He was now alone, helpless, and sixty-five years of age; his friends fading around him, and his own health failing. His only enjoyments were his library—the books in which were few, select, and handsomely bound—and in the conversations of his friends, who were in the habit of dining with him every Sunday, and oftener when convenient. His lonely and sedentary life affected his health, and he became subject to a chronic obstruction of the intestinal canal, which pained him sorely. He bore his ailment with patience, fortitude, and equanimity, sympathized with by friends, and resigned in his own mind. It cannot be doubted that he looked with regret upon the time spent in performing duties which almost any one of a thousand common men might have performed with all but equal skill and accuracy. He regretted "he had done so little. I meant to have done more," he said; "and there are materials in my papers of which I could have made a great deal. But that is now out of the question." Jealous of his literary reputation, and solicitous to free any of his friends and pupils from the charge of plagiarism, he destroyed all his lectures and papers, with the exception of six essays, a few days before his death. He had spent the previous winter in preparing for the press the sixth edition of "The Theory of Moral Sentiments," and the fourth of "The Wealth of Nations," both published in 1789, and had even expressed, in an advertisement prefixed to the former, a last faint hope of being able to accomplish his work on "Jurisprudence."

On the sabbath before his death a pretty numerous gathering of his friends had met to sup with him; but finding himself too weak to enjoy their society he left them, and, when retiring, remarked, "I believe we must adjourn this meeting to some other place." In a few days afterwards he died, on 17th July, 1790, exactly three months after Benjamin Franklin, than whom, however, he was seventeen years younger, but whom in many ways he resembled. He bequeathed his library and property to his nephew, D. Douglas, Esq., Advocate, whom he had educated under his own old pupil professor, Millar; and appointed Drs. Hutton and Black his literary executors. They published his six essays,—1st, "The History of Astronomy;" 2nd, "The History of Ancient Physics;" 3rd, "The

History of Ancient Logic and Metaphysics;" 4th, "On the Nature of Imitation;" 5th, "On English and Italian Verses;" 6th, "The External Senses." The first three were fragments of a great work he had once contemplated,—but subsequently abandoned from its unmanageable width and scope,—upon the principles which direct philosophical inquiries as illustrated in the "History of the Various Sciences,"—a work since in part accomplished in Whewell's "History of the Inductive Sciences."

Dr. Smith lies buried in the Canongate churchyard, in the Scottish metropolis—"Edinburgh town"—and Stewart, his biographer, occupies a place not far distant. The pilgrim may easily find the tomb of the father of political economy. All that was earthly of him lies *there*; but who shall tell where the influences of his intellect are unfelt? Trace but one chronological line of his disciples, and you will gain a faint idea of the power—the epoch-forming actuality—of his intellect. Millar, Stewart, Say, Horner, Brougham, Malthus, Macintosh, Ricardo, Cobbett, Torrens, Thompson, McCulloch, Mill, Whately, Doubleday, &c. Run over, in thought, only a few of the topics upon which he discourses, *e.g.*, labour, capital, wages, profit, rent, credit, interest, money, price, property, population, production, consumption, metals, merchandises, agriculture, taxation, banking, &c., and you will be able, in some measure and degree, to estimate the variety and extent of knowledge and thought which must have been brought to bear upon these matters to make a useful, popular, and original work upon them. Items of thought—disjunct and one-sided—had, it is true, appeared upon many of these points; special tractates on some of them abounded; but Adam Smith, for the first time, attempted to invade this extensive and difficult field of inquiry with the powers of reason, and made a whole mass of prejudices, errors, mistakes, and impolitic enactments fly from it in vanquished dismay. He inaugurated reasonable legislation, based upon a full and proper investigation of the facts, regarding the objects on which the law was to exert its influence or power. Trace, if you can, the mark he has made on the statute-books of all the countries of Europe; the measures founded on his views; the changes originating in his suggestions; the taxes remitted; the obnoxious laws repealed; the very form and method of thought altered by the active permeation of the public mind with his ideas,—and you may form some notion of the might that lies within a studious mind when it girds itself up to the height of its capacity, and gives its force and power to the elucidation of those questions which affect the happiness of mankind. Triumph upon triumph has proven the validity of Smith's theoretic views. Iniquitous laws have fallen from power; prejudices have crumbled into dusty nothing; customs have been altered, policies changed, and systems inaugurated, and doctrines of potency become dictates of policy, since Smith thought, and because he wrote. He was an epoch man.

S. N.

Religion.

IS THE CATHOLIC RULE OF FAITH TRUE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

"There was no time when a visible and speaking authority did not exist, to which submission was due. Before Jesus Christ, that authority, among the Jews, was in the synagogue; when the synagogue was on the point of failing, Jesus Christ himself appeared; when this Divine personage withdrew, He left a Church, and with it His Holy Spirit. Tell me that Jesus Christ once more appears upon earth, teaching, preaching, and working miracles, I want this Church no longer. But if you take her from me, again I must have Jesus Christ in person, speaking, instructing, deciding by miracles, and with an unerring authority. But has He not left, you say, His written Word? He has; a Word holy and adorable; but it is a Word that may be handled and expounded as fancy shall direct; a Word that remains silent under every interpretation. When difficulties and doubts arise, then I must have some external guide that shall solve those difficulties and satisfy my doubts, and that guide must be unerring."—*Bossuet, "Conférence avec M. Claude,"* p. 129.

THE nature of the Catholic Rule of Faith has been fully entered into by "Ignatius;" and "Gregory" has pointed out the testimony of the written Word of God to the existence of such an authority in pp. 86 and 87. If due consideration be given, it will be found that many of the passages which he has extracted from Holy Writ cannot possibly apply to any other institution than the Holy Roman Church. But, in doing this, he has by no means exhausted this rich treasury of evidence, for it would seem but meet that the prophets of God, as well as our Lord himself, should dwell much upon the future greatness of that glorious kingdom which He has established upon earth.

Although this article is intended chiefly to draw the attention of the reader to those times which immediately succeeded the apostolic age, yet, in order to render the testimony of the early ages of the Church complete, it will be necessary for me to revert to the period when Christianity was in its infancy.

First, then, I assert that, during the lifetime of the apostle Paul, the Church located in Rome was in possession of the true faith. This is a simple truth, which will be readily admitted. But although simple, it is, at the same time, highly important; because, although simple, it is a truth from which many others necessarily flow. "First, I give thanks to my God, through Jesus Christ, for you all, because your faith is spoken of in the whole world," Rom. i. 8. The same apostle writes to the Ephesians of "one Lord, one faith, one baptism," Ephes. iv. 5; and to the Corinthians thus, "For in one

Spirit were we all baptized into one body," 1 Cor. xii. 13. These passages prove that the Christians in Rome, Ephesus, and Corinth were in possession of one common faith. If an individual in one of these cities had taught a single doctrine contrary to, or had denied a single tenet of this one faith which S. Paul preached, he would have been marked out as a heretic, and, in all probability, the advice of this same apostle would have been followed: "A man that is a heretic, after the first admonition avoid." Now, if this be true of an individual, how much more noticeable would have been the departure of an entire local Church from this one true faith. If I, in common with all other Catholics, am in error, the Roman Church must have fallen into heresy. I ask, When? My opponents cannot declare that she fell into her supposed errors all at once. Must there not, then, have been a beginning to her heresy? What heretical tenet was first broached therein? or, what is still more important, which Bishop of Rome confirmed it? and how was it that the Church, in all other parts of the world, did not protest against it? I believe Protestants do not consider any early writers entitled to be called Fathers of the Church besides those which the Roman Church has ever recognized as such. If they do, can they tell which of them wrote against the Roman Church? If these questions cannot be fairly answered, we see clearly that the Roman Church in the early ages had no accusers, neither churches nor even individuals, save those whose tenets are acknowledged by Protestants themselves to have been of the most horrible description.

But let us look at this matter in a common-sense point of view, and judge which is most probable,—that Satan should instigate certain individuals, at different times, to affirm that the Church which Jesus Christ had founded, and the apostles and their successors propagated, was in error; or, that this Church, against which He had declared the gates of hell should not prevail, should really fall into heresy, and even idolatry. The Holy Scriptures declare that in the latter days many shall depart from the faith; and we know, indeed, that this has come to pass; but it gives the lie to the oft-repeated assertion that, for many centuries prior to the Reformation, the whole or nearly the whole of the world lay buried in spiritual darkness, and even "damnable idolatry."

Again, how unreasonable is it for Protestants to refuse to acknowledge the supremacy of the Bishop of Rome in the early ages of the Church, and yet, at the same time, declare that so many errors were palmed upon, to say at least, the majority of Christians in all other places. I have thus shown some of the reasons which induce us to believe that the Roman Church, which possessed the one true faith at the beginning, has not fallen into error, and has, therefore, the true Rule of Faith; but in order to show more clearly the impossibility of its erring without incurring the denunciations of the remainder of the Christian world, we subjoin an illustration.

The reader will imagine all Christians, no matter where located, to act in the following manner:—They are in the habit of meeting

together, at least once a week, to partake of bread and wine, in memory of the sacrifice and death of Jesus Christ. Before partaking, however, he whom they recognize as their minister makes use of certain words, which are indeed the words of the Saviour, when He instituted this memorial. This is simplicity itself; all believe they receive bread and wine, and in substance nothing more. But an individual residing in England, France, or Italy, no matter which, rises up and makes the astounding declaration that when the minister makes use of the words before mentioned, the bread and wine remain no longer, but that Jesus Christ, by His own power, changes them into His own body and blood, and that He even did the same thing when He instituted the memorial which they are in the habit of commemorating. The most probable notion is, that such a person would be looked upon in the light of a madman, and treated accordingly. If he *did* obtain any followers, a formal protest, at least, would be everywhere made against such a seeming absurdity. If the Bishop of Rome is *supposed* to be looked upon as superior in any degree, there can be no question about his decision,—it would decidedly be against any doctrine which was novel. If Catholicity be not true, then this *supposition* becomes a *fact*; and the Protestant is left to wonder, not only at the absence of a protest, but also to wonder for what motive the whole Christian world, with the exception of a solitary few, should renounce a simple practice for belief in the greatest of mysteries. But while we find no stir made in the Christian world against this and other supposed Romish errors, we find enough about the errors of Valentinus, Marcion, Arius, Nestorius, and a host of others. *How is this?*

I leave the Protestant reader to answer this satisfactorily, even to his own mind, if he can. The only answer I can give is this:—*Because all the rejected tenets of those heretics were novel.* Hitherto I have merely dwelt upon the absence of any kind of reproof given to the Roman Church by the immediate and subsequent successors of the apostles. Bearing in mind that the undermentioned writers were strenuous opposers of various heresies, I proceed to set before the reader their testimony to the truth and infallibility of the Roman Church.

S. Irenæus was the disciple of S. Polycarp, the angel of the Church of Smyrna, and disciple of S. John the Evangelist. After distinctly proving the descent of doctrine from the apostles, he (S. Irenæus) writes thus:—

“However, as it would be tedious to enumerate the whole list of successions, I shall confine myself to that of Rome,—the greatest, and most ancient, and most illustrious Church, founded by the glorious apostles Peter and Paul,—receiving from them her doctrine, which was announced to all men, and which, through the succession of her bishops, has come down to us. Thus we confound all those who, through evil designs, or vain glory, or perverseness, teach what they ought not. For to this Church, *on account of its superior headship* (propter potorem principalem), every other must have recourse,—that is, the faithful of all countries; in which

Church has been preserved the doctrine delivered by the apostles."—*Adv. Her.* lib. iii. c. 3, p. 175.

"Things being thus made plain, it is not from others that truth is to be sought, which may be readily learned from the Church; for to this Church, as unto a rich depository, the apostles committed whatever is of Divine truth, that each one, if so inclined, might thence draw the drink of life. This is the way to life; all other teachers must be shunned as thieves and robbers."—*Ibid.* c. iv. p. 178.

"The teaching of the Church is true and stable, showing to all men the same one path of salvation; for to her has been committed the light and the wisdom of God. As the wise man says (Prov. c. i.):—'*She uttereth her voice in the streets; she crieth on the highest walls; she speaketh, without ceasing, at the city gates.*' Everywhere the Church proclaims the truth. She is the candlestick with the seven lamps (Exod. xxv.), bearing the light of Christ."—*Ibid.* lib. v. c. 20, p. 317.

S. Cyprian died a martyr for the cause of Christ in the year 258. In his treatise on the unity of the Church, he says, that men are exposed to error—

"because they turn not their eyes to the fountain of truth; nor is the head sought for, nor the doctrine of the heavenly Father upheld. Which things would any one seriously ponder, no long inquiry would be necessary. The proof is easy. Christ addresses Peter:—'*I say to thee that thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.*' . . . He that does not hold this unity of the Church, can he think that he holds the faith? He that opposes and withstands the Church, can he trust that he is in the Church?"—*De Unit. Eccl.* pp. 194, 195.

"He cannot have God for a Father who has not the Church for his mother. If, excluded from the ark of Noah, any one might have escaped, so may he, if out of the Church."—*Ibid.* p. 195.

Origen died about the year 254. He thus writes:—

"As there are many who think they believe what Christ taught, and some of these differ from others, it becomes necessary that all should profess that doctrine which came down from the apostles, and now continues in the Church. That alone is truth which in nothing differs from ecclesiastical and apostolical tradition."—*Præf.* lib. 1; *Periarchon*, tom. i. p. 47; edit. PP. S. Mauri, Paris, 1733.

"If we follow the mere letter of the Scriptures, and take the interpretation of the Law, as the Jews commonly explain it, I shall blush to confess that the Lord should have given such laws. But if the law of God be understood, as the Church teaches, then truly does it transcend all human laws, and is worthy of Him that gave it."—*Hom. VII. in Levit.* tom. ii. pp. 224—226.

S. Jerome, in the fourth century, writes thus from the deserts of Syria to Pope Damasus:—

"I am following no other than Christ, united to the communion of your Holiness—that is, to the chair of Peter. I know that the Church is founded upon that rock. Whoever eateth the Lamb out of that house, is a profane man. Whoever is not in the ark, shall perish by the flood. But, forasmuch as being retired into the desert of Syria, I cannot receive the sacrament at your hands, I follow your colleagues, the bishops of Egypt. I do not know Vitalis. I do not communicate with Meletius. Paulinus is a stranger to me. He that gathereth not with you, scattereth."—*Ep. XIV. ad Damasum*, tom. iv. p. 19.

"I cease not to proclaim: He is mine, who remains united to the *chair of Peter*."—*Eph. XV.*; *ibid.* p. 22.

The great S. Augustine brings me to the fifth century, beyond which I will not extend these extracts, the testimony of five centuries being sufficient to illustrate the truth of my assertions.

"In the Catholic Church many are the considerations which must keep me in her bosom. The assent of nations; her authority first established by miracles; the succession of pastors from the chair of Peter, to whom the Lord committed the care of feeding His flock, down to the present bishop; lastly, the name itself of Catholic."—*Contra ep. Fundam.* c. iv. tom. viii. p. 153.

"The Church shall not be overcome; it shall not be rooted up; nor shall it give way to any temptations: it shall endure to the end of the world, when we shall be translated from this temporal to an eternal habitation."—*Enarrat. in Psal. LX.* tom. iv. p. 587.

"Some, who are not in the Church, are heard to say, her unity is gone, the Church of all nations has disappeared. What insolence! Is she no longer because thou art not a member? She shall be, though thou be not. This presumptuous saying, resting on no truth, upheld by no wisdom, full of vanity and rashness, the spirit of God foresaw. But the Way and the Truth has announced (*Matt. xxviii. 20*), Behold, I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world."—*Ibid. Ser. ii. in Psal. CI.* p. 1105.

Speaking of the validity of baptism conferred by heretics, he says:—

"Nor should we ourselves dare to assert such a thing, if we were not supported by the most united authority of the Universal Church, to which also Cyprian himself would undoubtedly have yielded, if at that time the truth of this question had been solidly established, being elucidated and declared by a plenary council."

The lucid explanation of the Catholic Rule of Faith by "Ignatius," together with the article of "Gregory," will, for the present, be found a sufficient answer to the objections of "Theophylact." I propose, therefore, to devote the remainder of this article to a review of that by "Lex Scripta." In doing this, I shall clearly show that many of his statements will not bear the test of investigation. He first complains (page 93) that "Ignatius" has not written in defence of the Catholic rule of faith, and in doing this makes use of the following remark: "It is always easier to attack than to defend." The reader will observe that this expression is perfectly uncalled for, since "Ignatius" has there abstained from any attack whatever upon the Protestant rule. Before the truth of any rule can be proved, the nature of it must be explained, and it was undoubtedly on account of the misconceptions existing among Protestants with regard to the Catholic rule, that "Ignatius" was induced to devote an entire article to its definition. In a former discussion, alluded to by "Lex Scripta," it was the duty of writers on the affirmative side to defend the theory, but on reviewing those articles I find a great deal of paper wasted by attacks upon the Catholic Church.

On the other hand, "Lex Scripta" himself makes the following admission:—"In the former discussion, our opponents have done

their best to cavil and object." To *object* in this instance was decidedly our *duty*, but in doing this it would appear that we have drawn upon us the wrath of "Lex Scripta," for he remarks, "Depend upon it, the arguments in this discussion, as in the former, will consist chiefly in attacking the opposite side." I promise "Lex Scripta" that by the end of this discussion he will be unanimously declared a false prophet. He does not hesitate to accuse us of making use of "baseless assertions," but readers of the *British Controversialist* will doubtless accuse him of a baseless assertion where he says, that abler hands than ours since the times of Luther and Chillingworth have never *attempted* to prove the Catholic Rule of Faith (page 93).

With regard to honour paid to the Blessed Virgin, touched upon at page 96, I would ask "Lex Scripta" if he ever knew any man of "education and acquirements" assert that we ought, or that it is lawful, to "offer to the Blessed Virgin the honour due to God alone"—or if he ever *heard* of any Catholic, in this country or *any other*, making such an assertion? I suppose he would answer honestly, and therefore his answer would be, No. But yet he believes the ignorant offer her this honour. If this is the case, who are their teachers? Not their priests, for they are men of "education and acquirements;" or if they were not, their bishops would be. Not their books, for if "Lex Scripta" refers to any book of instruction used by Catholics, he will find, that every degree of honour is to be paid to the Blessed Virgin, *save*—Divine honour.

With respect to indulgences, referred to by "Lex Scripta" (page 97), I must observe that we have here an instance on his part, either of lamentable ignorance with respect to Catholic doctrine (although he boasts of his knowledge on the same page), or of desire to mislead the reader. He not only asserts that Rome gives "indulgences to sin," but that Gregory admits the fact of documentary evidence to prove the existence of *such* indulgences. A few words will suffice to show what this "baseless assertion" is worth. It must be borne in mind that "Lex Scripta" distinctly mentions "*indulgences to sin*," which he supposes "Rome gives her followers." *These* indulgences have not, nor ever had, any existence, save in the imagination of such Protestants as "Lex Scripta." "Gregory," therefore, tells him to "inform himself a little better of what Catholicism consists, before he ventures to attack it."

The power of the Pontiffs to grant indulgences, (*not to sin*) however, is really a point of Catholic doctrine.* It was for *these* indulgences "Gregory" stated we have documentary evidence, *not* for "indulgences to sin," which "Lex Scripta" affirms "Gregory" first admits and then denies. Not content with this, he ("Lex Scripta") proceeds to accuse, not only "Gregory" but Catholics in

* To learn what the doctrine of indulgences really means, I refer the reader to Challoner's "Catholic Instructed," "Papist Misrepresented and Represented," or any other book of instruction, to be had of most Catholic booksellers.

general, with unprincipled lying, by the following malicious remark, "Thus do Romanists meet with a denial the charge of encouraging immorality by their pernicious doctrines" (page 97).

The impartial reader will perceive that want of space alone prevents me from noticing further the article of my opponent, and I must therefore look to some abler hand to complete the work. At the same time, it will be readily admitted, that in this instance I have endeavoured to prove "the Catholic Rule of Faith true" by an appeal to *facts*. The testimony of the first five centuries to the ever-enduring truth of the Catholic Church is no mean authority; and although I have been compelled, for want of space, to limit that testimony to the selection of a few passages only, yet should this selection lead all or any readers of the *British Controversialist* to make further inquiries, my labours will be well rewarded.

A LAYMAN.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

As, by common consent, the present discussion seems to be merged, to a great extent, in the question of Infallibility, we propose to examine the statements put forward in the two preceding papers, by writers on the opposite side, in support of this claim of their church. We will endeavour to show that, there have been adduced no reasons why we should accept the Romish Church as infallible; but, on the contrary, that there exist many reasons, with "confirmations strong," for believing that she has erred.

"Ignatius," who "merely states Catholic doctrine, and does not prove it," declares that the doctrine of the sufficiency of the Old Testament is an "absurdity." Well, *we* have not invented it; it was St. Paul who affirmed it; let "Ignatius" settle the question with St. Paul.

He congratulates himself that, on the question of the Canon, Protestants must have recourse to a "legitimate principle" and portion of his Rule of Faith, viz., the testimony of ancient churches. But in a note on page 16 we find that he stultifies himself and insults his Church, by declaring that he receives the doctrine of her infallibility "merely as a matter of history."

He next informs us that the Bible cannot instruct us on *all* points of Christian doctrine and practice. Now, on page 86, we find "Gregory" affirming "that Scripture by itself is sufficient to guide us, if interpreted rightly." Can any interpretation render Scripture by itself sufficient to guide us, if all points of Christian doctrine and practice be not contained therein? And what is the use of an infallible Church, if it cannot preserve its members from such downright contradiction?

He proceeds to "state" that the Catholic Rule of Faith is the whole word of God, or, in other words, Scripture and tradition. But in the course of a few sentences we begin to discover that these are not the rule, after all! For after asking, "How are we to obtain a certain and definite knowledge of this revelation?" he goes on to inform us of some "succession of men whose province it is to

deliver inviolate to man all that God has revealed;" and, again, "when the Church speaks, God speaks." Why, then, all this talk about the Bible and tradition being the Catholic Rule of Faith? Is it not plain that these are really disregarded, alike in theory and in practice, and that the only Rule of Faith recognized by the Romanist is "Infallible Church," which, being translated, means "priest of the parish"?

"Ignatius" seems to have been annoyed by the conduct of "these persons who in the last debate were constantly making" impertinent "inquiries as to the seat of infallibility in the Catholic Church." Well, "Ignatius," we wish now to be infallibly assured of the doctrine of Transubstantiation. Where shall we apply? To the Pope? "Gregory" informs us that Catholics do not believe in the personal infallibility of the Pope. Shall we go to a council? Why, there is no council now sitting: the last was held at Trent 300 years ago. If a council be the seat of infallibility, then the Church has been fallible for 300 years. Shall we go to a bishop? He is only a private individual. To a priest? He, also, is liable to err. Where, O "Ignatius," shall we find Infallibility? Listen to the "sufficient answer" of "Ignatius." "The human part (of the Romish Church) is not inerrable in itself, but only as the organ and as the manifestation of the Divine."

He tells us that "those who deny the infallibility of the Church (meaning *his* Church), practically assert that Christ has not fulfilled those glorious promises which He made before His ascension." Christ's promises were made for the benefit of His followers in every age, and while they ensure that some visible and true Church shall always exist, they do not guarantee infallibility to any external organization.

He adduces some quotations from Dr. Manning. Can Dr. Manning or can "Ignatius" bring forward a single proof that Christ ever promised infallibility to any corporation of professors of Christianity? He has never promised that the Church of England, or of Scotland, or any other *visible* body, shall be guided into all truth for ever. These have either erred or may err. Visible companies or churches are made up of mixed multitudes, and are compared, in the Gospel, to a ripening harvest of "tares and wheat;" to a mixed flock of "sheep and goats;" to a company of "wise and foolish virgins." The Church to which the most glorious promises of Christ were made is not a company of this sort. It is made up, exclusively, of the true believers in Christ of every age and place. It is of her members that it is said, that they are "born of the Spirit," that they "live by the Spirit," and that the Spirit "shall guide them into all truth." Whatever may be the arrogant pretensions of Rome, it is this Church which is the "body of Christ," and which "He will present to Himself a glorious Church, without spot, or wrinkle, or any such thing."*

He closes with some four statements, which he terms "admissions," from Protestant writers. Let him know that upon matters of religion Protestants will "call no man master." In every case our sole inquiry must be, "What saith the Scriptures?"

In the extracts from Bull and Whittaker there is not a word that need be construed into an "admission" of Romish doctrine. The others we are willing to make over to "Ignatius" as our parting gift. They are fit flowers to deck the Romish altars.

"Gregory" must now come in for a share of our attentions. After treating us to some ingenious remarks about "begging the question," and rehearsing some of his achievements in the previous debate, he points out as "worthy of remark that the teaching of the Catholic Church is positive." Such also was the teaching of the old Pagan mythology. Such also is the teaching of the Moslem creed, "There is but one Allah, and Mahomet is his prophet."

He says, "She dates the commencement of her creed centuries before any other church." But he should have told us, too, that she dates the end of it so late as the 8th of December, 1854.* He informs us that Protestantism, in his opinion, is a "mere negation." Can he not comprehend that the word "Protestantism" is only a new name for the negative side of that old thing, Christianity?

He alleges that several texts have been already refuted. We presume that this is a mere "*lapsus penne*." If not, we suggest that the old plan of burning the whole book is much more expeditious.

He gives us three meanings of the word "Church," and seems willing to insinuate that these are the only ones. Let us supply another, which ought always to be remembered by the readers of Romish controvertists. It is this: "The whole body of the elect of God, or the true disciples of Christ of every age and nation." "And the Lord added to the Church daily such as should be saved."† "And He is the head of the body, the Church."‡ "The general assembly and Church of the first-born, which are written in heaven."§ "That he might present it to Himself a glorious Church, without spot or wrinkle."||

We are next told, "that the early Christians were believers in certain tenets now branded by Protestants as corrupt," and that this may be "easily gathered from their own writings, the writings of their heathen enemies, and the records in the catacombs." We challenge "Gregory" to show from their writings that the Christians of the first four centuries held any one of the peculiar dogmas of his Church. But how is it that it does never occur to him to gather their faith from the book which they loved? And would he rather accept as evidence the calumnies of their

* Dogma of the Immaculate Conception of Mary, then first made an article of faith.

† Acts ii. 47

‡ Col. i. 18.

§ Heb. xii. 22.

|| Ephes. v. 26.

enemies and the forged records of a charnel-house, than the Word of the living God ?

He goes on to tell us that among these early Christians there existed at Rome a bishop who governed the whole Church. Well, there existed a bishop at Rome, A.D. 606, whose name (curious coincidence) was Gregory, surnamed the Great. Let us listen to him. "I most confidently affirm that whosoever calls himself Universal Bishop, or desires to be so called by others, shows himself by such haughtiness to be a forerunner of Antichrist; inasmuch as he proudly advances himself above all others."*

He makes an admission "that Scripture by itself is sufficient to guide us, if interpreted rightly. The question is, What is the right interpretation?" Of course, he goes on to say that it is the sense of the holy mother, the Church; and the unanimous consent of the Fathers. No, "Gregory," the best interpretation of the book must be that of the Author; and Protestants may have that. "If any man will do His will, he shall know the doctrine whether it be of God."† "Ask, and ye shall receive; seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you."‡

He proceeds to quote, as demonstrations of his Church, a great number of passages from the Hebrew prophets. These are all declarations of the glorious condition of the Jewish and Gentile churches during the future millennial times. We have examined every text he has adduced, and find that in every instance he has quietly put his thumb over some expression (frequently in the immediate context) that would have instantly detected the mal-appropriation. He quotes a promise from Isaiah ii. 3, and passes over verses 1st and 2nd, which show that it relates to "Judah and Jerusalem," and that "it shall come to pass in the last days." He quotes from Ezekiel xxxvii. 24. Let the reader refer also to the 21st verse.

He quotes several texts from Isaiah lx., and also from preceding and following chapters, and coolly concludes that they all belong to Rome. We suppose that he was too deeply impressed with the sad necessity for Swiss Guards and Irish Contingents to inform us that these promises all relate to a time of perpetual peace (verse 18), wherein "violence shall no more be heard in the land, wasting nor destruction within her (the Church's) borders." Can he recall to mind the "monster popes" of Baronius, the bloody fires of Smithfield, the demoniac massacre of St. Bartholomew, or

"The slaughtered saints, whose bones
Lie scattered on the Alpine mountains cold,"

and glibly tell us that it is of *his* Church that it is said, "Thy people also shall be all righteous"? On the whole, it is painfully evident that, in all these extracts, "Gregory," designedly or otherwise, has wrongfully endeavoured to appropriate for his Church

* Lib. vi. Epist. 33: Cambridge, 1718. † John xvii. 17. ‡ Matt. vii. 7.

those blessed promises that, like robes of beauty, are laid up in store for both the Jewish and the Gentile Church in coming ages.

He states that "the Church of Rome has always affirmed that besides her there is no true Church; and that she alone is the depositary of the promises." Well, it was long ago predicted that she should have a "mouth speaking great things and blasphemies."* He tells us of her long line of popes. Why did he not strengthen his argument by informing us that her "long line" has sometimes even been a "threefold cord" of contemporaneous popes? He says, "She does not date her existence from any Reformation." Certainly she is ancient enough. She is perhaps as old as Mahometanism; but not quite so old as Christianity. He affirms that "she has always been a prominent object in the eyes of the world." Yes; the apostacy was to "sit on many waters;" and "multitudes and nations"† were to follow her. Christ's flock is to be but a "few," a "little flock," while this dispensation lasts.

We are next informed, that "when our Saviour came upon earth, the Jewish priesthood and altars were not to be swept away." "The altars were still to stand in the magnificent temple, and the offering was to be that which before was only offered in type." This must be one of his traditions. The Bible only tells us that, at the death of Christ, "the vail of the temple was rent in twain from the top to the bottom."‡

He treats us to a long and laboured version of the old argument upon "succession." We have only time to quote his summary:—

"If, then, a succession of teachers be proved, and it be admitted that the promises, which were to last for ever, were intended for the bishops of the nineteenth century as well as those of the first, it necessarily follows that to those bishops we must have recourse in matters of doubt on any point of faith." How calmly he takes for granted that Romish bishops must be meant. Mark how a single simple statement will answer him. Christ promised to be for ever present with His disciples, while "teaching all things whatsoever He had commanded them." But, as has been shown, Christ never "commanded" invocation of saints, or worship of the Virgin. He never "commanded" transubstantiation, or purgatory, or the mass. Rome teaches "another Gospel," and therefore has a claim only on the threatenings of Christ. "Gregory" tells us that his Church has "unity." Has she unity with Christ? Is her Gospel His Gospel? May there not be unity in error, as well as unity in truth? Satan is not divided against Satan, or his kingdom could not stand. But are there no divisions about infallibility in the Church of Rome? Have there not been endless controversies between Jesuits and Gallicans; between Dominicans and Franciscans; between popes and councils? Does not Bellarmine, alone, enumerate above 300 divisions on matters of religion among the members of the Church? He says, the Church is holy: "She is holy in her doctrines."

* Rev. xiii. 6.

† Rev. xvii.

‡ Matt. xxvii. 51.

Well, "Theophylact" has shown the reverse of that. "She is holy in her pastors and people, who are 'very strict.'" We admit their strictness; they possess that in common with the Pharisees, who "tithed mint and cummin, but neglected the weightier matters of the law." We must, however, have some little proof of her "holiness," before accepting her claims. We shall, for this end, call in two or three unexceptionable witnesses, all true sons of the Church.

Genevebrard, the historian, tells us that "for nearly 150 years above fifty popes deserted wholly the virtue of their predecessors, being apostatical rather than apostolical."

Cardinal Baronius, in his "Annals of the Church," thus writes: "What was then the face of the holy Roman Church? How very foul! when harlots, as powerful as profligate, ruled at Rome." Again: "What unworthy, vile, yea, what execrable and hateful things the apostolic seat has been compelled to suffer! How many MONSTERS, horrible to behold, were intruded into that seat which is revered by angels!"

Nicholas Clemangis, an Archdeacon of the Church of Rome, in the fifteenth century, in his book, "Of the Corrupt State of the Church," chapter iii., informs us "that she was defiled with the sink of all vices, and might be fitly called the 'Church of the Malignants.' Who preaches or declares the Gospel? Who, either by word or deed, shows the way to life eternal?" He concludes with an apostrophe to the Roman Church: "What thinkest thou of thine own prophecy—the Revelations of St. John? Dost thou not think they do, in part at least, belong to thee? Thou hast not, surely, so wholly lost all shame as to deny this? Look, therefore, unto it, and read the damnation of the Great Whore sitting on many waters, and there contemplate thy famous facts and future ruin!"

The next statement put forth by "Gregory" is, that "the Church is catholic—that is, universal." Perhaps she is; but is she more catholic than paganism? The fact of her being universal will prove nothing but that she cannot be a true Church of Christ. It is not until the "last days" that "the mountain of the Lord's house shall be exalted above the hills, and all nations shall flow unto it."*

He then declares that she is apostolical in doctrine, and traces her descent from the apostles. We admit the "descent," which has, indeed, been a dreadful one. With regard to her doctrine, a comparative view of apostolic and of Romish teaching has already been instituted by "Theophylact." Let "Gregory" study it.

On page 91 he brings forward much previously-discussed matter to prove that oral tradition is necessary to be received, as well as the written tradition of the Bible. To all this let us give one general answer. If "Gregory" knows of any oral traditions of the apostles, distinct from those traditions which they first preached, and afterwards embodied in their writings, let him produce them,—prove them to be inspired, and not temporary in nature, when we

* Isaiah ii. 2.

will accept them;—till then we must hold that the “written” traditions are sufficient.

But he reminds us that St. Paul exhorts the Thessalonians to hold fast the traditions which they had been taught, whether by word or epistle. We answer, that there is not a particle of evidence that these were different traditions. The passage is just an exhortation to hold fast the faith, in whatever way it had been received. Should “Gregory” still remain in doubt, let us refer him to the historical account of St. Paul’s transactions at Thessalonica. He will find it in Acts xvii. 2, 3. We think it decisive on the question.

He hints that Protestants “deny the existence of a tribunal appointed by the Almighty to explain His law.” We do not, but we advise him to look for it where David sought it:—“Open Thou mine eyes, and I shall behold wondrous things out of Thy law.”*

He then inquires, “Who appoints and sends the Protestant teachers?” We answer, Christ, who commissioned His disciples to go and preach the Gospel. In return, we ask, “Who has sent the priests of Rome?” When they are ordained, they receive commission from their bishop—not to preach the Gospel, but to offer in sacrifice the body and blood, bones and nerves, soul and divinity, of the Lord Jesus.

He declares that “Catholics do not believe in the personal infallibility of the Pope.” We fear that some little quibble is employed here with respect to the word “personal.” Will he assert that Catholics do not believe in the infallibility of the Pope, speaking *ex cathedra*,—that is, authoritatively, and from the “chair of Peter”? We do not affirm that all Catholics must believe it, as it is a point on which the Church is divided. In the remainder of his essay we have not been able to discover anything to which it is necessary to reply.

One word in conclusion. If, in the excitement of debate, we have used any expression personally offensive to either of our opponents, we now heartily retract and apologize for it. The contest is for great and vital principles, and ought not to be waged with unworthy weapons.

MONTGOMERY.

Philosophy.

ARE THE PRINCIPLES OF THE DEVELOPMENT THEORY TRUE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

WE assume a sufficient elementary acquaintance with geology on the part of the reader to render unnecessary any exposition or defence of that science. The *facts* of geology, apart from any

* Psalm cix. 18.

theory, are so palpable, unmistakeable, and incontrovertible, that those who would deny or dispute them *must be* so unimpressible by reasoning that an attempt to convince them of the truth of *theory* would be but wasted effort. For such, then, we do not write, but address ourselves to those who have honesty enough to forsake old and long-cherished opinions when no longer tenable, candour enough to admit their own as well as others' liability to error, and intelligence enough to see that many of the ridiculed speculations of the past have become the unquestioned facts of the present, and that the theories of the present may yield corresponding results in the future. To these we shall endeavour to show that the preponderance of evidence and probability tends to indicate, and, as far as proof is possible, to prove, that the principles of the Development Theory are true.

Our argument is this :—

I. That it is more honourable to the Creator, and more in accordance with the intelligence of rational beings, to give the preference to natural than to supernatural means in the explanation of natural phenomena.

II. That the Development Theory supplies an explanation by natural means of the natural phenomenon of the creation of species.

III. That hence the Development Theory is more honourable to the Creator, and more in accordance with the intelligence of rational beings, than other theories of creation, and its principles are consequently entitled to be considered as true.

We proceed to discuss separately the above premises :—

I. *It is more honourable to the Creator, and more in accordance with the intelligence of rational beings, to give the preference to natural than to supernatural means in the explanation of natural phenomena.*

The Creator is most honoured by that which attributes to Him the greatest power, wisdom, and benevolence. Now, the prevalent supposition that the operations of nature take place and continue by successive active interventions on the part of the Creator, implies the existence of inferior power to that which would be requisite to endow matter at its creation with an inherent capacity of assuming the various phases of its development. That the power so to endow matter is possessed by the Creator, must be admitted by those who would honour Him most; and that its exercise cannot be deemed superfluous is evident from the necessity, if not thus employed at the first, that it should be eventually retailed (if the expression be allowed) in the production of each successive item of nature. It is equally in accordance with the greatest amount of wisdom and benevolence on the part of the Creator, to assume that He has not formed a universe which requires unceasing attention and renovation by Himself,—but rather a universe which, by a grandly simple exercise of omnipotence, He has made subject to inherent and self-acting laws, which work with ceaseless, unerring, and immutable accuracy, all His purposes and designs alike guiding the onward

sweep of stellar systems, and balancing the wings of a fluttering butterfly—appointing the tracks of fiery comets, and pencilling the petals of a primrose. That the execution of nature's operations are thus left solely to natural law does not imply any isolation from nature of nature's God, any more than does the spontaneous activity of our bodily structure indicate its independence of the vital spirit. As in the body each organ performs its function without specific volition by the soul, so in the universe each atom acts its part without special direction by the presiding Spirit.

"All are but part of one stupendous whole,
Whose body Nature is, and God the soul."

We honour the Creator more by giving the preference to natural means, *i. e.*, laws given to matter at its creation, than to supernatural means, *i. e.*, modification and impulse communicated from without to matter, in the explanation of natural phenomena. The reasons which account for this preference being more honourable to the Creator, likewise explain its accordance with the intelligence of intellectual beings; for, from the consistency and relationship pervading creation, it must inevitably result that the theory which most displays the power, wisdom, and benevolence of the Creator shall most favourably affect the mind of the reasoning creature.

II. The Development Theory supplies an explanation by natural means of the natural phenomenon of the creation of species.

Geology reveals the fact that for myriad ages prior to man's birth, the earth has been tenanted by countless forms of vegetable and animal life, all of which have become first existent and then extinct at certain regular recurrent periods, well defined by a marked change in the physical character of the earth's surface. Now these inorganic changes are admitted on all hands to be the natural results of physical causes, generally assumed to be volcanic action. During the intervals of this action such parts of the world as were exposed to the sea's influence became disintegrated, and finally deposited as strata.

All this was unquestionably accomplished by physical laws (natural means), and not by direct interposition of the Creator (supernatural means); in proof of which, the same action is really taking place at this time all over the world. Now, the Development Theory seeks to explain in the same way the changes of organic forms which occurred simultaneously with those of stratification. The forms of life existent at any given time have always been those adapted to the then physical conditions of the earth; and at the occurrence of an epoch of upheaval and redistribution of the configuration of the surface, these conditions have become changed, and consequently unfitted to the continuation of life in the same forms; and hence the necessity for either a re-creation by special act of the Divine Being (which would be supernatural), or a modification of organic structure produced by the new conditions (which would be natural), rendering the continuance of life, under

the form of fresh species, possible. The point to which we wish to direct especial attention is the fact, that the application of external physical conditions is capable of effecting structural modification in animals and plants. Our experience on these points is necessarily confined to the application of those conditions by man, the great physical catastrophes of the past having been pre-Adamic. The inference from analogy, however, leads to the conclusion, that, as artificial means used by man are capable of producing varieties, often more distinct than acknowledged species, it is reasonable to ascribe to the influence of those great conditional changes of temperature, climate, soil, food, &c., such changes in organic form as have simultaneously occurred. In the different breeds of horses and dogs we have marked instances of what artificial change of condition is capable of producing. The difference between the fleet, beautiful racer, and the plodding, heavy cart-horse, is surely as distinct as that which serves to define some species of animals. Yet these and every other variety of horse have been developed by human agency from one typical kind. And man, in opposition to nature, having effected thus much, what may not nature herself do when it becomes a necessity of the continuance of life that it should assume fresh forms, and seeing that the very change of circumstances which involve the necessity, may, by a beautifully-instituted law, become subservient to the development of the new forms of organization? "As man can produce, and certainly has produced, a great result by his methodical or unconscious means of selection, what may not nature effect? Man can act only on external and visible characters; nature cares nothing for appearances, except in so far as they may be useful to any being. She can act on every internal organ, on every shade of constitutional difference, on the whole machinery of life. Man selects only for his own good; nature only for that of the being which she sends. Every selected character is fully exercised by her; and the being is placed under well-suited conditions of life. Man keeps the natives of many climes in the same country; he seldom exercises each selected character in some peculiar and fitting manner; he feeds a long and a short-beaked pigeon on the same food; he does not exercise a long-backed or long-legged quadruped in any peculiar manner; he exposes sheep with long and short wool to the same climate. He does not allow the most vigorous males to struggle for the females. He does not rigidly destroy all inferior animals, but protects, during each varying season, as far as lies in his power, all his productions. He often begins his selection by some half-monstrous form, or at least by some modifications prominent enough to catch his eye, or to be plainly useful to him. Under nature, the slightest difference of structure or constitution may well turn the nicely-balanced scale in the struggle for life, and so be preserved. How fleeting are the wishes and efforts of man! How short his time!—and consequently, how poor will his products be compared with those accumulated by nature during whole geological periods! Can we

wonder, then, that nature's productions should be far truer in character than man's productions; that they should be infinitely better adapted by the most complex conditions of life, and should plainly bear the stamp of far higher workmanship."*

The opponents of the Development Theory may say, "We admit that man is capable of changing the characters of certain animals, for we see the results of his agency around us, but where is there any evidence that nature has done any analogous work? We are surrounded by multitudinous species, but where are the intermediate transitionary varieties?" To this we unhesitatingly reply, that each individual species may reasonably be considered as the evidence they seek, and that the development of one species from another may have been the work of one generation, and hence the absence of intermediate varieties, none having existed. And that this complete transition in the lifetime of one individual is not a stretch of lively imagination, we refer to a very similar fact, patent to all physiologists, that in the case of many animals, during growth from infancy to maturity, the organism develops, through successive stages, each the characteristic of some distinct species. And this is a result of the very principle we are endeavouring to demonstrate—the plastic power of condition. Thus, during the fetal period of an animal's life, its organism is totally different from its future structure; such, for example, as a system of circulation of the blood with the agency of the lungs, these organs being unnecessary till the commencement of extra-uterine life, when they become incorporated in the system of circulation by means of one of the conditions of such life, namely, existence in an atmosphere. So that, in this one point, for instance—and others might be adduced—the fetal state of certain of the more highly organized animals is identical in structure with the mature state of ones not only distinct as species, but widely separated in generic character, and in regard to classification of very inferior grade. Structural changes, greater than would be that of one species to another, the intermediate gradations of development of which are asked for as evidence of our theory, are thus seen to be the actual contingency of certain organic-forms, as a consequence of their exposure to the modifying influence of changing conditions during the periods of gestation and subsequent growth till the attainment of maturity.

As before stated, the great inorganic catastrophes which have from time to time changed the conditions upon which organic forms depend, have all been pre-Adamic, so that a change of species is an event of pre-historic occurrence; and hence, no actual evidence of observation can be adduced in proof of the Development Theory. Nor, at present, have the facts of geology been sufficiently accumulated to warrant any positive generalizations on the subject. But, reasoning from analogy, the preponderance of evidence decidedly favours the preference the theory gives to a natural rather than

* Darwin's "Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection," p. 83.

a supernatural explanation of the origin of species. We subjoin the mature conviction of a writer who has made this question his especial study for twenty years, and whose opinions are of weight, and worthy of consideration:—"I believe that animals have descended from at most only four or five progenitors, and plants from an equal or lesser number. . . . Analogy would lead me one step further, namely, to the belief that all animals and plants have descended from some one prototype. But analogy may be a deceitful guide. Nevertheless, all living things have much in common; in their chemical composition, their germinal vesicles, their cellular structure, and their laws of growth and reproduction. We see this even in so trifling a circumstance as that the same poison often similarly affects plants and animals; or, that the poison secreted by the gall-fly produces monstrous growths on the wild rose or oak-tree. Therefore, I should infer from analogy that probably all the organic beings which have ever lived on this earth have descended from some one primordial form, into which life was first breathed by the Creator."*

III. *That the Development Theory is more honourable to the Creator, and more in accordance with the intelligence of rational beings, than other theories of the creation of species, and that its principles are consequently entitled to be considered as true,* follows as a logical corollary from the premises already laid down. We have endeavoured to show that He who created matter, and endowed it with the law of gravitation, by virtue of which it assumes the spherical form of worlds; circles with swift flight through space in harmonious systems; or, in other phases, for ever ebbs and flows, as the ceaselessly moving ocean; leaps wildly down, as the impetuous cataract; glides slowly but inevitably onward, as the treacherous glacier; rushes down with appalling crash, as the blinding avalanche; descends as the heaven-sent fertilizing shower; trickles as a tear down the pale, wasted cheek of some broken-hearted one; or, may be, falls as a tear of joy from the eye of one whose heart's hope is realized:—that He who endowed matter with mechanical law, by virtue of which thousands of miles of hard rocks have been disintegrated by the waves, and deposited in layer upon layer, with such gentle action, that the most delicate organisms are preserved unbroken and entire therein, forming new rocks miles in thickness; whole mountain ridges are borne up from the ocean's bed, in some cases during the lapse of but a few hours, in others, slowly, but ceaselessly, for ages; continents and seas change place; the crust of our planet is rent and shivered in all directions:—that He who endowed matter with chemical law, by virtue of which the component gases of the atmosphere so combine as to become a suiting medium for the existence of life; the various elements unite so as to form the multitudinous objects whose diversity of purpose, nature, form, and hue, benefit and adorn this earth; the different

* Darwin's "Origin of Species," p. 484.

minerals crystallize with such wondrous regularity, harmony, and beauty; each organic product assimilates its respective nourishment:—that He who endowed matter with these among other laws, by virtue of which all these phenomena are inevitable :atural consequences of its existence, could have, and probably has, endowed it with a law by virtue of which organic development would naturally occur, and that with more honour to Himself than by specially creating by supernatural means each successive species. We have endeavoured to show, as well, that the existence of such an inherent law of matter is supported by the knowledge of nature we at present possess. And the conclusion, we think, of the unbiased reader will be, that the principles of the Development Theory are true.

E. M., JUN.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

"And God said, Let the earth bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed, and the fruit-tree yielding fruit after his kind, whose seed is in itself, upon the earth: and it was so."

"And God said, Let the earth bring forth the living creature after his kind, cattle, and creeping thing, and beast of the earth after his kind: and it was so."—*Gen. i. 11, 24.*

As a preliminary consideration, it is of great importance that the subject of the present debate should be understood as a theory, not a fact.

The propounders of the Development Theory do not presume to assert with certainty, nor even to claim any considerable degree of probability,—they only suggest the possibility of their theory, and, if true, of suggesting (to them at least) a satisfactory mode by which many of the mysteries of the natural world may be accounted for. Such being the modesty of their pretensions, associated as it is with erudition, talent, and an ardent love of God's great and wonderful world of nature, it would ill become us, on the present occasion, to treat them or their works with disrespect; our object is the attainment of truth, both for ourselves and for the readers of the *British Controversialist*. In the pursuit of this object we hope to be guided by reason, directed by wisdom, and assisted by both friends and opponents, in the exchange of friendly counsels and mutual instruction. Under such circumstances, truth is most likely to be attained, and to be most enduringly serviceable to all, on whichever side we may set out upon the inquiry before us. Knowledge and truth, not victory over an opponent, will also tend to remove the asperities of conflict, and result in lasting friendships.

Primâ facie evidence goes to show that all history, and the greater portion of all our experiences, knowledge, and observation, prove the theory of development a fallacy. Nearly all the familiar facts of every-day life, with the education received from the past history of nature, so evidently contradict the theory, that hitherto all our notions upon the subject are fixed in diametric opposition to

it. This being the case, the *onus probandi* necessarily rests with the advocates of the theory. It is for them to show, not only that the theory is possible, but that it is probable; nay, further, they must show that it is the only correct and true law of nature's operations; that she works by this one law, and no other. This is a fair and legitimate demand, and must be realized in the efforts of our opponents, or the thesis they have assumed will be unproved, and may be consigned to the region of visionary speculations, until abler hands again exhume it, and with more success.

The task assigned to us we feel is only affected by one drawback, that is—it is the advocacy of old notions in opposition to new ones. We would not, however, be understood as conservative in anything but the truth; and in this respect the most unflinching seeker after a knowledge of the mysteries of nature is, in our opinion, the truest conservative of truth; his only danger is, lest he should mistake appearances for realities, shams for facts, possibilities for incontestable verities.

It is necessary we should succinctly state the peculiar features of the Development Theory before proceeding further, which we will do with impartiality. The author of the "Vestiges of Creation," who, if not the originator of the theory, has at least the merit of having reduced the theory to a well-defined system, says, on bringing forward the principle of progressive development,—“The proposition determined on, after much consideration, is that the several series of animated beings, from the simplest and oldest up to the highest and most recent, are, under the providence of God, the results, *first*, of an inherent impulse in the forms of life to advance, in definite times, by generation, through different grades of organization, terminating in the highest dicotyledons and vertebrates,—these grades being few in number, and generally marked by intervals of organic character, which we find to be a practical difficulty in ascertaining affinities. *Secondly*, of another inherent impulse connected with the vital forces, tending, in the course of generations, to modify organic structures in accordance with external circumstances, as food, the nature of the habitat, and the meteoric agencies—these being the ‘adaptations’ of the natural theologian. We may contemplate these phenomena as ordained to take place in every situation, and at every time, where and when the requisite materials and conditions are presented—in other orbs, as well as in this—in any geographical area of this globe which may at any time arise—observing only the variations due to difference of materials and conditions. The nucleated vesicle is contemplated as the fundamental form of all organization—the meeting-point between the inorganic and the organic—the end of the mineral and the beginning of the vegetable and animal kingdoms, which thence start in different directions, but in a general parallelism and analogy. This nucleated vesicle is itself a type of nature and independent being, as well as the starting-point of the foetal progress of every higher individual in creation, both animal and vegetable.

"We have seen that it is a form of being which there is some reason to believe electric agency will produce, though not, perhaps, usher into full life, in albumen—one of those component materials of animal bodies in whose combinations it is believed there is no chemical peculiarity forbidding their being any day realized in the laboratory.

"Remembering these things, it seems, after all, an obvious idea that a *chemico-electric operation, by which germinal vesicles were produced*, was the first phenomenon in organic creation, and that the second was *an advance of these through a succession of higher grades and a variety of modifications*, in accordance with laws of the same absolute nature as those by which the Almighty rules the physical department of nature." *

A subsequent author has, by what he terms the "Principle of Natural Selection," shown the origin of species, or, in other words, that species were not originally independent acts of creation, but that, by a peculiar process of development, that variation in plant or animal which gives it any force not possessed by others of the same species, qualifies it to become the original of a new species, capable of superseding the parent species; thus new species have their origin and line, while old species may become extinct. It will be perceived that the latter theory is an offshoot from the former, yet, in some respects, essentially different. We shall treat them separately, and devote our attention for the present to the development theory, as shown in the extract we have made from the "Vestiges of Creation."

To put the question more clearly before the reader, we will categorize the leading ideas of this extract. First. Certain collocations of inorganic matter may, by peculiarity of external conditions and influences, become organic—endowed with life. Second. The lowest condition of vegetable life may rise to the highest and most perfect plant, under favourable circumstances. Third. The humblest polypus and mollusc may, under favourable conditions, progress onwards to the perfect mammal—may, in fact, become a human being. It is said that these changes may not, in their whole extent, take effect during the long period of the historical era, but they may have been realized in the many millions of generations preceding—in the geological eras. While we might, for all practical purposes in the cause of truth, reply that this very admission places the Development Theory beyond the pale of reason, we shall not take advantage thereof, but proceed to investigate the real value of the principles of the theory, as indicated above.

All elementary bodies have certain independent peculiarities, known by the student of natural philosophy; they have also other peculiarities which have especial relation to other bodies. These peculiarities are called their properties and qualities. *Vis inertiae* is a property possessed by all inorganic matter; nor can objection

* "Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation," pp. 130, 131.

be made to the universality of this property of matter by the processes of chemistry producing changes in organic bodies, because such changes are the result of extraneous influences, not of any inward impulse; on the contrary, organic matter, taken in each individual whole, is superior to this law of inertia; there is in all organic matter a peculiar preparedness to act under circumstances favourable to its nature; this action is from within, not from without. Herein we have an essential difference between the constitution of inorganic and organic matter, of general application.

The inquiry now presenting itself to our mind is, By what means is this difference to be removed, or the chasm it makes between the mineral world and vegetable and animal life to be traversed? An attempt is made to show that the germinal vesicle of organic life is capable of production from albumen by electricity; but has life ever been produced by such means? No, only a something similar to the nucleated vesicle,—similar, we say, but not the same, for the nucleated vesicle may be ushered into full life, while the chemico-electro vesicle is a “perhaps-not” capability of progress to full life. It is not too much to expect, if it were a law of nature, instituted in the beginning by the great Creator, that all the higher classes of beings are merely progressive developments from inorganic matter, we should at least be able to see some plainly marked instance crossing the abyss marking the distinctive separation of the inorganic and organic world, within the limits of the historical era.

The creative *fiat* was once issued, and each kind had assigned to it its personal limits; its peculiarities as a whole belonged to it alone, were not interchangeable, nor susceptible of extinction or change into other specific or contrary characteristics: Gen. i. 11, 24.

Admitting, for the purposes of our argument, that the first grade in the Development Theory is a fact, and that the germinal cell is capable of production from inorganic matter by artificial mechanical or chemical forces, we still shall find insuperable difficulties in the theory, even after inanimate matter has received life, according to the supposition now granted, because every germinal cell is presented by nature to us with certain definite peculiarities, or essential properties, by which its progressive development to mature age, and afterwards to decay and death, are fixed, with but slight deviation from the true course of its being. It can be no valid objection to this fact to say that the exact composition and properties of the germinal cell are unknown; neither is there any validity in the objection that the determining forces of its specific progress through life are unknown. It is enough for our purpose to know, that a germinal cell produces *its specific form* of vegetable or animal life, and *no other form*. In no case have philosophers observed any single broadly marked deviation from this specific progress of being in the vegetable and animal kingdom; and surely, in the long period of the historical era, and that still longer and larger page of history, extending throughout the myriad-aged geologic cycle, some

case might reasonably be expected to have found a record in the annals of science.

The fungi have never been observed to develop into the stately oak; the tiny mollusc has never been known to advance to the dignified condition and gigantic proportions of "the great whale;" the crawling worm, or the nimble gnat, have never attained to the beauty of form and fleetness of the sagacious horse, or the noble eagle. Still less has any one of the millions of animated beings which have ever lived upon this earth given us one trace of having progressed from the lower grades to that highest grade in this sublunary sphere—God's chief handiwork, the human soul divine, —man.

It is well for us constantly to bear in mind that if the Holy Scriptures are not formal treatises on science, they convey to us scientific truth; and if, in any case, we cannot perceive their exact harmony with our supposed knowledge acquired from other sources, we must search for a solution of the difficulty, not by a denial of the truth of Scripture, but by a careful and painstaking examination of all the sources of knowledge in question, precisely noting all the points of divergence from Scripture, and rightly estimating the value of our deductions from apparent facts; and while inquiring after truth, prayerfully seeking the guidance and love of the all-wise and mighty God, who created all things after their specific kinds and ordained to them their course through life.

For the present we conclude, wishing that this debate may be productive of much interesting inquiry into the beauties and mysteries of nature, feeling assured that the more intimate our knowledge of God's works may be, the more shall we endeavour to become humble in mind and holy in heart. L'OUVERIER.

Social Economy.

IS COUNSEL JUSTIFIED IN DEFENDING FROM PUNISHMENT A CRIMINAL OF WHOSE GUILT HE HAS BEEN PROFESSIONALLY MADE COGNIZANT?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

"Though justice be thy plea, consider this—
That, in the course of justice, none of us
Should see salvation: we do pray for mercy;
And that same prayer doth teach us all to render
The deeds of mercy."—*Shakspeare*.

It is usual for an advocate, when beginning his address to the court in a case upon which public feeling has run high, to desire the jury to dismiss from their minds all recollections of the

opinions and rumours current *extra curiam*; that they confine their attention exclusively to the evidence brought before them during the trial; and that on it alone they found a verdict which shall acquit or condemn. And on the present occasion we deem it necessary to follow a similar course; for the strong prejudices which an indiscriminating satire and too austere morality have connected with our subject must be uprooted from the minds of our readers—the jury we address—ere we may hope to make a favourable impression, or they to be benefitted by our humble endeavour.

If any one considers the demand now made either too great or unreasonable, we would advise him to skip this paper; but as we believe the judiciousness of our counsel will be perceived and acted upon, we feel encouraged to proceed, and enter upon our task sanguine of success.

The order and welfare, and indeed the very existence of civil society, depend upon one condition—security; which naturally divides itself into protection against foreign invasion, and safety from domestic violence. The preservation of the former is the province of the Admiralty and War offices, forms the principal duty of the public services, naval and military, and is the all-important object for which volunteers have started up in every corner of our land, instant as the clansmen at the shrill whistle of Roderick Dhu, but not, we trust, like them, so quickly to disappear; the latter, the object of public justice, is maintained by an extensive and complex machinery of law and police. But while the manifold advantages attending a rule of conduct, founded on justice, and authoritatively enforced as law, must be apparent, there are certain risks associated with the same no less manifest; and hence, in the enacting and administering of law, two important ends require to be kept in view: that it may prove a net in the toils of which the innocent shall not suffer, nor from its meshes the guilty escape. And these two features in the laws and legal administration of a country are pretty good indices to the condition of the country itself. During turbulent times, and under despotic governments, the terrors of law play no unimportant part; short trials and long ropes are then in especial favour, and impeachment forms but the prelude to condemnation. When, however, a state is free and tranquil, the opposite practice obtains; judicial proceedings are deliberate and impartial; law appears in true majesty; perfect assurance is felt in its power to reach the offending; the only anxiety being lest this power should be misdirected. This is what might be expected in Britain; and to this feeling may be ascribed the privilege enjoyed here by criminals in having the aid of counsel; and which is sometimes even provided by the court. Honourable, however, as this custom is, it will be found on examination to be no more than simple justice to the accused. The charge against him has been prepared by skilful hands, an experienced advocate elicits from the witnesses all the necessary evidence, and no more; joins the various facts link by link till they appear a perfect chain; and so collects the suspicious cir-

cumstances, that from their very grouping they assume a darker hue. What could any simple man, so circumstanced, hope to effect unaided? Some would find themselves quite unable to give utterance to their thoughts; while to all who could command their speech it would be difficult, although conscious of innocence, to rebut the criminating evidence, and almost impossible to expose any flaw in the reasoning or law brought to bear against them. Indeed, any attempt in the latter direction would most certainly fail: the smatterer in legal lore who endeavours to avail himself of his sciolism, invariably flounders. Nor need this excite surprise; for the legal profession, beyond perhaps any other, requires of those who wish to attain proficiency in it, severe study, and unremitting, undivided application. "Lady Common Law," says the maxim, "lies alone."

"Well," the reader may exclaim, "I am quite willing to allow the assistance of an advocate in ordinary doubtful cases, and to admit that a public benefit is conferred when he secures the acquittal of an innocent person; but do you really mean to say that it can serve any good purpose, for him, when quite aware of his client's guilt, to endeavour to

' ——— make the worse appear
The better reason, to perplex and dash
Maturest councils ——— ' ? "

Ah! dear rhetorical reader, let it not make you start when you learn that we do say so. If it is indeed possible "to make the worse appear the better reason" in the case you have mentioned, it is only because of some serious defect in the evidence, or imperfection in the law; mere specious sophistry need not be tried before the bench, as the judge in summing up would tear such to shreds and scatter it to the winds. And should a guilty prisoner be condemned when the evidence is either incomplete or conflicting, public safety would be imperilled, and a precedent established, which might prove the destruction of the innocent at some future time. At the mere consideration of such an occurrence popular feeling recoils; and, in proof, we need merely allude to the recent case of Dr. Smethurst. We do not know that this man had any sympathizers; but certainly some persons considered his condemnation as an outrage upon even-handed justice, on account of the unsatisfactory state of the medical evidence; and would have regarded his execution, had it taken place, as the inauguration of a new feature in our jurisprudence, fraught with danger to the community. Besides, the evidence of a prisoner's guilt being conclusive, it is no less necessary that the law which he is believed to have violated be distinct, precise, and perfectly applicable to his case. From what has been already said, it will be apparent that the accused cannot, in all probability, determine regarding this matter. Yet the importance of such an inquiry being made on his behalf cannot be too highly estimated; for not his interest only, but the interest of every one

imperatively demands that the law be observed to the very letter. To be tried *by the laws* of his country is the birthright of every Briton; is a source of our characteristic independence; and the palladium of our civil liberty. It is the right of the meanest criminal, guilty though he be, and all are concerned that this right he should enjoy. To strain a law, ever so slightly, that it by this means might reach a guilty individual, otherwise likely to escape, would be to render the whole body of law uncertain, and endanger the safety of the community. A door would then be opened for the entrance of all sorts of irregularities, of which no man could anticipate the extent nor foresee the termination. The prevention of such a contingency is a common duty, and the question arises, How can this duty be most effectually discharged? Few could spare time to acquire a knowledge of law sufficient to advocate their own cause if accused; fewer still, who have time, would enter upon a study so dry, and apparently uninteresting, merely to provide against so unlikely an event. And yet these events are often occurring. Not a week elapses but some one is accused upon suspicions almost groundless. Now it is a bank official on a charge of embezzlement, who is afterwards dismissed "without the slightest imputation on his character." Anon it is a child accused of murder most foul; on such frivolous ground, that her counsel is justified in demanding her immediate discharge. But the danger referred to is no cause of annoyance. Every one of our toiling, moiling millions regards it with perfect unconcern, or, rather, never bestows a thought upon it. And why? Because a practical solution has been given to our former question, in permitting the assistance of counsel to every person accused. For as an advocate in discharging his duty towards his client thoroughly examines in every particular the charge preferred against him, and restrains any excess of zeal on the part of those entrusted with the prosecution, a simple yet most effectual protection of the common weal is by this means provided. Here it may be objected to the theory propounded by us that many persons, though guilty of the crimes imputed to them, are, nevertheless, through the efforts of counsel, discharged from the bar; and that thus great encouragement is offered to the commission of crime. To this we reply, that it is to be regretted that the law or proof required to convict a guilty person should happen to be defective; but that, in such circumstances, so far from his dismissal being in itself an evil, it is quite otherwise; and that we ought to congratulate ourselves that so wisely tempered a judicial system prevails, and remember it to be better that ten guilty men escape than an innocent one suffer. The alleged effect we consider fallacious; for if in one case dismissal occurs through defective proof, it is too much to suppose that a like defect will appear in the next case; and if it be on account of a legal flaw, this can be remedied, and the loophole stopped up. It may also be urged by our opponents that the judge who presides at the trial will watch over the interest of the accused, and dispense the law in all its

integrity. We again reply, that to make the judge watch over the interests of either party is simply degrading him from his high office; and, while we admire the ability and impartiality of the bench, we think that, without counsel, the opportunity enjoyed by the judge of guarding the interest of the accused is rather limited: the prosecutor has previously studied and arranged the case; the judge's knowledge is only acquired as the trial proceeds: the prosecutor would of course only bring forward such witnesses as substantiated his statements, which, therefore, under the circumstances, could only be regarded as of an *ex parte* character.

We have thus, at the risk of being tedious, shown it to be for the public well-being that all prisoners should enjoy the aid of counsel; and so strong do we consider the position taken, that on it alone we will rest the justification of an advocate who knowingly defends a guilty person. Believing that what is socially right cannot be morally wrong, we might refrain from further consideration of the subject: but lest any of our *British Controversialist* moralists should think proper to oppose us, it may be well to glance at the moral aspect of the question. And first we should like to know, if an advocate's conduct in defending a guilty client be unjustifiable; when did he cross the delicate line between right and wrong? Does his transgression date from the commencement of his connection with the case. We scarcely expect to find any maintaining this. When requested to conduct a case, an advocate can hardly form such an opinion of the individual's guilt or innocence as (on this ground) would justify him in accepting or declining the duty. The case may, in his opinion, be bad, and yet not be so in reality; appearances are often deceitful, and the innocent have frequently suffered. Virgil, in his description of the nether world, does not omit the spirits of the

“———*faleo damnati crimine mortis;*”

and we do not require to refer to the records of the “*Causes Célèbres*” for instances of judicial errors and sad proofs of human fallibility; some such are doubtless known to all our readers. If, then, our opponents, instead of finding fault with counsel for *undertaking* the defence of a guilty person, assert that his conduct is to be impugned only when he continues his connection with his client after becoming aware of his guilt, we would offer several objections to this opinion. In the first place, he has no plea to excuse this desertion of his post, or justify this violation of the sacred trust reposed in him. It cannot be urged that he undertook the office on the ground of his client's innocence; and that, such not being the case, his engagement is at an end. No such guarantee is given or required; nor does such tacit understanding exist.

Again, the defence of his client does not imply his belief in that client's innocence, any more than the appearance of the counsel for the prosecution indicates his belief in the prisoner's guilt, while both the precepts of morality and the law of the land require him to observe the truth; neither wittingly putting forward a false state-

ment, nor using any deceit. There is therefore nothing in his duty that ought to offend the most fastidious moralist. Supposing, however, that the advocate determines to cut the connection, what is the obvious result? Why, that his client goes to other counsel, from whom he carefully conceals as much as he can; and the chances are, that the ends of justice will be defeated by the latter advancing bold and skilful hypotheses, which he would not have done had he been better acquainted with the merits of the case. Then his course would have been simply defensive,—parrying, and not thrusting.

We have thus endeavoured to vindicate the principle which custom has sanctioned; and in conclusion submit, that as it tends to the security of society, is no breach of morality, and rather advances than retards the course of justice, an advocate is justified in defending a criminal of whose guilt he is cognizant.

NONA.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

"Lying lips are abomination to the Lord: but they that deal truly are His delight."—*Prov.* xii. 22.

"Stand therefore, having your loins girt about with truth, and having on the breastplate of righteousness."—*Ephes.* vi. 14.

God is truth, and the more truthful we become in words and actions, the more do we become like Him, and the more faithfully are we obeying the Divine precept of Jesus,—“Be ye perfect, even as your Father in heaven is perfect.” Truthfulness is in the Gospel of Christ made the first and paramount duty of every Christian man, and its contrary in every respect is shown to be thoroughly opposed to the Divine will. The case of Ananias and Sapphira are impressive illustrations of this, as is also that of Gehazi under the Mosaic economy. Thus, not only in works of charity is lying condemned by the Spirit of inspiration, but in the ordinary duties of life incidental to our domestic relations. Even in those cases where an apparent good might appear probable of realization, we are not left without unmistakeable directions what course we ought to pursue; for the apostle Paul has spoken in his most vehement strain,—“Shall we do evil that good may come? God forbid!”

It is, then, of paramount importance we should understand what is intended by the term “truth” at the outset of this debate: a clearness and explicitness of definition will tend to facilitate our arrival at a just judgment.

Truth is the exact representation to others, by word or deed, of any fact or idea which might be the subject of communication. In the most general sense, truth, as thus defined, is not affected by the intentions of the person speaking or acting, for truth, being objective, cannot receive its character from any subjectivity of the individual through whom it is transmitted; a lie by good intention on the part of the speaker is not made truth, and *vice versa*; besides, that which is untrue may be communicated as truth through ignorance or vice of the individual, in which case the moral character of

the person acting is determined, while the objective truth or falsehood itself is unaffected thereby. The whole course of sacred history has given evidence to the great importance of truth, and imposed it as a duty upon every man. Profane history has also contributed many illustrations, both in ancient and modern times, which are doubtless familiar to every reader. The duty of truthfulness is recognized by every nation, whether civilized or barbarian, equally so within the Arctic circle and at the torrid zone; and if, under the deep darkness of a refined system of idolatry, lying is made a trade, and is constantly inflicted upon the Feringhees by the devoted Hindoo, the exception only proves the rule,—truthfulness is a universal duty of man.

The utility of this moral duty is evident if we contemplate its influence upon society. In our domestic relations it plays a conspicuous part. Suppose the father could not believe the son, the mother had no confidence in the word of her daughter, brothers in their intercourse with sisters found only deceit and lying, what would become of the family circle? how long would the endearments of the family hearth enchant us? In commerce, truth is the chief element of a nation's success; and in proportion to the degree of truthfulness possessed by any class of traders, other things being equal, success is always in favour of truth. In fact, it cannot be otherwise; a person once deceived does not buy again from the deceiver. So universal is the instinct planted in the nature of man, that, once deceived, he always fears and avoids the deceiver. The politician is relied upon and becomes popular, truly popular, only so far as he makes his sincerity or truthfulness palpable to his fellow-citizens. The physician is esteemed according to the sincerity or truthfulness of his efforts to heal his patient, which is the profession he makes. This leads us to consider whether, from the nature of his profession or any peculiarities of his position, the professional counsel is relieved of this universal obligation to speak and act truly.

We are of opinion that counsel is not justified in speaking or acting a lie to save his client from punishment when guilty, and we proceed to show our reasons for this belief. We have shown that it is the duty of all men, as men, to speak and act truly; therefore his humanity does not relieve the counsel from this obligation, and if he is relieved, he must derive the privilege of exemption from his office. The duty of counsel is evidently to prevent a wrong, having the sanction of a court of justice, being inflicted upon plaintiff or defendant, accuser or accused; but we have now to do with his relation to the accused only. The function of counsel, as now in question, is to protect the accused, when innocent, from all punishment; and when guilty, from undue punishment. In the latter case, we submit that he steps beyond his province as counsel, and becomes an accomplice after the fact, if, being cognizant of the accuser's guilt, he makes effort to prove him innocent; especially is the moral turpitude of counsel manifest when it is considered that he, being

conscious of his client's guilt, represents and tries to prove to a court of justice that he is innocent.

In accordance with these views of the question at issue are the doctrines laid down by that great man, Jeremy Bentham, for he speaks of it as "among the expedients that have been contrived for selling impunity to such criminals as have wherewithal to purchase it." And he thus illustrates this way of defending a known criminal: "A man has committed a theft; another man, who, without a licence, knowing what he has done, has assisted him in making his escape, is punished as an accomplice. But the law (that is, the judges, by whom in this behalf the law has been made) have contrived to grant to their connections, acting in the character of advocates, a licence for this purpose. *What the non-advocate is hanged for, the advocate is paid for, and admired.*"—Vol. vi. §50.

But it is not the function of counsel to defend the guilty from due punishment for his guilt. Every citizen in a rightly constituted commonwealth is in duty bound to assist in the free exercise of the laws; and, as a corollary to this duty, he is also under obligation to prevent every criminal escaping that punishment the law inflicts upon him for his crime. Not only is the law of England explicit upon this subject, but common sense and the dictates of morality confirm its propriety. The position of counsel cannot alter his responsibility as a citizen in this respect, because the general duty owing to society is paramount to that existing between himself and his client. It is a maxim of morals and law that the general law, or public duty, is more powerful and of stronger obligation than the private duty; especially is this maxim applicable when the private duty is owing to him who has broken the law, and respects that breach of the law only.

Above and beyond all arguments of a purely political or civil nature, we have to look at the moral and religious aspect of this question. What is there in the profession of an advocate to invest him with power to set aside the great command of God, "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour"? What right has he to defy the prohibition of the Almighty,—the puny worm to rise up in defiance of Omnipotence? The attempt at justification is surely the most ridiculous for its absurdity, yet most blasphemous for its impiety, that the mind of man can well conceive.

For the present we conclude, with the hope soon again to resume our argument, feeling assured we shall ever have an approving auditory in the readers of our magazine while advocating truthfulness under every circumstance, at all times, and upon all subjects.

Magna est veritas, et prevalebit.

L'OUVER.

The Essayist.

SHAKESPEARE FACTS, FANCIES, FORGERIES, AND FABRICATIONS.

III.—EARLY MANHOOD.

"Bright metals on a sullen errand
Will show more goodly, and attract more eyes
Than that which hath no foil to set it off."—*Henry IV.*

"LET me not to the marriage of true minds *admit* impediment," are the words with which Shakespeare commences his 116th Sonnet, and they appear to have embodied the thought uppermost in his mind, not long after he had companioned in intimate associateship with "sweete Anne" Hathaway, whom he early began to address as "My all-the-world." As he walked with her in the hours of "black Vesper's pageants," how keenly and kindly would he express himself on the enduringness of *his* affection:—

"Love is not love
That alters when it alteration finds.

Oh, no!—*it* is an ever-fixed mark,
That looks on tempests, and is never shaken:
It is the star of every *wandering* bark.

Love's not time's fool;
Love alters not with *his* brief hours and weeks,
But bears it out, even to the edge of doom."

And while he so speaks, do not

"A thousand blushing apparitions start
Into *her* face,"

and tell us a secret that she dare not utter?

Whatever engaged the youthhood of Shakespeare after leaving school—law, trade, or pedagogism—it is pretty clear that he must have made a good use of his eyes in noticing the tints in the sky, the flowered earth, the love-inspiring beauty of the river-threaded meadows, and the changeful variances of the seasons. Nor is it at all improbable that he sauntered, in slouched hat, into the taverns along the road, and lounged about travelled highways, or sped over the downs with dog at heel, and at night took a shot at a deer. These were the common amusements of his day. But we can never think of him as an idler, nor can we imagine him viciously bent on a breach of the law. With Anne Hathaway to occupy his thoughts and time—with her influence to keep him right—we cannot picture him as a wildling and a worldling, nor believe him to have been a

culprit, exposed to penalty and ignominy. *Before* his marriage, that would be unlikely; *after* it, still more improbable. The germ of the deer-stealing myth is palpable, but that it *grew* is just as plain. Aubrey (1680), the earliest *writer* of his life, says nothing about it. Rowe (1707) first relates it, with some circumstantiality. The Rev. Richard Davies, Rector of Sapperton, and Archdeacon of Lichfield (1701), is more particular in his narrative still, though he makes mistakes regarding known facts, which he might easily have avoided, and therefore shows his incompetency as a reporter. Capel (1768) brings an increase to the tradition; and in 1778, a confirmation of Capel's news comes from Oldys. Rowe says the ante-Lucy *ballad* was "lost." Capel and Oldys *recover* one verse of it, and Malone gets and prints the *entire* poem, but believes "*that the whole is a forgery.*" In this opinion most critics now coincide.

We believe Shakespere took his sport like a *man*, not like a vagabond; and we are the more inclined to think this, because we know that a true attachment is the best safeguard to a young man's character.

Our next earliest definite notice of Shakespere refers to 1582, and is Shakespere's marriage-bond. It was found by Sir Thomas Philips in the Worcester registry, in 1836. It bears date 28th November, 1582, and in it Fulk Sandells and John Richardson, farmers, of Stratford, become bound in £40, "that William Shagspere, one thone partie, and Anne Hathwey, of Stratford, in the dioces of Worcester, maiden, may lawfully solemnize marriage together," "with once asking of the bannes."

This document, besides the signatures of the bondsmen, bears the seal of R. H. (Richard Hathaway?) so that it seems *probable* that responsible friends on both sides had agreed to the match. We may believe, as was the custom of his age, that some time before he "was affianced to her by oath, and the nuptial appointed; between which time of the contract and limit of the solemnity,"

"Before the perfect ceremony of Love's rite,"

they had deported themselves, as the registers of Stratford in his time will prove to have been often the case, as married persons, esteeming the troth-plight and betrothal as equivalent to *moral* though destitute of *legal* sanction; for though we know not where the marriage ceremony was performed, we learn in the Stratford register that,—

"1583, May 26th, Susanna, daughter to William Shakspere," was baptized as a child begotten in wedlock. Shakespere was then little above nineteen, and his wife a little over twenty-six.

It is only reasonable to *presume* that, prior to friends consenting to this union, and the occurrence of the marriage, Shakespere had some independent means of support. What these were, we have no means of now ascertaining; but we know (or at least *infer*), that he was resident in Stratford parish in

1585, for in that year, "February 2, Hamnet and Judith, sonne and daughter to William Shakespere," were baptized. Before he has attained his majority, he has a family about him, and it needed no impulse from any Justice Shallow, no poaching notoriety or danger, to prompt a first-class mind like his to act in a kind and manly spirit, and "being inclined naturally to poetry and acting," as Aubrey says, to take his way to London, where, probably, his townsmen, if not his relatives, were at that time successfully getting on, and so become "an actor at one of the playhouses," and show that he could, as well as "did, act exceedingly well." Aubrey tells us, too, that he began *early* to make essays at dramatic poetry, which at that time was very low, and his plays took well. In the desire to drive hunger from the home of his children, we find a *motive*; and in his conscious possession of superior power, we perceive an *occasioning cause* for his removal from the "circumscription and confine" of Stratford to the city on "the banks of the Thames." When a given sufficient, efficient cause is given, there is no principle of logic which necessitates the search for a greater or more unusual one. We need not invent miracles to account for every-day occurrences.

Did Shakespere go alone to London? and did he there forget a father's love, a husband's duty? If the sonnets be in aught autobiographical, I would suggest that those numbered 50, 39, 36, 27—29, 44—49, 61, and 97, should be read as here arranged, as a reply. So read, we fancy that they will help to unthread the maze into which commentators have got themselves when they write as follows, viz.:—

"Another section of Shakespere's history is composed by that romantic chain of adventure which is supposed to be hidden beneath the obscure allusions of the Sonnets. There was, we are told, a friend and patron of the poet, a youth of high birth and personal accomplishments; there was also a dark-haired lady, whom the poet loved, but over whose relations towards him there is thrown a veil of mystery, allowing us to see little except the feeling of the parties—that their love was guilt. The female, introduced to the youthful friend, transferred her passion to him. The poet, at first shaken to his inmost soul, recognized at length, in the double treachery, a judicial visitation, punishing his own offence. He cast off the faithless woman for ever, but received the repenting friend again to his heart. That something not very unlike this did really happen, we firmly believe. The supposition that the most specific of the sonnets were written by Shakespere for a friend or friends, is too absurd to be listened to for a moment."*

Beautiful tissue-paper romance, vanish! Is there truth in man, and that man Shakespere? Then read, *seriatim*, that splendid justificatory series of sonnets, 109—121, beginning,—

"Oh, never say that *I was false of heart*," &c.,

and if there be self-reference in them at all, the calumny shall wither faster and more surely than the gourd of Jonah.

* *Edinburgh Review*, July, 1840, p. 466.

1586. On January 19th, 1586, the return to a *Distringas*—a writ to seize upon goods, &c., for debt; or to secure a person's appearance on a certain day, is—John Shakespeare has nothing in which he is able to be distrained; a *capias*—a writ of personal seizure, was then issued; again in February; again in March. He was afterwards deprived of his alderman's gown, the reason being, he "doth not come to the halles, nor hath he of long time." What these writs were about we do not know; perhaps to force compearance in the halls, perhaps to call in the fines due for non-attendance.

1587. Was he arrested in 1587? In that year he produced a writ of *habeas corpus*, i. e., a writ for the release or bailing of a person who considers himself illegally imprisoned.

These several law transactions may imply that he was then a man of falling or fallen fortunes, though they can also bear the interpretation that he was then living beyond the jurisdiction and power of the courts of Stratford. Were these legal actions indeed against this John Shakespeare? there was another, a shoemaker; resident in Stratford then.

1587. "The Queen's players" (Burbadge's company—incorporated as the Queen's, 1583—with whom Shakespeare is supposed to have thus early formed a connection) made their first appearance in Stratford, and are more highly rewarded than any previous company,—e. g., Oxford's, Warwick's, Essex', in 1584.

1589. A document, said to have been found among the Ellesmere papers, used to be quoted, though doubtfully, regarding this date, to show that at this period Shakespeare was a sharer in the Blackfriars Theatre—twelfth out of sixteen—but *this* has recently been branded as a fabrication; and though the matter is, in itself, probable enough, we forbear the insertion of it—as it may readily be found elsewhere—to save space.

1590. The "Anatomie of Absurditie," by Thomas Nash, "a man," as Isaack Walton says, of a sharp wit and the master of a scoffing satirical merry pen, author of "Summer's Last Will and Testament," &c., published in 1590, speaks of "new found songs and sonnets, which every red nose fiddler hath at his fingers' end;" of men who "make poetry an occupation; lying is their living; and fables are their moveables;" and who "think knowledge a burden, tapping it before they have half tunde it, venting it before they have filled it, in whom the saying of the orator is verified—*Ante ad dicendum quam ad cognoscendum veniunt*. They come to speak before they come to know. They contemn arts as unprofitable, contenting themselves with a little country grammar knowledge." As all the dramatists of this period (except Thomas Greene, Shakespeare's fellow-townsmen, a playwright and actor—unless it may have been Drayton, a Warwickshire man, or Kyd?) had received a university education, it is quite evident that Nash was here gnashing his teeth in spite at the achievements of a "country grammar" school scholar then rising into fame, whose sonnets were known, and who was beginning to obtain the name and repute of an English

poet; yet not them so successful as to restrain the affected contempt and real jealousy of "the alchemists of eloquence," of whom Shakespeare was then one—and one, too, who could "outbrave" even him, in "the swelling bombast of bragging blank verse." Nash was an intimate of Robert Greene, Lodge, Marlow, Peale, Maunday, and Chettle, who felt their reputation waning before this brighter light. It is held, therefore, with great probability, that the above is a notice of Shakespeare.

In 1590, the first three books of the "*Fairie Queen*" were published, and Edmund Spenser was appointed poet-laureate by Queen Elizabeth. Its popularity induced Ponsonbie, the bookseller, to collect a number of small poems, which, under the title of "*Complaints*," &c., he entered at Stationers' Hall in 1590, and published in the following year, viz., 1591. Of these poems, the second is entitled, "*The Tears of the Muses*." In it "the golden brood of great Apollo's wit" rehearse their "piteous plaints and sorrowful sad time," and in her turn *Thalia* (the muse of comedy) takes up the tale of dole, in a poem which has almost unanimously been regarded as referring to William Shakespeare,* and to the occupation of the comic stage by the Marprelate Controversy, 1589-90, to such an extent of personality as to have driven almost all other themes off the stage. These arguments have been induced against this interpretation,† viz., "firstly, that Shakespeare had not at the time attained a rank such as would justify the encomiums [the lines contain]; secondly, because there is no probability of his having subsided into the condition of inertness described; and, thirdly, because there are grounds for supposing the verses in question were composed before he even began to write." To these objections the following replies might be made:—1st. Though the lines might not apply to they might have been suggested by Shakespeare. 2nd. The first argument assumes the very matter in dispute. Its correctness will be considered under date 1598. 3rd. There is a probability shown by the advocates of this inference which he has not disproven; and, moreover, a probability is not absolutely required; for the general idea of the poem must govern the treatment of the particulars brought under it, and this demand for probability would necessarily imply a proof of a general decay in all branches of learning during the reign of Elizabeth, because all the muses have cause to mourn as well as *Thalia*—and that we think could scarcely be maintained. 4th. No other dramatist can be mentioned, of whom the lines are characteristic. Sir Philip Sidney (whom Todd suggests and Dyer advocates) was not a comic dramatist; and Lily, the euphuist, "a little fellow" Nash calls him, but adds, "he hath one of the best wits in England," was still less so. Malone's conjecture is

* See this matter argued at full length in Charles Knight's "*Shakespeare: a Biography*," book iii. chap. iv.; and Chambers' "*Knight's Shakespeare*," vol. xii., "*History of Opinion*," chap. i.; Halliwell's "*Life of Shakespeare*," pp. 139—142.

† Stanton's "*Shakespeare's Life*," p. 27.

quite untenable. 5th. The reasons for supposing a distant authorship are not stronger than those which tend to show that the poem was written during Spenser's visit to London in 1590. 6th. If the logic of exclusion is valid at all, every competitor must be set aside when Shakespeare's name is given. The gist of the verses may be gained from the following excerpts :—

"Where be the sweet delights of Learning's treasure,
That wont with comic sock to beautify
The painted theatres?
Oh, all is gone! and all that goodly glee
Which wont to be the glory of gay wits,
Is laid abed.
All places they with folly have possess,
And with vain toys the vulgar entertain.
But we have banished with all the rest,
That whilome wont to wait upon my train,
Fine counterfeisance and unhurtful sport,
Delight and laughter decked in seemly sort.
All these; and all that else the comic stage,
With seasoned wit and goodly pleasaunce graced,
By which man's life in his likeest image
Was limned forth, are wholly now defaced.
And those sweet wits, which wont the like to frame,
Are now despised and made a laughing frame.
And *he*—the man whom Nature's self had made
To mock herself, and Truth to imitate,
With kindly counter (contour?) under mimic shade,
Our pleasant *Willy*, ah! is *dead of late*,
With whom all joy and jolly merriment
Is also deaded and in dolour drent.
Instead thereof scoffing scurrility,
And scornful folly with contempt is crept,
Rolling in rhymes of shameless ribaldry;
Without regard or due decorum kept.
* * * * *
But that same *gentle* spirit from whose pen
Large streams of honey and sweet nectar flow,
Scorning the boldness of such base-born men,
Which dare their follies forth so rashly throw,
Doth rather choose to *sit in idle cell*,
That so himself to mockery to sell."

If this was not Shakespeare, who was it?

1591. Shakespeare's father, notwithstanding his apparent difficulties, seems not to have been quite done up; for his possession, and *perhaps* his occupancy of a house in Henly Street is proven by a deed of date 14th August, 1591. It is the conveyance of a tenement in that street, "between the house of Robert Johnson on the one part, and the house of John Shakespeare on the other, from Geo. Badger to John Couch." Unless, which is highly improbable, this was John Shakespeare the shoemaker.

The "Diary of Philip Henslowe," printed for the Shakespeare

ociety, consisting of 269 octavo pages of a copy from a bulky, parchment-bound, ill-spelled note-book about plays, dramatists, loans given to poor playwrights, the proceeds from performances, and the pay given to theatrical authors, extends from 1591 to 1609; and contains entries regarding a multitude of actors and playwrights; but it contains not one word regarding the greatest and best of them all, even in these years of his hard, lowly struggle,

“When in disgrace with fortune and men’s eyes.”

This is, at least, a sort of negative proof that he held aloof from borrowing and the convenience of getting money in advance; as well as of his seemly conduct, which did not, it appears, drive him into such rash necessities as would have made the help of the pledge-taker of playwrights a blessing and a boon. Ben Jonson and Rowley, Heywood and Cheetle, Field, Daborne, and Massinger, Marlowe, Dekkar, Maunday, Haughton, Lodge, Greene, Nash, &c., are there, but not Shakespere.

1592. “Henry VI., Part I.,” is alluded to by Thomas Nash in his poem of “Pierce Penniless, his Supplication to the Devil,” published in 1592. Robert Greene, an early dramatist of wonderful fluency and industry, though of low moral character, died on September 3rd, 1592. His executor, Henry Chettle (author of “Patient Grissell,” &c.), published, immediately after his death, Greene’s “Groatsworth of Wit bought with a Million of Repentance.” In this work, a rival playwright of his day is stigmatised as “an *upstart* crow, beautified in our feathers, that with his *tiger’s heart wrapped in a player’s hide*,* supposes he is as well able to bombast out a blank verse as the best of you, and being an *absolute Johannes Factotum*, is, in his own conceit, the only *Shakes-speare* in a country.” In this passage we have evidence that in 1592 Shakespere, the “*upstart*,” was *up*; and of so much consequence too as to excite the scurrilous ire of a disappointed rival. The abuse of opponents is the earliest sign of fame. Moreover, we see that his talents were not confined to one mode of endeavour,—he was “an absolute Johannes Factotum,”—his *sonnets* were getting abroad, as Nash, 1590, confesses; he was an actor and a dramatist, besides being a prudent man. Some have supposed he was a money-lender!

Greene had incurred the wrath of Doctor Gabriel Harvey, the college companion and friend of Edmund Spenser; and a few days after the death of the *quondam* parson and whilome dramatist, “Four Letters and certain Sonnets,” from the pen of Harvey, appeared, in which the character of Greene is very severely handled. In the third of these letters the following passages of moment and of intimate bearing on our subject occur, viz., “I speak to a poet. . . . Good sweet orator, be a divine poet indeed; and use heavenly eloquence indeed; and employ thy golden talent with

* A parody of “Oh, tiger’s heart wrapped in a woman’s hide,” in the Third Part of “Henry VI.” act i. sc. iv.

amounting usance indeed; and with heroical cantoes honour right virtue indeed; as noble Sir Philip Sidney and gentle Maister Spenser have done with immortal fame: and I will bestow more compliments upon thee than ever any bestowed upon them; or this tongue ever afforded; or any Aretiniah mountain of huge exaggerations can ever bring forth. . . . The right novice of pregnant and aspiring conceit will not outskip any precious gem of invention, or any beautiful flower of elocution, that may richly adorn or gallantly bedeck the trim garland of *his budding style*. I speak generally to every springing wit, but more specially to a few; and at this instant singularly to *one* whom I salute with a hundred blessings, and entreat with as many prayers to love them that love all good wits, and hate none but the devil and his incarnate imps, notoriously professed." As Harvey commends for imitation Spenser, Sidney, Stanihurst, Fraunce, Watson, Daniel, and Nash, it could be none of these; and as the characters of Marlowe and Peele cast them out, who among the poets of that age, whose style was in its bud in 1592, could this be but that one whose "Venus and Adonis," a poem in the verse and rhythm of Spenser's manner, must at this very time have been in the press? The friend of Spenser, like Spenser himself, seems to have gauged Shakespere thoroughly. Though they have not expressly and directly named him, the implication *appears to us* to be irresistible.

But more follows: Chettle, in 1592, published his "Kind Hart's Dream," five "invectives against reigning abuses," and from the preface to this pamphlet we find that his editorial labours had put him in a false position, out of which he endeavours to extricate himself thus:—"About three months since died Mr. Robert Greene, leaving many papers in sundry booksellers' hands, among others his 'Groatsworth of Wit,' in which a letter written to divers playwrights is offensively by one or two of them taken; and because on the dead they cannot be avenged, they wilfully forge in their conceits a living author; and after tossing it to and fro, no remedy but it must needs light on me. . . . With neither of them that take offence *was* I acquainted, and with one of them (Marlowe?) I care not if I never be. The other (Shakespere?) whom at that time I did not so much spare as since I wish I had. . . . That I did not I am as sorry as if the original fault had been my fault; because myself *have seen* his demeanour no less civil than he excellent in *the quality* he professes. Besides, divers of worship have reported his *uprightness of dealing*, which argues his honesty; and his *facetious* grace in writing, that approves his wit. . . . I protest it was *all* Greene's, and not mine, nor Master Nash's, as some have unjustly affirmed."

The links now fit pretty closely: Greene's attack, Harvey's advice, and Chettle's apology show that he (or if not, who?) *was*, about 1590—1593, known as a comic dramatist, and might, therefore, be praised as such by Spenser then, as he was subsequently in 1595.

1593. "Venus and Adonis" was entered by the publisher,

Richard Field, "at the sign of the White Greyhound in St. Paul's Churchyard," in the books of the Stationers' Company as "licensed by the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Wardens," 18th April, 1593, and the first edition was printed in the same year. In the Epistle Dedicatory, to the Right Hon. Henry Wriothesley, Earl of Southampton and Baron of Lichfield, Shakespere speaks of this poem as "unpolished lines," calls it "the first heir of my invention," and promises "to take advantage of *all idle hours* till I have honoured you with some graver labour." It has been a matter of dispute whether this was really a *first* work, or a *first published* work; and therefore whether it had been composed early in life, or but a short time before its publication. It is *probable* that it was an early work, written in the heyday of his blood, which—while the theatres were closed on account of the plague, in the autumn of 1592—he touched off (at Stratford?) It is, however, *equally probable* that he did not look upon his dramas as works of literature, but as articles of trade, and that he did not reckon them "heirs of his invention" in the peculiar sense the words here seem to bear. Or he may really at that time have produced no play so thoroughly and irrefragably *original* as to justify him speaking of any of them as an "heir of my invention." This would, to a certain extent, be a confession of Green's accuracy, or would at least be a confirmation of the implication it contains; at the same time, it would show that poetry was not the main and chief object of his efforts—the mainstay of his being.

"Titus Andronicus" was entered at Stationers' Hall for publication in 1593.

1594. A second edition of "Venus and Adonis" was entered at Stationers' Hall in this year by the same printer. On May 9th, 1594, Mr. Harrison, senior, placed upon the Stationers' register "A Booke intituled the Ravysheiment of Lucrece." This poem was also printed by Richard Field, and was sold by him at "the White Greyhound." Drayton's "Matilda," 1594, contains an allusion to it, and in some verses affixed to *Willobie his Avis*, mention is made of how "Shakespeare paints poore Lucrece rape."

"The First Part of the Contention betwixt the two Famous Houses of York and Lanaaster" (now the Second Part of "Henry VI.") was published in 1594; as was also "The Taming of a Shrew" (either a first draft by Shakespere, or an old play by Kyd, Greene, Marlowe, Haughton, or some other early dramatist, on which to fix the critics are divided), if not an early outline, then the source of the chief plot of "The Taming of the Shrew."

"The Comedy of Errors," says Hallam, in his 'Literature of Europe,' vol. ii. p. 177, *may be presumed*, by an allusion it contains, to have been written before the submission of Paris to Henry IV., in 1594, which nearly put an end to the Civil War; and in a note he indicates Act III. Scene 2, and adds, "Some have judged the play from this passage to be written as early as 1591, but on precarious grounds."

A "Historie" called "Titus Andronicus," presumed to be the play afterwards published as Shakespere's, was entered for publication at Stationers' Hall in 1593; and critics have assented to the probability of its having been published in 1594, although the earliest edition of which any copy is now known is dated 1600. In 1614, Ben Jonson, in the "Induction to his Bartholomew Fair," says: "He that will swear 'Jeronimo' or 'Andronicus' are the best plays yet shall pass unexcepted at here, as a man whose judgment shows it is constant, and hath stood still these twenty-five or thirty years." "Jeronimo" was first produced in 1588, i. e., twenty-six years before Jonson's notice of it; and if we allow of a like exaggeration of time for "Andronicus," it will bring us very nearly to 1594, so that we may regard this date as approximately correct. If, as many critics think, "Titus Andronicus" is not a play of Shakespere's, the above calculations, &c., are of little or no importance to us.* The Globe Theatre was built in 1594.

1595. "The True Tragedy of Richard Duke of York" (now the Third Part of "Henry VI.") was published in 1595. In a note to a work entitled "Polimanteia," 1595, it is said, "All praise the 'Lucrece' of sweet Shakespere;" and it is believed by most critics now that in Spenser's "Colin Clout's come again," 1595, Shakespere is alluded to in the following lines, viz.:—

"And there, though last not least, is Action:
A gentler shepherd may nowhere be found;
Whose muse, full of high thought's invention,
Doth like himself heroically sound."

The lines have been applied to Michael Drayton (and to Warner!), but evidently in error. The characteristics are Shakespere's *alone*.

"The Return from Parnassus"—a play first *publicly* acted by the students in St. John's College, Cambridge, which contains remarks on contemporary authors—is adjudged by critics to have been produced *about* 1595. Spenser, Constable, Lodge, Daniel Watson, Drayton, Davis, Marston, Marlowe, Shakespere, and Churchyard, are the authors specially noticed. Of Shakespere, the following is said:—

"Who loves Adonis' love or Lucrece rape,
His sweeter verse contains heart-robbling life;
Could but a graver subject him content,
Without love's lazy foolish languishment."

While in a prose dialogue between the actors, Burbage and Kempe, Kempe says, "Why, here's our *fellow* Shakespere puts them all lown—aye, and Ben Jonson, too. O! that Ben Jonson is a pestilent fellow, he brought up Horace, giving the poets a pill; but our fellow Shakespere hath given him a purge that made him betray his credit;" and Burbage replies, "He is a *shrewd* fellow,

* See the question argued in Knight's "Studies of Shakespere," book ii. chap. 1; Hallam's "Literature of Europe," vol. ii. p. 176; &c.

indeed." If, however, as we think, the allusion here made is to "The Poetaster," the assigned date will be too early—or this is an addition; or "The Poetaster" is older than it is usually supposed; or this being the work of a university pen, its author was not read up to the time in the theatrical literature of his age. Yet, if the poetical, like the prose opinion, is to be dated 1600, we cannot account for the writer's seeming ignorance of Shakespeare's published dramatic works!

1596. It has been customary, since 1831, in reliance on Mr. J. Payne Collier's "History of English Dramatic Poetry," then published, to quote, in reference to this date, a reply of the players of the *Globe* and the *Blackfriars*, to a representation from certain inhabitants of the precincts of the Blackfriars, against the repair and enlargement of that theatre, and the continuance of performances therein, in which Shakespeare's name holds the fourth place; but on the 30th of January of the present year, several eminent palæographers, Francis Palgrave, Frederick Madden, &c., have delivered, at the request of the Master of the Rolls, an opinion on the matter, and they have declared "that the document in question is spurious."

Malone inferred, from a paper that had belonged to Alleyn the player, that Shakespeare lived in Southwark, near the Bear Garden, in 1596, but the paper has not been found. One, said to be it, in which Shakespeare's name appears, has been declared to be "an evident modern forgery."

One melancholy entry gives this year a sad importance in our Shakespeare chronicle. Death first, in that year, invaded the poet's own household, and bereft him of his eldest and only son. The burial entry in the Stratford register reads thus:—"1596, August 11th, Hamnet, filius William Shakespeare." We cannot be far wrong in assuming that Shakespeare was in Stratford at the funeral, and that he, with a heavy-hearted sorrow, laid the youthful head of his son in the cold grave.

"How many a holy and obsequious tear
Hath dear, religious love stolen from his eye,
As interest of the dead!"

In the same year, a third edition of "Venus and Adonis," and a second of the "Rape of Lucrece," were published; and John Shakespeare, in all probability, "at the instance of his son," says Dyce, applied to the Herald's College for a grant of arms.

1597. Dethick, the Garter King of Arms, granted the application for arms, and they were accordingly blazoned (according to a pattern by Clarence Cooke in 1576?)

"Romeo and Juliet," "as it hath been often (with great applause) played publicly," &c., was printed by J. Danter, 1597.

"King Richard the Second," "as it hath been publicly acted," &c., and "King Richard the Third," "as it hath been lately acted," &c., were printed separately by V. Sims for Andrew Wise, in

1597. "The First Part of Henry IV." was also entered at Stationers' Hall.

"In one month from the day of St. Michael, in the 44th year of the reign of Elizabeth," &c., *i. e.*, on 29th August, 1597, by "a plea of covenant," between "William Shakespere, gentleman," and "Hercules Underhill, gentleman," the former became possessed of "one messuage, two barns, two gardens, and two orchards, with appurtenances, in Stratford-upon-Avon," and for this he gave "to the aforesaid Hercules sixty pounds sterling." The house on this property had been built by Sir Hugh Clopton, in the reign of Henry VII., and was called *the great house*, but Shakespere, a *novus homo*, called it New Place. He used it a short time afterwards as his residence.

In this same year, John Shakespere and his wife filed a bill in Chancery—the most expensive court in the country—against John Lambert, son of the Edmund Lambert to whom, nineteen years before, they had mortgaged the estate of Asbies, for the recovery of that estate, unjustly, as they averred, withheld from them, although the money in release had, according to agreement, as they say, been duly tendered. It is *believed* that this was done at the instance and by the help of their son William Shakespere.

The Reviewer.

The Denominational Reason Why. London: Houlston and Wright.

THE object of this work is to give a brief statement of the origin, history, and tenets of the various Christian sects, with the reasons for their forms of belief and modes of worship. In accomplishing his difficult and delicate task, the Editor has judiciously carried out the distinguishing principle of our own magazine—*viz.*, that of allowing the representatives of every sect to make their own statements, leaving the reader to draw his own conclusions. The work has evidently been compiled with great care, and from the number of authorities quoted it must be the result of great research. It is worthy of a place in the libraries of all truth-seekers and truth-defenders.

Historical and Descriptive Geography of Palestine. By JOSEPH A. MEEN. Sunday School Union. London.

THIS work is specially designed for use in day and Sunday schools, and is the production of one who has had much experience in the instruction of the young? It is written in an interesting style, and abounds with Scripture facts and references. The numerous pictorial illustrations are, for the most part, good, but we cannot say so much for the map of Palestine, which certainly should give place to a better when a second edition of the work is required.

Industrial Labour; where and how to get it. By ISAAC GREGORY, F.R.G.S. Manchester: David Kelly.

THIS pamphlet is published to make known to the working classes of this country the fact that in Manchester and other parts of Lancashire the demand for labour greatly exceeds the supply, while the reverse is the case in the south and west of England. The writer says:—

“In the north there is constant employment, with large wages; in the south, almost no employment for the young, from thirteen to sixteen or seventeen years of age; and wages which are a caricature upon history. There are thousands of young women under twenty years of age, in Lancashire, getting from 8s. to 18s. a week for light, easy work, while the only working head of a large family in Essex, Dorsetshire, Cambridgeshire, Kent, and other counties in England, is getting about 9s. or 10s. for many more hours of labour, and with wear and tear of body at a maximum. We are grievously short of hands, even at the above wages, and throughout this whole manufacturing district we have a daily increasing dearth of labour.”

The writer makes various suggestions for facilitating communication between willing labourers and anxious employers, which are worthy of the attention of both classes.

John Bright and his Calumniators. London: Gratton. Manchester: Heywood. Price 6d.

WE notice this pamphlet, not for the purpose of endorsing or condemning its political sentiments, but because it is the production of one of our own contributors, who, in this instance, writes under the *nom de plume* of “Caleb Crofton.” The object of the pamphlet is “the refutation of certain aspersions made upon the character of Mr. Bright, in regard to his connection with Manchester; and in confirmation of his views in reference to the peerage.”

Gabriel de Mirabeau. By HENRY KEEBLE. London: Horsell and Candwell. Price 6d.

The Life of Thomas Chatterton, the Poet. By JAMES R. BENNETT. London: F. Pitman. Price 6d.

WE have here two biographical sketches; the first being originally prepared for—though, for space-reasons, not published in—our pages, and the second delivered as a lecture to a society in which we feel interested. They are both evidently the result of considerable reading and research, and well calculated to interest and inform.

The New Quarterly Magazine, and Literary Chronicle. Nos. I. and II. London: J. F. Hope.

THE literary progeny of the *British Controversialist* are becoming numerous; and now we have to announce the advent of a Magazine in which the family features are very strongly developed in a “poetic” and a “societies’” section, &c., &c. We of course feel a paternal interest in this new candidate for public support, and trust it will merit and obtain a more than ordinary amount of success.

is given to Live. By ROBERT KERR, Kilmarnock.
London: Houlston and Wright.

THESE "firstlings from the pen of a working man," come to us from one of our earliest contributors—a working man, who is an honour to his class. He has suffered sorrow, borne difficulty, and encountered disappointment bravely. His hours of leisure have been long and often given to the service of men of toil; and after the irksome labour for daily bread was over with him, he has willingly lent his aid towards the improvement of his fellow-workers. He has cultivated his own mind well, read much, studied much. In Kilmarnock he is valued and esteemed. A physical infirmity has—unjustly, we think—acted as a barrier to his gaining a position of influence he sought, but with unconquerable will and endeavour he is about to "try again." This time he wants help and sympathy, and he has appealed to the public in this book—a collection of lectures, essays, and poems.

The book, though wanting in some of the graces of good writing, is a welcome addition to the literature of labour. It is kindly toned, large viewed, honest, full of ripe, excellent thoughts, touched here and there by the light of an imagination, bold, vivid, vigorous, and poetic. "The Poetry of Life" has seldom been better expressed than here, nor has "Self-Culture" often been more genially illustrated. "The Philosophy of Life" receives consideration such as we wish many of our working men were able and willing to give it. "The Bookworm" may gain a little pleasure, profit, and delight from the paper dedicated to him. The few poems with which the volume closes are chastely, feelingly, and musically composed; though we by no means think them the best part of this commendable book. The following extract, from "Self-Culture Illustrated," we place before our readers, because it possesses a double interest. It will serve as a specimen of the style and quality of the book, and it will inform our readers regarding another early and valued contributor, whose brief but useful life entitles him to some more lasting memorial than has yet been given it. The initials R. L. G. appear in some of our early volumes; and we think it a duty to show how impressively that writer's life has affected those who enjoyed his personal friendship.

"Permit me now to introduce you to one whose name not twenty persons present ever heard pronounced. Let us then suppose it is the 11th of August, 1856. We leave the port of Ayr, as the sun is dipping behind the peaks of Arran, and gazing an adieu to us as we launch out into a boisterous sea, bound for Liverpool in the ill-fated *Earl of Carrick*. After a fearful night of storm, spent amid all the horrors of sea-sickness in the steerage, into which the waves that sweep the decks come pouring ever and anon among the prostrate passengers; and a day which promises little improvement on the night, but latterly assumes a milder temper, and then throws sunshine o'er its face, we reach our desired haven. We are glad once more to secure comfortable quarters on *terra firma*, in the great maritime town. Next morning finds us a little after six o'clock on our way to Manchester, the metropolis of cotton, discussing part of our sea stores as 'the huge steam-horse

with his iron sinews' hurries us along. An hour-and-a-half spent in Manchester, and then we are off for Oldham, the workshop of the cotton city, some five miles distant. Having arrived, we make our way to a rising ground in the outskirts of this smoky, scattered, and uncouthly town, yet containing some 60,000 of a population; and at length reach a neat row of houses with garden plots before the doors, and lying at right angles almost with the Blue Coat School of Oldham. We have been seen approaching, and a blithe, bonny Scotch girl, the sister of the friend we seek, bids us welcome. We can see a subdued sorrow on her countenance, notwithstanding the smile of friendliness our visit has occasioned. By and by we are conducted into a neat bedroom upstairs. Stretched on his bed, there lies a young man, pale and emaciated, with a winning face, sparkling eye, and massive brow; a face in which you cannot fail to read the presence of a high order of intelligence, and to regard as the index of a soul full of generous feelings and lofty aspirations. Around him are quite a number of books and papers. In his long bony fingers is a pencil; and, as he lies on his back, he is engaged in writing, with a book for his desk, the leading article for the next number of the *Oldham Chronicle*. He sits up in gladness as we enter; extends his friendly hand, and gives us such a hearty shake and kindly welcome as we scarce could expect from one so far gone in consumption. He begins to talk with fervour and eloquence, on themes in which our mutual interest is centred. You cannot keep him from talking, for there is a great spirit in him that disease cannot subdue. But the excitement is too much for him, and vomiting of blood ensues. We are sadly pained that our interview should have such an effect on one whom we esteem so much, and to see whom we have travelled so far. After such a scene, we have little anticipation that our beloved friend will so far rally as to be able in three weeks time to pay us a visit, and stay a night with us in Kilmarnock, and will continue to run his brave race with death till July of the following year. But so it happened. And who is he? you ask. It is Robert Lewis Gerrie, the founder of the Neophyte Writers' Society, now grown into the British Literary Society, in connection with which I first formed his acquaintance in 1852. Never do I hear the name of Robert Nicoll uttered without having my breast stirred with love to him, or without having Robert Lewis Gerrie brought vividly before my mind; for their nobility of character was one, and their life-struggle and its results were sadly similar. Gerrie was born in Aberdeen, in January, 1831. At the age of thirteen, he went to be a compositor in the *Herald* Office there, where he served seven years. During his apprenticeship he attended evening classes, studying modern languages and other branches of mental improvement. At fifteen he wrote verses, but the bent of his mind was decidedly literary; and before he was nineteen he was a prize essay writer, and contributor to several magazines. He loved nature, and adored books; and in the haunts which he loved, says a friend, where every spiky pine-tree was a familiar friend, and every summer violet a thing to be caressed, it was not unusual to find him asleep with the moonlight upon his face. Such traits distinguish the mind exalted with the germs of greatness. And so he courageously struggled on in the culture of his own mind, and in extending a brotherly helping hand to other youths whose aspirations ran up the same golden track as his own. So did he live and labour, till he rose to be editor and proprietor of the *Oldham Chronicle* before he was twenty-four years of age. And what brought him to the condition in which I have first introduced him to your notice? It was partly the villanies and immoralities of trade. He purchased the copyright and furnishings of the paper beyond their real value. The circulation was less than 300, and many of the advertisements, on the faith of whose *bona fide* character he had purchased the paper, were fictitious; sometimes the workmen, whom he had continued in their places, rendered themselves unable on the Friday night to bring out the paper on Saturday morning, and poor Gerrie had to run to Manchester for help, and had

to act as pressman himself, in addition to all his other arduous efforts to establish a popular paper, and make it self-supporting. The ability displayed in his leaders occasioned the baseless rumour that leading men in the neighbourhood were their authors; so jealous is the public of a young, self-made man. So successfully did he fight the battles of reform, of freedom, and the people, in his columns, that, in three years, the circulation of the *Chronicle* rose from 300 to 3,000. It was little wonder that his constitution, not over robust at best, should begin to yield under such cheerless and harassing circumstances. These were the circumstances that planted the fatal ivy at the root of that noble stem; and for two long years did the insidious creeper drain the sap, and shrivel up the opening leaves of the better life that so cheerfully nursed it. Yes, cheerfulness was there up to the very last. Manly, Christian fortitude was there too, and a gladsome hope lighting up the soul, and entering into that which is within the veil. I would like to read you some extracts from letters of his which I received in '52 and '53, which are distinguished by eloquence and true friendship, by varied intelligence and sage-like counsels, tendered in the very spirit of a warm-hearted brother—but time forbids. I only give you a few verses from his pen, which are beautiful and pathetic, and have the melancholy interest of being written shortly before his death. So tenderly did he love his mother and only sister, who left Aberdeen to reside with him, and tend him in his journey to the tomb, that he was afraid they would be witnesses of his last conflict with the last enemy of men; and so, in touching tones, he expresses an anxious desire 'To die alone :—

“‘TO DIE ALONE.

- “‘No silence is there when the heart doth beat,
But warning sounds of many muffled feet,
Of inside watchers, servants not of ours,
Telling out the lingering mortal's hours.
Companions close are they on long black nights,
Our rest to share, or clamber fever's heights,
When rest is gone, as it has gone from me,
Nor other rest is wished but to be free,
Without a human ear to hear my moan,
To stretch my limbs, and thus to die alone.
- “‘O many are the nights that seem like years,
Countless in watchings, hopes, and stormy fears,
Endless in phantoms, bottomless in pain,
While anarchy and chaos rule the brain.
Many those nights, but with us lives the power
In lucid rests to make a heaven's hour,
With prayer of heart and highest thought of good,
With soul of faith so deep in earnest mood,
As helps for laggard doubtings to atone,
And sweetens more my hope to die alone.
- “‘Then night becomes so beautiful, that rest
Is well forgotten in a change so blest;
Mayhap the night fire spurts a cheery blaze,
And some old housepiece smiles of jocund days;
Mayhap my bird, that roosts within its cage,
Trills like the dreaming songster on the stage;
Or walls and roofs have changed to starry sky,
And show the quiet moon sail stately by,
While some still stars, from rosy childhood known
And loved, invite me then to die alone.

“ The death-bed is too serious for show,
 For formal parting, or set speech to flow;
 The gush of love that prompts us then to meet,
 Good bye to bid, and one another greet,
 Sore to all hearts, is sorest to that one
 Whose time's run out and all its watchings done.
 Oh! ye whose nursing kindness can prolong
 A feeble life your friendly joys among,
 You cannot wish to hear its final groan,
 Then why should I not hope to die alone?”

“ *Oldham, February, 1857.*

BETHEEDA.

But, no: he did not die alone. From the fond embrace of his mother's arms, on the 16th July, 1857, in the 27th year of his age, his freed spirit winged its flight to the Christian's home—inspired with the hope of yet meeting those dear ones whom he left behind. Nor had he long to wait till his beloved sister, whose health was impaired by attendance on him, followed him thither. To Robert Lewis Gerrie, and the institute of which he was the founder, I am indebted for some of the best lessons of my life; and so let me add to this tribute to his memory, these parting words: ‘Oh, man greatly beloved, go thy way till the end be; for thou shalt rest, and stand in thy lot at the end of the days.’ Farewell, brother, till we meet again!”—Pp. 95—101.

Young men, buy this book and read it carefully, you will find its contents repay you; and we hope that the knowledge of having helped a fellow-struggler towards a more useful and a diviner life may add a pleasant seeing to the eye that looks on it.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS TO WHICH ANSWERS ARE SOLICITED.

98. Was it common in the 17th century for the Litany to be sung or chanted in the service of our national church?—INDOCTUS.

99. I remember reading some time since of a book which was said to be the oldest in the world, the letters of which were neither written nor printed, but cut out of the vellum with a sharp instrument. Can any of your readers give any information respecting it?—C. A.

100. When did the custom of marrying in churches originate? An answer will oblige—THE INQUIRER.

101. I am making a collection of eloquent passages and gems of thought from sermons, speeches, essays, &c. Can any

reader of the *British Controversialist* direct me to the mines where such wealth may be found in abundance?—AUGUSTINE.

102. A few months back, the members of the Leicester Young Men's Christian Association were favoured by an illustrated lecture on an instrument called the Gyroscopa. Notwithstanding the lecturer's endeavour to be perspicuous, I could not clearly see its nature or use. I shall, therefore, be glad if you, or any of your correspondents, will explain them through the medium of the *British Controversialist*. We were informed by the lecturer that it was invented within the last two or three years, by a Frenchman. I should like to know if the fly-wheel is not an application of the same principle; also the fly-pulley

which is the shape of the wheel inside the gyroscope exhibited. This fly-pulley is used to gain speed; they are at work in this town, the shaft revolving at the rate of between 4,000 and 5,000 per minute.—J. T. B.

103. I shall be greatly obliged if any of your correspondents will explain the derivation of the word "Trollius," a name given by Linnæus to the common globe-flower. I am sometimes puzzled, not only to know the meaning of scientific terms in botany (which may, however, generally be discovered by reference to a Latin dictionary), but also the reason of their application. It seems to me a matter of regret that in most botanical works the English word is set against the Latin one without any explanation, as if the one were a translation of the other.—AN A B C BOTANIST.

104. Please be so kind as to inform me, in your next number of the *British Controversialist*, the titles and prices of a few of the best (and cheap if possible) books, where I can find the elements of the history of civilization in different ages and countries.—E. C.

105. Oblige by saying in your next number what are the simplest, shortest, and best treatises on the existence of a God and on the divinity of Christianity.—D.

106. What is the age of the "Te Deum"?—INDOCTUS.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

85. *Messada*.—P. inquires, "Who among modern travellers first discovered the ruins of a fortress, the fall of which extinguished the last hope of the Jews, and completely subjugated Judea to the Roman empire?" and the answer is:—The name of this famous fortress was *Messada*, which stood on the western shores of the Dead Sea, towards the south-western corner of the lake, on a lofty rock surrounded by deep ravines and precipices, and could only be reached by two dangerous narrow paths, one from the west, and

another from the east, which was four miles in length.

Upon this rock Jonathan, the Maccabean, built a citadel, which Herod the Great afterwards greatly strengthened by immense fortifications. The wall, which was of polished stone, was 14 feet thick and 22 feet high, flanked by 37 towers, each 87 feet high, and communicating with a line of buildings inside the wall. This celebrated fortress was besieged several times, and at last was taken by Flavius Silva. For ages after this stronghold was neglected and forgotten, but in 1838 Messrs. Robinson and Smith suggested that a certain rock they saw from the heights of Engedi, and crowned with ruined buildings, might be it; and in 1842, Mr. Walcott, an American missionary, with Mr. Tipping, an English artist, ascended the rock, and proved effectually that it was the real *Messada*. Since then (1851) M. De Sauley and a band of Frenchmen have ascended by the eastern path, and all concur in their details, corroborating to the very letter the descriptions of Josephus.—J. E. F.

93. *The History of the Gipsies*.—Has "Jesse" read Borrow's "Gipsies in Spain"? The work is entitled, "Borrow's Account of the Gipsies of Spain, with an Original Collection of their Songs and Poetry, and a Copious Dictionary of their Language," 2 vols., and may be had at the public libraries. It is a popular work, and I have heard it very well spoken of, though I cannot speak personally as to its value. Mr. Borrow has also published another work, entitled, "Lavengro; the Scholar, the Gipsy, and the Priest," in 3 vols. The well-known novelist, Mr. G. P. R. James, has also published a work, entitled "The Gipsy," in 3 vols.—J. W. J.

97. *Bookbinding*.—Lesné sung the praises of bookbinding forty years ago, and papers on the subject are to be found in almost all the cyclopedias; e. g. *Britannica*, Ure's "Knight on the Industrial Arts;" and Houlston and Wright published a small work, price 2s., on

titled, "The Bookbinder," in their "Industrial Library." Perhaps some other correspondent may be able to give more definite information.—N.

102. *Gyroscope*. — In "Recreative Science," No. L., price 6d., an article of some length, explanatory of this instrument, will be found. It may yet be usefully employed to prove and illustrate several important astronomical truths regarding force, motion, &c.

104. *The Theory of Civilization* has occupied much of the attention of thinking men. A very excellent paper on the general question—civilization—attributed to Albany Fonblanque, appears in the *London and Westminster Review* for April, 1836. A definition of what is meant by the history of civilization will be found in Sir G. Cornwall Lewis's "Methods of Observation and Reasoning in Politics" (28s.), vol. i. p. 305. Chapters XXII. and XXVII. of the same book contain many excellent remarks on and facts regarding civilization, and the bibliography of the subject is pretty well exhausted in the notes to these chapters. Guizot's "Civilization in Europe" (2s. 6d.) is a well-known, able, and readable book. F. von Schlegel's "Lectures on the Philosophy of History" (Bohn, 8s. 6d.), Hegel's "Philosophy of History" (Bohn, 5s.), exhibit the subject from a German standpoint; as do also the more elaborate works of Wachsmuth and of Adelung. Kames' "Sketches of Man," Miller's "Philosophy of History," Millar "On Civil Government," Dr. Adam Ferguson's work on "Refinement," James Barbar's "Essays on the History of Mankind," several of Hume's Essays, Arnold's "Lectures on Modern History" (15s.), T. McCullagh's "Use and Study of History," and J. S. Mill's "Political Economy" (30s.), are all easily accessible to the English reader. Volney, Montesquieu, Bachez ("Introduction to the Science of History"), Roux-Ferrand ("History of the Progress of Civilization in Europe"), and Daunou ("Course of Historical Studies") are among the best French writers. Besides the German

writers above mentioned, useful information may be gained by a perusal of Heeren's and Niebuhr's works (many of which are translated into English or French). Müller's "Historical Criticism" is valuable, as are also Leo's "Universal History," Ruh's "History of the Middle Ages," Rehm's "History of the Middle Ages," Spittler's "History of the European States," Hüllman's "Cities in the Middle Ages," &c. "A Historical Analysis of Christian Civilization," by L. B. de Vericour (a Frenchman who writes in English), was published by Chapman in 1850 (10s. 6d.) Hallam's "Europe in the Middle Ages" (24s.) is replete with the results of careful investigation, and rich with thought. Carlyle's and Macaulay's essays "On History," though differing widely in their matter and manner, are worthy of careful perusal. Several articles on "History," the "Philosophy of History," "Historic Criticism," &c., have appeared in the pages of the *British Controversialist* itself, which may be usefully read. The true theory of civilization has not as yet, we believe, been discovered, nor has its history been adequately written. A thoughtful perusal of any history will soon start such a host of reflections in the reader's mind as will work out for him a holier and nobler theory of civilization than books can give. One vigorous shoot of thought springing up in a man's own mind is worth a thousand hothouse growths planted by mere reading. To the thinker alone does *Clio* reveal her choicest secrets, and unroll "the map of days outworn" with an explanatory index.—N. L.

105. "The Evidences of Christianity," by Bailby Porteous, D.D., late Bishop of London (Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh), price 6d.; Archbishop Whately's "Introductory Lessons on Christian Evidences" (Parker and Son, London), price 6d.; Henry Rogers' "Reason and Faith" (Longmans, London), price 1s. 6d.; Gillespie's "Necessary Existence of God" (Blackwood, Edinburgh), 3s. 6d.—N. L.

The Topic.

DOES THE EXPEDITION OF GARIBALDI DESERVE THE SUPPORT OF ENGLISHMEN ?

AFFIRMATIVE.

Garibaldi is fighting under the banner of liberty against a world-wide execrated despot ; and although, as lovers of peace, we would rather have seen liberty extended by moral means, yet, as the battle has already unavoidably commenced, the sympathies of Englishmen—a liberty-loving people—must be with Garibaldi ; and doubtless they ought and will render that assistance which the law and ability admits of, and the case requires.—LUTHER.

The inherent love of political freedom, and the determination to possess and maintain it, which characterizes Englishmen, may be said to have greatly contributed to place this nation in the position it now occupies in the world ; and as it is for freedom and not fancy, for liberty and not lucre, for justice as opposed to jobbery, that Garibaldi fights, his mission cannot fail to excite the sympathy of Englishmen, and consequently entitle his expedition to their support.—G. A. H. E.

England being the land of liberty, it may naturally be inferred that her sons are lovers of freedom, and would do anything to promote its extension. The expedition of Garibaldi is, in our opinion, one which is intended to burst the bonds of tyranny, and untie its cruel shackles. The man has proved himself a brother to all who would see a tyrant overthrown ; and we cannot, therefore, understand why Englishmen should not aid him in his praiseworthy undertakings.—BETA.

Wherever oppression exists, wherever tyranny plants its iron heel, there is a spot to which the sympathies of Britain will certainly be directed. It is not always possible or proper for us to interfere, either by moral or physical

intervention. The safety of nations generally makes this not only a maxim, but a law. But when a native of the oppressed country starts up, dashes aside the yoke, and strikes for freedom, he then becomes a power recognizable without any transgression of the international law. Garibaldi has been treated with by the Neapolitans, who, in that way, acknowledge him an independent power ; and to which side will a free country lean, when watching a struggle between violence, oppression, and brutal tyranny (we use the words advisedly), and freedom and right government ? As a matter of course, to the free side. Then let us send every assistance, both material and in the shape of sympathy. Let us exclaim,—
“ Strike till the last armed foe expires ;
Strike for your altars and your fires ;
Strike for the green graves of your sires ;

God and your native land.”—

LYNDON.

Any man who honestly endeavours to rescue his fellow-countrymen from the bondage of tyranny, deserves not only the support but the sympathy of all who bear the honoured name of Englishmen. Are not the people of this country looking with thrilling interest to what Garibaldi is now doing for the sake of liberty in Italy ? The base and treacherous Bourbons have used every cruelty which human ingenuity could devise ; and beneath the iron heel of despotism they have trampled down that love of liberty which is the natural instinct of human nature ; and though it may wane for a time under the blighting and destroying influence of tyranny, it needs but such an influence as Garibaldi can give to rekindle it into a bright and irresistible flame. This

has been proved by the wonderful exertions the people have made, the marvellous success which has crowned their efforts, and the brilliant victories which Garibaldi and his brave co-patriots have won wherever they have fought. Henceforth victorious liberty and freedom are to rule with justice and with equity, and bright days are yet in store for suffering Italy; and soon the hearts of her children shall beat with a new joy, and the horizon of their existence shall be as bright and unclouded as her matchless skies.—S. T. W.

It is against the nature of Englishmen to stand unmoved at the cry of oppression; and, therefore, we cannot stand unmoved while the sons of Italy are asking us to help them to snap the chains of their oppressors.—J. R.

The expedition of Garibaldi *does* deserve the support of Englishmen, because the mission he has undertaken is *noble, just, and good*. Many words could not, I think, convey a more favourable opinion than the three I have used.—TNEJBOB.

Is not Garibaldi a *true* patriot, who, for the love of country, and hatred of a government which is the incarnation of tyranny and imbecility, has risked life and honour in the struggle for liberty, and the total overthrow of a decayed race of despots whose time is come? And such being the case, is he not worthy of the support of all free nations, and especially of England and Englishmen? This is a question which can only receive one answer, and that answer must be, *yes*.—CASTLESIDE.

England has herself had so many fights for liberty that she can really understand the uprising in Sicily. Freedom is a glorious thing, and any cause for emancipating a kingdom is worthy of the best support and encouragement of every one. The day will perhaps come, when despotic governments will give place to higher and better ones—when all the countries of Europe and Asia will be free. Till then let us fight the battle for true liberty and freedom of thought.—F. S. M.

One reason why England should assist Garibaldi in his attempt to overthrow the strongholds of tyranny, is to be obtained from a consideration of the fearful effects produced by the tyrant's rule. Tyranny takes away the liberty of the subject; robs the prostrate people of hope and energy; saps the very foundations of all moral rectitude and honourable feeling; annihilates genuine religion; and drives the miserable subjects of oppression to seek for relief from their bitter pangs in the madness and forgetfulness of the passing hour. Again, we think that nations possess an inherent right to rise and shake off any rule that has passed certain limits of patience and endurance. Can we be astonished that the frightful scenes exposed to view in the "chamber of horrors," should arouse the spirits of the warm-blooded?—T. L. P.

When boys at school fall out and quarrel, there is generally one of them, who is taller and stronger than the rest, who jealously guards fair play, and with earnest courage rescues the weaker boys from the blows of the bully of the school. To my mind, an affirmative reply to the Topic assumes a similarity to an expression of approval of the boy's noble-heartedness in saving his weaker companions from being the victims of oppression. Italy is in the hands of tyrants, and, consequently, in a state of slavery. Garibaldi is the hero who succours the weak, and delivers them from their mental and physical bondage, and this from no selfish end, but simply from the patriotic love of freedom. He is the noble-hearted boy; but when he lacks the height and strength of the oppressor, and has the earnest will to overcome him, then sympathy is the more enlisted in his cause. Upon these grounds I think that the expedition with which Garibaldi has identified himself, deserves our support.—J. C.

We think it to be the duty of those who have successfully striven under the banner of liberty, to aid, to the utmost of their power, any nation who

seeks to free herself from tyranny. Would it not be inconsistent and cowardly of Englishmen, who boast of their freedom, and urge others to obtain it, if they refused a helping hand to a people most slavishly enthralled, who have risen for their lives and liberty? Did they do so, we are sure so noble and patriotic a spirit as Garibaldi's would tremble at our heartlessness, and scorn us as a band of sentimentalists.—IOTA.

Let indignation rest on those men, unworthy to bear the name of Britons, who can calmly and dispassionately view, while they are enjoying the blessings of freedom, the haughty tyrant pursue, with unrelenting heart, his fellow-men, and crush their very souls by the brutal aid of the fiends in human shape in his pay!—MARCUS.

They who enjoy the blessings of liberty, whose fetters have been broken, and who breathe the pure air of freedom, purchased by the blood of the brave, the patriotic, and the pious, should be first to support the man who

"Swears, beneath God's burning eye,
To break his country's chains, or die."

J. K. C.

The words, "Garibaldi," "Sicily," cannot but arouse in the breast of every Englishman the burning desire to assist in the glorious cause of Italian emancipation; and although we cannot render physical aid, we ought, as a duty we owe to Providence for the happy position which we, as Englishmen, occupy, to do all in our power to further the cause of the long-oppressed Sicilians.—S. R.

The innumerable calamities ensuing to a nation from the attack of an outward force, and an ill-concerted revolution, make it a matter of some diffidence to many in hazarding an opinion; but however that may be, there cannot, we think, in the present instance, be one who wishes for the emancipation of his fellow-beings from the galling chains of monarchial or empirical tyranny, that will refrain from giving his support to the expedition of the famous guerilla chief, Garibaldi. Dictated by the purest

patriotism, sanctioned by the future interests of liberty and humanity, it is calculated (if successful) to establish in greater security the peace of Europe, and to extinguish those agitations which have so often arisen, to the annoyance of every nation possessing diplomatic relations with the continent.

The antecedents of Garibaldi show him to be actuated, not like Louis Napoleon, by a sordid avarice, and a personal ambition. In a chequered career of romance and vicissitude, Garibaldi has as yet proved the purity of motive and unstained character of those life-actions of his which have identified him on the dark yet bright page of his country's history. His unswerving loyalty, undying patriotism, and magnanimity, mark him as one in whose breast perfidy and treachery could find no home. A man like Garibaldi, known as the present knows the past, seems alike incapable of taking a wrongful side, or acting in any part other than to elevate mankind. This, then, is our sufficient guarantee that his present expedition deserves the support of Englishmen. What is the great characteristic of our own country? Is it not its *Christianity* and its *heroism*? and does not Garibaldi eminently represent both these virtues? His life has been one long war against oppression and tyranny. Guided by the principles of Christianity, he has heroically fought to regain for his brothers the glorious heritage bequeathed to universal man. England has struggled, long and hard, to hold that glorious heritage (liberty); and, not unmindful of the intensity of the fight, and the preciousness of the prize, does she pray with fervour that nations may have strength given them from on high to carry on the holy war, and to plant, though it be with bleeding hands, the standard of victory and freedom on every citadel; for with such a history, and such a position, England, who has bought her freedom at the price of her sons' blood, not to say "God speed" to brothers who fight for birthright, such as she holds so dear,

would prove herself an ingrate above all ingrates;—that is, why never should she be dearer to English hearts than the present expedition of Garibaldi, for whose safety and preservation, at heaven's footstool, should England bewail her morning prayer.—D. S.

Englishmen have ever been foremost in extending their support to those great spirits whose aim has been to crush tyranny and emancipate the downtrodden from the thrall of bondage. Shall they now be false to the aspirations that have heretofore made every nation, upon whom the blight of tyranny has fallen, look to England as their star of hope and their haven of rest? What man in this epoch of European history deserves the support of Englishmen so well as Garibaldi? His name shines above all other names; his action in the cause of Italian nationality stamps him as a patriot in whom the love of country supersedes all other love; we behold in him the stuff of which tyrants are afraid; his name sounds the knell of their departing power, and the strongholds of their oppression totter to their fall. As we love and venerate the departed great ones of our country—whose memories are enshrined in our hearts, who sealed by their blood the freedom of England, and taught our tottering steps to climb to our present greatness,—when we recall the names of a Hampden, a Cromwell, and a Russell, we see in a more noble and exalted form the patriot Garibaldi. Sardinia's king, seated on his now thrice-powerful throne, may truckle to France's tyrant. Count Cavour, checkmated in his diplomacy by the honesty of Italy's uncorruptible patriot, may envy his greatness and fulminate reports derogatory to his honour. But Garibaldi, undismayed by frowns, and unconciliated by overtures—swerving not from his purpose—his great soul looks forward to the goal of his wishes and of his hopes. As Englishmen love patriotism and freedom they will support Garibaldi. Because they venerate the patriot names of their own land, and as they detest the

deeds of Sicily's late hated tyrant, they will give Garibaldi their support.—D. R. R.

The events now occurring in southern Italy are becoming the general subject of discussion in every assembly in Europe. And when we bring to the bar of our deliberative judgment the state of the theatre of conflict prior to the first efforts of the great conqueror of tyranny and oppression, the endurance of hardships and misery by the ill-fated Italians could not be borne with patience *within* or passive inactivity *without*. The attempts at emancipation demand from every *son of happy Old England*—and, indeed, from every votary of freedom—*aid*, so far as his pecuniary or other strength will contribute. The funds now being raised in England for the purpose of sending succour to the *hero* who deserves so well of his country, cannot be expended in a holier cause—the liberation of the inmates of the *fetid dungeons* of Italian cruelty; and the *outpouring of the blood of the brave* is the price that must be paid for the completion of so worthy and much admired a cancellation of the decrees of scandalous oppression beyond all suffering. Let the sword of freedom be *energetically supported* to the utmost, so that the fullest effect may be given to the worthy deeds of the greatest warrior of that country which is the garden of Europe, and which the soldiers of Hannibal viewed with such ecstasy from the summit of the Alps.—S. F. T.

NEGATIVE.

Here is the *law* of Britain on the subject:—"If any person whatever, within the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, or in any part of his Majesty's dominions elsewhere, or in any country, colony, settlement, island, or place, belonging to, or subject to, his Majesty, shall hire, retain, engage, or procure, or shall attempt or endeavour to hire, retain, engage, or procure, any person or persons whatever to enlist, or to enter or engage to enlist,

or to serve, or to be employed in any such service or employment as aforesaid, as an officer, soldier, sailor, or marine, either in land or sea service, for, or under, or in aid of any foreign prince, state, potentate, colony, province, or part of any province or people, or for, or under, or in aid of any person or persons exercising, or assuming to exercise, any powers of government as aforesaid, or to go, or to agree to go, or embark, from any part of his Majesty's dominions, for the purpose, or with intent, to be so enlisted, entered, engaged, or employed as aforesaid, whether any enlisting money, pay, or reward shall have been, or shall be actually given or received or not, in any or either of such cases every person so offending shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanour." Are we to violate law, and so begin with licence, to gain liberty? Surely no.—LEX.

The European complications which Garibaldi's expedition involves—the want of a defined publicly announced purpose it shows—the politic aversion he displays to the announcement of his designs—and the unguaranteed action he may take—are all premises on which to withhold English help till his ultimate aims are known, not guessed.—Q. P. Q.

If it be illegal in our country to urge on rebellion and upstart mutiny in any other country, then we do wrong to support—however right they may be in their aim—the objects of Garibaldi's expedition.—GRANT.

We have no more right to invade a country with our money than with our military, unless on a declaration of war. Every contributor to the Garibaldi Fund is a violator of the laws of nations, inasmuch as he is an invader of another's coasts, while the Government under which he lives is at peace with the Government of that country. Non-intervention is a misnomer if this can be allowed.—T. R. Y.

Those who subsidize the expedition hamper the Government in subsequent action, and lead to inferences not legiti-

mated by the public opinion of this country.—T. H.

Dictator Garibaldi may win a throne by the contributions of liberty-loving Englishmen which may become as plagues as another President-Dictator whom we did our best to help to a seat, his security in which makes us uneasy.—FACT.

Would it be agreeable to the British Government that European Romanists should pour in treasure, enticement, and excitement into Ireland, to free it from the oppression it (as it is said) endures? "Do unto others as ye would others should do unto you."—L. K.

John Bull is far too apt in his honest zeal for freedom to credit pretenders—especially Italian ones—e. g., Mazzini, Gavazzi, &c., without certificate. Have we got full proof of Garibaldi's honesty of intention now? Have we no reason for suspecting the *Napoleonization* of Italy?—A. N. Y.

Self-reliance is the only true basis of liberty. To acquire freedom by charity is to gain it without the struggle which gives it value. Cheap liberty is too likely to be thought worthless liberty; and the charity of to-day may be sold to the highest bidder to-morrow. The sympathy of Britain is enough to show Italy that it is right,—the pocket of Britain is very likely to lead them wrong.—TOUCH.

Private charities cannot secure national esteem; and hence, though we may help Italy to freedom, it will not feel bound to our land on account of that help, and it may prefer a neighbour nearer and more politic, who knows when to help a success just in time to make it look as if he had accomplished it. If it be right to help Italy, let us do it in our national character, and not in an eleemosynary manner; and we may rest assured our Government will never lend a hand as long as the people of Britain are willing to tax themselves for the performance of that duty which ought to devolve upon and be provided for by the State. Private charity is a public evil in this as in most cases.—TIM.

So long as the English people support and encourage Garibaldi's expedition themselves, so long will the Government hold aloof from affording any help. Governmental help alone can be efficient in the long run. For success in arms may be defeated by diplomacy. Let us, if help is really needed, which may be doubted, urge upon our representatives to give it, assuring them of our support, but do not let us fritter our efforts down into penny patriotism, and become mere pecuniary promoters of proletarianism. To be true to Italy we must see justice done, not charity given. Life and liberty are too precious to be holden as donations from anybody.

—Q.Æ.

The noblest nations have struggled for and gained liberty for themselves. Wallace, Tell, Hofer, Kosciusko, Washington—who gave them penny subscriptions, bazaar profits, concert proceeds, theatre benefits, ninepin alley bets, &c., to help them to ennoble the people for whom they fought? The worth of liberty may well excuse any endurance to gain it but this—that liberty should be made a fashionable pauper. The Italians ought to be quite able to take liberty, without exposing themselves to the charge of being the mere lazzaroni

of European freemen. Honour the brave, do not dishonour them.—C. B. D.

National independence for Italy has ever been a dream, an unrealizable and entrancing vision; but it has never yet been other than a nympholepsy, because the Italians have never been able to believe that

"In native swords and native ranks,
The only hope of freedom dwells."

Italy must hazard all upon the die now cast, except honour, and if it do it will acquire independence independently.—EXCELSIOR.

We have no right to intermeddle with the internal relations of any country; to bribe a rebellion therein; or to covertly attain our own designs by urging on others to work our work in the belief that it is for their own good.

—N. O.

There is a legal way of giving support to other countries; that is, through the State. Let us support the Italians by our representatives; or we may find that the support we give may be rendered only to be made null by the operations of the State machine.—CUT.

"Plenty and peace breed cowards; hardness
ever—

Of hardness is mother."—*Shakespeare*.

G.

The Societies' Section.

Birmingham.—*Meeting of Readers and Friends of the British Controversialist.*—Through the efforts of a few earnest friends of our Serial, resident in this town, a large and interesting meeting was held on Friday evening, August 17th, in the Charendon Chambers, Temple Street, under the presidency of Dr. Keyworth. Mr. J. A. Cooper, F.R.S.L., stated the circumstances under which the meeting had been convened, and the objects its promoters had in view, and then gave an interesting account of the origin of the *Controversialist*, the success which had attended it, and

the good it had been known to accomplish. Samuel Neil, Esq., author of "The Art of Reasoning" (who was on a visit to Birmingham), spoke of the proper province of controversy, and the advantages which must flow from it, when conducted in an earnest and kindly spirit. Mr. F. Derry bore testimony to the healthy influence of the Serial in dispelling prejudice, strengthening the reasoning faculties, and in promoting mental culture in general. Mr. J. S. Wright remarked on the advantages of written over oral controversy, and urged upon the assembly

the duty of individually supporting a Magazine the influence of which was so beneficial. The Rev. Henry Boyden, in an eloquent speech, advocated the claims of the Magazine, on account of its impartial character, and its high educational tendencies. Mr. Shrubbs expressed the interest with which he always perused the *Controversialist*, and stated that it was his custom to take in two copies per month, *one of which he circulated among his friends, with a view to induce them to become subscribers.* On the motion of Mr. S. Edwards, a cordial vote of thanks was presented to Dr. Keyworth, for his kindness in presiding, and to Mr. Neil for the favour of his attendance.

From the interest manifested in the meeting, we anticipate a large increase to our circulation in Birmingham. Might not the example thus set be successfully followed in many of our large towns, especially during the coming autumnal and winter months? We shall be happy to correspond with friends respecting the best means of getting up similar meetings.

Liverpool. (The Byrom Literary Society.)—The third annual meeting of this society was recently held in the rooms adjoining the Byrom Street Chapel. The chair was taken at eight o'clock, by Mr. B. H. Grindley (one of the vice-presidents of the society), and the attendance of members and friends was tolerably good. After the disposal of some preliminary business, the treasurer presented his account, by which it appeared that, in a pecuniary point of view, the year had been a most successful one, and closed with a balance in hand sufficient to meet all the working expenses of the ensuing session. The secretary then read the report of the committee, reviewing the operations of the society since its reconstitution in May last. Previous to this period, two societies were in existence in the same locality—the Byrom Mutual Improvement Society, and the Students' Society; both, however, were languishing; and it was decided, after a revision

of the rules, to merge the two societies into one, under the title of the "Byrom Literary Society." The Committee regretted that the interest exhibited by members at first had not been of a more permanent character, and that the depression under which literary societies had laboured during the year had been allowed to extend its influence to the Byrom. The number of members had slightly decreased. Eighteen meetings had been held during the year, five of which were devoted to debates, ten to essays, two to presidential addresses, and one (as an experiment) to readings and recitations, with criticisms. Essays had been contributed by the following members:—On "Economy of Time," and "Punctuality," by Mr. J. S. H. Evans; "Provident Societies," by Mr. Edwin Carver; "Friendship," by Rev. Thomas Dawson; "Popular Literature," by Mr. B. H. Grindley; "The Life and Character of Napoleon III.," by Mr. Robert M'Gowan; "Britain and her Slaves," by Mr. H. M. Latham, jun.; "Wit," by Mr. Thomas Linton; also a paper on a "Tour to Wales," by Mr. F. A. Latham. These meetings had been pretty well attended, and the numbers of visitors had greatly increased, during the last session, by the admission of ladies,—an extension of privilege which had worked most beneficially. The committee concluded by urging upon members the necessity for increased exertions and more diligent efforts in the pursuit of knowledge. The report was unanimously adopted, and the following officers elected for the ensuing year:—President, Mr. B. H. Grindley; vice-presidents, Messrs. W. B. Luckman and James Davies; treasurer, Mr. Thomas Linton; secretary, Mr. F. A. Latham; committee, Messrs. Edwin Carver, R. M'Gowan, Ed. Tinkir, jun., and William Robinson.

Shrewsbury Discussion Society.—This society originated, several years ago, with a few young men cultivating literary attainments, and two or three kind-hearted gentlemen, who wished to encourage the members, and cheerfully

gave them the advantage of their more extended education. The society has gradually augmented in numbers, and continued to hold free and spirited debates on the most popular and interesting topics of the day. According to annual custom, it adjourned for the summer months on May 16th, when its fourth session concluded by a meeting to audit and pass the accounts, after which the president, Mr. Robert Rogerson, delivered an address on the objects and advantages of debating societies. He commenced by describing the qualifications requisite to become debaters. He then engaged the marked attention of the audience by describing the untiring labours of Demosthenes, and the plodding perseverance of Cicero; and from ancient orators came down to modern times, and portrayed, in a graphic manner, the career and style of the illustrious orator and statesman, William Pitt, the late Baron Macaulay, Dr. Chalmers, and Lord Brougham. To be great, required the labour of a life, and the germs of greatness, in many eminent men, were first developed in debating societies. Both Dr. Chalmers and Lord Macaulay have left on record how deeply they were indebted to debating societies. We may, like them, learn to overcome difficulties; and though we may not become great,—for only a few attain to greatness,—yet we may improve ourselves, and be useful in our day and generation. He next remarked on the benefit of combining religion with education. In the decline of life, men of cultivated minds would derive happiness from their previous studies, while those who had neglected the improvement of the mind, would find time hang heavy on their hands.

Several other speakers addressed the meeting, and votes of thanks were given to the president and the honorary secretary. The society has, during the past session, held thirty-four meetings, with an attendance, on the average, of thirty-one members and seven visitors at each. There being a fund in hand, it was unanimously agreed to purchase

a complete set of the "*British Controversialist*," for circulation among the members of the society, and to continue taking it in.—J. TASKER, Hon. Sec.

Whitby Wesleyan Young Men's Association.—Some time ago, the members and friends of this young men's association held a social *r union* on the last night of the session. The Rev. W. H. Bambridge presided, and gave an address on "Self-Respect." The secretary, Mr. John R. Price, read the report, from which we gather that the society was established in September last, its objects being, "to acquire and communicate information on the principles, and to further the interests, of the Wesleyan Church; to promote friendly intercourse among Wesleyan young men, and to furnish the means, by the diffusion of general and Christian knowledge, for the moral and intellectual improvement of its members." The association numbers thirty-six members, the average attendance being eighteen. Twenty-three meetings have been held. Five lectures have been delivered, three by the president, on "Young Men Wanted;" "Mercantile Morals;" "The Study of the Bible." "The Rise of Methodism," by Mr. R. T. Gaskin; "The Poetry of Longfellow," by Mr. J. R. Price. Essays have been delivered on the following subjects, with discussion or conversation afterwards:—Drunkenness; Sunday Schools; Restoration of the Jews; Morals of Business; the Promised Deliverer, and Introduction of the Typical Dispensation; Advantages of the Sabbath; Holy Places of Scripture; Insensible Influence; Witness of the Spirit; Class Meetings; Divinity of Christ; Prayer Meetings; the Study of Theology; Prayer; Unlawfulness of War. After votes of thanks to the president and secretary, a very pleasant and profitable season closed, with hearty words of counsel from the president, and a sincere prayer for the happiness of the members.

Dundee Eastern Literary Association.—The third anniversary festival

of this association was held in Lamb's Saloon, Reform Street. There was a large attendance of members, and a numerous gathering of ladies. After tea, Mr. D. Stephen Robertson, Vice-President, who occupied the chair, delivered an able address on "Self-Culture, in its moral and religious bearings." Mr. Nicoll, secretary, thereafter submitted his annual report, in which were enumerated the following questions, which have been discussed during the past session, viz.:—"Ought the Franchise to be extended?" "Is Reason confined to Man?" "Can Government interfere in the Social Evil question?" "The Character of Queen Elizabeth;" "Is Machinery Beneficial to the Working Classes?" &c., &c. Essays on the following subjects have also been delivered:—"Charity;" "Public Amusements;" "Patriotism;" "Leaves from a Note-book;" "Watt and the Steam-engine;" "Self-education;" "Creation;" "Milton's 'Paradise Lost:'" "Celebrities of the Present Generation" (No. I.); "Pictures of 1859;" "Portraits from Life;" "The Animal Creation;" "Home;" "Revelations of a Star;" "Hugh Miller and his Works;" "Books and Reading;" "Revivalism;" &c., &c.

The report also stated that a monthly manuscript magazine has been instituted in connection with the association, which is contributed to by the members, and is privately circulated among them, together with the *British Controversialist*; this enterprise is working successfully.

Mr. Preston, treasurer, then submitted his financial account, showing a good balance in hand. After a few songs and recitations from various members, Mr. Scott addressed the meeting on "Peter the Great," and showed the life and characteristics of that worthy. After an aria, with variations, on the violin, by Mr. Kinnes, an interval of fifteen minutes was allowed. On all having again assembled, a service of fruit and cake was served up. "The Irish Gentleman" was sung by Mr. McIntyre. Mr. Skinner then delivered

an instructive and somewhat amusing address on "Love," which elicited shouts of laughter. "Anticipation," by Mr. Scott, and the "Downfall of Poland," by Mr. Gibson, were well rendered. During the evening, a handsome copy of Southey's "Poetical Works" was given, by one of the ladies present, as a prize to the best elocutionist. The ladies acted as adjudicators; and, on the conclusion of the programme, they by a large majority awarded the gift to Mr. D. M. Nicoll, who took for his subject, "The Laird o' Luggiehead on Marriage" (!) Towards the close, votes of thanks were passed to the ladies, chairman, speakers, and Mr. Lamb.—THEOCRITUS.

Dundee Literary Association.—On Wednesday evening, 27th June, 1860, this association sat down to tea in Lamb's Saloon, when a numerous and intelligent auditory was present; Andrew Jones, Esq., president of the association, in the chair. In the course of an able and eloquent address from the chairman, he stated the objects of such associations—that their aims were comprehensive and far-reaching, leading men from the solitary walks of their own peculiar study into the broad and varied fields of kindred minds, extending the bounds of empirical knowledge, and thereby forming a basis for original thought; rebutting the flimsy argument that the pursuit of knowledge leads to self-conceit and pride, by the dictum of Lord Bacon, that great learning shows the littleness of men, and leads to humility. Mr. James Lumgair then gave a recitation, entitled "Spanish Champion," in a graceful and masterly manner. The song, "Death of Nelson," was sung by Mr. Bruce in a very high class style. A dialogue was then entered into between Messrs. McIntosh and McKay, entitled "Vanok and Valens," which was executed in a spirited manner. Mr. Alex. Rae delivered an address on "Patience and Perseverance," in elegant terms, with numerous and striking illustrations of the force of these virtues. Mr. J. McIntosh then recited "Lochin-

var" with great effect. An amusing song, "Hame cam' our gude man at e'en," was sung with characteristic effect by Mr. Rine. Mr. Beattie then told a very humorous story, entitled "A Love Exploit," amid the interrupted laughter of the audience. A dialogue from the "Stranger," between Messrs. Bruce and Dunn, was executed with dramatic effect; and a ludicrous recitation, entitled "Paddy the Swabber," by Mr. Clark, concluded the first part of the proceedings. An interval of ten minutes, with service of fruit; after which Mr. James Lumgair delivered an address to the ladies on "Love," which was enlivened throughout by broad bursts of humour and eloquence. The song "Rule Britannia" was sung in admirable style by Mr. McKay, while the audience joined heartily in the chorus. Mr. Bruce then delivered an eloquent and elaborate address on "Excelsior," abounding in apt allusions and telling illustrations of the value of this motto. A song, "My native home," was sung with true patriotic feeling by Mr. Dunn. The dialogue, "Clarence's Dream," between Messrs. McIntosh and Lumgair, was done in a highly artistic manner. A recitation, "Crescentius," was spoken by Mr. Burrie in a very commendable style; followed by a humorous and side-convulsing story by Mr. Mc-

Intosh; while "Auld lang syne," sung by the audience with great *éclat*, finished the proceedings of the evening. This association has been in existence for two years, and is in a very flourishing condition. Its regular attendants vary from twenty-two to twenty-four. An essay is read every Wednesday evening, varied by debates once a month, which are all prepared with great care by their several authors, and mostly treating subjects of great practical value to individual members. A manuscript magazine has been established among them, published monthly, which goes the whole round of the members, receiving generous and impartial criticisms thereon. Their annual meeting was held in their rooms, Dock-street, on the evening of the 2nd of May last, A. Jones, Esq., in the chair, when the secretary and treasurer read encouraging and satisfactory reports of last year's proceedings. Votes of thanks were then proposed to the president and other office-bearers, when the following gentlemen were elected for the following year:—president, A. Jones, Esq.; vice-president, Mr. Millar; secretary, Mr. Rae; treasurer, Mr. McIntosh; editor, Mr. Dunn; committee, Messrs. Robertson, Burrie, Bruce, and Lumgair.—A. S. R.

LITERARY NOTES.

It is said that the baton of the *Quarterly Review* has passed from the hands of the Rev. Mr. Elwyn into those of an erudite Scotchman, Mr. Macpherson. Are national alternations absolutely necessary in this journal?—Gifford, Lockhart, Elwyn, Macpherson. It must be an Englishman's turn next.

Mr. James Hannay, author of "Satire and Satirists," &c., is reported to have assumed the editorship of the *Edinburgh Courant*, the oldest Conservative newspaper in Scotland.

"The Isthmus of Suez" is the topic given out by the French Academy for the prize poem of 1861.

M. E. Bonnehose's "History of England" has gained the Halphen prize, by decree of the French Academy.

Editions of Pope and Addison are shortly to be produced by Murray, under the supervision of Mr. Elwyn; for Croker is dead, and Cunningham is ill.

The *Moniteur* for 1789 to 1799, containing materials for a history of the French Revolution, is republishing in Paris.

The *London Review* has commenced the issue of a series of inedited letters between Lord Nelson and Sir William Hamilton.

Griffin and Co. intend re-publishing

a collective edition of the philosophical writings of the Rev. F. D. Maurice for the "Encyclopædia Metropolitana."

Dr. Maine, Middle Temple reader in jurisprudence and civil law, has in the press a work on "Ancient Law in its Relation to Early History and Modern Thought."

The *North British Review* has again changed hands. It is now published by Messrs. Clark, Edinburgh.

"Species not Transmutable" is the title of an anti-Darwin work, by Dr. R. E. Bree, in the press.

Mr. E. Clifford is to issue a Biography of Edward I.

Cædmon's "Fall of Man" is to be translated from the Anglo-Saxon by W. H. F. Bosanquet.

Marcus Niebuhr, son of the great German historian, a courtier and an author (!), is dead.

Mr. Charles Wells has recently issued a "Treatise on Political Economy," in the Turkish language. Will it *medicine* "the sick man"?

Gerald Massey's "Poetical Works" are republished in America.

"Pages and Pictures from the Writings of J. F. Cooper," the American novelist, are preparing by a relative, Miss Susan Cooper, author of "Rural Hours."

Lord Stanhope is to enlighten men farther regarding the "Life of William Pitt;" and Mr. Motley is writing the "History of the United Netherlands."

A statue of Cromwell, raised by subscriptions from the million, is talked of.

Fox, the founder of Quakerism, is about to be biographed.

Miss Macready, daughter of the eminent tragedian, is to appear before the public as an authoress in "Leaves from the Olive Mount."

A volume of unpublished Voltaire letters, entitled "Voltaire at Ferney," has been issued by Didier and Co., Paris.

The mathematical writings of Leibnitz have been published, from original MSS. in the library of Hanover, and under the editorship of Dr. G. Pertz, at Berlin.

Kavanagh, the author of "How I Won the Medal," is appointed Assistant-Commissioner at Oude.

A French "Peerage" is about to be *officially* published at Paris.

Ponsard, of "Divine Williams" notoriety, has had his play, "What Pleases the Ladies," unequivocally perditionized at the Vaudeville, in Paris.

During July the theatre receipts in Paris amounted to £33,300.

An inedited dramatic sketch of Schiller's,—a domestic comedy of real life, in which himself and his friends are banteringly exhibited, is now in the possession of Herr C. Künzel, of Heilbronn, but is likely soon to be published.

A novel entitled "Galileo Galilei," by Raven, has been published by Brockhaus, Leipsic.

B. B. Woodward, Esq., is engaged on a Historical and Chronological Encyclopædia.

Signor Dall'Ongaro has lately completed, at Florence, a series of twelve conferences on Dante's "Inferno." In the autumn, he intends illustrating the "Purgatorio," and the "Paradiso." His poetico-political expositions of the work of the great Florentine, are well adapted to the present times in Italy, and highly popular.

"Fabian Mercer," a London mayor of the fifteenth century, is to become the subject of G. A. Sala's sketchy biographic pen shortly.

R. W. Dale's "Life and Letters of J. A. James" are to be published by Nisbet and Co.

The Notts "Young Men's Literary Association" will issue, early next month, essays, tales, poetry, &c., in "A Book without a Name."

Napoleon III.'s "Julius Cæsar" is in active preparation. Has he seen Shakespeare's work on that topic? Therein it is said,—

"Such men as he be never at heart's ease,

Whiles they behold a greater than themselves,

And therefore are they very dangerous."

Epoch Men.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCRATES.

In one of those grave epochs of human history when polity, policy, morality, jurisprudence, and religion, are waning in their control over, or influence upon, the individual soul; and it has become a question among men whether these are the results of priests' fables, legislators' dicta, the mere fictions of poets, or whether they have an everlasting fountain in God, and an eternal applicability to man,—Socrates appeared. It was a time of crisis; a time when a *man* is needed who can sweep the whole horizon of speculation with an eye at once free and acute, and distinguish between the seeming and the true. It was one of those periods which recur in the process of the cycles when reform is needed but unheeded; when evils are felt, yet remedies are unwelcome. Effete formalism, and shameful shamming, abounded. There had been an apotheosis of humbug. He came, and the tremor of despair thrilled through the spasmodized hypocrisies of life thought, statesmanship, and ritual; for the sly laugh, the jocose twitting, the ironic reverence, and the *modest* questioning, which Socrates had for each and all, were worse to bear than outspoken disbelief and arrant heresy. In the very "fitness of things," he came to out-comedy in real life the humour of the dramatist, to carry into debate upon beliefs and laws the intense contentiousness and rude mirthfulness of Olympia and Nemea, and to out-sophistize sophistry itself.

Unwelcome intruder! disturbing the quiet of enjoyment, the patient sluggishness of soul, the *dolce far niente*-ism of the time: you have stirred up a strife of which you must "take the consequences." Why should it be needful to search into the *meaning* of worship and right, of law and life, of policy and honour, when we can attend to the *forms* of them all so much more easily than to their realities? Such heterodoxy is troublesome and vexatious; we will have "none of it." Innovation shall have no ovation from us; we are sick of investigation; we are bent upon enjoyment. To conserve our privileges is the only way to deserve our love. Crowd life with delight, and win our gratitude; torture us with probing inquisitiveness, and you will excite our hate. An adviser is seldom esteemed a friend; a critic, much more a censor,—never.

Coolness, coldness, resistance, opposition, enmity, are the states of mind that are entered into in quick succession, under the influence of censure, however honestly exercised, or however ably expressed, in ordinary men. It is quite easy to predicate that a reformer must be unacceptable to his own age, and must pass through a period of trial and endurance, before the day of his fame arrives. Socrates was a reformer, therefore he was criminal; "criminal, inasmuch as he acknowledgeth not the gods whom the state holds sacred, and introduceth new deities: he is likewise criminal, because he corrupteth the youth."

"So grows, so flourishes" among men the hate of innovation; and then all forms of procedure are considered legitimate, and even law itself may, it is thought, be twisted into injustice and injury. Nor are there wanting plausible grounds for this accusation:—the philosophic innovator in politics, Pericles,—Socrates' pupil,—had led the Athenians into the Peloponnesian war; the profane and profligate Alcibiades, another pupil, had hurried them into the Sicilian war, a war so perilous in its course, so disastrous in its end;—and the downward tendency given to the power of Athens by these events was consummated by the overthrow of the constitution by the Thirty Tyrants, one of the chief of whom, Critias, had also taken Socrates, for a while, as his Gamaliel. To reason from the *per hæc* to the *propter hæc* is a fallacy of no uncommon prevalence, even now; and in those days, when logic was only struggling into potency, it was a form of reasoning to which passion lent a wondrous relevancy. Socrates was condemned, and the hook settled for the nonce the awkward dispute of that age,—lastly renewed in ours,—“On the worth of Socrates as a philosopher.”

On this subject the formation of a fair, impartial, and intelligent opinion is not so easy as it seems. Socrates “has been exaggerated to gigantic dimensions by Plato,” and he “has been dwarfed by Xenophon; he was in intellect a mean proportional, if we may so speak, between the Platonic and the Xenophontic Socrates.” But how is this proportion to be calculated? How reconcile and harmonize Plato's idealism, grace, pleasantry, inventiveness, and genius, with the cold, flat, dead-level, realistic, yet sagacious common sense of Xenophon,—the Ionic picture with the Attic statue,—the poetic exaggeration with the simple matter-of-fact,—the artistic and mystic, with the severe and the sincere? Plato's originality and wide stretch and compass of mind caused him to give, as Aristotle somewhere says, “a character of overstraining, bombast, innovation, inconclusiveness, and impracticability” to some of the reasonings which he puts into the mouth of Socrates; while the simple equibilty, the tranquil practicality, and the mere mirroring, not comprehending powers, of Xenophon's mind, rendered him unfit to become the expositor of the philosophic tenets of his

* Rogers's “Essays,” vol. i., p. 314. “Literary genius of Plato—character of Socrates,” an epitome of Platonism of great value and excellence, worthy of careful perusal and study.

master; while they manifestly made him admirably suited for becoming his apologist,—say rather, defender. It is likely that the fair medium may never be struck; for it is difficult to hold away from the reason the influences of the imagination; and it is never an easy matter to strike the balance between the decisions of two powers so jealous of each other. Perhaps no proof could be given of the real “worth of Socrates as a philosopher” as this one fact,—that his life and doctrine impressed so fully, so deeply, so seriously, so lastingly, minds so much the opposites of each other, as those of Xenophon and Plato.

We shall not here attempt to re-argue, critically, and at length, a question which has so much and so tensely occupied philosophers, philologers, and historians, for ages; because we believe that, in the main, the compromise proposed by Grote is feasible and fair. The following excerpts will put our readers in possession of the chief parts of the adjudication, and the reasons for it. The “*Memorabilia*” of Xenophon profess to record actual conversations held by Sokratēs, and are prepared with the announced purpose of vindicating him against the accusations of Melētus and his other accusers on the trial, as well as against unfavourable opinions, seemingly much circulated respecting his character and purposes. We have thus in it a sort of partial biography; subject to such deductions from its evidentiary value as may be requisite for imperfection of memory, intentional decoration, and partiality. On the other hand, the purpose of Plato, in the numerous dialogues wherein he introduces Sokratēs, is not so clear, and is explained very differently by different commentators. Plato was a great speculative genius, who came to form opinions of his own, distinct from those of Sokratēs, and employed the name of the latter as spokesman for these opinions in various dialogues. How much in the Platonic Sokratēs can be safely accepted, either as a picture of the man, or as a record of his opinions; how much, on the other hand, is to be treated as Platonism; or in what proportions the two are intermingled, is a point not to be decided with certainty or rigour. . . . But though the opinions put by Plato into the mouth of Sokratēs are liable to thus much of uncertainty, we find, to our great satisfaction, that the pictures given by Plato and Xenophon of their common master are, in the main, accordant; differing only as drawn from the same original by two authors radically different in spirit and character. Xenophon, *the man of action*, brings out at length those conversations of Sokratēs which had a bearing on practical conduct, and were calculated to correct vice or infirmity in particular individuals; such being the matter which served him as apologist, at the same time that it suited his intellectual taste. But he intimates, nevertheless, very plainly, that the conversation of Sokratēs was often, indeed usually, of a more negative, analytical, and generalizing tendency;* not destined for the reproof

* “*Memorabilia*,” Lib. i., 16.

of positive or special defect, but to awaken the inquisitive faculty, and lead to the rational comprehension of vice and virtue, as referable to determinate general principles.

Now, this latter side of the master's physiognomy, which Xenophon records distinctly, though without emphasis or development, acquires almost exclusive prominence in the Platonic pictures. Plato leaves out the practical, and consecrates himself to the theoretical Sokratès, whom he divests in part of his identity, in order to enrol him as chief speaker in certain larger theoretical views of his own. The two pictures, therefore, do not contradict each other, but mutually supply each other's defects, and admit of being blended into one consistent whole. And respecting the method of Sokratès—a point more characteristic than either his precepts or his theory—as well as respecting the effects of that method on the minds of hearers, both Xenophon and Plato are witnesses substantially in unison; though here again the latter has made the method his own, worked it out on a scale of enlargement and perfection, and given to it a permanence which it could never have derived from its original author, who only talked, and never wrote. It is fortunate that our two main witnesses about him, both speaking from personal knowledge, agree to so great an extent.* Similar opinions might easily be multiplied, *e.g.*, "For the personal history and customary manners of Socrates, I need not inform you that you are to refer to Plato and to Xenophon, and to form your estimate from both."† "To fill up the blank which Xenophon has manifestly left, we are driven back to the Socrates of Plato."‡ "The 'Memorabilia,' which of all the works of Xenophon have most of historical value, with respect to Socrates personally, are in the same degree unsatisfactory as to his doctrines, since the author . . . was but ill-qualified to form a due estimate of the Socratic philosophy. The Platonic writings, in their scientific portions, are equally unavailable as guides in this inquiry; since, with the exception of a few unconnected remarks, they do not furnish us with any means whereby we might distinguish the Platonic from the Socratic."§

Even on this subject, however, we find striking differences of opinion expressed by men well qualified to judge; *e.g.*, it has been said that "In the Socrates of Plato we find both the Aristophanic and the Xenophontic Socrates,—the mere humourist and debater, and the mere moralist, uniting to form the real man."|| Again, in direct opposition to this, it has been asserted that,

* "History of Greece," vol. viii., chap. 68, pp. 347—352.

† W. A. Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy," vol. i., lect. vii., p. 367.

‡ Schleirmacher, "On the Worth of Socrates as a Philosopher," "Berlin Transactions, 1815, and translated by Bishop Thirlwall in "The Philological Museum," vol. ii., 1832.

§ Ritter's "History of Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii., Morrison's translation. "Oxford, Talboys," p. 41.

|| Maurice's "Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy. Ancient Ency. Met.," p. 122

"We are not to look in the Socrates of Plato for the *real, living* Socrates." *

We have already given in our adhesion to the decision of Grote. We defer, for the present, the inquiry regarding the Socratic element in Plato's works, because that will naturally require careful consideration in our subsequent paper on "Plato; his Life and Writings:" though we need not here hesitate to express the general conviction that there are genuine Socratic elements in the "Apology" of Socrates, the "Crito," and the "Phædo;" and probably in the "Hippias," major and minor, "Phædrus, &c." As Xenophon can only turn up again incidentally, it may be advisable here to give a brief notion of the contents of his "Memorabilia" of Socrates.

It was during the absence of Xenophon, while engaged in the celebrated expedition of the Ten Thousand (B.C. 401—399), for the dethronement of Artaxerxes, and the enthronement of Cyrus, that Socrates was accused, condemned, and perished, by the unjust decree of the restlessly jealous and capricious population of Athens. In an undeserved exile,—perhaps in great part owing to his having been a disciple of Socrates,—and while superintending the education of his two children at Sparta, the warrior-historian penned the defence of his master in the "Memorabilia,"—a book which commences with the following *naïve* statement:—"I have often wondered by what *arguments* the accusers of Socrates *persuaded* the Athenians that he deserved death from the state." In the first book he examines and disproves, by facts known and patent, the accusation made; shows his piety to the gods, and the morality of his life. In the second book, the various branches of personal duty which were enforced by Socrates are mentioned, and insisted on, in the terms which his master used, as proofs of his innocency. In the third book, the opinions of Socrates on public duty, civil and military virtues, justice, &c., are reported and defended; and in the fourth book, the religiousness of Socrates is argued, maintained, and exemplified. There is contained in the "Memorabilia," therefore, a cumulative defence, viz.—a direct negation of *both* parts of the accusation, with exemplifications and facts in proof of his thesis,—the innocence of Socrates. Then there follow elaborate confutations, arising from the practices and tenets of the noblest of Athenian controversialists, with regard to self-government, or personal duty; justice, or public duty; and religion, or duty to the gods. Xenophon lived long in terms of close and observant intimacy with Socrates; he had no pretensions to originality of thought on philosophic topics; his own mind was essentially poetical; and he was but lightly skilled in the perceptive faculties to comprehend the larger and wider—the exotic—teachings of his master. The full sense and spirit of Socrates are not, therefore, likely to be exhibited in Xenophon. We are on this account, however, far more likely to have a genuine and unadulterated outline of such part of Socratic

* Sewell, "On the Dialogues of Plato," p. 78.

thought as he reports upon, and was able to appreciate and expound. Plato again interpenetrated the Socratic tenets with the finer issues of his own original mind, and we cannot be sure that we have the thoughts of Socrates, though we may have his method and much of his expression. Xenophon appealed to the Athenians as fellow-witnesses with him of the truthfulness of his report. Plato appears to have indulged in a sort of dramatic idealization of his master but then he would have destroyed the *vraisemblance* essential to his purpose, had we not in his dialogues much of the cast, tone, style, thought, mannerisms, &c., of his representative man. From both we gain much; from neither all. We must still construct, by critical thought, a Socrates for ourselves, and do that as honestly as we can. If we wish to comprehend "the philosophy of Socrates," we must rely greatly, it is evident, upon the vigorous Attic commander, as well as upon the Ionic thinker, whose grace, wit, and dramaticism have so much more captivated the world.

This question of authorities has really carried us much farther than we at first intended, and we must now resolutely turn aside from this criticism, and endeavour to bring before our mind's eye some clearly intelligible account of the peculiar tenets and opinions, practices, and personal beliefs, which enabled Socrates to take place in the erudite city of Athens as one of the most remarkable citizens, and in history as an Epoch Man.

In philosophy, what constitutes an epoch? *A method.* "A method," says Lewes, with his usual emphatization of ideas, "was his all in all. . . . Previous philosophies had shown the futility of speculation; certitude was nowhere to be had; all theories were but the conceit of knowledge. The method which he taught was that by which alone man could become wiser and better. Socrates thought explicitly, teaching no method or mode of searching for truth; he was himself consciously possessed of a system, a plan of procedure, a logic of investigation. This is evident, not only from the sameness of the course adopted by him in all his conversations, exercises, but also from the genuine impression made upon his pupils, that science—knowledge—was the result of a process not so much of education as of education;—it was not taught, it was drawn out. Even when ignorant of the peculiarities and processes of his method, they were never at a loss to comprehend the special aim he kept constantly before him, viz.,—to make each man capable of *thinking for himself*. He sought by controversy to excite the mind to thought, in perfect confidence that, if it worked honestly it would attain to truth, or something near it. Socraticism was, in fact, a cross-examining controversialism; a turning of thought against thought, "not to contradict nor to believe, but to weigh and to consider." His style of thought was a realization of the Miltonic maxim, "Let truth and falsehood grapple. Who ever knew truth to be worsted in a fair and open encounter?"

* "Biographical History of Philosophy," second edition, p. 134.

Religion.

IS THE CATHOLIC RULE OF FAITH TRUE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

THERE is an old story which I dare say most of the readers of the *British Controversialist* have heard, over and over again, to the effect that when the celebrated Royal Society was in its infancy, the merry monarch, Charles II., who loved a good joke, proposed to the members the following question, "How can the *fact* be explained, that when a large fish is thrown into a tub quite full of water, the water will, nevertheless, not overflow the brim?" Many learned papers were read on the subject, and many were the theories devised to account for the extraordinary fact, until, at length, one of the members proved to the rest by actual experiment, that the singular fact which they had been trying to explain was, after all, no fact at all. I do not know whether any of my Protestant readers have noticed it, but I think they will find upon examination that the conduct of the negative writers in the present debate has been very similar to that of the members of the learned Society to which I have alluded. A great deal has been said which has not the slightest bearing upon the question at the head of these pages, we have had many answers to arguments which no one has advanced; we have been treated to long dissertations to show that certain texts do not prove the infallibility of the Catholic Church, when no one has said that they did; and, instead of showing that the Catholic Rule of Faith, *as laid down by the Catholic Church herself*, is "not true, our opponents have confined themselves to refuting some imaginary theory of their own, which they dignify with the name of the Catholic Rule of Faith. They have "set up a man of straw, for the pleasure of knocking him down."

Now, in the first article, "Ignatius" very properly commenced by explaining the nature of the Catholic Rule of Faith, and gave the definition of the Rule in the very words of the Council of Trent, the highest authority with Catholics. The definition which, to avoid, I suppose, all disputes about mere words, was given also in the original Latin, was elucidated from the comments of our best divines. Why have our opponents not attempted to show the falsity of the rule there laid down? Why are "Montgomery" and "Lex Scripta," and especially the latter, so angry with Ignatius for "stating" the Catholic Rule of Faith in the words of the highest Catholic authority? Simply because it is different from the imaginary rule against which their articles are directed, and they find it impossible to attack the Catholic theory without (unintentionally, perhaps,) distorting it. Where have our opponents found out that

the Catholic Rule of Faith is the priest of the parish? (page 164) where have they found out that the traditions of the Catholic Church are merely "old wives' fables"? (page 25) where have they found out that infallibility means exemption from sin? (page 168.)

Theophylact says in the first article, that the principal passage to which Catholics appeal to prove the infallibility of the Church is the text, "Thou art Peter," &c. Now, although part of this passage may be used for the purpose, it is not the principal text. The principal texts have been quoted by other writers on the affirmative side; and neither Theophylact nor any other writers have attempted to evade their force. I will venture to repeat them. "And Jesus came and spake unto his apostles, saying, All power is given to me in heaven and on earth. Go ye, therefore, and *teach* all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, teaching them to observe *all* things whatsoever I have commanded you; and lo, *I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world.*" "And I will ask the Father, and He will give you another Paraclete, that He may *abide with you for ever, the Spirit of truth.* . . . You shall know him, because he shall *abide with you and in you*: but when He, the Spirit of truth, is come, he will teach you all truth." "My spirit that is in thee, and my words that I have put in thy mouth, shall not depart out of thy mouth, nor out of the mouth of thy seed, nor out of the mouth of thy seed's seed, from henceforth and for ever." "He that heareth you heareth me, and he that despiseth you despiseth me." Before our opponents can disprove the infallibility of the Catholic Church, they must show that Christ has failed in his promise to be with His church till the end of the world; they must prove that the Spirit of truth has not abided with the church; they must prove that the Holy Ghost, who teaches through the church, does not teach truth; they must prove that the "words which Christ has put in the mouth of the church" *have* departed; they must maintain that Christ himself teaches error, for He has said to His church, "He that heareth you heareth me, and he that despiseth you despiseth me."

Theophylact, after informing us that "the Romish Church has no Scripture authority for the doctrine of infallibility," breaks off into a line of reasoning which would be much more appropriate in a debate on the supremacy of the Pope. All I can tell him is, that to give his theory even a semblance of plausibility, he would have to prove that our Lord was in the habit of speaking in the Greek tongue to a few illiterate Galilean fishermen. Almost every eminent Biblical scholar will tell Theophylact that the language in which our Lord conversed with his apostles was the Syro-Chaldaic, the vernacular language of the country. This is the language of the very few passages in which the very words of our Lord have been preserved; such as "*Eli, Eli, lama sabachthani!*" Now, in the Syro-Chaldaic language the words for Peter (or Cephas) and for rock are identical. The word which expresses both is *KIPHOZ*,

from which the word *Cephas* is derived.* So that the passage would run thus, "Thou art KIPHOΣ, and upon this KIPHOΣ I will build my church." It is exactly the same in modern French; the words for Peter and rock are the same, viz., *Pierre*. The passage in both the Catholic and the Protestant version of the French Testament runs thus; "Tu es Pierre, et sur cette pierre je bâtirai mon Eglise." What now becomes of Theophylact's pretty theory?

A little further on in his article "Theophylact" gives us some passages of Scripture, and a few extracts from Catholic sources, which are *apparently* in opposition to the declaration of holy writ. As his extracts embrace so wide a variety of subjects, it would occupy more space than is allotted to me to attempt a reconciliation of the two columns. I will merely ask "Theophylact," if he could not produce similar apparent contradictions from the Bible itself? Would it not be very easy to fill whole pages with *apparent* contradictions such as the following?—

"The Father is greater than I."

"I and the Father are one."

"The poor ye have always with you;
but me ye have not always with you."

"Behold, I am with you all days,
even to the consummation of the world."

Another word on these extracts, and I am done with "Theophylact." There was no occasion to display his possession of that extraordinary talent which I believe is almost peculiar to no-popery writers,—I mean the habit of quoting from books which have never had any existence. The reader will find an instance of this in page 25, where, in No. XX., he pretends to quote from "The Liturgy of the Heart of Mary Liguori!" There is nothing in the extract itself to which a Catholic could object; but why throw suspicion on the rest of his authorities by pretending to quote from so self-evident an absurdity as "The Liturgy of the Heart of Mary Liguori"? The last quotation, page 27, proves that "Theophylact" can not only quote from works which do not exist, but also that he can perform the equally wonderful feat of extracting, from books which do exist, passages which they do not contain. I can assure my readers that Cardinal Bellarmine's work, "*De Pontifico Romano*," does not support any such absurd impiety as that contained in "Theophylact's" article, page 27. The work may be had of Messrs. Burns and Lambert, 63, Paternoster Row, for half-a-crown. Let the reader buy it, and judge for himself.

I really am at a loss to understand how "Lex Scripta" can presume to call his contribution a negative article on the question, "Is the Catholic Rule of Faith True?" He tells us that the *British Controversialist* has become a Roman Catholic caviller; that a vulgar labourer can pull a house down with a spade and a pickaxe; that no Catholic has ever *attempted* to prove his Rule of Faith,

* See Cardinal Wiseman on "The Supremacy of St. Peter." He refers to Dr. Lee, late Professor of Oriental Languages at Cambridge, in corroboration of his statement.

since the days of Chillingworth; that it is rash in the extreme to talk about British ignorance of Romanism; that the Irish pay divine honours to the blessed Virgin; that the Church of Rome grants indulgences to sin; that no *honest* or *sensible* man would call Protestant prejudices "the traditions of men;" and, after wasting a great deal of valuable space in vainly endeavouring to excuse a gross blunder which he made in the interpretation of a very plain sentence in the last debate, he withdraws, telling us that "The jury having retired for two minutes, returned with a verdict in favour of 'Lex Scripta.'" Such are the leading points of the article of one who boasts of his acquaintance with the "tactics of Rome."

"Montgomery's" article is more to the point. He objects that Catholics do not really know what their Rule of Faith is, because they sometimes say that it is the authority of the Church, and at other times say that it consists of Scripture and tradition. Precisely the same objection might be urged against Protestants, for they sometimes speak of the *Bible only* being their Rule of Faith, and at other times say the same of *private judgment*. The matter is very easily explained. The Catholic Rule of Faith is the whole Word of God,—all that He has revealed. This may be learned from the living voice of the Church, or from Scripture and tradition, interpreted by the Church. In page 164, "Montgomery" says that Christ "never promised any *visible* body that it should be guided into all truth for ever." The apostles were a visible body. Were not many such promises made to them? I have quoted several, near the commencement of this article. I must own that this is the first time I have heard, from a Protestant even, that these texts do not apply to the apostles; I always thought that the only dispute between us was as to the duration of the promise, Protestants maintaining that the words "for ever, unto the end of the world," mean during the lifetime of the apostles; Catholics maintaining, on the other hand, that the promises are still in force.

A little further on we are challenged to show from the writings of the Christians of the first four centuries, that they held any of the peculiar dogmas of the Catholic Church. I refer him to Baptist Noel's "First Five Centuries of the Church" (London, Nisbet), the object of which is to show that the Early Christians were rank Papists. If he has not access to this work, the nearest Catholic priest will be glad to show him "Waterworth's Faith of Catholics," a work in three large octavo volumes, consisting almost entirely of extracts or controverted points of the Catholic faith from writers of the first five centuries. Here are some inscriptions from the catacombs, date 2nd century:—"Atticus, thy spirit is in bliss; pray for thy parents." "Pray for us, because we know that thou art with Christ." From S. Ignatius, 1st century, "The Gnostic heretics do not acknowledge the Eucharist to be the flesh of our Saviour Jesus Christ, which suffered for our sins."—"Ep. ad Smyrn., 36." From Justin Martyr's Apology, 2nd century,—"**We**

have been taught that the food which has been blessed by the prayer of the words which He (Christ) spoke, and by which our flesh and blood are nourished in the change, *is the flesh and blood of that Jesus incarnate.*" I could fill volumes of the *British Controversialist* with such extracts, but those I have given will, I trust, be a sufficient answer to "Montgomery's" challenge.

The passage from S. Gregory, in page 166, is not very correctly quoted, I suppose it is quoted from memory, or perhaps has been "corrupted" by being "handed down" from one Protestant writer to another. But what does it amount to? The Patriarch of Constantinople, in a fit of pride, and thinking that his pretensions will be supported by the Emperor, arrogates to himself the title of "Universal Bishop." Pope Gregory the Great writes to him, censuring his conduct in setting himself above the rest of the episcopacy. May I ask "Montgomery" how he can possibly construe this into an argument against the Papal supremacy? Does it not plainly indicate that Pope Gregory was the patriarch's ecclesiastical superior? Suppose that the Archbishop of Paris, for instance, were to claim to be "Universal Bishop," is it not very probable that he would receive a missive couched in similar terms from Pius IX.?

In the next paragraph we are informed that "the best interpretation" of the Bible "is that of its author, and Protestants may have that." "Ask, and ye shall receive, seek, and ye shall find, knock, and it shall be opened unto you." I presume that "Montgomery" means by this that if a Protestant reads his Bible, and prays for enlightenment, he will be infallibly guided to a correct interpretation. Well, Luther, as he himself tells us, read his Bible, prayed for enlightenment, and came to the conclusion that the words, "This is my body," teach consubstantiation, a theory of the real presence, differing very little from the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation. Calvin read his Bible and prayed, and came to the conclusion that Luther's doctrine was "more blasphemous than the pope's." If what "Montgomery" says be true, why do those who read the Bible contradict one another?

But let us take the argument as it is stated. We may, it is said, be guided to a right interpretation of the Bible, if we ask the favour from God. If this be true of the individual, it is true of the church collectively. It is on a principle akin to this that General Councils depend. If all who read and pray for guidance receive infallible direction, the Bible has been clear to every saint of God from the beginning; it has been clear to the pastors and teachers of the Catholic Church, and they, therefore, have handed down its clear and certain interpretation. Why are individuals so sharp-sighted and unerring, and the saints of God and His Church at all times so blinded? This is but the recoil of your own argument.

I do not see anything that needs a reply in the rest of "Montgomery's" article. He tells us near the conclusion, that Protestants do not "deny the existence of a tribunal appointed by the Almighty

to explain His laws," but very curiously forgets to mention where this tribunal is. Until he gives us this piece of information, we are content to acknowledge the authority of that tribunal which was appointed with the words, "Go, *teach* all nations . . . and lo, I am with you all days, even to the end of the world." J. H.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

WE complained that "Ignatius" had devoted his whole paper to a *statement* of the Roman Catholic Rule of Faith, which required but a few paragraphs. We foretold that every future article would be as full of assertions, and as meagre in proofs. "Gregory" followed, to verify the remark, "showing the grounds upon which" that rule is founded, and then "leaving the question for the present" (page 93). "A Layman" follows in the same track, and though his is the *third* article, he gives but a promise that, "by the end of this discussion, 'Lex Scripta' will be unanimously declared a false prophet" (page 163). It is our intention in this paper to show how "Gregory" has based assumption upon assumption,—assuming all the points on which this controversy hinges. The Roman Catholic Rule of Faith is based upon a series of prepositions, the truth of each of which has to be established, before that rule can be accepted. If any one of them be false, the rest are worthless; but it is customary with its defenders to *assume every one of them*; and when they do agree, it is an argument based on these assumptions. This fact is abundantly proved by "Gregory's" article, as will be presently manifest.

There is, to our minds, a still more humiliating practice,—that of resorting to evasions. "I have written," "Gregory" remarks, "my article, without using those texts which 'Theophylact' conceives Catholics only refer to prove their Rule of Faith. It is hardly necessary for me to notice them" (page 92). It would have been more candid if he had informed us, if these are not the texts, what *are* the passages on which they rely. We foresaw this miserable evasion as in reserve, when we read the opening article of "Ignatius." We knew well that, unless an *avowal* appeared in the *British Controversialist* of the supports of Romanism, the negative writers would be treated precisely in this disingenuous style; and, in our former article, we refused to attack, until the enemy had unmasked his batteries. We should like some future writer to tell us where "most of the texts brought forward by 'Theophylact' have been replied to," as asserted on page 92. That it would be "easy to place Protestant opinions in juxtaposition with texts of Scripture," is perfectly true; but the rules of controversy required that "Gregory" should prove, instead of insinuating, that the same flagrant discrepancies between them would be manifest, as "Theophylact" has shown exists between the doctrines of Rome and the Bible. That it is as easy to "torture Scripture into the same apparent" contradiction, no one disputes; but it is, to say the least,

unhandsome towards an antagonist, to insinuate without taking the slightest pains to show, that "Theophylact's array of texts and notes from the Douay Bible" is the "torturing" process pretended by "Gregory" (page 92). Nothing is more damaging to Rome than to compel her to face the Word of God; and if a similar "juxtaposition" be as adverse to Protestantism, we feel assured that such a comparison would, long before this, have appeared in the pages of this periodical.

According to "Gregory," the Church of Rome "founds her interpretation upon the Holy Scriptures, and upon the true interpretation of them, as delivered by the apostles to the Fathers" (page 86). "Her interpretation!" Of what? If of the Scriptures—how founded upon them? An interpretation of any writing is founded upon the rules of grammar, criticism, and common sense; but how upon the thing itself, of which it is an interpretation? How, again, can that interpretation be founded upon another interpretation of the same thing, namely, that delivered to the Fathers? If, again, not only the Scriptures, but their interpretation, were delivered to the Fathers, and by them to "the Church," what need was there that that "Church" should be "under the immediate and constant guidance of the Holy Spirit"? To profess to found the interpretation of Scripture upon its true interpretation, if at all intelligible, is to prove too much. If the aid of the Holy Spirit is necessary rightly to interpret Scripture, then it is not true that the apostles handed down the interpretation. If, on the other hand, the writings are accompanied by the interpretation, then no interpreter is necessary.

Apart from such inconsistencies, observe the numerous points which are quietly assumed. Assumption *first*:—that the apostles delivered to the Fathers any interpretation at all of their writings, beyond what Protestants have, namely—the interpretation one passage affords of another, the Acts of the Apostles, and one epistle of another. There is no intimation in the New Testament that the apostles left any such "deposit." The early Fathers do not *pretend* to the possession of any such deposit. Had they done so, the writings of different Fathers disagreeing with one another, and the writings of the same Father contradicting themselves, as they notoriously do, would expose the nature of such a pretence. Assumption *second*:—that the Fathers delivered that "sacred deposit" to the Church. The Romish Church has preserved their writings; but where is the interpretation of the Scriptures bearing the marks of "the true"? If Rome has it, why not produce it, instead of advancing and reiterating such baseless assertions? Assumption *third*:—that the Fathers, assuming they inherited "the sacred deposit," have transmitted it pure and intact to the Church of Rome: and, assumption *fourth*:—that what that Church pretends to is the same "deposit" which the Fathers inherited from the apostles. Here are four grave assumptions of the very points which are to be proved in this discussion, before the "Roman

Catholic Rule of Faith" can be shown to be sound and true. Not one of these vital points has ever been proved, and in numerous Protestant works it has been demonstrated that not one of them is capable of proof. "Gregory," on pages 86, 87, proceeds to quote several prophecies, and adds that "in the Protestant Bible the above texts are, by the headings of the chapters, referred to the Church of Christ." Of this there can be no question, and the pages of the *British Controversialist* were not opened to inform the reader of this fact, but to afford "Gregory," and others, an opportunity to prove that *that* Church is *Rome*. Instead of attempting this, he tells us, what no one requires to be told, that "there is a Church *claiming* to be the only true one, which *declares* that the texts apply to her, and to her alone" (page 87). Let attention be fixed upon the words "claims" and "declares," which we have italicised. We ask for *proof*, and we are favoured with antiquated *claims*; we ask for *reasons*, and we are treated with arrogant *declarations*.

Again; "She alone can point, with unfeeling and undoubted certainty, to the long line of teachers, from Peter down to Pius IX." (page 87.) Now this succession is pure imagination, in the opinion of Protestants; and their champions have been at the pains to show that it is a mere figment, invented for the purpose of supporting sacerdotal assumptions. To establish their Rule of Faith, "Gregory," and brethren, have to prove that this succession is not a dream of the dark ages,—that it is a mere delusion we intend to show,—and unless our arguments are answered, "Gregory" will assert and reiterate utterly in vain. First,—it cannot be shown that our Lord ever commissioned the apostles to appoint any persons, or body of persons, to be their successors, *in the sense in which they were successors of Christ*; that is, in the sense that these successors had the powers and the functions, either in part or whole, which were the privilege of the apostles. "Gregory" quotes our "Lord's promises" to the twelve, that he "should be with them *all days*, for ever," and then adds, "as these promises of the perpetual presence of Christ were made to those whom He sent to teach,—the practice of the apostles, in appointing successors, shows clearly that they conceived these promises as extending to the chief teachers of the Church, call them apostles, bishops, patriarchs, or whatever name you will. As they were not to live for ever, the words are unintelligible, unless they refer also to those who were to succeed them. That the apostles understood it in this sense, may be inferred from the fact of their appointing bishops," &c. (page 88). Now, the inference of "Gregory," though perfectly intelligible, is not justified by the promise of perpetual presence, for in none of the passages containing it is anything said of a *succession of apostles*. To see clearly this point, we have simply to borrow an illustration from what is taking place in Italy. Garibaldi occupies the seat of Francis II. at Naples, but no one who knows how to use texts correctly would say that the patriot general has *succeeded* the despot. It is true that Romish bishops occupied the place of the

bishops of the Primitive Church at Rome, but it is absurd to say that they succeeded them. It was a revolution, not a succession. Again; when apostles, who were not pastors or bishops, appointed pastors over the churches they had founded, these pastors did not *succeed* the apostles, any more than a viceroy, since appointed by a sovereign over a newly-acquired district, could *succeed* his sovereign. The *first* and vital point *assumed* is, then, the possibility of a *succession*. A perfectly intelligible sense of our Lord's words will be found in Protestant works, which have the merit of being based upon no assumption. The *second* assumption is that the apostles appointed *bishops*, that is, *diocesan* bishops. We have no time, and this is not the occasion to discuss whether "bishops" are a scriptural institution. Whatever may be proved from other passages, it would outrage common sense to assert that a provision of perpetual presence is the warrant for introducing *diocesan bishops* into the Church as the proof that *bishops* succeeded *apostles*. All that is promised in such passages as Matt. xxviii. 20, John xvi. 16, is, that in teaching and baptizing, the apostles, and, therefore, those that should succeed them in respect of teaching and baptizing, should be favoured with this perpetual presence. All, who scripturally teach and baptize, succeed the apostles in these inherited functions of teaching and baptizing, and, therefore, inherit the promise annexed. Men who are not *diocesan* bishops may now, as they did in the primitive church, lawfully teach and baptize, and do, in fact, inherit the promised presence. And, further, diocesan bishops, *as such*, do not teach or baptize. These are not, even in pretence, *episcopal* functions; and as the promise is in reference to these non-episcopalian functions, diocesan bishops, *as such*, have no promise of perpetual presence. In the passages quoted by "Gregory" there is nothing upon which he can ground his "inference." Indeed, he grounds it upon "the practice" of the apostles appointing bishops,—a practice not proved, as will be shown. The inference is not in itself legitimate, and the ground upon which he bases it is pure assumption, and in the face of historical evidence.

We are informed that "the teachers were sent by the apostles to the early churches *precisely* as our Lord sent the apostles; *only* the apostles were not sent to any special place" (page 89). The words "*precisely*" and "*only*," which we have italicised, simply destroy one another. The apostles were sent to the *foundation* of the church (Ephes. ii. 20; Rev. xxi. 14), and to "sit on thrones" for ever, "judging" God's spiritual "Israel"; and by their authoritative revelations and enactments, to open or shut the gates of the heavenly kingdom (Matt. xvi. 19; John xx. 23; 1 Cor. iv. 1). It was *thus* that Christ sent his apostles; and it was *not thus* that the apostles sent the teachers whom they appointed. To be an "apostle," it was necessary that a man should have "seen" Christ, and have received a personal commission from our Lord (1 Cor. ix. 1), and have had personal knowledge of Christ (Acts i. 22—28).

Their office is clearly defined, and their functions are sure to be, from their very nature, absolutely peculiar to them; and ceasing with them, according to the canon law, "a personal privilege doth follow the person, and is extinguished with the person." Nothing short of a standing miracle could give successors to such officers. In their writings their authority still exists, which may be usurped, but cannot be inherited. Their office has never been vacant (Matt. xix. 28), and no successor can fill it. They are at this moment the foundations of the Christian temple (Rev. xxi. 14), and to try to add successive foundations is to undermine it. Such are the radical differences between the commission of the apostles and the commission of the teachers sent by the apostles, which "Gregory" confounds by his "precisely." And the difference he admits does not exist in the two important cases he adduces, namely, Timothy and Titus. "Only," we are told, "the apostles were not sent to any special place." St. Paul expressly defines the duties of Timothy to be those of an evangelist (2 Tim. iv. 5), who was not sent to any "special place." Historical facts show that he was not "set over" the church at Ephesus as its first bishop, as assumed by "Gregory." Roman Catholics assume this point from the ambiguous expression, "abide still at Ephesus" (1 Tim. i. 3); but his abiding temporarily for a special object no more constituted him a diocesan bishop, than St. Paul abiding three years in the same city (Acts xx. 31) made him a bishop. Subsequently Timothy was re-called to Rome (Col. i. 1; Phil. i. 1). So Titus, left in Crete (Titus i. 3), is directed in the same epistle (iii. 12) that he would be soon required at Nicapolis; and in an epistle written subsequently (2 Tim. iv. 10), we find him at Dalmatia. The permanent location of these men at Ephesus and in Crete is a pure assumption; and upon it is founded another, that they were constituted diocesan bishops. If such had been their office and position, St. Paul would not have deemed it necessary to request Timothy to "abide still" in his supposed diocese, or to give Titus a reason for his being left in Crete, his supposed diocese. The passages adduced show that these teachers were evangelists, and facts show that, as such, they were sent hither and thither, assisting the apostles, but attached by local ties to no "special place." "Gregory's" "only" difference is the point in which Timothy and Titus did not differ from the apostles; and his "precisely" the same, interpreted by facts, means essentially different.

We are further informed that "the number of the apostles was peculiar,—twelve," and that it was to "them" that "certain promises were made"; and in a few lines after, "St. Paul, Titus, and Barnabas," are represented as *successors to these twelve*, and as not having "any personal promise" of the presence of Christ (page 88). Now, Paul distinctly, emphatically, and repeatedly, disclaims his being a successor to any or all of "the twelve," and asserts direct personal appointment and independent authority and inspiration (Gal. i. 12—24; ii. 1—10). Not an instance is or can be adduced

by "Gregory" in which "teachers" were appointed bishops by "the twelve." The two important cases he does adduce are of Timothy and Titus, who, whatever their functions, were "sent" by Paul, to whom no "personal promise" is said to have been made. Now, Paul did not succeed Peter, or any of the twelve, as declared by himself; and, as stated by "Gregory," had no "personal promise" of the presence of Christ. Paul, therefore, had no promise, and the teachers he sent could not inherit what was not bequeathed to Paul. Let it, then, be assumed, contrary to facts, that Timothy and Titus were diocesan bishops, and it will follow that they were not in the line of succession commencing with the "peculiar twelve," but in the line commencing with Paul, who was not in the line of the twelve, and having no personal promise, had no promise whatever. A succession of teachers through Timothy and Titus is then not "proved," as assumed by "Gregory" on page 89, and it is, therefore, not "admitted" that any such promise as he claims for them, was intended to extend to the bishops of the nineteenth century," and there is no necessity to have recourse to them "in matters of doubt upon any point of faith." Thus the Roman Catholic Rule of Faith is, at its very first step, shown to be founded upon misstatements and pure assumptions of the very points to be proved.

We have next to remark upon a statement which always compels a Protestant to summon to his aid all the patience and forbearance at his command. Rome, we are informed, "alone can point with unflinching and undoubted certainty to the long line of teachers from Peter downwards to Pius IX." (p. 87.) No attempt, on the principles of common sense, has ever been made to prove this notoriously false statement; and no attempt is made to refute the facts and arguments on which Protestants base their charge of falsehood. From age to age the Romanists continue to try our patience by reiterating what they refuse to *prove*. Let it, however, be conceded that there is an unbroken line, and that it is of "unflinching and undoubted certainty;" this concession is utterly worthless to Rome, if it can be shown either that the so-called successors claim what the apostles, their presumed predecessors, could not transmit, or that they claim what the apostles had not to transmit. We shall briefly show in the sequel, that Rome claims for her bishops both what the apostles could not transmit, and also what they did not possess, and, therefore, could not transmit.

But, first, the "long line" itself is nothing more than one of those "fables and endless genealogies," which the apostle foretold would "minister questions,"—a prediction which history verifies, in the rancorous feeling which Roman Catholics show towards Christians not of their own profession. Instead of a vain boast, it is incumbent upon "Ignatius," "Gregory," and others, to demonstrate by appeals to history that many, a great many, of the names on this catalogue are of persons who have any historical existence at all, and not fictitious,—mere names invented to fill up most unpleasant gaps in the succession. We demand "unflinching and un-

doubted certainty" in the line itself; not in imagination and assertions. If there be such "certainty," let "Gregory" produce competent historical evidence, for it would save the poor miserable man who occupies "Peter's chair" in Rome, and make him realize what he is, in pitiable pretence, the head of Christendom. The first thing he must cease to assume, and begin to prove, is that St. Peter was ever at Rome; and having done this, it will have to be proved, not assumed, that he lived at Rome, and lived as its bishop. Barrow, in his treatise on the Pope's supremacy, has shown that it is impossible to maintain these vital points. If Barrow's facts and reasons are not facts and reasons, let this be proved; but we cannot allow "Gregory" to assume these points. The next step for him to take, is to account for the very suspicious facts, that Clement is made the first successor of Peter by Tertullian, Rufinus, and others; that Anacletus is made Clement's predecessor by Irenæus and Eusebius; that Anacletus and Cletus are both made the predecessors of Clement by Epiphanius and others; that again, Anacletus, Cletus, and Linus are made the predecessors of Clement by Augustine and others. If these facts bear out the startling assertion of "Gregory" that "the long line is of unfailing and undoubted certainty"? Such words are, and will ever remain, in the opinion of Protestants, "great, swelling words of vanity," and for this impression "Gregory" and others are responsible as long as they withhold proofs. Eusebius, in the fourth century, declared his inability to find even "bare traces" of this certainty,* which is so "undoubted and unfailing" in the nineteenth century.

We should unduly extend this article if we were to indicate the numerous *canonical irregularities* which vitiate the integrity of the line itself broken in various parts. We have no time to show that deposed bishops went on ordaining bishops, and other irregularities, which were tolerated because they could not be entirely suppressed, which commenced at the close of the third century, and became hopelessly rife during the general confusion of the middle ages. Now, the Roman Catholic Rule of Faith is inseparably bound up with this apostolical succession, and cannot be proved till that succession has been proved.

"Gregory," again, represents "the body of Christians," "from the time of their founder," as having "priests to offer the eucharistic sacrifice, and to perform the various functions still exercised by the priesthood," and "deacons to assist at the altar and in the church" (pp. 85, 86). Here a priesthood, a sacrifice, and an altar are all assumed, and not a text given in proof that such institutions are *Christian*. The introduction of each of these notions was gradual, and the date of introduction is traced by the historian, and from the New Testament it has been repeatedly demonstrated that each one was a fresh revolutionary step in the church once existing in Rome.

The process by which "Gregory" shows that "the priesthood

and the sacrifice" of the Jewish dispensation "were not to be swept away" (page 88), is most extraordinary. "Christ himself" set the example of frequenting "the temple (which he chooses to call 'the church') at stated hours for prayer." Attending the temple for prayer, a proof that "the priesthood and sacrifice were not swept away!" Observe how the proofs accumulate: "Christ speaks of His own Church several times;" promises to "found it upon a rock;" describes it as "a city set upon a hill," "a light in the world," "a grain of mustard seed, growing up to an immense tree!" What imaginable connection is there between these doings and sayings of our Lord with "Gregory's" priesthood and sacrifice, which subvert the priesthood and sacrifice of Christ? Let the passages we cite below* be read, and the whole tenor and spirit of the Christian dispensation be duly considered, and it will be seen that no sacerdotal institution existed under the apostles, and that none were designed to exist after them. Let Mosheim and Neander be read in the next place, and the time and manner in which the simple Christian bishop appointed by the apostles was supplanted by the priests of Rome will be clearly perceived. It is incumbent upon "Gregory" to explain the fact that he cannot adduce a single instance in which the inspired authors of the New Testament employ *sacerdotal phraseology* to designate the functions of the Christian minister and deacon; whereas they do use sacerdotal phraseology to indicate the dignity and privileges of the *body* of Christians, who are constituted "a holy priesthood, to offer up spiritual sacrifices" (1 Pet. ii. 5). Rome has divested Christians, who blindly submit to so great a loss, of their spiritual functions, and pretends to invest the teaching and ruling class to whom, *as such*, Christ bequeathed no priestly function whatever.

In the absence of all warrant for the assumption of priestly functions, Roman Catholic writers resort to such passages as those to which we refer in the note below,† and in which "loosing," "binding," "remitting and retaining sins," and "stewardship" of divine "mysteries," are described as apostolical functions; and then assume, without proving first, that they imply *priestly* functions; and, secondly, that, as such, they were transmitted to their successors. We have already observed, that, except as teachers and baptizers, the apostles had not, and could not, have successors, and it remains only to be shown that it is a pure assumption that the apostles had any priestly functions to transmit. We have, under the Mosaic economy, a divinely constituted priesthood. Now, "Gregory" ought to have proved, not to have assumed, that *binding, loosing, remitting, or retaining sins* were the appropriate functions of the Levitical priesthood. Did Aaron, or any of his successors down to Caiaphas, ever blaspheme God (Luke v. 21), by pretending to absolve men of their sins? If not, it does not follow

* Rom. xii. 1; Heb. x. 19, 20; 1 Pet. ii. 4—10; 1 Jo'n ii. 1, 2; and the whole Epistle to the Hebrews.

† Matt. xvi. 19; John xx. 23; 1 Cor. iv. 1.

that apostles were priests because of their *peculiar* functions—functions which no divinely-constituted priests ever pretended to discharge. If they were not priests, their successors cannot be priests.

If, again, the functions of an apostle, denoted by “binding,” “loosing,” &c., are rightly interpreted by Rome, we have reason to expect some intimation that they, at least some of them, did absolve men from their sins. Romanists indicate their sense of the importance of such pretensions by giving prominence to them; and the apostles, supposing they also absolved men, could not have been ignorant of the importance of such a function; and yet, neither their “Acts” nor their “Epistles” is there a single instance of the exercise of so awful a function. As interpreted by all Protestants, they imply that Christ commissioned the apostles as His ambassadors to *unfold and enforce the terms* on which God forgives men their sins. The “Acts” and the “Epistles” show that they fully and finally discharged this their sacred trust; and, therefore, left neither room nor occasion for a succession, that is, made an apostolic succession a simple impossibility, and all pretension to it something akin to blasphemy.

If, as asserted, “the Christian was to take the place of the Jewish law, but to be a continuation and development of it—not its destroyer” (pp. 87, 88), it follows that the apostles “offered gifts and sacrifices for sins;” for “every high priest,” and therefore every apostle, “taken from among men,” was “ordained” for this very purpose (Heb. v. 1). St. Paul tells us, that this was *the* function of the priesthood, and if “Gregory” be right, it was at least *one* of the most important functions of an apostle; and in any description of the apostolic office, this priestly function could not possibly have been omitted. We have such a description in Acts i. 22, 23; 1 Cor. iv. 1—3, 9—17; and chap. ix. And yet not the barest allusion to anything sacerdotal exists in these passages. We have, again, qualifications of a Christian bishop specified in 1 Tim. iii. 1—7; but amongst them there is not one that has the remotest approach to priestly functions. We have, in Acts vi. 1—7, the institution of the diaconate, and in 1 Tim. iii. 8—13, a statement of the character and the duties of a Christian deacon, but in neither passage is there a word to bear out “Gregory’s” assertion that deacons existed to “assist at the altar and in the church” (p. 86). The whole tenor and spirit of Christianity is so antagonistic to sacerdotal ideas, that though, in certain communities, a Christian minister is called “priest,” yet the man who should venture to “offer both gifts and sacrifices for sins” would be regarded as *insane*. The teaching of the whole New Testament, and even of the Old, so clearly declares Christ to be the only priest of this dispensation, His cross its altar, and His body our only sacrifice, that even Gregory, in the plenitude of his assurance, does not, and *dare* not, cite the text that would prove the contrary. The only way in which he does endeavour to show that the officers of the Romish Church are priests is by representing the Lord’s Supper as a “eucharistic sacrifice.”

But that the Lord's Supper is a *sacrifice*, is so pure an assumption, that we need not take any pains to explode it.

Having illustrated how "Gregory" has begged every essential point it was incumbent upon him to *prove*, it is unnecessary to enter upon the series of minor misrepresentations, which form the remainder of his article. "A Layman" writes the third article in support of "Gregory's" paper; but as it is in support of *assumptions*, it may, for the present, at least, be left unnoticed. The ground upon which the "Catholic Rule of Faith" is based is a quicksand. To trust that rule, a man must be credulous. To appreciate the arguments used in its defence, we must carefully abjure our reasoning faculties.

There is another point on which "Gregory" bases his Rule of Faith, namely, the *visibility* of the Catholic church. A few paragraphs allow sufficient room to assume this dogma of visibility, but it cannot be exposed without writing a separate article. If the Editor can protract the discussion, we should gladly take up the subject in the next number of this periodical. If not, we trust that "Theophylact" will, in the closing negative article, show what the assumption is worth.

LEX SCRIPTA.

Philosophy.

ARE THE PRINCIPLES OF THE DEVELOPMENT THEORY TRUE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

SUCH is the consternation produced in the world of dogmatism by the "Vestiges of Creation" and the "Origin of Species," that, were we guided alone by their fears, we might speedily anticipate the closing scene of this world. We are not of those who tremble at every theory the busy intellect of man may publish to the world. He who sitteth on high in the heavens, guides the mighty stars in their courses, and with equal facility superintends the progressive life of the tiny animalculæ. Our faith in truth is strong, and still stronger in the God of truth, that He does all things well, while we erring mortals go on groping in the dark with our poor, mean, and meagre capacities, fixing the limits of His power, the propriety of His action, and the wisdom of His laws. Pietists may exclaim with frantic anger, may quake with fear, or dogmatize with arrogance. Still the world moves on, inquiry progresses, theories are propounded, criticized, and exploded, while truth gradually cumulates, facts take the place of fiction, and man advances in civilization and knowledge. The outcry raised against this theory is proof positive of the weakness of that faith in truth, nature, and nature's God, which all pietists and theorists should alike possess.

The following extract from the last number of the *Quarterly Review* seems so perfectly apposite with our present feelings, that we cannot resist the inclination to present it to the reader:—"He

who is as sure as he is of his own existence that the God of truth is at once the God of nature and the God of revelation, cannot believe it to be possible that His voice in either, rightly understood, can differ, or can deceive His creatures. To oppose facts in the natural world because they seem to oppose revelation, or to humbug them so as to compel them to speak its voice, is, he knows, but another form of the ever ready feeble-minded dishonesty, of lying for God, and trying by fraud or falsehood to do the work of the God of truth. It is with another and a nobler spirit that the true believer walks amongst the works of nature. The words graven on the everlasting rocks are the words of God, and they are graven by His hand. No more can they contradict His word, written in His book, than could the words of the Old Covenant, graven by His hand on the stony tables, contradict the writings of His hand in the volume of the new dispensation. There may be to man difficulty in reconciling all the utterances of the two voices. But what of that? He has learned already that here he knows only in part, and that the day of reconciling all apparent contradictions between what must agree, is nigh at hand. He rests his mind in perfect quietude on this assurance, and rejoices in the gift of light without a misgiving as to what it may discover."

Although it is not our purpose to follow the arguments, in their present *ex parte* condition, of the veteran controversialist, "L'Ouvrier," in passing, we would express our thorough appreciation of the religious tone with which he has introduced the question: as our opponent, we agree with him, that by "friendly counsels and mutual instruction," the thoughtful student of nature is assisted in the attainment of truth. Much stress is not laid by advocates of this theory on the evidence obtained from geological science, although firmly believing that it preponderates in their favour. It is chiefly by the facts of every-day life in the natural world by which we are surrounded, that the theory is and must be supported. Great confusion exists among naturalists as to what is and what is not a species. Consequently, some instances, both in the animal and vegetable world, are classed by different naturalists in more than one species. This, while it retards the extension of accurate knowledge, does not affect the question now at issue. It is sufficient for our present purpose to take the common acceptance of the term: we shall then understand a species to be a division of organic life, in which certain peculiarities are possessed by every individual: these peculiarities being considered either as morphological or physiological essentials, however much they may differ among themselves as to other varying peculiarities.

That all organic life has descended from a few primordial forms must be apparent to every student of nature, whatever may be the peculiar theory he may have adopted with reference to their original creation. We read, in the second chapter of Genesis, that all things were created by God *before they grew*, and that they all possessed those peculiarities by which they were to be propagated upon the earth. Hence it is unnecessary for us to enter upon any theory to

account for their existence; that is a fact, and we have now only to do with things as they do and may exist.

Much variety is found in all animals and plants with which we are most familiar. The question is, How is this variety to be accounted for? Dogs are so greatly varied, that but few can tell the catalogue of their names and characters. Yet perhaps no animal has become so plastic under the controlling care of man. Who shall dare to assert that a new race, crossed between two varieties of this animal, may not possess such peculiarities as to recommend them to the particular care of man as his servants, to the exclusion of their original parents, and perhaps to the utter extinction of the original races from which the mongrel has sprung? In such a case, what would be the position occupied by the mongrel race, supposing all living specimens of their originals to have failed? Would it then be regarded as a race, a variety, or a species? The horse presents great varieties; yet who will say that the pure Arab steed, in his native clime, is not morphologically a distinct animal from the dray-horse of the city of London? Are we to call this difference a race, variety, or a species? And if these differences are so perceptible, and so capable of production within a limited historic time, why may not still longer times produce still greater deviations? The argument of infertility, as applied to hybrids and crosses, is without effect, because facts show equal evidence for and against fertility. The permanence of the peculiarity in any line of race is strong evidence of the possibility to originate new species, or beings essentially different to their progenitors. The rock pigeon is said to be the parent stock of all the varieties of pigeons; and from this man has selected certain peculiarities of form, colour, or habits; and these peculiarities he has carefully propagated, so that they are comparatively permanent. Now supposing this had taken place in nature far from the influence of man, and that variety farthest removed from the rock pigeon in form, colour, or habits, had shared with its original the domain of life, extinguishing all transitional or intermediate forms, would these two kinds of birds on their first discovery have been considered as the same species, but of different varieties, or would they have been placed on the records of science as different species? We are inclined to believe, that had they fallen into the hands of a naturalist with leanings in favour of a morphological classification of species, he would have ranked them as separate and distinct species.

Again, counting up the points of divergence, do we not find that there are points more distinct, more divergent, and more numerous between the so-called varieties of dogs, horses, and pigeons respectively, than there are between some species?

The delicately formed Italian greyhound, the lady's pet, is much more divergent in its morphological peculiarities from the bulldog and the mastiff, than the wolf is from the pointer, or the fox from the English terrier.

In like manner, the ass is nearer in many respects to the Welsh

or the Shetland pony than the rough, uncultivated English cart-horse is to the pure Arabian.

Instances might be continued *ad libitum*, but we trust we have indicated sufficient to lead the judgment without wearying the attention.

Thus we perceive that—how creation was effected is no part of this question; that all things had planted in their nature, by the act of creation, power to propagate their kind with variations; that these variations are susceptible of increase according to the circumstances of their being; and that, such being the case, variety may become more potent than the original peculiarity: that those possessing the original peculiarity may be displaced from the sphere of organic being; and that hence, the more potent peculiarity may become a new species.

Nature delights in change, orderly change; and all things assume, however closely they may be examined, a progressive development towards perfection: such poets sing, historians record, and science observes. Then far be it from the *British Controversialist* to fossilize themselves in the cold dogmatism of an exploded fallacy, while they can marshal themselves under the banner of intellectual progress raised by the authors of "*Vestiges of Creation*," and "*The Origin of Species by Natural Selection*," the foremost advocates of the Development Theory.

DELTA.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

"This is the origin of the heavens and the earth when they were created, in the day that the Lord God made the earth and the heavens, and every plant of the field before it was in the earth, and every herb before it grew."—Gen. ii. 4, 5.

HAVING, in our previous remarks introduced the Theory of Development to our readers, as we believe impartially, and shown some reasons for disbelieving the theory, it is our duty, on the present occasion, still farther to show, that it is contrary to fact, opposed to reason, and logically false, being based on assumptions which are incapable of proof.

We are not of that number who would fear the results of the Development Theory, if generally received as truth: we believe that the more exact our knowledge of nature, the more earnest becomes our faith in the divine record; and the more perfect our intimacy with the sublime sciences of astronomy, geology, and natural history, in like proportion we are led to admire the wisdom and perfection of inspiration. It is true, this theory of development and the transmutation of species had their origin in an age of scepticism, and have received much favour from the great doubters of all time since their first promulgation; but Holy Scripture has stood the test of many fiery trials, and we still find it is written, "*All Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction in righteousness, that the man of God might be thoroughly furnished to every good work*," and we can-

time to learn "how the worlds were fashioned, when as yet there was none of them," in the simple language of narrative; so that the poorest peasant may read and understand as much of the grand mystery of creation, as the most erudite philosopher who has ever sought glory or fame in the literary world.

The Development Theory assumes that the earth, as originally formed from nebulous matter, consisted entirely of what is understood by geologists as the metamorphic rocks, which have never yet yielded any evidence of life upon the earth during their formation; upon these all other rocks rest, and are of a stratified character, showing a progressive formation, or deposit of a particular character, according to the nature of the circumstances under which they are found; these stratified formations all exhibit fossiliferous remains of various forms of life. The advocates of development assert that the lowest strata afford only the lowest types of life, both vegetable and animal, and that each ascending stratum in regular progression ascends in the character of its fossils, until the highest point is reached, or that on which man is made to perform his part as God's vicegerent, creation's chief handiwork.

Ten formations are reckoned, from the azoic rocks upwards—viz., the Lower Silurian, the Upper Silurian, the Devonian, the Carboniferous, the Trias, the Oolitic, the Cretaceous, the Eocene, the Miocene, and the Drift. The three first of these formations are distinguished as the Primary age; the next four compose the Secondary age; the Tertiaries form the third age; and the last is called the Modern age of the world; and they are still further characterized respectively as the reign of fishes, of reptiles, of mammals, and of man.

Throughout the whole of this geologic cycle, by the Development Theory, life is made to commence with the lowest possible form, and gradually, yet steadily, to advance, one form and one organism running into and becoming another and a better form—each succeeding organism being an improvement and gradual perfection of its predecessor; it being essential to the theory, and boldly maintained by the theorists, that the simplest, lowest form of life, is never coeval with any higher or the highest grades of organic existence: that such is their assumption, we appeal to their works, *passim*.

The Silurian system being the lowest formations, and resting immediately on the granite or azoic rocks, is represented by the theorists as entirely devoid of life, excepting such as belongs to the humblest divisions of the vegetable and animal kingdoms. "The radiata, articulata, and mollusca, were, according to their report, represented by their simplest forms, while the higher and more perfect divisions were wholly wanting."

It must be remembered that the Lower and Upper Silurian systems are divided into the lowest or Llandeilo formation, next the Caradoc, thirdly, the Wenlock, and, highest of all, the Ludlow formation. Now, "in 1838, Sir R. Murchison found the *onchus Murchisoni* and *onchus tenuistriatus*, the highest order of placoids, in Llandeilo flags." "In 1842, Mr. Phillips found 'innumerable small teeth

and spines,' just above the Aymestry limestone; and in 1845, 'a portion of a fish belonging to the cestracant family of the placoid order was found in the Wenlock limestone.' "In 1847, 'defensive spines of fishes' were found in the Upper Llandeilo flag, by Sir R. Murchison; and afterwards similar spines were found in the Bala limestone by the Government Survey. The Bala limestone is below the Lower Silurian group." The onchus is as perfect in the Bala limestone as it is in the Ludlow rocks, although ages, beyond our powers to calculate, must have intervened between the existence of these specimens of the onchus found in these two formations, so widely differing in their historic position. "Professor Agassiz found on comparison, that the spine of the onchus which was found, is more than twice as large as the *spine* of the dog-fish, or that even of the Port Jackson shark. These early placoids were found to be larger than those of the present day. They were not mere abortions or pigmies, but true and noble vertebrata, of enormous proportions, armed with defensive spines, five times as large as the dog-fish of the present era,—Adams at their birth, admitting of no improvement, and proving, by comparison, that none has ever taken place." — (*Taylor's Indications* pp. 74, 75.) So much for the Cambrian and Silurian systems, in which the friends of Development found nothing but the lowest forms of animal life. Fact is contrary to their theory, and although this one fact were sufficient disproof of their theory, we shall see further proof of a cumulative character as we proceed.

In the Old Red Sandstone the theorists found a few fishes, but "they were manifestly of an inferior character to those which succeeded them;" these "inferior" creatures are the ganoids and placoids of the preceding formations, and are said only to possess "a rudimental or cartilaginous skeleton," whereas they possessed a real osseous skeleton, and are placed by eminent naturalists among the most perfect of their order: recent knowledge, however, is acquired of an extraordinary fish, the *asterolopis*, in this formation. This fish was discovered by the lamented Hugh Miller, in Stromness, in 1848, and again by Mr. Peach, in Cornwall, in 1850.

Here, at the base of the Old Red Sandstone, are discovered the remains of a giant fish of most remarkable structure; the *asterolopis* was covered with true osseous scales, and well supplied with free and protected gills; the osseous plate or cranial buckler measures in some specimens eighteen inches or more in length, and the defensive spines seven inches long, representing fishes of not less than nine to twelve feet in length, with all the marks of their high order. "Thus," says Hugh Miller, "in the not unimportant circumstance of size, the most ancient ganoids yet known, instead of taking their place, agreeably to the demands of the development hypothesis, among the sprats, sticklebacks, and minnows of their class, took their place among its huge basking sharks, gigantic sturgeons, and bulky sword-fishes. They were giants, not dwarfs."

. . . . In cranial bucklers, in which the average thickness of

the plates does not exceed three *eighth* parts of an inch, their thickness in the centre of the ridges must have been three-quarters. The head of the largest crocodile of the existing period is defended by an armature greatly less strong than that worn by the *asterolopis* of the lower Old Red Sandstone. Why this ancient ganoid should have been so ponderously helmed, we can but doubtfully guess; we only know, that when nature arms her soldiery, there are assailants to be resisted, and a state of war to be maintained."

A reviewer, speaking of this *asterolopis*, says, "This fish," to speak in the technical language of Agassiz, "undoubtedly belongs to the cestraciant family of the placoid order, proving to demonstration that the oldest known fossil-fish belongs to the highest type of that division of the vertebrata."

It is, however, upon the brainular development of animals that we must depend for their true position in the scale of being, not on their osseous system only; for if mere bone were to mark the highest position in the scale of being, then would man dwindle into mere dwarfishness beside the giants and monsters of the Tertiary period. Judging from the brainular standard of animal life, "which is undoubtedly the true one, the placoids and ganoids of the Lower Silurian and Cambrian, and the Old Red Sandstone systems, take their places high up in the scale of Ichthyic existence,—not at the foot of the list of fishes, but at the head; real giants, constituting the highest and best specimens in their order." "The *asterolopis* is not the only large and well-developed fish whose history has been written on the rock-book of that era. There are many. To use the language of H. Miller, this series 'could supply with ichthyolites, by the ton and ship-load, the museums of the world.' A few only of the many witnesses have been interrogated; but these, we think, fully contradict the idea of development." Besides evidences of air-breathing animals, monster reptiles having lived in this ancient period have been discovered by Mr. J. Lea, in America, and are authenticated by Sir C. Lyell.

We could, in like manner, adduce from each geologic age facts equally potent to contradict the theory; but space is wanting for so detailed an examination and refutation. Suffice it, then, for our present purpose, to remind the reader that the theory assumes the commencement of life to be of the humblest forms and lowest types. Known and well-attested facts show this to be an assumption without proof; that the theory is contrary to fact, so far as the fossil history of the earth is concerned. The theory is not more supported by fact in the historic era of the earth. No man has ever recorded a single fact in support of the theory; many assumptions are made; hypotheses with their *ifs* are plentiful; but facts are things of such a stubborn nature, that they are utterly regardless of the service required from them by the theorists, and refuse to yield any evidence in their favour. A pigeon is a pigeon, whether it may be called fantail, pouter, tumbler, carrier, or common rock. A horse is and always has been a horse, whether it has lived amid

the splendours of Egyptian and Assyrian greatness, carried warriors to the siege of Troy, or now draws a brewer's dray along the crowded streets of our metropolis. The gazelle may have acquired timidity, agility, velocity, by the circumstances in which nature has placed it, but it is still the gazelle. The fox or the wolf show no traces of transition or transmutation into the form, character, habits, or constitution of a dog. Neither have we any transitional form, to show that the chasm hitherto dividing the human family from the lower orders of animal life is possible to be passed by anything short of an independent act of creation—the will of the Almighty God; although, to the disgrace of humanity, many instances are found in which man degrades himself below the brute creation, by doing that which the instinct of inferior beings forbids them to do. These remarks necessarily lead us to that phase of the question assumed in the “Origin of Species by Natural Selection.” All that is true in this system is not new, and all that is new is not true.

That the strongest of all organic life is most likely, nay, will become victor in the struggle for continued existence, is so trite an observation, that we feel surprised any amount of scientific celebrity is necessary to give it currency. That, under favourable circumstances, organisms will become improved, stronger, better, more perfect, needs not a second Daniel to inform us, nor is a Solon necessary to prove that many forms of animated being are apparently designed for the sustenance of others of their fellow-mortals. But that an apple may become a pear, a cherry improve to a peach, the acorn give birth to a cedar of Lebanon, or the rose tree have for its genealogic successor the banian tree of India, would induce us to look for more than a second Daniel, or even a Solon. Yet all this must be believed, if we adopt the whole theory, time and circumstances alone being requisite to conduce to this end.

The only instance in which Mr. Darwin has attempted to show anything like transition is mentioned at page 191 of his work on the “Origin of Species,” where the pedunculated cirripedes are said to graduate into the balanidæ, or sessile cirripedes, and *vice versa*: but we submit that not one word is found to demonstrate those relations of the folded membranes in the balanidæ with the heart or muscular system, which could alone prove the respiratory function of such membranes.

Therefore, whether we take the facts of past time or present, or look to the works of the most celebrated authors, we are necessarily led to conclude that facts are against the theory, and the instances adduced in support of the theory are assumptions without proof.

But we have said that the theory is contrary to reason. Reason, looking at the whole field of organic life, and gathering up the observations of many ages, infers this general law—that all existences have an ordained course of being; that this course of being is the same for each individual of his stirps, or line of being; and, although great difference may exist between the several stirpes, no

essential difference exists among the individual of any one stirps. Such being then the ordinary course of nature, it must necessarily be irrational to assume, without positive and most irrefragible proof, that one species may become another, either from outward circumstances, however potent in their character, or from inward influences of the most impulsive nature. To suppose the change to arise from inward impulse, is to suppose a cause contrary and superior to the ordained course of its being—a supposition of glaring absurdity; and to suppose the change to be effected by outward circumstances, is to give to secondary causes of an unintelligent and inanimate nature a power to override and render nugatory the great First Cause of being, the intelligent Creator of the universe, which is a species of reckless daring amounting to blasphemous impiety. Nor can objection be taken to this view of the reason of the thing, from the apparent similarity of all organic existence at the beginning, or during the period of embryonic existence. The germinal cell may appear to us similar in all cases, but its appearing so to us, with our limited powers of knowing whether it is so, is no proof that it does not possess distinctive peculiarities sufficient to act as natural and efficient causes to produce those results which the ordained course of its being requires, in each particular individual, according to its genealogic relations.

In like manner, the embryonic condition of organic life may present certain analogous appearances, with the same mysterious deviations at certain ordained times; but these deviations occur according to the ordained course of that stirps to which the individual embryo belongs. We submit that the order and regularity of the change proves the existence of an efficient cause, in accordance with the laws of the Great Creator, implanted in the germinal cell, and continued throughout its embryonic state, until maturity is secured. To suppose otherwise, were to resist reason, facts, nature, and nature's God.

That the principles of the theory are assumptions without proof, is evident to the most casual student; for a theory is started, and facts are distorted; hypothesis is taken as the groundwork, while the ignorance and weakness of the human intellect are made the superstructure upon which the whole theory is elaborated. It has been well observed, that one fact would have done good service in support of the theory; but the absence of all well-authenticated facts, the opposition of all known facts and experiences, combined with the irrationality of the theory, stamp it as a futile, fallacious folly—a monument erected to commemorate the vagaries to which scientific men have committed themselves in the nineteenth century.

In conclusion, we submit, since science demands it, that this theory, in common with all other theories which are contrary to observation and the historic experiences of this world's life, should produce demonstrable proof of each and every step in the theory, from its foundation maxim upwards, to the most minute

detail. Until this is done—and we contend, the *onus probandi* lies with the theorists—our conviction of the permanence of species must remain, and be utterly opposed to the idea of development as hitherto propounded.

L'OUVRIER.

Social Economy.

IS COUNSEL JUSTIFIED IN DEFENDING FROM PUNISHMENT A CRIMINAL OF WHOSE GUILT HE HAS BEEN PROFESSIONALLY MADE COGNIZANT?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

It appears to us that this question is unfairly put, as it assumes that counsel usually know whether the criminals whom they are defending be guilty or not. This, we believe, is seldom or never the case; but granting, for the sake of the present discussion, that it is, we yet affirm that even then an advocate is justified in defending the criminal with whose guilt he has been professionally made acquainted; and we hope we shall be able to adduce sufficient reasons to justify our position. Far be it, however, from us to wish for the painful spectacle of eminent advocates calling on the Deity to attest the innocence of known guilty clients, or, with tears in their eyes, declaring that they believe them to be injured persons; but even in such cases, the excitement of the moment, the pale faces of the criminals, the shadow of the gibbet, and the impending sentence of the law, furnish many excuses for this error in advocacy.

In order to set the question more clearly before our minds, let us suppose, for the moment, that it stands thus:—"Is counsel justified in defending from *legal* punishment a criminal of whose *moral* guilt he has been professionally made cognizant?" Should we give a negative or an affirmative to this proposition? Undoubtedly an affirmative.

Let us correctly ascertain, then, in the first place, what is the precise position of the prisoner as he stands before the dread tribunal of the law.

He is arraigned by the law, to answer to the law, whether he has offended that law or not. He has been domiciled in the place where the law before which he is arraigned has been in operation, and he has, therefore, the right to any and every protection which he can derive from that law, in his hour of need; and he has as good a title to that protection as the purest in the land, even though his guilt were as deep-dyed as that of the notorious Palmer.

Twelve of his fellow-men have been summoned to decide whether he has offended against the law or not,—each being under the

protection of the same law. The prisoner has then read over to him an indictment,—a legal instrument,—detailing those parts of the law against which he is supposed to have offended. He is then required to say whether he be guilty or not, which simply means, “Do you wish to be tried, or do you not?” and he makes his reply according to his own pleasure; but whichever way he may choose to plead, he must be *found* guilty by the jury, for the judge cannot sentence the man, although self-convicted, till he is likewise convicted *by the law*; and, according to law, he is not guilty till he is found and proved to be so; and, in many cases, it happens that, although he may be guilty of an act against the law, yet he may not be guilty of the act imputed to him.

Mr. Baron Martin, some short time ago, was the judge before whom a young man was indicted for wilful murder. When called upon to declare himself “guilty or not guilty,” he chose the former; but the learned judge did not like to take this confession, and pressed upon him the importance of pleading “Not guilty,” at the same time explaining to him that he would in no way compromise his conscience by so doing, as he thereby merely expressed his wish to have the matter proved, one way or the other. He even humanely offered to grant him a day for consideration; but, although the young man persisted in his course, it was with the sincere tears of genuine feeling in his eyes that he pronounced upon him the fearful sentence of the law: and all honour, we say, to that judge, for his humanity, in not wishing to doom his fellow-man to destruction, if it could be avoided.

It is the duty of the administrators of the law also to study justice; and it is, or ought to be, the spirit and intention of the laws of a Christian country not so much to punish as to reform; not to send the man out of the world unprepared, nor to turn him into the world with the brand of the felon on his brow, but to make him, if possible, a fit and useful member of society, remembering the Divine injunction, “He that is without guilt, let him cast the first stone!”

In the next place, let us ascertain what is the duty of the English advocate. It is his sacred duty to throw the shield of protection over the weak, to defend the defenceless, to give counsel to those who need it, to help his fellow out of the “Slough of Despond,” and finally, as Lord Brougham declares, to know no one but his client, to believe none other, and to do his best for that client, utterly regardless of any consequences that may accrue; this then is the duty of the advocate, and we believe every man to be justified in doing his duty, whatever that may be.

Surely, then, if the prisoner *should* have acknowledged to his counsel that he is guilty, as he stands arraigned at the bar, to answer for his life, or liberty, with, perhaps, a few circumstances in his favour, he is a proper subject for the English advocate to extend the strong hand of protection to. Take, for instance, the extreme case of murder, and grant that the advocate is aware of the criminality

of the accused, yet there may be circumstances in extenuation of the crime—circumstances of provocation, or extreme wretchedness; or blindness through drink, or other matters—which can only be drawn out of the witnesses by a counsel used to dealing with them, although they have been sworn to give the “whole truth;” and who can so well as a disinterested person show the effect these circumstances may have had upon the mind of the criminal, whereby he may have been insanely urged to the committal of the deed of blood?

Surely, in this age of civilization, it will not be argued that it is unjustifiable for an advocate to endeavour to produce all the favourable evidence and extenuating circumstances he can, to mitigate the blackness of the offence. To this may be traced the fact of many lives being saved through recommendations to mercy, brought about by favourable evidence thus adduced, and which would, otherwise, never have come to light. Far distant be the day when the justice of the interference of counsel to protect even the guilty shall be universally denied! We think this is one of the foundation-stones on which the gorgeous superstructure of free English jurisprudence has been raised, and we hope we may never live to see the time when it will be thrown from its place and trampled upon.

Again: it is a well-known fact that there are so many different shades of offence, that it might happen, but for this interference of counsel, that the prisoner, although guilty of an offence, might receive punishment for some offence never committed. Thus it so frequently occurs that prisoners accused of murder are often only guilty of, and receive punishment for, manslaughter; and the same holds good for all offences.

Let us refer to the famous state trial of Simon Bernard, for aiding in the attempt against the life of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte. There can, we think, be very little doubt that he was really guilty of that crime (if crime it was), but, according to the ancient usages and laws of England, he was not legally guilty, and the jury refused to convict him. Will it be said that his counsel acted wrongly in defending him from punishment? Surely not.

But it is better that ten guilty men be liberated, than that an innocent one suffer; and it is rarely or never the case that the guilty man obtains an acquittal, whatever may be the ingenuity of his counsel. Although he may not be convicted of the capital offence for which he is indicted, yet it usually happens that he is sentenced on the lesser charge.

The well-known case of Astlett exemplifies this principle. Through the ingenuity of Lord (then Mr.) Erskine, he was acquitted from the charge of forging Exchequer bills, and, without entering into the details, we may say that this was a verdict strictly in accordance with every principle of truth. But what then? He was sentenced and imprisoned on a charge of stealing pieces of paper, of which he was guilty. No prisoner should be sentenced for forging, if he be not guilty of it; and if it can only be detected by an advocate, we

think that advocate is fully justified, although he may be aware that he is guilty of some crime.

In conclusion,—whenever a prisoner stands before us, we should remember that we see a man, a brother in trouble, it may be, with heart seared and a conscience blackened by the committal of crime; that he is weak and helpless, and perhaps repentant, therefore we hold it to be the duty of every one of us, as far as we can, to shield him from destruction, and to endeavour to find some good in him till, to save him from punishment, if we can, and turn him, if possible, into a right path; to succour and assist him, knowing not what temptations and severe trials he may have been subjected, or through what fiery furnace of affliction he may have had to walk to the criminal's position.

H. K.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

SIMILAR or the same arguments should be used to prove the above question in the affirmative as would be employed to prove all punishment wrong: since the success of a counsel who defends guilty men tends to prevent all punishment. If it be wrong to punish, it cannot be wrong to assist a criminal to escape punishment; but if it be right—nay, even necessary—to take vengeance on guilt; then it seems to us the question is answered, and there remains little need for discussion. Yet, as it is probable the busy, acute brains of some intelligent contributors may discover reasons why an advocate should defend a guilty man, we shall endeavour briefly and conclusively to show it to be both unjustifiable and immoral.

With respect to the criminal, it may perhaps be said that he was driven to his deed by drunkenness or by hunger; that he is weak and unfortunate; and that his case will be made worse than it is by the counsel for the prosecution. Certainly he is to be pitied, but bad as his condition is, he is plainly answerable for it. If he was drunk when he acted wrongly, it was himself who put the “serpent into his mouth that stole away his senses.” If hunger urged him on—and that is the very best excuse we can imagine a prisoner alleging—he still had no right to take what was not his own. If the prosecuting counsel makes the case appear worse than the truth, it is then the proper work of the prisoner's advocate to show where the exaggeration is. Still he is a criminal, and must be treated as such. As he is a man, we mourn over him; as he is fallen, we pity him; but as he is guilty, we punish him.

Of the advocate it may be said, that his knowledge of the prisoner's guilt was obtained professionally; and an attempt may be made to endow him with a sort of dual existence, to separate the man from the counsel, and to allow in the special pleader what is not allowable in the man. To a person who is guided by the moral principles which no one likes openly to scoff at, it will not seem excuse sufficient to say, that because he would not have known except professionally, he was therefore justified in lying professionally. And what must we think of a profession that assumes the right of pre-

venting the execution of the laws, and boldly laughs at justice and truth?

Let us put a case clearly before you. Bill Sykes is in trouble. He was in want of money, and his soul abhors honest labour. So he watches old farmer Thompson coming home from market, rather the worse for liquor, and with a tempting sum in his pocket. Bill Sykes easily dispatches him, and bears away the spoil. He has the marks of blood upon his clothes as well as upon his soul. By some train of circumstances he is suspected, arrested, and put in prison, with every prospect of a short shrift. Consequently, he is in trouble, and the question is, how can he get out of it? He engages Mr. Sergeant Twister, famous for getting the guilty clear. He will defend him, but he must be told everything, to be prepared for all possible evidence. When the judge and jury are met to settle the affair, Mr. Sergeant Twister cross-examines and browbeats, pleads and supplicates, and finally succeeds, by indignant protests and weeping appeals, in deceiving the soft-hearted jurymen into a verdict of "Not Guilty." And so they turn upon society a wretch whose appetite for blood is simply whetted, and whose dread of punishment is changed into a feeling of impunity. The question for you, impartial reader, is whether Mr. Sergeant Twister is justified in his lying, or whether he is not a sharer in the guilt of the murderer? Now we don't wonder that Bill Sykes engages a counsel. We should marvel if he did not. He is in a fair way of ending his days in a very unpleasant manner. He loves life, miserable as he is. But how is it that Mr. Sergeant Twister, a learned and a respectable gentleman, can lend his assistance to Bill Sykes? He might just as well supply him with files and ropes, and make the turnkey drunk.

The prisoner "is allowed to have a counsel, to assist him not only in the discussion of any point of law which may be complicated with the fact, but also in the investigation of the fact itself; and who points out to him the questions he ought to ask; or even asks them for him. This is only done through custom and the indulgence of the judges."* This is a wise and merciful privilege, for it may often happen that a prisoner, although innocent, may still find it impossible to disprove the evidence against him. To be allowed the assistance of one practised in law, and accustomed to carefully sift the testimony of witnesses, is truly a blessing to the man whose character or liberty, or whose life even, is at stake. To strive for the acquittal of some unfortunate individual, who is unjustly charged with crime, is a noble enterprise. We can imagine none nobler than to vindicate the cause of the weak, and to rescue the guiltless from the penalties designed for the guilty alone. How different must our estimate be of the efforts of a man whose application and talents are all devoted to making "the worse appear the better reason."

It is true we cannot repress a feeling of commiseration for the poor wretch whose fate depends on the jurymen. But have we the

* De Lolme.

ing faculty of being both merciful and just? If we indulge our good nature, and through kindness refrain from punishing crime, there is the sacrifice we shall offer instead? "A king is a mortal on earth." It is his duty to vindicate the laws; for they are only a terror to evil-doers, and those countries are always most unhappy where the laws are not respected. If guilt is not visited with its due punishment, the first and chief bonds of society are broken, and licence and anarchy ensue. If, then, it is right to punish, it must be wrong to prevent punishment. Nor does it avail to say that the counsel stands in place of the prisoner, and merely acts for him; can that absolve an individual from his duty to society, to truth, and to God? Has any man a right to cause truth to be disbelieved, to render vain the expensive efforts of society to preserve national morality, and to commit a crime against the public good, just because he is—paid for it?

We can imagine some one saying, "Are you not going too far? Are you not hyper-virtuous?" This is a thing that is done every day. It is understood that a counsel does all he can to get his client off. You are straining when you talk of public morals and bonds of society, of crimes against God and man." Yes, sir, it is a common thing, and so is sin, but it is not the more right on that account. Suppose Sergeant Twister to be always successful. Every criminal is acquitted, and cannot again be tried for the same offence; how soon would security of life and property give place to lawless times, in which honest people would be driven to the unseemly expedient of Lynch law. So that when we talk of sinning against society, we are not wronging the venal advocate. As a citizen, he cannot be justified, because he arrays himself on the side of the enemies of law and order. And, personally, he is as culpable as any other man who wilfully "maketh and loveth a lie." We cannot imagine a single veritable reason that acquits an advocate of blame who acts in a manner, which, in any other situation of life, would be accounted false and dishonourable. Not that it is wrong to advocate the cause of a guilty person. There is good scope for the abilities of an ordinary man in preventing the crime of the accused being magnified, in laying before the jury the extenuating circumstances of the case, and in softening the harsh charges of opposing counsel. We contend that, beyond this, a person who believes in a difference between Truth and Falsehood cannot conscientiously go. To the man who acts thus—honour and praise; but to him who sells truth for pelf—contempt and ignominy.

"If," to quote "Nona's" words, "a guilty person be condemned when the evidence is either incomplete or conflicting," the sin would clearly lie at the door of the prosecuting counsel, of the jury, and of the judge. We don't deny the justice of allowing a guilty man an advocate. Let him have one, and let him see that the "law be not strained ever so slightly." And the law has made so many reservations in favour of an accused person, holding him innocent till proved guilty, and giving him the advantage of every doubt,

that he will be assisted by the law itself. It is a privilege we boast of, but surely there is nothing in it that excuses a man in defending a criminal from punishment. We agree with "Nona" that it is better that ten guilty escape, than that one innocent suffer. But "Nona's" reason is, that "what is socially right cannot be morally wrong." Where is the proof that socially it is better for ten guilty to escape than for one innocent to suffer? "If," says Paley, "by better be meant that it is more for the public advantage, the proposition, I think, cannot be maintained. The security of civil life is protected chiefly by the dread of punishment. The misfortune of an individual (for such may the suffering, or even the death of an innocent person be called when they are occasioned by no evil intention) cannot be placed in competition with this object." If then, it is not socially right, what becomes of "Nona's" argument? And what becomes of his cause, which he is willing to risk upon it being for the public good?

There is something amusing in "Nona's" endeavours to show that counsellors are philanthropic gentlemen, who devote their time, firstly, to the study of the law; and, secondly, to the rescue of unfortunate rogues and murderers, whose trade is interfered with by meddling justice. Good, kind testimonial; deserving creatures, what slanders an envious world raises about golden fees!

But let the truth be spoken, even if it be to the disadvantage of these worthies. Let us see what "Nona" says about them:—"The defence of his client does not imply his belief in that client's innocence, any more than the appearance of the counsel for the prosecution indicates his belief in the prisoner's guilt." Well may they exclaim, "Save us from our friends!" And well may we inquire how it has come to pass that no one supposes an advocate to have a conscience. And if the question be asked, will not the answer be found in the bold and confident manner in which they have defended some of the greatest scoundrels that ever cursed the earth?

R. T. G.

The Essayist.

SHAKESPERE FACTS, FANCIES, FORGERIES, AND FABRICATIONS.

IV.—FAME—FORTUNE—LEISURE—DEATH.

"Oh! his desert speaks loud; and I should wrong it
To lock it in the ward of covert bosom,
When it deserves, in characters of brass,
A fortified residence 'gainst the tooth of time,
And razure of oblivion."—*Measure for Measure*.

1598. The most direct, trustworthy, and unimpeachable evidence of Shakespeare's position in the literary world appears in "A

Comparative Discourse of our English Poets with the Greek, Latin, and Italian Poets," contained in eight pages of a thick little 12mo., entitled "Palladis Tamia; Wit's Treasury; being the Second Part of Wit's Commonwealth: by Francis Meres, Maister of Artes of the Universities. London: Printed by P. Short, for Cuthbert Burbie, 1598." Meres was born in Lincolnshire; was a clergyman, schoolmaster, and compiler of school-books; and Heywood calls him "an approved good scholar." In this work—which contains an enumeration and classification of the most celebrated poets up to and at the time when it was written, not only in the judgment of the author, but by general repute—Shakespeare is ranked among the most esteemed contemporary poets in different branches of art; as alone and unrivalled in tragedy and comedy; and is specially marked out as an improver of the English tongue. No fewer than six times does the name of Shakespeare flow to the pen-point of the writer, as worthy of mention and praise. No other poet is noted so frequently. Spenser and Drayton stand next; but at a considerable distance. Though no play had as yet been published with Shakespeare's name, Meres speaks of them as matters of public notoriety, and indicates by special mention several, as instances in proof of his assertions regarding his merit. Lest, however, our account be held to be too favourable, we shall show, in the author's own words, the opinion of Shakespeare entertained and published in 1598. We quote as briefly as possible, but verbatim, the allusions Meres makes to the great dramatist, viz.:—

"The English tongue is mightily enriched and gorgeously invested in rare ornaments and resplendent (h)abiliments by Sir Philip Sidney, Spenser, Daniel, Drayton, Warner, Shakespeare, Marlow, and Chapman."

"As the soul of Euphorbus was thought to live in Pythagoras, so the sweetest, witty soul of Ovid lives in mellifluous and honey-tongued Shakespeare. Witness his 'Venus and Adonis,' his 'Lucrece,' his *sugred sonnets* among his private friends," &c.

"Shakespeare, among the English, is the most excellent in both kinds (i.e., tragedy and comedy) for the stage. For comedy, witness 'Ge[n]tleme[n] of Verona;' his '[Comedy of] Errors;' his 'Loves Labours Lost;' his 'Loves Labours Wonne;' his 'Midsummer's Night Dream;' and his 'Merchant of Venice.' For tragedy, his 'Richard the II.;' 'Richard the III.;' 'Henry the IV.;' 'King John;' 'Titus Andronicus;' and his 'Romeo and Juliet.'"

"The Muses would speak with Shakespeare's fine-filed phrase, if they would speak English."

"As Ovid saith of his work,—

"*Opus ævægi, quod nec Jovis ira, nec ignis
Nec poterit ferrum, nec edax abolere vetustas.*"

And as Horace saith of his, 'Exegi monumentu[m] aere perennius; et fuga temporum;' so I say severally of Sir Philip Sidney's, Spenser's, Daniel's, Drayton's, Shakespeare's, and Warner's workes,

"Non Jovis ira, imbres, Mars, ferrum, flamma senectus,
Hoc opus unda, lues turbo, venena ruent."

"As Pindarus, Anacreon, and Call[imachus] among the Greekes, and Horace and Catullus among the Latines, are the Lyrick poets, so in this faculty the best among our poets are Spenser, who excelleth in all kinds, Daniel, Drayton, Shakespeare, Breton."

Again, after naming the chief "tragicke poets" of Greece, and "among the Latines," and some of the earlier English dramatists, he enumerates "Marlow, Peele, Watson, Kyd, *Shakespeare*, Drayton, Decker, and Benjamin Jonson;" and having done the same for "the best poets for comedy," he mentions "Lillie, Lodge, Gascoyne, Greene, *Shakespeare*, Thomas Nash, Thomas Heywood, Anthony Munday, our best plotter, Chapman, Porter, Wilson, Hathway, and Henry Chettle: again, having spoken of those famous "for elegies," he says, "These are the most passionate among us to bewaile and bemoane the perplexities of love, Henrie Howard, Earl of Surrey, Sir Thomas Wyat the elder, Sir Francis Brian, Sir Philip Sidney, Sir Walter Rawley, Sir Edward Dyer, Spenser, Daniel Drayton, *Shakespeare*, Whetstone, Gascoyne, Samuel Page, sometime fellow of Balliol College, Oxford, Churchyard, Breton."

Some discussion has arisen as to the period at which the landlord of New Place began to write for the stage. In leisure and affluence he is reported, by tradition, to have produced two plays a year. That seems to have been about the average of Ben Jonson and of Philip Massinger; nor do Beaumont and Fletcher seem to have done more than four, on an average, between them. Unless, therefore, we assume an extraordinary speed and productivity in *Shakespeare*, and that, too, while he had the duties of an actor and theatrical proprietor, as well as *probably* some other business in relation to his sales and purchases, we ought to have a good means of inferring, with some approximation to truth, the age at which the dramatist began his career. Meres' book was probably written some time before it was published—but let that pass—and he mentions besides "Venus and Adonis," "Lucrece," and "Sonnets," no fewer than twelve plays, exclusive of "Pericles," if it was *Shakespeare's*, and of the three parts of "Henry VI." We have, then, in 1598, sixteen plays, two lengthy poems, besides (some) sonnets attributed to *Shakespeare* at the age of thirty-four. If we average the production of plays to two each year (intercalating two years for the production of his other poems), we find a probable commencement about 1588; though it is likely to have reached even farther back, for we can scarcely believe Greene's jealousy of a four years' old playwright to have been so speedily aroused, so soon intensified, or its occasion to have flashed so suddenly into fame. Knight begins his chronology of *Shakespeare's* plays in 1585; Malone in 1589; and *between* those periods the truth seems to lie.

The publisher of Meres' "Palladis Tamia," when the anonymity had been dispelled, issued "Love's Labour Lost"—"as it was presented before Her Highness this last Christmas"—newly corrected and augmented by *William Shakespeare* in 1598; and Andrew Wise re-issued "Richard II." and "Richard III." with *named* title-pages immediately thereafter, though he had but a short time previously published "The Historie of Henrie the Fourth, with the humours conceits of Sir John Falstaffe," in "Paule's Church-yard, at the sign of the Angell," without mentioning the author.

Richard Field laid the third edition of "*Lucrece*" before the public in the same year.

So much for the literary activity and recognition of this year; and now for the signs of personal life. On 24th January, 1597-8, Abraham Sturley wrote from Stratford a letter to his brother-in-law, Mr. Richard Quiney (father of Thomas Quiney, who subsequently married Shakspeare's youngest daughter), then in London soliciting Lord Treasurer Burleigh, on behalf of the town of Stratford, for exemption from subsidies and taxes, as well as for a grant of a portion of £36,000 for the relief of decayed cities and towns, in consideration of two furious fires that had raged in Stratford—in which New Place had narrowly escaped—in the years 1594 and 1595. In this letter the following sentences occur: "It seemeth that our countryman, Mr. Shakspeare, is willing to disburse some monei upon *some* *ed yarde land or other at Shottre*, or near about us. He thinketh it a very fit patterne to move *him* to deal in the matter of our *tithes*. *Bi* the instructions u can geve him thearof and *bi the frindes he can* make thearfore, we think it a fair mark for him to shoot at, and not impossible to hitt. It obtained, would advance him indeede, and would do us much goode."

On 4th February, 1598, in an inventory of corn and malt in "Stratforde Borroughe Warwick," taken in apprehension of a scarcity, William Shakspeare is entered as possessing ten quarters, being the third largest holder in his ward, the other two having, respectively, seventeen and a half, and eleven quarters. In the town accounts of Stratford for this year, Halliwell says this entry occurs, viz.:—"Pd. to Mr. Shaxpere for on lod of stone, Xd." Richard Quiney wrote on 25th October, 1598, to his "loving good friend and countreyman, Mr. William Shackespere," from the Bell, in Carter Lane, London, asking the loan of £30; and he wrote to Mr. Sturley on the same date to the import that "our countriman, Mr. Wm. Shak., would procure us money." It may, therefore, be presumed that Shakspeare was able to, and actually did, lend the money desired.

In "Poems in Divers Humours," by Richard Barnefield, published in 1598, we read,—

"And Shakspeare, thou whose honey-flowing veine
(Pleasing the world) thy praises doth obtaine,
Whose 'Venus' and whose 'Lucrece' (sweete and chaste)
Thy name in Fame's immortal book hath plac't,
Live ever you, at least, in Fame, live ever.
Well may the bodye dye; but Fame dies never."

In 1598, an amended copy of Ben Jonson's play, "*Every Man in His Humour*," was performed at Blackfriars Theatre (*it is said*) at Shakspeare's interposition and suggestion; it had formerly been (1596) played at the Green Curtain. In this play Shakspeare occupies the head place in a list of the "principal comedians" who represented the *dramatis personæ*. It is supposed that he acted the

character of Old Knowell. This is said to have been the occasion of a life-long friendship between "gentle Willy" and "rare Ben."

In a subsidy roll of date 1st October, 1598, discovered by the Rev. J. Hunter, in the Carlton Ride Record Office, William Shakespere is assessed in the parish of St. Helen's, Bishopsgate, at 2s. and rated in the sum of 13s. 4d. The entry reads thus:—"A^gd. William Shakespeare, v li.—xiijs. iiijd."

"The Merchant of Venice" was entered at Stationers' Hall, 1598. 1599. The "Historie of Henrie the Fourth," which Andrew Wise issued in 1598, was re-issued in 1599, "newly corrected by William Shakespeare" being on the title-page. A second edition of "Romeo and Juliet" was published by John Dunter; and a small miscellany of poems—several not from Shakespere's pen, entitled, "The Passionate Pilgrim." By W. Shakespeare: at London, Printed for W. Jaggard, and are to be sold by W. Leake, at the Greyhound, in Paule's Churchyard," were issued in 1599. This publication is good evidence of the worth of Shakespere's name on a title-page. It would not have been put to this piratical work unless it had been regarded as a *taking* one.

Among Weever's "Epigrams," published in 1599, we find one—

"AD GULIELMUM SHAKESPEARE.

"Honie-tongued *Shakespeare*, when I saw thine issue
I sware Apollo got them, and no other;
Their rosie-tinted features clothed in tissue,
Some heaven-born goddess said to be their mother.
Rose-cheekt *Adonis* with his amber treasures,
Faire fire-hot *Venus* charming him to love her;
Chaste *Lucretia*, Virgine-like her dresses,
Proud lust-stung *Tarquine* seeking still to prove her:
Romeo, *Richard*, mere whose names I know not,
Their sugred tongues and power-attractive beauty
Say they are saints—although as saints they shew not,
For thousand vowes to them subjective dutie,
They burn in love, thy children, *Shakespeare*. Let them;
Go, woo thy muse! More nymphish brood, beget them."

1600. At this turning-point of time the contemporary recognitions of Shakespere became unusually numerous.

In this year fourth editions of "Venus and Adonis" and "La crece" were issued by John Harrison.

"Titus Andronicus" (if Shakespere's) was republished, but without his name, by "J. R. for Edward White," at "the sign of the Gun." Two editions (apparently rival ones) of "A Midsummer Night's Dream" (named), one "printed by Thomas Fisher," and another "printed by James Roberts," belong to this year; as do also two editions of "The Merchant of Venice," one "printed by J. R. for Thomas Heyes," and another printed by James Roberts.

On the 23rd August, 1600, "Much Adoe about Nothings," and "The Second Parte of the History of King Henry the Eighth," are

stered in the books of the Stationers' Company. They were printed by V. S., for Andrew Wise and William Apsley, and published by them, 1600. "The Chronicle History of Henry the Fifth" was "printed by Thomas Creede for Tho: Millington and John Busby," and was sold by the printer in Carter Lane in 1600.

Robert Allot, a literary bookseller in London, published a work called "England's Parnassus: or, the Choysest Flowers of our modern Poets," &c. Allot "had picked these flowers of learning from their stem" himself. Extracts (arranged under distinct heads, like a modern Dictionary of Quotations) are given from forty-four different poets; and Shakespere furnishes ninety excerpts (of which eighteen are upon Love).

In "Bel-vedere, or the Garden of the Muses," a somewhat similar work, several quotations are made from Shakespere; and in "England's Helicon," three pieces, attributed to Shakespere, are inserted.

1601. Attached to Robert Chester's "Love's Martyr; or Rosalin's Complaint"—"the first essay of a new British poet"—there are a few poems "done by the best and chiefest of our modern writers, with their names subscribed to their particular works, *never before extant*." These are, among others, by Ben Jonson, Marston, Chapman, and Shakespere, to whose pen one piece is ascribed.

The "Merry Wives of Windsor," written, it is *said*, by command of Queen Elizabeth, was entered in Stationers' Hall in 1601.

In a list of witnesses (P) in an action for trespass, the name of "Mr. John Sackespere" appears in 1601; and again the same name appears in the burial register of Stratford—

"1601, Sept. 8. Mr. Johaⁿes Shakspeare,"—

and the dramatist was *fatherless*. Grief was in Henley Street and in New Place; and Shakespere laid his father's grey hairs in the grave with a humbled heart as he, with self-reference, felt,—

"I, once gone, to all the world must die;
The earth can yield me but a common grave."

Thomas Whittington, shepherd to Richard Hathaway, died in 1608, having made a will in which he bequeathed "unto the poor of Stratford 40s. that is in the hand of Anne Shaxspere, wyfe unto Mr. Wylliam Shaxpere, and is due debt unto me, being paid to mine executor by the sayd Wylliam Shaxpere or his assignes."

1602. Can we *fancy* Queen Elizabeth coveting the incense of *one* poet in her reign that she did not receive unasked? There is a tradition that a play was composed by Shakespere at the request of her Majesty; and those who read attentively the sonnets 82—85 will find a most ingenious excuse offered for an apparent negligence, such as might befit an incident like that which our fancy has shadowed. The play to which this tradition refers was printed in 1602 as it had been "acted before her Majesty and elsewhere." It is a well-known, and not an improbable story either, that while he

was playing once, so engrossed in his part as not to notice His Majesty, that she returned, and dropped her glove—a token of high favour; the poet stooped, picked it up, saying (in character)—

“And though now bent on this high embassy,
Yet stoop we to take up our cousin’s glove,

then withdrew, and delivered it. This is *pretty* chiding; and the sonnets mentioned above *may have been* the poet’s reply.

The fifth edition of “*Lucrece*” was published in 1602; as well as a second edition of “*Henry V.*”

At Harefield (Middlesex), the seat of Sir Thomas Egerton, the sum of £10 was paid to “*Burbidge’s players*,” for performing “*Othello*” before Queen Elizabeth, 6th August, 1602.

1603. These lines from John Davies’ “*Microcosmos*,” p. 116, 1603, appear from a marginal note to refer to Shakespeare and Burbadge. The reference, too, is made more palpable and pertinent from an allusion to Sonnet cxi., beginning,—

“Oh, for my sake do you with *Fortune* chide,” &c.

“Players, I love ye, and your qualitie,
As ye are men that pass-time not abused,
And *some* I love for painting poesie. W. S. R. B.
And say fell *Fortune* cannot be excused
That hath for better uses you refused
Wit, courage, good-shape, good partes, and all good,
As long as al these goods are no worse used;
And though the stage dothe *stain* pure gentle blood,
Yet generous ye are in minde and moode.”

Ben Jonson’s “*Sejanus*” was produced on the stage in 1603. In a printed list of the personators of the characters in that drama, the name of Shakespeare holds a place; but if we read and reason rightly a passage in the author’s address to the readers, it may, we think, justly be *inferred* that in its earliest form for presentation, it was indebted to the pen of Shakespeare; for in that advertisement there appears the following passage, viz.:—“I would inform you that this book, in all numbers, is not the same with that which was acted on the public stage; wherein a *second pen* had good share: in place of which I have rather chosen to put weaker, and, no doubt, less pleasing of mine own, than to *defraud so happy a genius of his right* by my loathed usurpation.” To what *other* dramatist than Shakespeare would Ben Jonson be likely thus publicly to knuckle down? What *other* would or could he have so praised? As our hypothesis regarding the meaning of this sentence accords with the tradition of Shakespeare’s kindly dealing with Jonson as formerly mentioned, and with the amiability always spoken of as characterizing the great dramatist, it may be that this *fancy* is neither impossible nor unlikely to be true.

We have already alluded to Shakespeare’s reticence in praising Queen Elizabeth, as well as to the tradition that she favoured him. Both are alluded to, in the following unmistakeable language, by

Henry Chettle, editor of Greene's "Groatsworth of Wit," in a poem entitled "*England's Mourning Garment*."

"Nor doth the silver-tongued Melicert
Drop from his honied muse on sable teare
To mourne her death *that graced his desert*,
And to his lines opened her royall eare,
Sheapheard—remember our Elizabeth
And sing her rape done by that Tarquin—Death."

Elizabeth died 29th March, 1602-3. James I. and VI., her successor, reached London on the 7th May, 1603. He resided first in the Tower, and then removed to Greenwich. A warrant, under the privy seal, was issued from "our mannor of Greenewiche, the seventeenth day of May, 1603," by which "our servants, Laurence Fletcher, William Shakespeare, Richard Burbage, Augustine Philipps, John Hemmings, Henrie Condell, William Sly, Robert Armin, Richard Cowlye, and the rest of their associates," are licensed and authorized "to use and exercise the arte and faculty of playing comedies, tragedies, histories, enterludes, moralls, pastorals, stage-plaies, and such other like as thei have already studied, or hereafter shall use or studie, as well for the recreation of our lovinge subjects as for our solace and pleasure, . . . as well within theire now usuall howse called the Globe, within our county of Surrey, as alsoe within anie towne halls or mont halls, or other convenient places within the liberties and freedome of anie other citie, university, towne, or borough whatsoever within our said realms and dominions," &c. So that we see Ben Jonson uses no hyperbole when he speaks of—

"Those flights upon the banks of Thames,
That so did take *Elisa* and our *James*."

1605. On 24th July, 1605, "Wm. Shakespere, of Stratford-uppon-Avon," bought from Ralph Hubande the unexpired term of a portion of a ninety-two years' lease, dating from 1544, of the tithes of Stratford, Old Stratford, Bishopton, and Welcombe, for the sum of £440 sterling. (The indenture for this purchase is printed at full length in Halliwell's "Life of Shakespere," pp. 210—216.)

Augustine Philips, a fellow-actor and co-proprietor of the Globe Theatre, in his will, of date May, 1605, bequeaths to "William Shakespeare a thirty-shilling peece in gold."

In the "Accounts of the Revels" the following entries occur:—

"By his Ma ^{ty} . plaiera.	Betwin Newers day and Twelfe day a play of 'Loves Labours Lost.' [1605.]	
"By his Ma ^{ty} . plaiera.	On the 7 of Jannary was played the play of 'Henry the Fift.' [1605.]	
"By his Ma ^{ty} . plaiera.	On Shrove Sunday, a play of the 'Marchant of Venis.' [Mar. 24th, 1605.]	Shaxberd.
"By his Ma ^{ty} . plaiera.	On Shrovetuesday, A play cauled 'The Marchant of Venis,' againe commaunded by the Kings Ma ^{ty} ." [Mar. 26th, 1605.]	Shaxberd.

About this time we may mention the tradition that "King James the First was pleased with his own hand to write an amiable letter to Mr. Shakespeare," which letter, on the testimony of "a creditable person now (1710) living," is said in Lintot's edition of "Shakespeare" to have remained long in the hands of Sir William Davenant. Oldys says that Sheffield, Duke of Buckingham, told Lintot he had seen that letter. It is now, however, and at all events, *lost*, if it ever existed.

1606. In a Survey of Rowington Manor of date 1st August, 4 James I., 1606, William Shakespeare is noted as holding the house in Walker Street, otherwise Dead Lane, near New-place, surrendered to him in 1602 by Walter Getley, and from the form not having been filled up, it has been concluded that at that time he was not in Stratford.

1607. The following lines, in "The Scourge of Folly," by John Davies (of Hereford), published in 1607, are addressed—

"TO OUR ENGLISH TERENCE, MR. WILL. SHAKESPEARE.

"Some say—good Will—which I in sport do sing,
Had'st thou not plaid some kingly parts in sport,
Thou had'st bin a companion for a king,
And bene a king among the meaner sort.
 Some others raile, but raile as they thinke fit;
 Thou hast no rayling, but a raiguing wit:
 And honesty thou sow'st, which they do reape,
 So to increase their stocke, which they dee keepe."

Shakespeare's eldest daughter, Susanna, aged twenty-four, was married, June 5, 1607, to Dr. John Hall, medical practitioner in Stratford. On 31st December, 1607, Edmund, the youngest brother of William Shakespeare, was buried in the church of St. Saviour's, Southwark. He is entered on the register as "a player." On this occasion twenty shillings were paid for a "forenoon knell of the great bell," *probably* by his brother, who would, in all likelihood, be present at his interment.

A new edition (the *fifth*) of "Venus and Adonis," and another of the "Rape of Lucrece" (the *sixth*), appeared in 1607. This edition was published by John Wriettoun, in Edinburgh! "King Lear" was entered in Stationers' Hall on 26th November, 1607.

1608. During the year 1608, Nathaniel Butter printed *three* editions of "Mr. William Shakespeare; his True Chronicle History of the Life and Death of King Lear and his three Daughters. With, &c. . . . As it was plaid before the King's Majesty at Whitehall uppon St. Stephen's Night in Christmas Hollidies. By his Majistie's servants playing usually at the Globe on the Banck-side."

Again the melancholy finger of Death comes near the heart of the poet; for the burial register of Stratford contains the following entry:—"1608, Septembr 9, Mayry Sharpere, Wydewe," and filial piety and duty become to him memories only, not incitements to labour, effort, and aspiration.

On 24th October, 1608, Shakespeare stood sponsor for his "god-son, William Walker," to whom in his will he leaves "20s. in gold." A third edition of "Richard II.," with additions; a fourth of "Richard III.;" and a fourth of "Henry V., Part I.," belong also to this year.

In 1608, "*Hallam*" (vol. ii. p. 175, note), says, "The Yorkshire tragedy" was published, with Shakespeare's name on its title-page as the author. This was probably a trade trick; but it shows that his name was a selling and a telling one in the market.

1609. Dryden, in a prologue to Davenant's "*Circe*," 1675, says,—
"Shakespeare's own muse his *Pericles* first bore."

Whatever may be the value of this tradition, we know that it was first printed with Shakespeare's name on the title-page in 1609; and that it was published separately three times prior to the issue of the folio of 1623—in which it does not appear. It is noticed with a sort of sneer in the prologue of Robert Tailor's "*Hog hath Lost its Pearl*," 1612, thus:—

"And if it prove so happy as to please
We'll say—'Tis fortunate like *Pericles*."

The external testimony of its authorship by Shakespeare is esteemed by critics much stronger than the internal evidence.

"The famous historie of '*Troilus and Cressid*,' . . . written by William Shakespeare. London, imprinted by G. Eld, . . . we to be sold at the Spread Eagle in Paule's Churchyard, 1609:" and a second edition appeared within that year.

"Shakespeare's Sonnets. Never before imprinted. At London, by G. Eld, for T. T., and are to be Sold by John Wright, dwelling at Christ Church-gate, 1609," is the title of a small quarto which contains 154 sonnets, and "'A Lover's Complaint,' by Wm. Shakespeare." In the Stationers' registers, the entry—"2nd May, 1609, Tho. Thorpe. A booke called Shakespeare's Sonnets"—occurs; and from this we learn the name of the T. T. who signs the following dedication—"To the only begetter of these ensuing Sonnets, Mr. W. H., all happiness and that eternity promised by our ever living poet, wisheth the well-wishing adventurer in setting forth. T. T."

[The begetter, i. e., collector of these mystery-shrouded poems, we guess to have been William Hathaway, fourth son of Richard Hathaway, and brother-in-law to Shakespeare.]

On 15th March, 1609, the Records of the court of Stratford show that Shakespeare instituted a process for £6 of debt, and 24s. damages and costs, against John Addenbrooke. He could not be found, and the dramatist pursued his surety, Thomas Horneby, on 7th June thereafter. A proof not only that he had business in Stratford, but that he attended to it.

1611. Fourth and fifth editions of "*Hamlet*" were printed, with the author's name, "for John Smethwicke," in 1611; also a second edition (unnamed) of "*Titus Andronicus*." The "*Accounts of the Revels at Court*" contain the following:—

- "By the King's players. Hallomas nyght was presented att Whitehall before the Kinges Ma^{ties}. a play called 'The Tempest.' [Nov. 1st, 1611].
- "The King's players. The 5th of November: A play called 'The Winter Nightes Tayle.'" [1611.]

In a list of donations "collected towards the charge of prosecuting the bill in parliament for the better repaire of the high waies; and amendinge divers defects in the statutes alredy made, Wednesday the xjth of September, 1611," the name of "Mr. William Shakespere" is found, showing that he was able and ready to help forward public improvements.

In Trinity Term, 1611, a fine was levied upon the property [and twenty acres of pasture land more] which William Shakespere had bought from William and John Combe in May, 1602.

1612—13. The Burial Register of Stratford contains the following entry, viz.:—"1612. February 4. Rich: Shakespere."

By an indenture of conveyance, dated March 10, 1612—13, preserved in the City of London Corporation Library, Guildhall, in a glass case, we learn that at this time Shakespere bought a house (with ground attached) near Blackfriars Theatre, "abutting upon a street leading downe to Pudle Wharffe, on the east part, right against the Kinges Majesties Wardrobe." The purchase-money of this house was £140, but Shakespere only paid down £80, and mortgaged the property the next day for the balance, and leased the house to John Robinson for ten years.

In 1612, we have the following publication, viz.:—"The passionate Pilgrime. Or Certaine Amorous Sonnets, betweene Venus and Adonis, newly corrected and augmented. By W. Shakespere. The Third Edition. Whereunto is newly added two Love-Epistles, the first from Paris to Hellen, and Hellen's answere backe againe to Paris. Printed by W. Jaggard, 1612." This *cunningly* contrived title, in which the authorship of the latter part is merely implied; not stated, did not save the tradesman from exposure. In Thomas Heywood's "Apology for Actors," published in 1612, by Nicholas Okes, the following passage occurs in a letter to that bookseller, viz.:—"Here likewise I must necessarily insert a manifest injury done me in that worke, by taking the two Epistles of Paris to Helen and Helen to Paris, and printing them in the name of another, which may put the world in opinion I might steal them from him; and hee to do himselfe right hath since published them in his owne name: but as I must acknowledge my lines not worthy his patronage under whom he hath publisht them, so the Author I know much offended with M. Jaggard that (altogether unknowne to him) presumed to make so bold with his name." That this [and probably other agencies] had some effect is presumed from Malone's having a copy of the book, of date 1612, with two titles, one with, the other without the author's name. N.B.—Though this purports to be the *third* edition, there is no known intermediate issue

between 1599 and 1612, and Jaggard's conduct being suspicious, it is *probable* there was none.

The draft of a bill in Chancery, endorsed "Lane, Greene, and Shakespere, Com[plainants]," intended to be presented to Lord Chancellor Ellesmere, is in the possession of the Shakespere Society, and is referred to date 1613, from which it appears that on the moiety of tithes purchased by Shakespere in 1605 a larger proportion of the reserved rent than was right fell to be paid by him and his fellow complainers, because of the remissness of others, much to the injury of the persons raising the action. Besides this, we gather from the draft that Shakespere's annual income from these tithes was £120.

A letter from Thomas Lorkin, dated "London, this last day of June, 1613," says, "No longer since than yesterday, while Bourbege his companie were acting at the Globe the play of Hen[ry] VIII., and there shooting of certaine chambers in way of triumph, the fire catched and fastened upon the thatch of the house and there burned so furiously as it consumed the whole house, and all in lesse than two hours, the people having enough to doe to save themselves." In this fire, most probably, many of Shakespere's MSS. were burnt; if, indeed, he was then no otherwise interested in the property. In some MS. notes to Stow's "Annales" it is stated that the Globe was "newe built up againe in the year 1613 [1614 P] at the great charge of King James, and many noble-men and others."

A *fifth* edition of "Henry IV.," part first, was issued (named) in 1613.

1613. Among the plays performed during the marriage festivities of Frederick V. and the Princess Elizabeth, before Prince Charles, the Lady Elizabeth, and the Prince Palatine Elector, in 1613, Shakespere's hold no mean prominence, as may be seen from this excerpt from the accounts of Lord Harington, treasurer of the chamber to James I.—"Paid to John Heminges uppon the Councel's warrant, dated at Whitehall, xxth day of May, 1613, for presentinge before the Princes Highnes, the Lady Elizabeth, and the Prince Pallatyne Elector, fourteene severall playes, viz., one playe called 'Filaster;' one other, called 'The Knotte of Fooles;' one other, 'Much adoe aboute Nothinge,' 'The Mayed's Tragedie,' 'The Merye Dyvell of Edmonton,' 'The Tempest,' 'A Kinge and no Kinge,' 'The Twin's Tragedie,' ['The Comedy of Errors' P] 'The Winter's Tale,' 'Sir John Falstaffe' [*i. e.*, 'The Merry Wives of Windsor' P] 'The Moor of Venice,' 'The Nobleman,' 'Cæsar's Tragedye,' and one other, called 'Love lyes a-bleeding,' all which playes were played within the tyme of this accompte." Shakespere was, we see from this, equally popular with court and people, a proof not only of the universality of his genius, but also of the truthfulness and accuracy of his representative delineations of human life in all its phases, forms, and modes.

1614. In the summer of 1614, fifty-four houses were burnt

down in a great fire in Stratford, and in the same year the town was agitated by some projected enclosures of common lands. The corporation opposed the enclosure. In memoranda of property whose owners would have claims for compensation, of date 5th Sept., 1614, among the "auncient freeholders in the fields of Old Stratford and Welcombe," the name of "Mr. Shakespeare occurs." On 6th Oct., 1614, Shakespere enters into legal covenant for his own safety, "and one Thomas Greene, gent.," with Wm. Replingham, of Great Harbrow, regarding compensation for injury done, "by reason of anie inclosure or decaye of tillage there ment and intended by the said Wm. Replingham." Thomas Greene, clerk to the Corporation, was sent on this business to London, and in notes of his stay, of date 17 Nov., 1614, he says, "My cosen Shakspear comyng yesterday to town, I went to see him how he did. . . . And [with reference to the enclosures?] he and Mr. Hall say they think ther will be nothing done at all." On 23rd Dec., 1614, there was held "a hall" of the corporation, and there were "lettres wrytten, one to Mr. Manyring, another to Mr. Shakspear, with almost all the companies' hands to either;" and Greene adds, "I also wrytte myself to my cosen Shakspeare the coppyes of all our acts, and then also a note of the inconvenyences wold happen in the inclosure." Mark in all these the confidence reposed in Shakespere, the importance attached to his aid, and the seemingly prideful claiming of relationship to him by the clerk.

The 92nd of a collection of epigrams, entitled, "Rabbe and a Great Cast," by Thomas Freeman, Gent. (whom Wood mentions along with George Chapman among the friends of Shakespere), is addressed "To Master Wm. Shakespere." "Perhaps the happiest encomium that Shakespere had yet received as a dramatist," is in Mr. Dyce's opinion contained in a rare narrative poem, entitled, "The Ghost of Richard the Third," by C. B., whom Collier supposes to be Charles Best, published in 1614.

1615. A fourth edition of "Richard II.," with the author's name, was published in 1615.

1616. On 10th Feb., 1616, Judith, the poet's youngest daughter, then aged 31, was married to Thomas Quiney, vintner and wine merchant, Stratford.

On 25th March, Shakespere executed his will, and prepared his worldly affairs against the sudden advent of the

"Last scene of all in life's eventful history,"—

his *death*,—which took place, as is generally believed, exactly on his fifty-third birthday, 23rd April, 1616,—for two days thereafter the Stratford burial register was supplied with the following addition to its contents, viz.,—

"1616, April 25. Will. Shaksperre, Gent."

Of the manner and cause of his death nothing is certainly known. A tradition, extant forty-five years after his demise, asserts, "Shake-

pear, Drayton, and Ben Jonson, had a merrie meeting, and itt seems drunk too hard, for Shakespear died of a feavour there contracted." It is hard to believe this. We should have preferred knowing that reflections such as these occupied the last earthly hours of *William Shakespere*!

"Poor soul! the centre of my sinful earth,
 Foiled by those rebel powers that thee array,
 Why dost thou pine within and suffer dearth,—
 Painting thy outward walls so costly gay?
 Why so large cost, having so short a lease,
 Dost thou upon thy fading mansion spend?
 Shall worms—inheritors of this excess—
 Eat up thy charge? Is this thy body's end?
 Then, soul! live thou upon thy servant's loss,
 And let that pine to aggravate thy store;
Buy terms divine by selling hours of dross;
Within be fed, without be rich no more:
So shalt thou feed on Death, that feeds on men:
And Death once dead, there's no more dying then!"

NOTES ON THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM COWPER.

THE American essayist remarks concerning history that "there is, properly, no history but biography." There is an ambiguity about this idea which can only be explained by the same writer's words, that the student of history should "live all history in his own person;" that he must individualize "all public facts," and generalize "all private facts;" "then, at once, history becomes fluid and true, and biography deep and sublime." Some there may be who do not go so far as this; but there are none, we presume, who will not grant that biography is the main element of history; that as a nation consists of individuals, so its history, for the most part, must necessarily contain the life, character, and actions of individuals who sustain the representative character. History is, therefore, more or less perfect, according as it gives the true character and principles of those who, by the public consent, stand forth as national representatives. Thus, as a general rule, individuality is the symbol of nationality in all true history. The old proverb is still true, especially in all free institutions, "As the people, so the rulers." History, like all other great topics, is viewed by many through limited and false media. To some, history is little more than a branch of education confined to one's youth, and the borders of the academy. To such, Goldsmith's or Hume's histories are sufficient, perfect, and infallible; to others, history is one of those great, deep, and sublime subjects, the study and investigation of which is to be, and actually becomes, a life work,—a source of constant mental fruition; for the study of history cul-

ministers in spiritual good. Such persons realize the great truth that "there is a relation between the hours of our life and the centuries of time:"—that each of us may see ourselves in the lives of those who have gone before; and thus may we live "history in our own person."

History is the sum total of individual experience, in all ages, of all nations, civilized or uncivilized, Christian or pagan. If there is one class of men whose influence has been greatest in the formation of the character of the nations, in all ages, but whose individual history and life have been most obscure, and veiled from the public view, it is the poet's. We learn much of the characters of Homer or Anacreon from their respective works, but much more should we learn from their lives, if we had the account of them. It is to the life, or to a portion of the life, of one of our modern poets, that we wish now to direct the reader's attention; and some will say, "What is there concerning Cowper which his biographers have not told us?" We reply,—much that will be found in his autobiography. Dr. Southey is the only biographer of this poet that plainly informs the reader of its existence, or quotes to any extent from it. This memoir is invaluable, as it shows plainly the actual life of the poet during the otherwise most obscure portion of his history, from his early youth up to his settlement in Mr. Unwin's house, November, 1765, a space of not less than thirty years. The perusal of this memoir will, no doubt, be a source of interest and satisfaction to the reader, inasmuch as it throws open that which is of the highest moment in the poet's life,—his spiritual experience,—as it briefly, plainly, and awfully sets before him this important phase of the poet's history, in all its terrible reality, and in the beautiful simplicity and exactness of his own language. The readers of the popular biographies of Cowper believe he was naturally of a timid, retiring, and melancholy disposition, but to what extent they know not, nor would it have been possible for any one to have known, if he had not left it recorded in his own words. It is our desire to publish the fact more extensively, that this portion of the poet's existence may be as generally known as his works, and that, ere long, Cowper's poems and autobiography may appear, for the first time, bound together. The obscurity of this valuable memoir probably arose from the circumstances under which it was written, and circulated amongst a few of his friends. We are indebted to the widow of one who knew Cowper personally, and who was favoured with the perusal of this memoir in manuscript, for this information. It was the poet's request that it should be read by three persons only during his life, and after his decease be circulated among those of his friends who wished to peruse it. The document was preserved during his life, and published some time after his decease. With it we have three short poems, one of them in Latin, which was published for the first time with his autobiography, and which we shall mention hereafter, as it is highly indicative of the poet's state of mind at the time

when it was written. Strictly speaking, this work is more an epitome of the author's spiritual experience, and the severe mental discipline through which he passed for years, than an autobiography, according to the popular idea.

We cannot do more than give a superficial survey of the autobiography. The poet, conscious of the real nature, greatness, and importance of the task to which he was about to apply himself, commences, not with his parentage or birth, but goes directly to the crisis of his spiritual history, and writes thus:—"I cannot recollect that, till the month of December, in the thirty-second year of my age, I had ever any serious impressions of a religious kind, or at all bethought myself of the things of my salvation, except in two or three instances." Thus was he nearly thirty-two years ere he recognised the great object of his existence,—ere he began to live and sing the psalm of life. What light does this circumstance throw on the deep and solemn spiritual import of that pathetic and inimitable poem, written some twenty years after, beginning thus:—

"O that those lips had language! Life has pass'd
With me but roughly since I heard thee last.

Me howling blasts drive devious, tempest-toss'd,
Sails ripp'd, seams opening wide, and compass lost,
And day by day some current's thwarting force
Sets me more distant from a prosperous course."

More than fifty years had the poet weathered the storm of life when he penned these words. He then refers to those instances which he would not have mentioned had he not intended this sketch, as he says, to be a history of his heart. This is the essence of biography, without which the life of a good and great man can have no practical influence on the mind of the reader. This sketch, then, is the history of his heart, traced through the storms vicissitudes, and sorrows of his inner life, up to the thirty-fourth year of his age. All this he gives in a few pages. Aptly has he termed that severe and awful spiritual discipline through which he passed, the "horror of darkness," in the midst of which he thus wrote:—

"Et, fluctuosum seu mare volvitur,
Dum commovebar mille timoribus,
Coactus, in fauces Averni,
Totus atro perii sub amni!"

These seasons of darkness and melancholy were temporary, and came upon him several times during his life, arising partly from mental despondency, and his constitutional tendency. There were, however, as his works plainly testify, periods of an opposite nature, in which his joy and peace flowed as a river, and his poetic genius shadowed these forth in such poems as "Light Shining out of Darkness;" "Joy and Peace in Believing;" "O Lord, I will Praise Thee."

The poet then refers to the cruel treatment which he suffered from one of the boys, who singled him out "as a proper object upon whom he might let loose the cruelty of his temper," when at school, and at an age when he was most susceptible of lasting impression. This seems not only to have increased his constitutional melancholy, but to have made it almost habitual, as it attended him more or less all his days.

Here we may venture a remark concerning those who have the care of youth. It is a lamentable fact that the majority of teachers never study the mental tendencies, or constitutional defects of their pupils; and that the school-boy experience of Cowper has been the lot of many youths, arising from the treatment which they met with at an early age. Another important fact he mentions, from which the guardians and teachers of youth may gather wisdom. His "seven years' apprenticeship to the classics," he tells us, "was carried on at the expense of knowledge much more important." How many well-educated persons could testify to the same? If there be one period of a youth's education, when the inculcation of religious truths and principles is more necessary than at another, it is during the study of the classics.

While at Westminster he passes through St. Margaret's churchyard late one evening; his curiosity is excited by a glimmering light in the midst of it; he approaches the spot, and beholds a grave-digger at work by the light of his lantern, who, on throwing up a skull, struck the contemplative youth on the leg. The dark night, the gloomy churchyard, the flickering light, the earnest sexton, the open grave, the rolling skull, the silent heaven, and slumbering dead, aroused him to thoughtfulness, awoke his spirit, and alarmed his conscience; therefore did he mention "this little incident" as "among the best religious documents which I received at Westminster." The impression wears off; he imbibes the notion that all men are mortal except himself. This, however, soon forsakes him; he desponds, and thinks himself consumptive; and believes he is mortal. He prepares for confirmation; he attempts to pray in secret; he finds it a heartless work, and a painful task, and is frightened at his own insensibility. The ceremony is no sooner over, than he relapses into a total forgetfulness of God. Another visitation comes in vain. He recovers, and becomes "an adept in the infernal art of lying," and "capable of deceiving the wisest." At the age of eighteen he leaves Westminster tolerably well furnished with grammatical knowledge, but as ignorant of all kinds of religion as the satchel at his back. After nine months at home, he goes "to acquire the practice of the law with an attorney." And at twenty-one we find him in "possession of a set of chambers in the Temple." Not long after his settlement there he was again visited "with such a dejection of spirits, as none but they who have felt the same can have the least conception of. Day and night," he says, "I was upon the rack, lying down in horror, and rising up in despair." While thus enduring the "horror of darkness," he meets with Herbert's poems,

and finds in them a strain of piety which he admires. He reads them oft and long, as though they had been the chapters of Christ's Gospel! He finds no cure for his malady in them! He lays them aside, and after twelve months' experience in "the inefficiency of all human means," seeks his God in prayer! He visits Southampton, and there realizes in his own experience the fulfilment of the glorious prophecy concerning those "that mourn in Zion." He suffers another relapse, returns to London, burns his prayers, and casts away from him all thoughts of devotion and of dependence upon God.

Twelve long years in the Temple, in an uninterrupted course of sinful indulgence, passed away, he clearly perceiving "that, if the gospel were true, such conduct must inevitably end in destruction." He keeps company with Deists, and argues with them concerning the "truth of Scripture, in the very act of rebellion against its dictates!" His patrimony well nigh spent, he is "apprehensive of approaching want." He desires the death of him whose station in life he covets. The poor man dies, he obtains his "heart's desire," but with it comes unutterable agony. In the meantime he is presented with a more lucrative appointment. He accepts it, not reflecting upon his incapacity to perform its duties. "I returned to my chambers thoughtful and unhappy; my countenance fell;" with thought came perplexity and misery. Convinced of the impossibility of keeping the office, he writes a letter to his friend entreating him to accept his resignation, and grant him the office he first desired. He carries his point, and his mind is somewhat relieved. "But, behold, the storm was gathering all the while, and the fury of it was not less violent for this gleam of sunshine." An opposition is raised against the right of his friend's nomination. He was to expect an examination at the bar of the House. "All the horrors of my fears and perplexities now returned: a thunder-bolt would then have been as welcome to me as this intelligence." He attends the office regularly, but reads and studies to no purpose. Month after month passes away, and he despairs of ultimate success. He escapes to Margate, and spends his time either in forgetfulness of the future, or in misery. In October, 1763, he is required to attend the office again, to prepare for the dreaded event. He returns, and his misery increases ten-fold. "As Saul sought to the witch, so did I to the physician, Dr. Heberden." He anticipates madness, *and hopes for it*, in order to avoid appearance at the bar. "Now came the great temptation, the point to which Satan had all the while been driving me,—the dark and hellish purpose of self-murder." He reconciles himself to the thought, and falls in with the opinion that man is at liberty to die as he may see convenient. Again and again he attempts it, but as often his plans are frustrated by an unseen hand. The morning of the day arrives on which the examination was to take place, and his mental state is such, that his appearance before the bar is impossible; and thus ended all connection with the parliamentary office. From about this period we

may date the "great change" in his life. Henceforth he is "a new creature." His state, prior to this, was wretched indeed, but brightest days oft succeed the darkest nights. He removes to St. Albans, where he is visited by his brother, who is the means of giving the poet some relief on religious points. Referring to the change in his spiritual experience, he says,—“Unless the Almighty arm had now been under me, I think I should have died with gratitude and joy. My eyes filled with tears, and my voice choked with transport; I could only look to heaven in silence, overwhelmed with love and wonder.” He leaves St. Albans for Cambridge, on his way to Huntingdon, where his brother had taken lodgings for him. Not long after his settlement in Huntingdon, he forms an acquaintance with the Rev. Mr. Unwin's family, whither he is directed to find a happy home, and a kind, intelligent friend who should be his spiritual comforter through many future hours of bitter anguish. Of her he thus writes in the "Task"—

“And witness, dear companion of my walks,
Whose arm this twentieth winter I perceive
Fast lock'd in mine, with pleasure such as love,
Confirmed by long experience of thy worth
And well-tried virtues, could alone inspire—
Witness a joy that thou hast doubled long.”

The poet took possession of his new abode, Nov. 11th, 1765. Here this truly affecting, interesting, and instructive narrative ends. We can but express our earnest desire that those, who may by this imperfect sketch be led to peruse it, may derive as much satisfaction and profit from it as we have.

E. W. S.

Poetic Section.

Leaves from the Olive Mount. By CATHERINE FRANCES B. MACBETH.

Various Poems in Manuscript.

Is it not passing strange that in the heat of life's conflict man finds both time and heart to cultivate the gentler emotions of his nature? Strange, that on the field of battle the wounded man enjoys the glories of the sunset. Strange, that Garibaldi, whose path has been by the red river of strife, should stay to pluck a flower, and listen to the nightingale's song, whilst the cloud preceding the march of despotism darkened the air. Strange, that in the midst of controversy, the battle of opinion, and the conflict for the right, men should stay to listen to the quiet flow of poetic utterance. Yet thus it is, that nature, speaking with the voice of flower and stream and sunshine, as the quiet moon rules the restless waters, rules and controls, and ever charms, quietly, but powerfully, the turbulent tumult of the souls of men.

●

Poetry is the voice of nature,—a song-voice uttering in musical cadences the hitherto unutterable meanings of the world's grand hieroglyphs.

The poet is nature's interpreter. Serving in the temple are many. Some are high priests, some but wave the incense, all help in the quiet on-march of love, of truth, of liberty.

At the head of our article is a book of poems by Miss Macready, the talented daughter of our famous tragedian.

Miss Macready opens the volume with a dedication to her father, which tells of a true heart and its unutterable yearnings.

TO MY FATHER.

For ever loved, revered,—my heart's first friend,—
Tender as love itself, and true as truth,
I would that men might see thee with my eyes,
Know thee as I have known—then should fame's wreath
(Bound on thy brows of yore) new semblance take,
And show thee halo'd with celestial light!
Yet I, who know thee best, and have enshrined
Thy virtues in my soul, shall feeblest prove
To speak, how dear thy worth!—That which has been
Most noble in thee, never can be known.
Oh, loving lips, long silent in the grave,
Could but the old life warm them for a space,
How would they echo now my poor applause!
And oh, if this adventurous tongue can boast
The transcript of one pure intent, true thought,
Or generous aspiration, unto thee
Alone be praise! All good my life can show
Is of thy teaching, and in offering thee
This lowly tribute of my grateful love,
God knows, I give thee but thine own again!

The poem of the book is "The Passion Flower," a tale of simple construction, with a slight dash of the improbable running through it. The imagery is not striking or vivid; the fancies are not brilliant; but the fervour of each thought makes that thought felt, and the tone of true brother-love that breathes in every syllable more than atones for the lack of gorgeous drapery or brilliant oratory.

We have a faithful portrait of the inner life of a true poet in the following:—

"To see before and after—know too much
And yet too little—suffer in excess,
And taste of joy the veriest ecstasy—
Hope, yearn, and strain for what to others' eyes
Are shadows, fashions of a fevered dream—
Love with a love, before whose fires the light
Of human passion flickers faint and dim,—
Such is the poet's lot."

"Ah me! some lips there are
 With power to frame our unformed fancies, give
 Our vague emotions utterance; some eyes,
 Interpreting and answering with a look
 Of mutual exaltation and despair
 Our soul's aspirant questionings, and moods
 Of deep despondency! by such great gift
 Are poets, like their father-prophets, made
 'Revealers of the thoughts of many hearts.'"

"Hope was mine,
 To sing one song at least of love and truth,
 Ere my lips close for ever. Oh, to leave
 Some sign, however feeble, just to show
 That we have been! that we have loved and wept,
 And sinned, and been forgiven, and sinned again,
 Frail, loving, suffering souls, such as we see
 Living and dying round us every day!"

The truest of all poetry is that which claims kinship with heaven.
 In the following we think we see the reflected radiance:—

"Where turn our thoughts in all distress and pain,
 When mortal love deceives us? when the leaves,
 Which hope puts forth so green and fresh in spring,
 Lie in dead heaps upon our path, long ere
 The summer's ended? Life is dull and cold—
 The heav'ns look gloomy grey—one spot alone
 (To our sad fancies) on the dreary earth
 Seems bright with sunbeams—even that hallowed mount,
 Whereon of old the gracious lips proclaimed
 A blessing on the mourner! Our wan eyes
 Strain towards it thro' their tears, as though thereon
 They might ev'n now behold Him, the Beloved,
 The world's great Comforter, in light enthroned
 Breathing forth consolations, speaking peace
 To all perturbed and sorrow-laden souls."

The following ballad is deserving of high rank beside the already
 rich collection which our country so proudly boasts:—

ICHABOD.

"Oh, wherefore is my mother's face
 So sad and wan?" I said;
 And when she sighed, "Thy father,
 child!"

I knew that he was dead.

Upon her bosom, three months old,
 My baby brother lay:
 "And you must be his mother, child,
 When I am called away.

The glory of my life lies low
 Beneath the churchyard sod;
 Then take my son, to sorrow born,
 And name him Ichabod."

I took him from her dying arms,
 And in my anguish cried,
 "Love is the curse of life! of love
 My gentle mother died!

I will not love, save this young child,
 This orphaned Ichabod;
 And, as I give my heart to him,
 So give I his to God.

Nor dream of joy shall tempt us here,
 Where naught to last is given,
 But all our thoughts, and hope, and love,
 Shall wing their way to Heaven!"

Years past,—I bore him in my arms,
Till active, grown, and strong,
We played together in the fields
With laughter, dance, and song;

And every night his little prayers
He said beside my knee;
And oh, whate'er is best in life
My brother was to me!

And when the seal of manhood first
Was set upon his brow,
Upon the altar-steps he took
Th' irrevocable vow,

And decked him in the priestly robe,
And all his days consign'd
To bear the Cross of Him, who died
In love to human kind.

So beautiful, so grand he stood
In those too sanguine days;
I sigh to think how proud I was,
When all men spoke his praise!

What blessed days in works of love
And tranquil joy we spent,
Our hearts at peace with all the world,
And with ourselves content!

At ev'n we walked beside the sea
To watch the setting sun,
And breathe the fresh cool evening
breeze,
When all our toil was done.

Oh, wherefore, sorrow, didst thou take
A form so frail and fair
To lay my pride with chast'ning low,
And change it to despair?

When first I marked her sweet sad face
And meek uplifted eyes,
I took her for some messenger
Of mercy from the skies!

The pomps of earth weighed heavily
Upon a form so light,—
The daughter of an Earl was she;
Betrothèd to a Knight.

Oh, fatal was the day, when first
Across our path she trod,
For she was in her beauty's prime,
And so was Ichabod!

And, free from guile, nor fear of sin,
Nor danger marred their rest,
Till friendship's flame unconscious grew
To love in either breast.

As blind I trusted in his strength,
Till time its frailty proved,
So mad I writhed with grief and shame,
When first I knew they loved.

Cold horror seized the luckless maid,
Remorse and wild dismay,
To find her heart, unweeting, drawn
Thus fearfully astray.

I knew the anguish of her soul,—
But what was that to me?
I had not pity, thought, or care,
Save, Ichabod, for thee!"

The organ-tones had died away,
The midnight mass was o'er;
I stood upon the altar-step,
She knelt upon the floor.

Her forehead touched the marble stone,
Her hands were clasped in prayer:
The dying lamps threw fitful gleams
Upon her golden hair.

And as she raised her face to Heav'n,
So sad, and wan, and meek,
The saints themselves had wept to see
The tears upon her cheek!

But I,—her cold hands crushed in mine,
I could have laid her dead!—
"Thou serpent in an angel's form,
God judge thy sins!" I said.

"He was the chosen of his Lord!
A seal was on his brow,—
But thou the temple hast profaned,
And laid his glory low!"

She clasped my knees,—“Oh, curse
me not!”
With frenzied sobs she pray'd,
“But bid me live, or bid me die,
And thou shalt be obeyed!”

“Go, bid thy bridal guests,” I said,
“And wed thine injured knight,
And hide thy fatal witcheries
For ever from our sight!”

Oh, lightly lay the morning dew
On grass, and flower, and tree;
And softly crept the summer breeze
Across the deep blue sea!

And village maidens, far and near,
Brought wreaths and garlands gay,
To strew beneath the young bride's feet
Upon her marriage day.

I saw the church with faces thronged,
I saw the hapless maid,
A victim in her bridal robe
For sacrifice arrayed!

I saw my brother's pallid lips
Convulsive move in prayer;
His ashen brow and sunken cheek,
And eyes that looked despair!

I heard him seal with hollow voice
The everlasting vow:—
“And God be thanked,” I said, “his
soul
Is safe from evil now!”

I hurried from the fatal spot;
I dared not stay to see
My idol humbled to the dust
In silent agony!

I sat down to the bridal feast
Within the castle wall.
But pale and silent were the guests,
And gloom hung over all.

The bride upon her chair of state,
Arrayed in gems of gold,
With front erect and fixed look
Sat speechless, calm, and cold.

They called her name, and chafed her
hands,
And loosed her jewelled vest;
But life nor lingered on her lip,
Nor fluttered at her breast!

The guests shrunk back; the bride-
groom raved
Like one with grief gone wild;
The wretched father wrung his hands,
And called upon his child.

We bore her to the bridal bed,
And robed her limbs in white;
And thro' the darkened chamber lamps
Were burning day and night.

We wreathed her brow with orange-
flowers,
With roses strewed her o'er,
Till mortal bride had never looked
So beautiful before!

We knelt beside her grave and wept,
“Thy will be done, O God!”
Then up I rose, and hurried home
To comfort Ichabod.

I sought him high and low; explored
The empty house in vain;
I called him in despairing tones;
He answered not again!

O'er hill, and dale, and moorland wide
Like some distracted ghost,
That never rests, in hope to gain
The heav'n too early lost.

I wander'd, even to barren wastes,
By human foot untrod,
And made the rocks and caves resound
The name of Ichabod!

I paced the noisy city streets
With weary foot and sore,
But no man asked me whence I came,
Or oped to me his door!

The night was dark with wind and rain,
Upon the bridge I stood;
With rushing sound beneath me rolled
The river's angry flood:

I saw the threat'ning clouds above,
The threat'ning tide below:
“There is no refuge, God,” I said,
“Save death, to whom I go!”

Upon the verge of fate I hung,—
When lo! a sudden gleam
Of moonlight thro' the darkness broke,
And glistened on the stream!

And in its silver rays I saw
The pale and lovely face
Of her, whom long ago I deemed
A messenger of grace.

The flowers yet hung upon her robe,
And wreathed her golden hair,
And lingered on her lips the smile,
That holy angels wear.

I sunk repentant to the earth,
And prayed in lowly plight,
That God would still be near my soul;
And keep His Heav'n in sight..

"And I will seek thy grave," I said,
"Thou monitress divine,
And tamer my proud, rebellious heart.
To patience such as thine!"

'Twas evening, and the summer sun
Was fading in the west;
I stood among the low-green graves,
Where lay the dead at rest.

I marked the sculptured tomb, where
death
Long since received the bride,
And all o'ergrown with turf and flowers
A lowly grave beside!

A marble Cross above it stood
To guard the sacred sod,

It is well that we have among us hearts that dare utter the truth..
Amid the purposeless, soulless, yet alluring fascinations of much of
the poetry of modern growth, such books as this come as saviours,
offering to guide the thought and pen of the worker away from the
flatterer's pathway, out of the field of the cloth of gold, into
the field of the world's million-heart harvest.

A. S. H. contributes a lengthy piece, called "An Emblem of Life." As a recital of events, and the emotions aroused by those events, it reads pleasantly and prettily; but the chief thing in a poem being the THOUGHT therein contained, both in quality and quantity, this has too little for the space occupied in relation. A lighted candle in a small room fills that room with light, but placed in a long hall, it only makes darkness visible; and a good thought compressed into a sonnet or a stanza gives appreciable light and pleasure, but if diluted in a hundred lines, both the light and the pleasure are diminished immensely. The following, on the moments succeeding a storm, is vigorous, truthful and poetic:—

"The air
Again was pure and cool, but seemed
To be more laden than before,
With varied and with sweet perfume,
As though the storm had beaten out
A hidden odour from the flowers
More rich than erst they breathed."

"Iota" sends two pieces; one called "The Astronomer's Address to the Sun," which is too familiar far to elicit anything but dignified silence from the sovereign addressed,—

And there with wondrous joy I read
The name of Ichabod!

I flung my arms about the Cross
With tears and kisses vain,
As if the cold hard stone could speak,
And answer me again!

"O thou, too much my crown of life!
Thou Idol of my heart,
Too late upon thy grave I learn,
How frail a thing thou art!

Too late deplore the cruel vow,
That marred thy hapless past,
To curses all earth's blessings turned,
And broke thy heart at last!

Presumptuous Priest! such vows pro-
fane
The hallowed laws of God!
Bear witness many a blighted soul,
Like my poor Ichabod!"

"Prince of the universe! bright orb of day!
 Pouring on earth thy self-productive light,
 Save in the true alternate change of night,
 Which in quick order melts at thy first ray,
 Say what thou art: and if thou wilt *just stay*
 And satisfy my search."

The other, called "Ever Parting," has much sweetness, but lacks the right words to express what it only dimly shadows forth. If "Iota" read Trench "On the Study of Words," and persistently studied the structure of some of our best prose authors, he would reap incalculable benefit therefrom. Thoughts are feeble indeed, if ill-expressed; but are all powerful when properly stated.

F. S. Mills favours us with two ballads, which have much sympathetic, but little poetic, merit. We can find only one couplet that is at all poetical. The pale, thoughtful, injured wife of the drunkard opens the door to him after long hours of waiting,—

"Twelve years ago this day, was she wed,
Two children had she, two children are dead."

"Llieweillyan" sends a poem called "Christabel," a name already made famous as a title by Percy, Coleridge, and Massey. The diction is good, and the imagery well drawn; occasionally the metre is defective,—a fault which careful training may speedily correct. We would recommend our author to read much, think much, and write little, for a year or two, and believe that then his efforts might meet with much success.

"Christabel stande alone, pale and trembling.
 The ice-drops of her fear upon her brow
 Hang glistening like a coronet of pearls.
 A dream of tombs, of arching sapphire skies,
 Of ocean's pearly halls, distracts her soul.
 Even as a lily wet with tempest-rain
 And nodding in the blast, she shakes with fear."

"E—s," who, we are informed, is blind, writes two very pretty poems, which, in their quiet, unaffected utterance breathe as with a soul in them. One we insert.

EVENING.

Gentle praise is crowning
 Every hill and dell;
 Nature slumbers, owning
 Night's enchanting spell.

Still with wild endeavour
 Leaps the stream below,
 Gurgling ever onward
 With unceasing flow.

Ne'er doth night allure it
 Sweet repose to try;
 Ne'er the tinkling vespers
 Sound its lullaby.

Soul! in all thy longings,
 None, but God beside,
 Can bestow upon thee
 Rest at eventide.

"Pictures of Solitude," a very long manuscript by E. P., is too discursive for a poem. Few readers care to trust themselves

to twenty or thirty pages of reflections, be they ever so well strung. In this, as in the poems previously reviewed, the leading defect is want of *mechanical* skill and knowledge: the *art* of poetry must be studied, if you would be a poet. The A B C of poetry must be learnt, or the eloquence of poetry can never be taught.

We would say to one and all, aim high, look up always; but see to it that your foothold is good. If you tremble at the danger of the way and its difficulties, stand on one side, and let the stout-hearted pass you. Occasional effort never yet made a poet.

Hard work is the soul of success. Let those work who will, and those who will, let them play. The sum of each life will be in its successes equal only to the sum of its efforts. To be a true poet, great or small, is the noblest aspiration possible to the soul of man.

F. G.

The Reviewer.

Caius Marius; the Plebeian Consul. By THOMAS DOUBLEDAY.
Second Edition. London: Smith, Elder, and Co.

THIS "Historical Tragedy" has life, energy, and action in it. The language is more distinctly of the Elizabethan age than that of most modern dramas, and the cast of thought is well modelled after the great dramatic authors of that era. As a contribution towards *realizing* Roman history, and teaching us the secrets of the inner life of these times, it merits perusal. It *reads* well, and, we think, should *play* well. The characters are well discriminated, and some of the poetical passages are of intense power, *e. g.* :—

"Night falls apace. How awful is this spot!
Here fell the bolt of Scipio! And here Carthage,
The naval crowned queen, blue Neptune's daughter—
Strong as the storms, and richer than the seas
With all their untold gems—before the Roman
Sank down in blood and ashes."

We cordially commend this work to any reader of the drama of Britain.

Sects in Syria: or Notices of the different forms of Religion professed in Syria and Palestine; with Observations on the Recent Outbreak, its Causes, &c. By B. HARRIS COWPER. London: Henry James Tresidder.

This is a useful and timely publication, giving as it does, in a few pages, a reliable account of the opinions and peculiarities of the religious sects of Syria, and particularly of those who have been brought into special notice by those recent distressing events which have occurred in that misgoverned land.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS TO WHICH ANSWERS ARE SOLICITED.

107. Would any of your readers be kind enough to answer the following queries:—1. Is there in existence any Latin grammar designed specially for the use of those who wish to teach themselves? and, if so, what is the price of the work, and where may it be obtained? If not—2. What grammar is best calculated to answer such a purpose, the price of it, and the publisher's name? 3. Similar information with regard to a work on the French language. A reply would greatly oblige—SYLVIA MAY.

108. We live in an age of progress, when men's opinions, especially on religion, are freely discussed both by the press and the pulpit; and as this is generally best done by endowed lectures, both among Episcopalians and Nonconformists, I should be glad if some of your readers would supply me with an account of the Hulsean Lectures, delivered in Cambridge, stating the name of the preacher or lecturer, and the subjects discussed, say for the last twenty years. Also the same of the Donnellan lecture, preached in Dublin. As these lectures contain a statement or defence of some points of theology, and are intended to grapple with any prevailing heresy that might arise, the information sought would be acceptable to students in divinity, as it would supply them with material for thought on the current and progressive state of theological literature.—ADMIRER.

109. Could you, or any of your readers, inform me whether there is any magazine, or other medium, wherein short musical compositions might run the chance of being criticized or inserted, or what publisher is most likely to favour such pieces?—BETA.

110. In reading a biography of Fichte, in Chambers's papers, I met with a reference to certain views respecting the human will, named *Determinism*. Can any of the readers of the *British Controversialist* inform me where I can obtain information respecting the above-named views?—S. S.

111. Will some one of the correspondents of the *British Controversialist* kindly inform me what was the origin of the village feasts which are annually celebrated in Cambridgeshire and other English counties?—S. S.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

99. *A Curious Book*.—C. A. inquires after a book neither written nor printed; I beg to give the following information:—It was composed of the finest vellum, and had the letters cut out of each folio; the whole being interleaved with blue paper, was as easily read as if printed. Its title was, "*Liber Passionis Domini nostri Jesu Christi, cum figuris et characteribus nulla materia compositis.*" In the year 1640, Rudolph II. of Germany offered 11,000 ducats for it. It is said to be in existence in France, and as it bears the royal arms of England, it is extremely probable that the whole is an English production.—BETA.

101. *Quotations*.—The best book for the purpose of quotation is, "*Great Truths illustrated by Great Authors,*" a collection of 4,000 quotable passages culled from the first flora in the fields of literature. Published at 6s., and to be had of any bookseller.—J. O.

103. *Trollius, or Globe-flower*.—Professor Macgillivray, in his edition of Withering's "*British Plants,*" gives the origin of every generic name used therein. He states that the word "*Trollius*" is derived from "*trol,*"

which, in some of the Gothic dialects, signifies a ball.—W. W.

106. *Age of the "Te Deum."*—This eminently majestic hymn of praise is generally supposed to be at the least thirteen hundred years old. The authorship is, we believe, ascribed to St.

Ambrose; and the occasion for which it was composed was the baptism of St. Augustine.—J. W. W. P.

The "*Te Deum*" was composed by St. Ambrose, of Milan, about A.D. 373.—J. H.

The Topic.

SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT SCHEME OF FORTIFICATIONS TO BE CARRIED OUT?

AFFIRMATIVE.

Our conclusion to support in the affirmative this question is dictated neither by craven fear, nor is it the offspring of an ordinate desire to see England maintain a foremost place in the military roll of the world; but it arises from a spirit of conservatism, jealous of our institutions, our liberties, and our homes. These we desire to see bulwarked by all that genius can suggest, science achieve, and a wise expenditure accomplish.—LUTHER.

Though our volunteers deserve great praise and encouragement in their noble determination of fighting for "our country, our altars, and our homes"—though never engaged in any real battle, they have acquired a tolerably proficient knowledge of the tactics of war—though they have shown that "British pluck" has not yet died out of this "nation of shopkeepers"—yet let us not expect too much from them as being perfectly able to repel an invasion. How can we expect that men, "though brave as brave can be," who were never employed in bloodier affray than that on Wimbledon Common, would be able to oppose successfully those warlike "devils" of African training? And if victory were ours, with what loss of precious life would it be gained! Let us, then, carry out the Government scheme, which, augmenting our means of defence, will also increase our security; and, in case of

invasion, will enable us to defend ourselves with greater hope of success.—G. M.

We have before advocated the cause of "increased national defences;" and as we consider "the Government scheme of fortifications" as tending to an increase of safety, we would support it now. There can be no doubt that, if other nations, particularly those of Europe of greater size than England, increase their army, strengthen their navy, and make other warlike demonstrations, "our tight little island" ought not to remain unprotected. At present she is comparatively so, and is therefore at the mercy of any invader. And who can say at this time that no foe will attempt an intrusion? Who would venture to assert, in the present troubled state of affairs, that England "need fear no evil"? Those of the "Peace-at-any-price" school will do so of course; but we appeal to persons of common sense and upright principles. We consider that the "Government scheme of fortifications" tends to the greater safety of England, and therefore we consider that it should be carried out.—BETA.

Yes, by all means, our coasts should be fortified, and that immediately, for who can tell the moment when "grim-visaged war" may hurl his thunderbolts into the heart of our peaceful island home? History shows us that war is forced upon a nation when it is

not prepared for it. Then let us spare no money, to defend our Old England from the ambitious designs of a foreign enemy.—S. C.

Any scheme of fortification for the protection of the nation is better than none; and as there is no better one proposed, the Government scheme ought certainly to be carried out. We must consider that until some sort of fortifications are completed, we shall be open to an invasion, but afterwards no country will dare to threaten us with impunity, as long as there are British hearts and hands upon our shores.—F. S. M.

The Government scheme for internal fortifications deserves the notice of every one interested in the welfare of his country; the independence of which he desires to remain intact, as regards invasive attempts from external foes. The importance of this measure *has not yet, I am aware, taken full possession of the minds of all the British people*, because they have not fully weighed the matter; they consider our navy equal to any emergency that may occur. Looking at the modern improvements introduced into the increasing navies of other nations as well as our own, chances exist for successful attempts to subdue our independence. How long would the steamers of France be in throwing her hosts upon our shores? It is probable that such events might occur, even before our Channel squadron had received any intimation of the fact. What is Garibaldi doing at this moment, under the *combined influences of darkness and steam*? Surely we have something to protect, adequate to the estimated expenditure.—S. F. T.

Fortifications are the safeguard of nations; they form a wall of defence, and behind which the people of this country may work in perfect peace and safety. They have resisted successfully even the people of England; but when defended by English hearts and English hands, how much more powerful will they be, and what a guarantee will they give of security to its inhabitants.—WHITE.

If the navy, our first line of defence, met with any reverses, we should have nothing to fall back upon. Therefore fortifications are necessary, and will make invasion almost impossible.—RED.

National prosperity is concomitant with, and synonymous to, realised security. National security, like personal, is resultant from capability to meet exigencies, either existing or anticipatory. Exigencies are measured and calculated from the experience of the past; the sole data of *the will* being, necessarily, the *what has been*; and although history may never actually repeat herself, with inscrutable identity she ever repeats herself under varied modifications and divergencies; the whole phenomena of political, social, and individual life, in 1860, being strictly identical in spirit with what has been in every age of the world's history. Every nation has its prejudices, its preferences, and its foibles; they may be healthful or injurious to the national weal; but, as one or other predominate, they mould and mark their impress upon the state and people, and when so impressed, we call them national characteristics. These prejudices or preferences may be resultant from a variety of causes, known to philologists; among others, none are more effective than climate, race, and geographical position. These we term natural causes, and those less liable to derangement from external agency. If, then, a nation possesses a defined character, resulting from natural causes, over which they have but little control, and can only modify by circumstantial intervention, and then only affect the superficial strata, does it not follow that, in our survey of man, or a conglomeration of men, which we call a nation, that we view that which is what it is, by an arbitrary law of nature? Take one or two instances:—The inhabitants of warm, or tropical countries, are notoriously indolent, not because they possess less physical powers than those of colder climates, but it is attributable to the fact that nature, in warm climates, is

more prolific than in cold, and needs less the auxiliary aid of man. Hence he has fewer stimulants or incentives to industry, and becomes indolent; while, owing to the comparative sterility of nature in cold climes, man is forced to exertion to assist her operations, and habits of industry become part and parcel of his being. Again:—islanders, from their constant contact with the ocean, become fearless of its dangers, while those unaccustomed to the water imbibe a natural dread of its perils. The inhabitants of a hill country, familiar with the precipice and the gorge, the abyss and the gulf, are careless of its dangers, and possess a courage and an independence of nature unknown to the denizen of the city. So, also, are the inhabitants of a continent affected by geographical position; and these, acting on the mind, have produced some of the great political phenomena in the world's history; and when in combination with race, causation has been greatly intensified. We have not space to go into details, but will simply allude to the great race which inhabits continental Europe—the Caucasian—who, by their superior intelligence, have made recede before them all the inferior races, so that we may justly call them a conquering people. The inhabitants of countries of great extent have opportunity of expansion which those living in more contracted spaces do not possess. Citizenship affects the mind; and in proportion to the character and position of the state, is the mind of the citizen affected. The inhabitants of a small and mean country have nothing to incite to pride, or, as our neighbours would say, to "glory;" while the native of a rich and powerful state has much to cause independence of character. This independence, rightly guided, becomes a source of good to society at large; but if misdirected, is the root of many of the evils which afflict the world. Perhaps the greatest has been that spirit which has been engendered by a consciousness of power, developing

itself in aggression and encroachment upon other than its own. It is embodied in the *imperial ideal*—an ideal for which ambitious spirits, in every age, have fought, conquered, succumbed, or died,—an idea over which even now dark thoughts are brooding in the cabinet and the closet. Did we say now? Yes, even now; after 6,000 years of the butchery and massacre of man; after his sacrifice in perpetual holocausts; after the fairest portions of earth have been deluged with blood, and 10,000 cities razed and ravaged; after infuriated hate, and diabolical spleen has racked its brains to torture its fellows, all for this one ideal,—we say—we use no poetry, nor are our words those of hyperbole, when we repeat that the same dark spirit, which has cursed and blighted the world so long, is as rampant now as ever. The imperial idea—as old as Babylon, as expanded and as expansive as the world—is as much alive in this our day, as when Alexander led his phalanxes to India's scorching clime, or when Julius Cæsar carried his eagles to the distant British isles, when Attila traversed Germany, or when Napoleon ravaged the plains of Europe. We say this "ideal" exists now (recent history attests it), and it is only by the jealous guardianship of the high privileges which destiny has confided to Europe, that that ideal shall not become embodied again. At the present moment there are two great powers coveting universal supremacy, Russia and France. Of the former, Europe has no immediate dread; she has elements which, for many ages, will incapacitate her for supreme rule; but it is France which Europe in reality dreads (not a dread of the final result, but a dread of the suffering and sacrifice of life which the contest to thwart her will cost); for the line of conduct which her present Emperor is following is identical with that marked out by the first Napoleon. Will Europe stand by and see that line followed? We answer for England alone. Every motion in France

will meet its response in England; watchful and vigilant, she will follow her every track. If France wishes war, England will not shrink from the contest. Those that at Agincourt and Cressy, those that triumphed at La Hogue and Trafalgar, now, as ever, possess the same blood, energy, and invincible courage. Freemen by birth—their country untrod by foe for 800 years,—they are prepared, come what may, to stand for England's glory and England's weal. That is why, when France builds her fleet, England launches her liners; when France improves her gunnery, the echo of England's Armstrongs is wafted by the breeze over Cherbourg's ramparts; when France mobilized her army, and threatens aggression, England's sons unite, and 150,000 stand in immoveable column; and when France erects her batteries, *England does and will fortify her coasts*; and, duty done, awaits results. —D. S.

NEGATIVE.

In France, we believe, there is in existence a law which constitutes the raising of a false alarm a misdemeanour, punishable by imprisonment. We wish such a law were in force in England. From our childhood we have heard dark rumours circulated about an expected French invasion, and from those happy days when we thought that "the gun" above the fireplace was a match for a legion of Frenchmen, we have never known those rumours to assume a tangible form; but they have always continued, in their pristine purity, to be nothing but—rumours. What inducements have the Government to undertake such gigantic measures of fortification? None but the alarms raised by a number of newspaper editors, who are often at a loss for something to write about. Is it fair to an already overtaxed people, to saddle them with millions of money to allay the fears of some few timid beings who think their country is not well enough fortified by a vast fleet on sea, and

thousands of soldiers, militiamen, and volunteers on land, not to speak of thousands of unostentatious good hearts and true, who are ready, when the danger comes, to—

"Shoulder the rifle, and gird on their thigh

The sword that grows brighter as danger draws nigh."

In order to maintain inviolate their liberties, their altars, and their homes—leaving the question of expense—we think it is a work of supererogation fortifying like a citadel the shores of such a country as England. We give the Emperor of the French credit for being the possessor of a good deal of cunning; but we think we do not show our appreciation of his craftiness—in fact, we do him an injustice, according to the opinion we have formed of him—when we suspect him of cherishing aggressive designs towards our sacred soil. *He knows better, if his boasting colonels do not.*—J. I.

Although I admit there have been grounds for some anxiety as to our position, I consider that much false alarm has been raised throughout the country. The expense of the proposed fortifications would be immense, and it should not be forgotten that we are already an overtaxed people. The large number of volunteers, rifle and artillery, ought to make us feel more secure than hitherto; and, as no substantial reasons have been assigned for expending so large an amount of money, I think that the Government scheme should not be carried out.—THEJBOR.

Notwithstanding that the present Government is composed of clever, far-seeing men, whose experience of State matters and State defences has undoubtedly been great, we believe that the scheme of fortifications they have brought forward is totally unnecessary and inconsistent. It is unnecessary, because, as a nation, our resources, and the means of transporting our army from one end of the country to the other, are immense. If an invading

army were about to descend upon our shores, are we to suppose that our navy and army would prove ineffectual in such a case, when they both involve such an expense upon the country? It is inconsistent, because we are professing to be a peaceable nation, and endeavouring to obtain mutual confidence with our nearest ally; while at the same time we show him that we distrust his friendship, and are doing all we can to destroy mutual confidence.

—IOTA.

We say decidedly, No. We think that the recent parliamentary vote is the most foolish one that has been adopted for many years. It is the latest manifestation of that Anti-Gallican policy which led, in years gone by, to the great French war, and will, in these times, most assuredly lead to a similar result if persisted in. When all the money to be spent on these fortifications has been so spent, England will not be *one whit* the more secure against invasion. The fortifications to be erected will not stop an invading enemy for an instant; and all the money will be utterly thrown away. The idea of invasion is itself most absurd. What could the Emperor of the French, or any one else, gain by landing troops in Britain? The first Napoleon, brave as he was, never attempted it. What should we think of a man, who, living in a very good house, which had never showed the least signs of decay, suddenly began to prop up the sides and roof of his dwelling, in the fear that it *might* some time fall down, and then strengthened the props, lest they *might* break? Should we not say of his conduct, as Mr. Bright said of that of the Defence Commissioners, that it was *insane*?—J. G. J.

Unity and goodwill between nations are great blessings. The flourishing state of commerce and manufactures tends much to a nation's prosperity. Men of talent and foresight know that war and the love of conquest are sure to sever the commercial relations which exist between nations. Louis Napoleon

is eminently distinguished for his talent and foresight. The Emperor, we believe, is anxious to avoid falling into the fatal mistake which first shook, and then overwhelmed the power of his uncle. *That great mistake was his quarrel with England.* It is the object of the Emperor Napoleon III. to establish a Buonapartist dynasty. He knows that this cannot be effected if at any time England should become his enemy. Under such circumstances he might possibly maintain his power for his own lifetime, but we firmly believe the doom of his family would be fixed. But our opponents will argue, that Napoleon III. is not master of his position; and that his army may compel him to make an attempt on England. We deem this extremely chimerical. But even in that case we do not think the Government scheme of fortification would be needed. When a single county can turn out 10,000 amateur soldiers, well armed, well drilled, and unsurpassed in physique, we say, England need not fear. Who that saw the 20,000 volunteers, assembled in Hyde Park to be reviewed by our dearly beloved Sovereign, can fear an invasion of the French? We would ask, Are we not likely to increase and foster the warlike spirit and warlike preparations of the French Government, by pushing our own to too great an extreme? We wish England, and England's honour to be well guarded, but we think she is safe, without an outlay of £12,000,000 on fortifications. We believe that the sturdy spirits of her stalwart sons, their love of country and home, will *ever* protect her shores from the hostile tramp of a foreign enemy.—T. L. P.

At the risk of being called "prejudiced and unthinking," a disregarder alike of the late Duke of Wellington's pathetic appeal, and of Lord Palmerston's "straightforward and manly enunciation," when introducing his motion for the contemplated scheme of fortifications—to all and each part of that scheme, our negative is frankly and firmly given. We are told, that "no

such thing as panic enters into the consideration of this question." What is it but panic that has filled the heads of a goodly portion of the people with imaginary fears?—who see in imagination our navy in flames, or at the bottom of the sea, and the victorious enemy in full march upon London;—who have characterized all who object to their wanton and needless expenditure of the public money as "cowards or niggards, or amiable zealots," who "cry peace, when there is no peace"—who, by a strange kind of logic, tell us that "the stronger we are, the better our ally ought to love us." The knowledge of strength might cause fear; but seldom does it produce the feeling of love: such arguments can be used, like a two-edged sword, to cut both ways. From the same cause we ought to love the Emperor of the French, because we acknowledge him to be the most powerful. Do the contemplated fortifications show whether we love or fear? Let their eulogizers answer. Britain, for the first time in the annals of her progress, has in the face of the world proclaimed her terror of a foreign foe; for the first time she has renounced her faith in the prowess of her naval heroes, and the proved valour of her unconquered soldiers: her Government has said, "Our soldiers will henceforth fight behind stone and mud walls." The fact of their allowing that fortifications are needed, implies that our navy is useless for purposes of defence. The sooner that branch of the service is broken up, the more means will be placed at their disposal for the carrying out to its full extent that system upon which they say "the very existence of Britain, as a nation, depends." But, alas for the perfectibility of the scheme, no two authorities are agreed upon the most efficient plan of procedure! though they all see the impending ruin that is sure to fall upon us by the hand of the avenging Gaul, if their particular theory is not adopted. Like all other national schemes, the fortification scheme must be wrought in the dark, with much

waste of the public money, in the end to be abandoned as useless—another monument added to the folly of our rulers, and another example of the nation's capability for paying taxes.—M. W.

Since the days of Carausius to the present time we could boast, without vanity, and exult, without pride, of the superiority of the British navy. But its requiem has been chanted, and its death-blow dealt by her present Government; the victories of Blake and Nelson are tarnished, and the power of our navy for defensible purposes are by them acknowledged to be inadequate. No longer can we say, with conscious pride, in the words of the poet—

"Britannia needs no bulwarks,
And no towers along the steep."

The glorious memories of a thousand years are extinguished, and the humiliating fact of a nation of freemen defending themselves behind ramparts of stone and mud, mark the decline of our greatness. Jobbery and waste are eating, canker-like, into the very vitals of the nation. Fourteen millions yearly are not enough for army purposes, two millions more are required as a first instalment to erect fortifications, in a few years to fall to decay, and to be held as useless for defence as the huge war-vessels that now rot in our docks, or are falling to pieces for want of rivets to hold them together. Let this country depend on her heretofore invulnerable navy, and in the strong arms and willing hearts of her volunteers, who have raised "a wall of fire around our much-loved isle" that would crumble the pride of boastful Gaul, and scatter to the winds the world in arms:—

"This England never did (and never shall)

Lie at the proud foot of a conqueror
But when it first did wound itself—
Come the three corners of the world
in arms,

And we shall shock them, nought
shall make us rue,
If England to itself do rest but true."

D. R. R.

The Societies' Section.

Liverpool.—Meeting of the Readers and Friends of the British Controversialist.—On Tuesday evening, August 28th, a meeting of the friends of this Magazine was held in Hope Hall—which, notwithstanding the unfavourable state of the weather, was numerously attended. We copy the following report of the proceedings from the *Liverpool Daily Times*. Dr. F. J. Bailey, on taking the chair, read letters, regretting their inability to attend the meeting, from the Rev. Dr. Hume, John M'Laughlin, Esq., &c., &c.; and remarked on the great benefits that the Magazine had conferred, of an intellectual character, causing many of its readers to enter into various spheres of usefulness, and increasing materially the mental activity of all who studied its pages; and concluded by introducing Mr. J. A. Cooper, F.R.S.L., who, after explaining the reasons for holding the meeting, fully described the character and objects of the Magazine, which he characterized as unsectional and unsectarian; it belonged alike to no party, but was open alike to the opinions of all. The Magazine, he said, besides being a controversial, was also a literary work, and contained essays, reviews, &c. To literary societies it was invaluable, and was in a great measure devoted to their promotion and extension. He concluded an eloquent address amidst much applause. Samuel Neil, Esq., who was well received, next addressed the meeting in an able speech on the benefits and usefulness of controversy, and indignantly denied that the promoters of the *British Controversialist* had any peculiar opinions of their own which they wished by that serial to propagate. Every one ought to know that error hated controversy; they, however, believed in truth, and above all, and more than all, in God's truth. (Loud cheers) Dr. Barnes then moved the following

resolution:—"That in the opinion of this meeting the *British Controversialist* has been the means of imparting instruction to many, of largely promoting self-culture, and causing an increased mental activity amongst its readers; further, it has fully demonstrated the benefits attendant and derivable from written controversy." Mr. Thomas Ham, in seconding the motion (which was carried unanimously), fully agreed that the benefits conferred on the readers were great, and showed most lucidly the benefits of written controversy. Mr. Grindley moved the following motion:—"That the *British Controversialist* has conferred great benefits on our mutual improvement and literary societies by the information it has afforded, and the active interest in their welfare it has evinced, and that this meeting tenders its thanks to the editors for their valued exertions, and pledges itself to aid in increasing the circulation of the Magazine," and strongly urged the claims of the work on the members of literary societies, and earnestly recommended the same to their attentive study and perusal. Mr. Silverlock briefly seconded the motion, and Mr. Edward George supported it, when it was carried, *nam. con.* Mr. Cooper, in conclusion, moved a vote of thanks to the chairman, which concluded a very instructive and interesting meeting.

Faversham Mutual Improvement Society.—The sixth annual meeting of this institution was held in the Public Rooms, on Wednesday evening, September 12th. The President (Mr. F. W. Monk) occupied the chair, and after some introductory remarks, called upon the Secretary to read the report for the year 1859—60, and of which the following is a summary:—

The number of members had increased during the year from 360 to

487, and since the preparation of the report, several persons had been proposed for membership, so that in the course of a few days there would be upwards of 500 members. Nearly £40 had been expended upon the library, and it was gratifying to know that the circulation of books had very considerably increased, whilst through the attention and vigilance of the librarian not a single volume had been lost. Amongst the works added to the library were copies of "McClintock's Voyage of the *Fox*," "Arago's Astronomy," "Buckland's Geology," "Tennyson's Idylls of the King," "Russell's Diary in India," "Humboldt's Life Book and Travels," "Strickland's Queens of England," and "Humboldt's Cosmos." The thanks of the society were due to Giles Hilton, Esq., for a valuable present of books. The last lecture season had been a great success; the lectures were good; the average attendance large; and, although the price charged for admission was very small, yet a profit of between four and five pounds had been realized by the course. The annual *soirée* held in February last was attended by a large number of members and their friends, and the results in all respects were satisfactory. It had tended to unite the members in one common cause—the cultivation of social friendship and the furtherance of intellectual advancement; and it had in no way infringed on the ordinary funds of the Society, as the amount realized by the sale of the tickets more than covered the cost of the entertainment. The attendance at the ordinary meetings had not been large, owing mainly to the inconvenience of the Society's room. At those meetings the following lectures and readings had been given:—Mr. Webb, of Eynsford, on "The Reformation;" Mr. Monk, on "Geography;" Mr. Kirby, on "Great Painters;" Mr. Boorman, on "The Pitcairn Islanders;" Mr. Johnson, "A Reading from Shakespeare;" Mr. Monk, "A Reading on Lord Macaulay." The institution had been placed in union with the Society

of Arts, and would derive therefrom the advantages enumerated in the Society's prospectus. The attention of the members was invited to the arrangements for the new season. And first, there was the course of lectures as follows:—Mr. Barnett Blake, of Leeds, "On the Philosophy of the Breakfast Table;" Mr. Henry Vincent, on "Home Life, its duties and its pleasures;" Mrs. Balfour, on "Charlotte Brontë;" Mr. Wheeler, on "The Planets and their Attendants;" Mr. Gerald Massey, on "Robert Burns;" Mr. William Parsons, on "Old Homer and his days;" Dr. Letheby, on "Ancient and Modern Alchemy;" the Rev. E. Paxton Hood, on "Kings Crowned and Uncrowned;" Dr. Lankester, on "The Sea-shore, its Products and its Lessons." To the whole of this excellent course of lectures members might be admitted to the front seats for two shillings, and to the back seats for one shilling. It was clear that nothing but a large sale of tickets would suffice to cover the expenses, and one powerful reason why a great effort should be put forth to secure this *desideratum* was the fact, that a loss upon the lectures would prevent the committee from purchasing many new library books. It was pleasing to know that up to the present time about thirty pounds' worth of tickets had been sold, but it was evident that the sale must continue to grow, in order to prevent disappointment. A new feature in the Society's operations was the offer of prizes to stimulate a spirit of laudable emulation in the production of works of literature or art. The following prizes had been offered:—A guinea edition of "Keith Johnson's Atlas of General Geography," for the best (and, if the competitors number ten, a twelve-and-sixpenny edition of the same work, for the second best) "Map of England and Wales;" also, a guinea edition of "Longfellow's Poems," for the best (and, if the competitors number ten, a half-guinea edition of the same work for the second best) "Essay on Recreation." Up to the present time, ten members had given their names as com-

petitors in the construction of the maps. A special fund had been formed, by shilling subscriptions, for the purchase of the rewards. It had been arranged to hold the ordinary meetings monthly, in the Public Rooms, and the time was to be occupied by the production of the report of the Society's proceedings, discussion upon the affairs of the Institution, and readings and conversation upon the writings of great men, as Shakespeare, Longfellow, Lord Macaulay, and others. The report concluded with an appeal for renewed and mutual exertion on the part of the members, that the Society might continue the noble work it had begun, and extend its operations to a wider field.

Mr. Bryant moved the adoption of the report, which was carried unanimously.

The chairman stated that the next business was the election of officers for the ensuing year. In accordance with the provisions of a new rule, the president, two vice-presidents, treasurer, secretary, one librarian, and four directors, were to retire annually, in rotation. As that was the first annual meeting since the formation of the rule, it was necessary to draw lots to determine upon the gentlemen who should on that occasion retire. Lots were accordingly drawn, and the result was that Messrs. J. Tong and F. Palmer, vice-presidents; Mr. W. Dobbie, librarian; and Messrs.

H. Anderson, Boorman, C. Smith, and Holloway, directors, had to retire.

S. G. Johnson, Esq., in an eloquent and complimentary speech, proposed the re-election of Mr. F. W. Monk, as president. The proposition was most favourably received by the members, none of whom availed themselves of the opportunity of moving an amendment; and Mr. Monk, having thankfully acknowledged the kind manner in which his name had been received, expressed his willingness to accept the office for another year.

The election of the other officers was then proceeded with in the most pleasant manner, and the result gave the following as the committee of the present year:—Mr. F. W. Monk, president; Messrs. S. G. Johnson, V. Court, C. Smith, and T. Goff, vice-presidents; Mr. J. Tong, secretary; Mr. H. Kirby, treasurer; Messrs. R. Mills and W. Dobbie, librarians; and Messrs. Boulden, W. Tong, Paine, J. A. Anderson, H. Anderson, C. F. Dane, A. Bate, and Stevens, directors. Messrs. Difford and Hood were next elected auditors.

Mr. Hood proposed that a vote of thanks be given to the president, secretary, and committee, for their services during the past year, which was carried unanimously, and acknowledged by the chairman, who then declared the meeting at an end.

LITERARY NOTES.

The King of Saxony has translated "Dante."

Jules Janin has issued an edition of "Horace," text, translation, and notes.

Horace Mayhew is understood to be engaged in preparing "Transatlantic Sketches; or, Model Men and Women of Canada and the United States," from a tour in which lands he has but recently returned.

Oehlenschläger, the Shakespere of Denmark, born 14th November, 1779; died 28th January, 1850; is to have a monument raised to his memory.

Professor C. Lobeck, author of "Aglaophamus," and other critical works composed in severe Latin, died at Königsberg—where he was professor of eloquence and Greek Literature—on 27th August, aged 80. Having been appointed in 1802, he was two years the colleague of Kant.

An Art-Biography of Michael Angelo has been issued by Herman Grimm; and Professor Springer, of Bonn, is preparing a "Life of Albert Durer—whom his tombstone at Nürnberg characterizes as "light of the arts—sun of artists—

painter, engraver, sculptor without equal."

Koesegarten, the philologist, expired at Griefswald.

R. W. Emerson, "On the Conduct of Life," is announced.

The sequel to Sir William Hamilton's "Dissertations on Reid," for which the philosophic world has so long and so patiently waited, is promised shortly by Messrs. MacLachlan and Stewart.

The editor of the "New Quarterly Magazine" has obtained from a relative of the famous Scottish poet, Motherwell, some of his unpublished pieces, which he intends to insert from time to time in the "New Quarterly Magazine." One or more of these will appear in No. IV. for November.

Gustave Liebert has written a work entitled "Milton; a contribution to a History of the English Mind." It is published by Meissner, Hamburg.

Madame Ida Pfeiffer's "Autobiography," edited by her son, is announced. There are 2,000 booksellers in Leipzig.

A monument to Duncan Ban Macintyre, a Gaelic poet, was inaugurated at Dalnally, New Brunswick, on the 14th ult.

Napoleon III.'s "Julius Cæsar" is in the press, and it is to be republished in a translation executed from an advance copy by Miss Mary Booth.

Joseph Locke, Esq., M.P. for Honiton, President of the Institute of Civil Engineers, and joint author with Robert Stephenson of "Observations on Fixed and Locomotive Engines," died at Moffat, on the 18th ult.

Smiles, the biographer of Stephenson, is collecting materials for a "Life of Sir Hugh Myddelton," the New River engineer.

Hood's "Poems" have been translated into German.

The reign of Queen Anne is said to be engaging the attention of Mr. Thackeray, with the intention of making a history of it.

The Cottonian Library at Plymouth has lately been enriched with several

MSS. of Sir Joshua Reynolds, who began his painter's career in that town. They consist of autograph letters, notes and observations on paintings, his note-book for 1755, &c.

It is proposed to erect a statue of John Locke in the county hall of Somersetshire, at Taunton. Having inaugurated a monument to Blake—the *dear*, the men of Somerset have resolved to honour Locke—the *thinker*.

"Carthage and its Remains" is shortly to be issued by Bentley, from the pen of Mr. Davis.

Dr. Roscher, the explorer of Central Africa, was killed by two natives of Zanzibar with poisoned arrows.

Several letters of Napoleon I. have been published in the *Moniteur*. They refer to the Egyptian expedition; but are evidently issued with what logicians call—a *second* intention.

Mr. William Bain, the distinguished psychologist, has been appointed by Sir G. C. Lewis—for the Queen—to the Professorship of Logic in the University of Aberdeen.

The Hon. James Wilson and Sir Henry Ward, both literary men and statesmen, are now names of the dead yet living exponents of finance, politics, and government.

C. G. Leland (translator of Heine's Poems) is editor of "Vanity Fair," the American Thackerayish *Punch*.

Dickens is said to be employed on a new monthly serial story.

F. von Wessenberg, a historian, essayist, and poet, one of the most learned of the bishops of the Roman Church, died at Constance, 10th ult., aged 86.

Miss Vandenhoff (Mrs. Swineburne), authoress of "Woman's Heart," &c., died in Liverpool, on 15th ult.

A. A. Knox, one of the *Times*' staff, has been raised to the magisterial bench.

We understand that Her Majesty is a subscriber to Mudie, "the Napoleon of librarians;" and that the Prince of Wales took with him, to Canada, a finely selected stock of books from the Oxford-street *bibliotheca*.

Epoch Men.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCRATES.

THE controversialism—what Grote calls the “apostolic dialectics”—of Socrates was regarded by Plato as the characteristic of his master. He calls him “an elenctic (*i. e.*, a refuting) cross-examining god, going about to argue with and so to convict the infirm in reason.” Over the logic of refutation Socrates had an unparalleled mastery. Through all the turnings and windings of a lengthy and ingenious debate, he never lost sight of the single aim with which he started, and he never closed without having reduced his opponent’s opinion by an irrefragibly destructive process of analysis. There was a sleuth-hound-like* persistency in the manner in which he pursued an error, and run it out of every fastness and retreat it might choose or attempt. He had an escapeless keenness of intellect, from which no fallacy could conceal itself. It was his mission to make the Athenians practical logicians. Zeno had invented dialecticism, but Socrates had to prove it to be a workable agent—as George Stephenson had to do with Trevithick’s steam-engine. Men had then, as now, got into the habit of mouthing platitudes and commonplace under the name of wisdom, and of using words eloquently arranged, maxim-like, or epigrammatic, as if they were in reality *thoughts*. The nicely balanced period, and well-rounded sentence, which titillated the ear and struck harmoniously on the tympanum, was taken or mistaken for sagacity. But it was the wont of Socrates to probe the minds of his hearers, that he might discover the true state of the thoughts of those whom he addressed, when the veil of words was withdrawn, and the disguise of quibble and quillet was taken away. He had an easy, natural, apparently common-sense way of putting his questions, or expressing his sentiments; a clear, unambiguous, and unmistakable precision of language—simple, unostentatious, unrhetical, yet withal pliant, knowing, and pointed,—which, though it did not at first reveal the drift and purpose of his speech, was so engaging and ingenious as to be at once attractive and argumentative—presented a well-chosen *experimentum crucis* for the acceptance or rejection of the mind. Not that he seemed much to care for the synthetic upbuilding of dogmatic truth, or of systematic philosophy; *that* was sure to come, and to come right too, he believed, when men had their minds freed from error, and had become thinkers. To lay the axe, therefore, at the root of the tree, with the sturdy blow of a genuine backwoods

* A “Laconian dog” is the simile Plato uses in the “Parmenides.”

clearer, was his aim, duty, and delight; good could scarcely fail to spring up in the thoroughly cleared soil when the seed of right-thought fell into fitly prepared places. General notions, he knew, were logically aggregated from inductions derived from many particular instances; by the arrangement and distribution of individuals into species and genera. These, however, he found were seldom re-tested by the realities from which the notions were gained, and so very frequently contained latent fallacies and lurking errors. To resolve these generic terms into their specific, and then into their particular significations—to retrace the steps of generalization—and to compare, at each step, the word with the thought and the thing—these seemed to be processes by attention to which truth, or at least consistency of thought, could be attained. This is the action of mind to which Locke has given the expressive designation of *bottoming*, and of which he says it is necessary “to accustom ourselves, in any question proposed, to examine and find out upon what it bottoms. Most of the difficulties that come in our way, when well considered and traced, lead us to some proposition, which, known to be true, clears the doubt, and gives an easy solution to the question; whilst topical and superficial arguments, of which there is store to be found on both sides, filling the head with variety of thoughts, and the mouth with copious discourse, serve only to amuse the understanding, and entertain company, without coming to the bottom of the question, the only place of rest and stability for an inquisitive mind, whose tendency is only to truth and knowledge.”*

To comprehend a truth—root, sap, trunk, branch, leaf, flower, fruit, and use—that is man's business, if he have any at all in this universe, whose God is “a God of truth.” Specially is it requisite to *know ourselves* as we are in truth—not in the soft and delicate flatteries of self-love and egotistic deception. To know what we are and can do, to know what we purpose, and why, and how—to know what we speak, think, do, and believe—to know what we ought to be and become—these are the all-important duties of humanity, no less requisite now than in the long-past age of the sage, whose whole life was a practical teaching of the elder thinker's maxim, “*Know thyself*.” This knowledge, however, is not to be sought for itself alone, or the mere gratification of the irking curiosity of the ever-active mind; it is to be acquired, that we may in act and life be and do right. Hence, truth, above all possessions of the mind, is the most precious; and sincerity, above all other manifestations of being, becomes man best. Truth and sincerity are, indeed, alike in this, that they demand the very impress, image, and self-sameness of thought, to be expressed or shown in word and deed—that no thwart, distortion, or intermediate change should be permitted to occur or have place between the thought or desire, and the utterance or act by which the inner life is manifested outwardly. That the sign shall really be the type of the antitype it signifies; that

* Locke's “Conduct of the Understanding,” par. 44.

mankind should rightly and conscientiously mirror the inner activities of their being in the outer media through which they desire them to become known; that not "through a glass darkly," should thought be seen, or desire expressed, or aim exhibited; but that, at all times, the form of outward showing, and the fact of inward being, should be able to stand "face to face," and be known by reference to each other, in perfect and unimpeachable truth of likeness—are the demands made by truth and sincerity. Without these man is not man, but something lower, worse, and baser. Hence, above all things, oh, man! be truthful and sincere to thyself, and know thyself, that thou mayest be what thou shouldest be. This is the chief knowledge—the seedling out of which all useful knowledge grows. *Useful* knowledge! Why those terms? Is there a *useless* knowledge? Is not that rather ignorance? Out of knowledge use springs, not out of use does knowledge germ and bud. Mere *use* is the basest of all aims and intents. Man ought to seek to *know* that he may *be*, not that he may *use*. His own nature is higher and holier than all utilities, and, in its noblest manifestations, sacrifices—as martyr, patriot, student, and teacher—all the utilities of life, that being may have full growth. The measure of human nature can never be taken by the stunted fathom-line of utility, nor ought man to shrink his capacities into the shrivelled worthlessness, weakness, and narrowness, of perceptible utility. Every power has a godlike use, which will only manifest itself when the honest outgrowth and expansion of our being brings us into contact with it; but so long as we limit our life-culture to the palpable and the seen, to the apparent only, we can neither be nor know ourselves. All conventionalities, moralities, customs, creeds, expectations, habits, forms of thought, aims, aspirings that tend to circumscribe and limit the whole legitimate growth and activity of humanity, ought to be looked upon as hindrances, not helps; and to know ourselves is the only sure way of knowing what manner of men we ought to be.

For look at the *cant* of every-day life—its indefinite, pretentious, insincere, untruthful words, how they belie humanity! Examine the so-called knowledge of those "most potent, grave, and reverend signors" who march about in state and majesty as the instructors of our race; how cunningly contrived their speech—how little adapted to our real wants—how sedulously it avoids touching the points that interest our souls, and make us feel, and know, and long, to act as men! And turn to the civic forms of being; how unreal the distinctions set up—how touchy and testy are men regarding any infringement of them—how cramping and hypocrite-making are the courtesies, the allurements, the greetings, the meetings, the tradings, and the rulerships, of civic life! Yet might all citizenship and companionship of man with man be so purified and humanized, as to be the very sap of life to the tree of thought. But to be this they must be made truthful and sincere; they must be legitimated by a right and conscientious life—a life which, from the innermost core of the soul to the outer and uttermost trifle, shall

be at one in and with itself. Hence it is that the revision of all thought, policy, life, is urgently required; and that logic must be applied to every dogma, opinion, practice, and fashion, that it may be seen how far each is based on certain and definite realities, or merely on a sandy and slippery mass of seemings and schemings. The philosophy of the outward world, and the causes and agents of all that totality of changes which move in marvellous procession round us, it would be well to know. Speculative cosmogony, with its grand and glorious glimpses into the far-reaching depths of causative power—the stirring and curious inquiries which the physical sciences bring before us, their vast and wondrous problems, their acute guesses and their singular discoveries—it *would* be pleasing to learn the secrets of; but before and above all these, there are things it behoves us to study and know. What is piety?—what impiety? What is honourable?—what base? What is just?—what unjust? What is courage?—what cowardice? What is a State?—and who should bear rule therein? These are the true and primal topics of human interest; upon these ought our cogitations and our reasonings to be exercised. And how is this best to be done? Plainly by sounding with the truest fathom-line of thought the sea of speculation; and finding, if haply we may, a genuine anchorage for the soul. The aim of the Socratic method was to accomplish this; and all its demurrings, debatings, and ironical questionings, were directed to this end. The purpose and *modus operandi* of Socrates have been thus ably and concisely described and exemplified by Grote:—"On such questions as these, What is justice?—What is piety?—What is a democracy?—What is a law? every man fancied he could give a confident opinion; and even wondered that any other person should feel a difficulty. When Sokratês, professing ignorance, put any such question, he found no difficulty in obtaining an answer, given off-hand, and with very little reflection. The answer purported to be the explanation or definition of a term—familiar, indeed, but of wide and comprehensive import; given by one who had never before tried to render to himself an account of what it meant. Having got this answer, Sokratês put fresh questions, applying it to specific cases, to which the respondent was compelled to give answers inconsistent with the first; thus showing that the definition was either too narrow or too wide, or defective in some essential condition. The respondent then amended his answer; but this was a prelude to other questions, which could only be answered in ways inconsistent with the amendment; and the respondent, after many attempts to disentangle himself, was obliged to plead guilty to the inconsistencies, with an admission that he could make no satisfactory answer to the original query, which had at first appeared so easy and familiar. Or, if he did not himself admit this, the hearers, at least, felt it forcibly. The dialogue, as given to us, commonly ends with a result purely negative, proving that the respondent was incompetent to answer the questions proposed to him, in a manner consistent and satisfac-

tory even to himself. Sokratēs, as he professed from the beginning to have no positive theory to support, so he maintains to the end the same air of a learner, who should be glad to solve the difficulty if he could, but regrets to find himself disappointed of that instruction which the respondent had promised.* Yet all the while, the whole tenor of his questions, though destructive of the respondent's opinion, and seemingly only negative, has all along been such as to *suggest*, and often even to imply, a distinctly positive teaching; and so to cause the truth to creep into the heart without offensive dogmatism on his part, and with the pleasant though fictitious feeling on the part of his hearers, that they had thought out the truth for themselves. Without distinctly asserting his own opinion, and even while professing to have none, Socrates managed to make his audience embrace with favour and fervour the just and indisputable conclusions to which the discussion led or tended. Through continuous exclusion of the wrong, a knowledge of the right is gained. As fallacy after fallacy fails and falls before the strong practical intellect which directs its energies against them, and they are thrust by the onlookers into the limbo of the extravagant, the ludicrous, the sophistic, the incorrigibly false, the eye turns upon that which is unhit and undemolished, and sees that *that* alone is unassailed, and is evidently unassailed, because impregnable. This polemic, free though it is from profession, is a strong weapon in the armoury of controversy; it commits the opponent to little, if to anything; but fastens down the respondent to every previous assertion or inference, however mistaken. Assent and approbation mingle so cunningly with double-thoughted queries, which give no indication of contrariety of opinion or of feeling until the speaker is fairly committed to some indefensible thesis, and is compelled to surrender, at or without discretion. The tact necessary to concoct such arguments—

“As by the strength of their illusion,
Shall draw one on to his confusion,”

Socrates possessed, and exercised with a will and efficacy which annoyed the Sophists, awakened the jealousy of the ambitious, and excited the hatred of the thoughtless.

In the preceding paragraphs we have aimed at being explanatory rather than expository. Though, to accomplish this more efficiently, we have slightly modernized both the thought and the expression, we believe we have neither misrepresented the tenor nor the form of the Socratic method of teaching. The following passage, put into the mouth of Varro by Cicero, in his *Academic Questions*, appears to us fully to substantiate all that we have advanced. Cicero was not only a student of Greek, but of Greek philosophy; and he may be accepted as an evidence of the historic position assigned to Socrates by the interpreters of his age. “It is agreed on all hands, and, I think, justly, that Socrates was the first

* Grote's “History of Greece,” vol. viii. chap. 68, page 285.

person who called away philosophy from the study of occult things, purposely concealed by Nature herself, in which all the philosophers before him had been occupied, and introduced her to common life; making virtue and vice, good and evil, the objects of his inquiry; but esteeming the higher branches of natural philosophy (*caelestia*) far removed from our cognizance, or at all events, if they were ever so well understood, of no importance toward living well. In all those discourses which have been committed to writing, with great variety and copiousness of language, by those who heard him, his method of disputation is, to affirm nothing himself, but to refute others: he professes to know nothing, except the fact itself of his knowing nothing; and says, that in this respect he excels other men, who fancy that they know that which they do not know; whereas, all his own knowledge consists in the consciousness of knowing nothing; and he assumes that Apollo had pronounced him to be the wisest of mankind, because the whole of true wisdom consists in a man's not thinking that he knows that of which he is ignorant. This being the constant tenor of his discourses, and his fixed opinion, all his eloquence was expended in praising virtue, and in exhorting all men to the study of virtue; a fact sufficiently evident from the writings of the Socratic philosophers, and especially of Plato."

This bantering debate—this double-meaning and trenchant controversialism—this peculiarly Socratic dialecticism, is called by the Greeks *εἰρωνεία*; an ignorance purposely affected, to provoke or confound an opponent. It proceeds by a constant contrast of expression and impression, of word and meaning. Every outward demonstration of respect for the opinion of an adversary is solemnly offered, while all the time the speaker is sedulously employed in withdrawing, one by one, the supports on which that opinion rests. With the most humble deference, and seeming unassumingness, he hears, considers, suggests, and queries, until the base of the opinion is wholly undermined, and it sinks into the bathos of the absurd. This is not merely refutation; it is the art of charming one in perfect confidence in his errors till he has been led into thickets and dangers altogether unperceived by him, and then to open his eyes to the manifest danger to which he has become exposed by his thoughtless trust and unreflectiveness. It then effects conviction by the surest process; for it merely reduces the opinion expressed to a supposed rather than a real danger, and then shows its untenableness and want of safety. The false security of mind, into which the fallacy lulled one, is exposed, and the inclination to retrace one's steps, and regain a fresh and firmer foundation, is irresistibly excited. This unmalignant, ironic dialectic, was the grand Socratic organon. Into the stiff, tame, formal, pedantic, and lifeless speculations of his age, he threw the stirring energy of his own intellectual being; and with the fresh and vigorous investigative processes of his logic, broke through the dull monotony and form of the Sophistic reasoning, and at once widened the boundaries, and inten-

sified the aims of philosophy, by introducing other rules of thought, and bringing within the limits of philosophy the long-exiled questions of the nature, duty, and destiny of man.

He never opened a school, nor did he deliver showy lectures, like the Sophists; neither did he stain his palm with the receipt of fees. He devoted himself to the self-imposed task of thinking, teaching, and controversy; to awaken the Greeks to inquiry rather than inquisitiveness; and to "arouse the sensual and the vain" among the Athenians to raptures of a newer and nobler kind—those which true knowledge yields. His surpassing capacity for clear explanation, ready suggestion, acute questioning, and unwearied thought, gave him an immense advantage over the Sophists, and made him the antagonist of every false appearance, and every conceit of knowledge.

This last statement leads us to mention, that though we have explained the dialectical irony which Socrates employed as consisting of a continuous *stratum* of apparent coincidence of thought with a *substratum* of real hostility, we do not intend to intimate that there was any dishonest seeming in his style of controversy. It had always a double meaning in it, but it had no double dealing. The great tact he possessed in so doubling his thought as to bring out, at once and invariably, a test-instance which possessed an apparent congruence with his respondent's theory or thought, and yet, in reality, was fully charged with a destruction-dealing potency, is one of the marvels of this great man's nature. The firm hold which, amid all his vivacity, humour, pleasantry, and even equivocation, he held of the leading thought or principle which he had in view, was most extraordinary, and his faith in the method of ironic controversy was so great, that he could even surrender himself to the passing current of the moment, and converse on any and every conceivable topic, in the full confidence that out of the talk would arise an opportunity of insisting upon and impressing the great moral truths about which he was most concerned, and which also most concerned man as man.

This strength of mind and purpose might, if we rightly understood it, enable us to comprehend the much vexed question of the genius or "demon of Socrates." This extraordinary faculty of judgment—which so unerringly, intuitively, almost even instinctively, led him to apprehend and know results from an acquaintance with their antecedents—which gave to him almost the power of prophecy, always the capacity to decide and determine—which he had learned to look upon as his unfailing help in argument, and his infallible guide in life—was it in reality natural or supernatural? When he looked abroad upon the flighty, unsettled, fickle Athenians, "tossed about with every wind of doctrine," and veering continually as the tenor of a discourse changed; when he conversed with the reputed wisdom-mongers of his day, and found them each opposing the other, and yet unable to give him explicit and unequivocal grounds for the belief they strove to inculcate on the minds of men; when he saw

worships, politics, parties, &c., changing to suit the changing fashions of the time, and yet felt within himself a spirit of fixed and firm-built faith—an instantaneous decisiveness of thought—a resolutely unswerving method of life,—what could he fancy but that there was in him a something, an agency, a spirit, which was not equally operant in other men. The very earnestness and force of his imagination, the very power and intensity of his intellect, would give a feeling of inspiration to him at some moments; and he would fancy, in these supreme hours of thought,—as the poet in his rapt and excited moods fables himself submissive to the muse—that a Divine teacher whispered to his soul, that a wisdom higher than man's spoke in his thoughts, and that his genius really taught him to distinguish *false* from *true*.

An idea, something like this, was mooted in the early ages, in the Platonic schools. Apuleius, in "The Demon of Socrates," says: "According to a certain definition, the human soul, even when it is still located in the body, is called a demon."

"Dine hunc ardorem mentibus addunt
Euryale?—an sua cuique deus fit dira cupido?" *

If, then, this is the case, a longing of the soul, that is of good tendency, is a "good demon." Similarly, Olympiodorus, in his *Scholia* on the *First Alcibiades* of Plato, says:—"The allotted demon is *conscience*, which is the *consummate flower* of the soul." Menander, the Greek poet, who was a pupil of Theophrastus, the successor of Aristotle, gives currency to a similar thought. One of his fragments is to this effect:—

"To every mortal, *conscience* is a *god*."

Many ingenious hypotheses have been framed upon this topic, ranging from lunacy to inspiration,—a pretty wide sweep of the pendulum, unless, indeed, we consent to believe,—despite the eloquent disclaimer recently produced in *Blackwood's Magazine*, that—

"Great wit to madness nearly is allied."

But the most rational, and withal the most consonant with the Socratic life, is that which we have attempted to suggest here. "We ought to understand that this seeming . . . was once a reality; that not poetic allegory, least of all that dupery and deception, was the origin of it. Men, I say, never did believe idle songs; never risked their soul's life on allegories." "Let us try if, in our elucidation of them, we cannot convince ourselves that such things were not refuges of lies, but that there was a kind of fact at the heart of them; that they, too, were not mendacious and distracted, but, in their own poor way, true and sane." The hypothesis

* "Do the gods, O Euryalus! add this ardour to our souls?
Or does each one's strong-felt desire become to him a god?"

Virgil's Æneid, IX. 184—5.

the support seems best to secure this desirable point, and, therefore, seems to us the best attainable one.

Hastily and inefficiently, we feel, have we run over the most marked characteristics of the Socratic philosophy. So grand a theme was worthy of greater care, and more extended exposition. Much space might be occupied with debateable and debated topics to little purpose. We have sought to seize upon the salient points, and to present these to the reader. We have endeavoured, however ineffectively, to indicate the place of Socrates as a thoughtsman among the thinkers of ancient—of all times,—and we do not scruple now to endorse the estimate of Mitford:—"The singular merit of Socrates lay in the purity and usefulness of his manners and conversation; the clearness with which he saw, and the steadiness with which he practised, in a blind and corrupt age, all moral duties; the disinterestedness and the zeal with which he devoted himself to the benefit of others; and the enlarged and warm benevolence; whence his supreme and only pleasure seems to have consisted in doing good. The purity of Christian morality—little enough, indeed, seen in practice,—nevertheless is become so familiar in theory, that it passes almost for obvious, and even congenial to the human mind. Those only will justly estimate the merit of that near approach to it which Socrates made, who will take the pains to gather, as they may, from the writings of his contemporaries and predecessors, how little conception of it was entertained before his time; how dull to a just moral sense the human mind has really been; how slow the progress in the investigation of the moral duties, even where not only great pains have been taken, but the greatest abilities zealously employed; and when discovered, how difficult it has been to establish them by proofs beyond controversy, or proofs even that would be generally admitted by the reason of men. It is through the light diffused by his doctrine, enforced by his practice, with the advantage of having both the doctrine and practice exhibited to the highest advantage in the incomparable writings of disciples such as Xenophon and Plato, that his life forms an era in the history of Athens and of men."

S. N.

The bibliography of works on Socrates is very extensive. We recall, at present, as among the most useful and interesting, in addition to those already quoted and referred to, Wigger's "Life of Socrates;" Stapfer's article, "Socrates," in the "Biographie Universelle," as well as his monograph, Berne, 1786, "De Philosophia Socratis;" Heller's "Socrates," Frankfort, 1789; Gilbert Cooper's "Life of Socrates," London, 1749; the chapters on "Socrates," in Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy," second edition; Potter's "Socrates and Plato," the article, *sub voce*, by Janet, in the "Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques;" and by Brandis, in Smith's "Dictionary of Classical Biography," &c. A great collection of other references are to be found in Tennemann's "Manual of the History of Philosophy" (Bohn), and in several works referred to above. They need not, therefore, be mentioned here.

Religion.

IS THE CATHOLIC RULE OF FAITH TRUE?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

As all the principal objections of the negative side have been disposed of by J. H., I propose, in the present article, to notice the paper of "Lex Scripta," which appeared in the last Number, and then to lay before the reader a summary of the reasoning generally employed to demonstrate the Catholic Rule of Faith, in order to supply a connecting link between the articles which have appeared on the affirmative side.

The purport of "Lex Scripta's" article is to show that the affirmative writers have assumed many points without demonstrating them. He goes through the articles of his opponents, and wherever he meets with a passing allusion to a Catholic doctrine, he insists upon the proof of that doctrine. If a simple historical fact is mentioned, he insists upon having the evidence for that fact. If the Papacy is alluded to, he asks us to demonstrate that every single pontiff really did exist. If St. Timothy is alluded to as a bishop, he would compel us to go into the controversy between Episcopalians and Presbyterians. When "A Layman" quotes a number of passages from the early Fathers to show that *their* Rule of Faith was identical with that which Catholics now hold, "Lex Scripta" declares that "the whole article is based upon assumptions;" the "assumption" being, I suppose, that these authors really did exist, and that they wrote the works from which "A Layman" quotes. I do not know what the readers of the *British Controversialist* may think, but, to my mind, the mere subterfuge to which "Lex Scripta" seems obliged to have recourse, indicates his utter inability to answer our arguments on the question under discussion. I could very easily retort his accusation. His own article is full of the wildest assumptions. He tells us that a large number of the Roman Pontiffs were purely imaginary persons. Where is his proof? He tells us that the apostles did not deliver anything to their successors which they did not also commit to writing. Where, again, is his proof? In opposition to the testimony of every respectable historian, he tells us that St. Peter never was at Rome. Where is his proof? Do not all historians agree that he was martyred there, with St. Paul? Does not St. Peter himself inform us that he was there, in his first epistle (chap. v. 12, 13)? It would occupy too much space to attempt to expose even a few of the extravagant statements of which his article is composed; besides, I do not think that anything I could write would go far to convince a writer who threatens, if the editor can allow him another

article, to disprove a fact so patent to all the world as the *visibility* of the Catholic Church.

In accordance with my promise, I will now lay before the reader in abstract of the line of argument generally used to demonstrate the Catholic Rule of Faith.

Let us suppose that a Catholic, not content with the more compendious method whereby God brought him, through baptism, and early instruction, into the possession of the faith, were desirous of investigating the authority of its principles. He naturally commences with the Scripture; he takes up the Gospels, and submits them to examination. He abstracts, *for a moment*, from his belief in their inspiration and Divine authority; he looks at them simply as historical words, intended for his information. He finds, in the first place, that to these Gospels, whether considered in their substance or their form, are attached all those motives of human credibility which he can possibly require; that there is throughout them an absence of everything which might create a suspicion that there has either been a desire to deceive, or a possibility of having been mistaken. He finds a body of external testimony sufficient to convince him that they are documents produced at the time at which they profess to have been written, and that those persons were their authors whose names they bear. As the writers were eyewitnesses of what they relate, and give us in their lives and characters the strongest security of their veracity, he concludes that all they have recorded must be certain and true. We thus arrive at the discovery that, besides the mere narrative, they unfold to us a system of religion preached by One who wrought the most stupendous miracles to establish the Divinity of His mission. In other words, we are led, by the simple principle of human investigation, to an acknowledgment of the authority of Christ to teach as one who came from God; and we are thus led to the necessity of yielding implicit credence to whatever we find Him to have taught. So far the investigation, being one of outward and visible facts, cannot require anything more than ordinary historical or human evidence.

Having once established the Divine mission of Christ, we naturally ask, "What did Christ teach?" We find that He was not content with teaching certain general principles of morality—that He was not satisfied with unfolding to mankind doctrines such as none before Him had attempted to teach, and thereby making man acquainted with his own fallen nature and his future destiny, but that, moreover, He adopted means to preserve those doctrinal communications to mankind. He selects a certain body of men; He invests them with great authority and power; He makes them a promise of remaining with them, and teaching among them, till the end of time. From the very words of the commission which Christ gave to His apostles, we conclude that there exists now, and that there will exist to the end of time, a corresponding institution for the preservation of those doctrines, and for the perpetuation of

those blessings which our Lord came to communicate; and moreover, that this institution, in consequence of its being guided by Christ and His Spirit, delivers these doctrines to us inviolate.

Thus, merely proceeding by historical reasoning, such as would lead an infidel to believe in Christ's superior mission, we come, from the word of Christ, whom historical motives oblige us to believe, to acknowledge the existence of a body, the depository of those doctrines which He came to establish among men. This body we call the Church. From the moment we are satisfied that Christ has appointed a succession of men, whose province it is, by aid of a supernatural assistance, to preserve inviolate those doctrines which God has delivered,—from that moment, whatever this body of men teaches, is invested with that divine authority which we had acknowledged in Christ upon the evidence of His miracles.

The Church now takes upon herself the office of teaching, and informs us that the sacred volume, which we had hitherto been treating as mere history, commands a greater degree of respect and attention than any human motives could possibly bestow. She says, "Under that guarantee of Divine assistance, which the words of Christ, in whom you believe, have given me, I proclaim that this book is the revealed Word of God, and is inspired by the Holy Spirit, and that it contains all that has a right to enter into the sacred collection." It is thus that we arrive, on the authority of the Church, at those two important doctrines of the canon and inspiration of Scripture, which, as several writers endeavoured to show in the preceding debate, could not be proved by any course of ordinary human investigation.

Having thus arrived at the fact of the inspiration of the Bible, we open it, and find that it confirms the authority of the Church. In the prophecies, we find God saying of the Christian Church, "I will direct their work in truth, and I will make an everlasting covenant with them (Isa. lxi. 8)." "The eyes of the blind shall be opened, and a highway shall be there, and it shall be called the way of holiness . . . so that fools shall not err therein" (Isa. xxxv. 5). "There shall come a Redeemer to Zion . . . as for me, this is my covenant with them, *my Spirit that is in thee, and my words which I have put in thy mouth*, shall not depart out of thy mouth, nor out of the mouth of thy seed, nor out of the mouth of thy seed's seed, from henceforth and for ever" (Isa. lix. 20, &c.). And turning to the New Testament, we find a distinct promise that the Spirit of God shall guide the Church into all truth for ever (John xiv. 6—17, and xvi. 13). We find, in consequence of this promise, that the apostles prefaced a doctrinal decision with the words, "It hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us" (Acts xv.); words which are used for the same purpose in the Catholic Church to this very day.—We find it promised that "the gates of hell shall not prevail against the Church," which is Christ's kingdom, "The Church of the living God, the *pillar and ground of truth*" (1 Tim. iii. 15).

Our reason, moreover, tells us that a Church which could teach

error is evidently unworthy of a good God. He who was so solicitous to save, as that He sent His only Son to die for us, could not commit us to the blind guidance of an erring, fallible teacher. To have true faith, we must have a teacher that cannot err. Christ does not teach us himself personally; the apostles have long since left the world; the Bible is only an infallible guide when infallibly interpreted; and what individual can pretend to this gift? Private interpretation of the Scripture is made, as we may see by looking around us, to teach every absurdity. It therefore remains that the infallible teacher, which the necessities of man require, can be no other but that Church which was appointed to teach all nations by Christ Himself.

I have been at the trouble to go thus minutely into the subject, because our friend "Lex Scripta" has said that our demonstrations have been all along founded upon mere assumptions. I have given a bird's-eye view of the whole argument: point out an unwarrantable assumption, if you can.

And now I must conclude. For nearly twelve months we have been discussing the two questions upon which all the differences between Catholics and Protestants are founded, questions upon the right solution of which our salvation depends. Both sides, no doubt, have written words which, upon mature deliberation, they would gladly withdraw; both sides have, no doubt, been guilty of occasional *lapsus pennæ*; but nevertheless, the discussion has been conducted, I am happy to say, with an amount of good feeling and moderation which is rare in religious polemics.

"And if any one should have felt his previous system of faith, even in its smallest part, shaken, let it be but a reason with him to try the security of the whole building. If some small cloud shall appear to have cast a shadow over the serenity of his former conviction, oh! let him not scorn or neglect it, for it may be like that which the prophet commanded his servant to watch from Carmel—rich with blessing, and fertility, and refreshment to the soul that thirsts for truth."*

IGNATIUS.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

As the present debate has been viewed as a continuation, under another aspect, of the preceding one,† so we shall, in this reply, take a comparative review of both; for by so doing, we shall have a clearer comprehension of the whole subject, and be more likely to form correct opinions upon it. We purpose, therefore, laying down a few general principles by which to test the soundness of the arguments adduced to establish the claims of each party. Our limited space forbids us entering minutely into all the arguments brought forward; but we hope our readers will *study* both the debates with calmness and a sincere desire to arrive at the truth, and we have no fear as to the result.

* Cardinal Wiseman.

† Vol. XII.

Our first inquiry should be, What is a Rule of Faith? H. B. says, "By the term 'Rule' I understand a *measure* or standard by which we may compare or try a thing, thus testing its correctness. A Rule of Faith, therefore, must be that *measure* by which we are to regulate not only the *agenda*, or things to be done, but also the *credenda*, or things to be believed." This definition is a good one; and the sixth article of the Church of England limits the Protestant Rule of Faith to the Holy Scriptures. But the Church of Rome says that her "Rule of Faith is the *whole Word of God*, viz., Holy Scripture and Divine traditions" (p. 15). This definition does not contain the whole of it; for the *Douay* note to 2 Tim. iii. 16, says:—"But if we would have the *whole* rule of Christian faith and practice, we must not be content with those Scriptures which Timothy knew from his infancy, that is, the Old Testament alone, nor yet with the New Testament, without taking along with it the '*traditions*' of the apostles and the '*interpretations*' of the Church, to which the apostles delivered the book, and the true meaning of it." This note assumes the Apocrypha to be part of the Old Testament, though it is well known that it does not and never did form any part of the Jewish Scriptures; and to the Jews were committed the oracles of God (Rom. iii. 2). It will be seen from this, that the *statement* of "Ignatius" (p. 15) concerning the "Catholic Rule of Faith," though taken from the decree of the Council of Trent, is *faulty*; or else some one has added the "*interpretations* of the Church" to "*the whole Word of God*, viz., Holy Scripture and Divine traditions." We should like to know by what authority this was done. From this statement it will also be evident that both Protestants and Roman Catholics are agreed respecting the Divine inspiration and authority of the BIBLE; and that they are *not* agreed respecting the *Divine* authority of the Apocrypha, the "traditions" and "interpretations" of the Romish Church.

This leads us to inquire, What truth or truths ought we to have assumed as the basis of our propositions and arguments in these debates? First, we ought to have assumed that a Divine Rule of Faith was necessary for man; second, that God has given him one; and third, that the Holy Scriptures are divinely inspired. Respecting the first two we need say nothing at present, but believing, as both parties do, in the Divine authority of the Holy Scriptures, we perceive the fallacy of "Ignatius" in laying down the "complicated and laborious inquiry" on p. 99 of the last volume. Were we discussing the Divine inspiration of the Bible with an *infidel*, such an inquiry might be instituted by him with propriety; but for one who believes the truth of these things equally with his opponent, to require *him* to do so, is "mere cavilling and captious trifling." Nor do we think an infidel would, like "Ignatius," illogically conclude that because the Bible has no proof of its Divine inspiration in itself in not having "a list of inspired books," that, therefore, the Bible alone is not a sufficient Rule of Faith (p. 104, vol. xii.).

Assuming, then, that the Bible is divinely inspired, we are led

to inquire, Is the Bible, without the Apocrypha, the "traditions" and "interpretations" of the Romish Church, sufficient to guide man to heaven? or, in other words, Does it contain all doctrinal truths necessary to be believed, and all precepts necessary to be obeyed, in order to secure eternal salvation? If it does not, Are the Apocrypha, the "traditions" and "interpretations" of the Romish Church divinely inspired? The *onus* of proving the Bible *alone* sufficient rests upon us Protestants; and the *onus* of proving the Divine authority of the Apocrypha, the "traditions" and "interpretations," rests upon our opponents.

As we both believe the Bible to be the Word of God, we ought to receive its testimony and authority as unquestionable in these debates. But while our opponents appeal to the Bible to try to show its insufficiency as a Rule of Faith, they coolly say to us, "But it is to no purpose at all to refer to the Bible for any proofs, without you first prove the genuineness, authenticity, and inspiration of it. Until this is done, argument is useless" (p. 383, vol. xii.). It is evident, even from this "captious trifling," that they feel the force of our appeals to the Divine authority of the Word of God; and also that they are obliged to admit the legitimacy of proofs from the Bible when its inspiration is acknowledged. And since this very point is *necessarily assumed* by us both, we shall perceive the propriety of H. B.'s proposition (p. 11, vol. xii.), namely:—"Because the Bible bears testimony to its own sufficiency as a rule of faith, and the Bible being the Word of God, its testimony must be true." This is not *naïvely* begging the question of the canon and inspiration of the Bible, as asserted by "Augustine," but *properly assuming* the truth of what we both believe in, and appeal to as an authority on the subject.

We shall not be able to notice the arguments adduced in the previous debate further than to briefly reply to the article of "A Layman," which "Gregory" says, "has hardly been noticed by subsequent affirmative writers." "A Layman" asserts "*that the Divine Rule of Faith must necessarily be both CLEAR and INFALLIBLE* (p. 164). "Gregory" says, "*that if the Bible be so clear, it must teach EVERY ONE with UNERRING certainty the SAME BELIEF.*" Putting this and that together, it amounts to the following syllogism, namely:—

The Divine Rule of Faith must be so *clear* and *infallible*, as to teach *every one* with *unerring* certainty the *same belief*.

The Bible does *not* teach *every Protestant* with *unerring* certainty the *same belief*. Therefore the Bible is *NOT* the Divine Rule of Faith.

We reply as follows:—

The Divine Rule of Faith must be so *clear* and *infallible*, as to teach *every one* with *unerring* certainty the *same belief*.

The Bible, with the Apocrypha, "traditions," and "interpretations" of the Romish Church, do *not* teach *every Roman Catholic* with *unerring* certainty the *same belief*.

Therefore *these* together are NOT *the Divine Rule of Faith*.

Having thus shown the fallacy and absurdity of "A Layman's" proposition, on which his arguments depend, it is needless further to notice his paper.

We now turn to a review of the present debate; and in so doing, cannot but express the astonishment we felt when reading our opponents' articles, at the assumption of everything essential to establish the "truth" of their Rule of Faith. We fully agree with "Lex Scripta" that they have based assumption upon assumption—assuming all the points on which this controversy hinges. And we hope to make this apparent to our readers before we conclude.

We have shown that that portion of our opponents' Rule of Faith which is disputed is the Apocrypha, the "traditions," and "interpretations," and that the only *indisputable* authority to which we can both appeal, is the BIBLE. We also showed that these controverted points depended upon the question or fact of Peter being the *rock* of that Church. And although "Ignatius" (p. 17) lays great stress upon its *infallibility*, and "Gregory" (p. 88) says:—"He (Christ) declares that it is to be founded upon a *rock*, which name He bestows upon the disciple who was to be the HEAD and KEYSTONE of it, and that 'the gates of hell should not prevail against it;'" and although "A Layman" (p. 160) quotes from S. Cyprian, a reference to the same passage of Scripture, and from S. Jerome and Augustine, references to the authority of *the chair of Peter*, i.e., his *supremacy*; yet "Gregory" (p. 92) says:—"Theophylact" has endeavoured to show that S. Peter was not the *head* of the apostles, nor the *rock* of the Church. *This has nothing to do with the question.* The primacy of S. Peter might form the subject of a separate debate, but it certainly is not the Catholic Rule of Faith." Why, then, did "Gregory" and others refer us to the *infallibility* of the Church and the *supremacy* of Peter as the ground of the "truth" of their Rule of Faith? And why did "Gregory," with our article before him, instead of answering our arguments on Matt. xvi. 18, quote it, and then say:—"I have written my article without using those texts which 'Theophylact' conceives Catholics rely upon to prove their Rule of Faith?" *Error* is always *inconsistent* with *itself* as well as with TRUTH. Why did he not try to prove that *his Church* might be *infallible*, although the *rock* or *head* of it were *fallible*? We argued (p. 22) that the *infallibility* of the Church would depend upon that of the *rock* upon which it was built. The house built on the *sand* perished, *because* it was built on the *sand*; while that built upon the *rock* withstood the storm and tempest, *because* it was founded upon the *rock*. But "Gregory," after denying the *infallibility* of the Pope, and asserting the *fallibility* of Peter and the other apostles, affirms that the Church, built upon *poor fallible Peter*, (only think of a *fallible head* and *keystone*!) is an *infallible* Church. The summary of this is, that "Gregory" first asserts or assumes that Peter was the *head, rock, or keystone* of Christ's Church; he then affirms that *this has nothing to do with the*

question at issue; next, he denies the *infallibility* of *Peter* and the *Pope*, and then, lastly, *assumes* that the Church, built upon *fallible Peter*, supported by a *fallible keystone*, and governed by a *fallible head*, the *Pope*, is an *infallible Church*! By what rules of logic he deduces such a conclusion from his contradictory premises we know not; but we do know that this shows the *hollowness of the grounds* of his Rule of Faith, and the *worthlessness of his assumptions*.

We now notice the fact that not one of our opponents has offered a word in reply to our arguments (pp. 23, 24) respecting the *Divine authority* of the Apocrypha. We there showed that inasmuch as they affirm the Jewish Church to be *infallible*, and thence argue the *infallibility* of their own, so, by their own confession, the Jewish Church was *infallibly* right, when they, on the grounds adduced, did not receive the Apocrypha. And though our opponents should prove the "truth" of the other controverted points, yet until they show *their infallible right* to set aside the *infallible decisions* of the Jewish Church in this matter, the fact will still remain that the "Catholic Rule of Faith is not true."

We have showed that the *onus* of proving the Divine authority of the controverted points rests upon our opponents, and we have just seen that, respecting one of them, they have not offered a single word in proof. Regarding the others, they have based their arguments upon the assumption of their Church being *exclusively* the *Catholic* or *Universal Church* of Christ; and that, *as such*, she cannot teach *error*. Both these assumptions our readers will perceive are false and groundless; for the term *Catholic* is, and always has been, denied to belong to the Church of Rome exclusively; and as long as the Greek and other churches remain in existence, or on the page of history, over whom the Romish Church never did exercise jurisdiction, and whose existence was antecedent or coeval with that of Rome, the absurdity and baselessness of such an assumption will be apparent. But even this assumption is based upon another, which is the *supremacy of Peter*, and this we showed in our opening article to be "as baseless as the fabric of a vision."

On page 86, "Gregory" says:—"I shall, therefore, proceed to show that the authority upon which a Catholic believes in Christianity is founded upon truth; and that the Church, whose Rule of Faith we are now discussing, is the *true Church*, and, in consequence, teaches us the *true faith*." The "authority" on which a Catholic believes Christianity is that of his Church; consequently, "Gregory" undertakes to prove that it is founded upon truth. He is next to show that it is the *true Church*, and that, *consequently*, no error is taught therein. We have already shown that the Romish Church cannot be *EXCLUSIVELY* the *true Church*, but that she is a *part* of the Universal or Catholic Church we admit and maintain. We also maintain that a *TRUE Church* may fall away—may teach error. Were we to assert the opposite, we should give the lie to the plain facts of history. Was not the Jewish Church a *true Church*? and did not our Lord himself charge its members with "teaching for

doctrines the commandments of men—making the Word of God of none effect through their tradition? Mark vii. 7. The Galatian Church was a *true* Church, yet they fell into error in teaching the necessity of circumcision and the observance of the Mosaic law. Those of Pergamos and Thyatira were true Churches, yet they, even in apostolic times, taught error. And what is the Church of Rome more than they? That the Romish Church has taught errors we believe is indisputable. Let our readers judge by comparing the teaching of the BIBLE and the CHURCH OF ROME on pp. 25, 26. We think, then, that we have shown the fallacy of "Gregory's" proposition, and that all his arguments founded thereon are therefore fallacious.

Respecting the *visibility, unity, catholicity, holiness, and apostolicity*, which "Gregory" claims as the property of his Church, we have not time nor space to enlarge upon. We must leave them with our readers; but we hope they will bear in mind that though all these marks were true of the Romish Church, they would not prove her to be *exclusively* the Church of Christ, nor yet make her incapable of teaching error. It is one thing to *claim* these marks, and another thing to prove the *possession* of them. Those who are acquainted with Church history will readily call to mind periods which will give the lie to the possession of these by the Romish Church. Just one instance, and we close this topic. "Gregory" says:—"Although the Church invites her children to practise holiness, it has not, of course, *the power to COMPEL*. *It is left, as God leaves our own salvation, in our own hands, to accept or reject AS WE THINK PROPER*" (p. 90). We ask, then, *why* the persecutions and wholesale slaughters of the Waldenses and Albigenses because they refused to submit to the Pope, and preferred to be guided by the simple Word of God, as their forefathers had been? *Why* the massacre of St. Bartholomew? *Why* the blazing fires of Smithfield? *Why* the Inquisition of Spain and Rome? *WHY all these* if the Church of Rome be holy, and her children left "to accept or reject as they think proper"? The marks of holiness, &c., are made the *ground* of the "truth" of the Catholic Rule of Faith. Hence the hollowness of that ground and the falsity of her Rule of Faith.

On page 157, "A Layman" asserts that the Church of Rome was in the possession of the true faith during the lifetime of the apostle Paul. But surely he does not infer therefrom that she has it *now*. He asks *when* the Church of Rome fell into error. Shall we conclude that because a sick man cannot tell *how* or *when* he received the seeds of his complaint, that he is not sick, or that he is not so because *we* cannot tell? But if we bring plain and strong evidence from the Scriptures that the Church of Rome *now* teaches doctrines contrary to the Word of God, no sensible man would doubt of her having fallen into error, although neither he nor we might be able to tell *when* this error first arose.

The quotations which he has given us from the Fathers, Irenæus, Cyprian, Origen, Jerome, and Augustine, seem to have small

connection with the subject of debate. There is little in them from which any Protestant need dissent. Most of these extracts do not refer to the Church of Rome at all; while the utmost that can be proved from the remainder is that the writers agreed with the doctrines which were *then* taught by her. Not one of these Fathers held the Rule of Faith of the present Church of Rome. Irenæus writes of the heretics of his time, that,

"When reproved with the Scriptures, they begin to accuse the Scriptures as if they were not correct, nor of authority; and as if they were ambiguous, and as if the truth might not be discovered from them by those who knew not tradition."*

Hear Cyprian. In the celebrated controversy between him and Pope Stephen, respecting the re-baptization of those baptized by heretics, it was pleaded by Stephen that "tradition" was against him. To this Cyprian replies,—

"Whence is that tradition? Does it descend from Dominical and Evangelical testimony, or does it come from the commands and epistles of the Apostles? For God declares that those things are to be done that are *written*. . . . If, therefore, it is either commanded in the Gospel, or contained in the Epistles or Acts of the Apostles, let that divine and holy tradition be observed."†

Hear Origen:—

"We must take the Scriptures as witnesses. For our doctrines and interpretations, without such witness, are not to be believed."‡

We recommend the following to the special attention of J. H.:—

"Ye ought to know that the things read from the sacred volumes are worthy of being uttered by the Holy Spirit; but we need the grace of the Holy Spirit to interpret them."§

Hear Jerome:—

"The other things also, which they find and feign of themselves, without the authority and testimonies of the Scriptures, as if by apostolical tradition, the sword of God smites down."||

"As we deny not these things that are written, so we reject those things that are not written. That God was born of a virgin we believe, because we read it; that Mary married after the birth, we believe not, because we read it not."¶

Hear Augustine:—

"Either with respect to Christ, or His Church, or anything else whatever, that pertains to your faith or life, I will not say 'we;' because we are by no means to be compared to him who said, 'Although we;' but certainly I will say what he has allowed it up with, If an angel from heaven shall have preached to you anything beyond what ye have received in the Scriptures of the Law and the Gospel, let him be anathema."**

* Adv. Hær. lib. 3.

† Epist. ad Pompeium. Oxon. 1682.

‡ Hom. in Jer.

§ Hom. in Josh.

|| In Aggæum, c. 1.

¶ Adv. Helvid.

** Contra litt. Petil. lib. 3.

"A Layman" next proceeds to inform "*Lex Scripta*" that, on reference to any book of instruction used by Catholics, he will find that "every degree of honour is to be paid to the Blessed Virgin, save Divine honour." In a book of instruction not much used by Catholics, "A Layman" will find that every degree of religious honour is to be paid to God alone—none to any creature:—"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with *all* thy heart, and with *all* thy soul, and with *all* thy mind, and with *all* thy strength," (Mark xii. 30.) "Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and Him *only* shalt thou serve," (Matt. iv. 10.)

We fear, however, that such references may be distasteful to "A Layman." Perhaps the following may suit him better:—

"I will confess thee, O Lady, because thou hast hid these things from the wise, and hast revealed them unto babes. Thy glory has covered the heavens, and the earth is full of thy mercy. O Blessed Virgin, thou savest whom thou wilt, and he from whom thou turnest thy face dies."

"O Lady, permit me not to be delivered over to the fury of God, that I be not judged in His anger. Incline the face of thy Son towards us; *oblige* Him to have pity on the sinners."

"The world remains by thy *Providence*; for it is THOU who at the beginning founded it together with God! I am wholly thine: O Lady, save me."

The author of the above blasphemies is a canonized saint of the Church of Rome. On the 14th of July in each year, every *Romish* priest thus prays:—"O God, who didst give blessed Bonaventure to thy people for a minister of eternal salvation, grant, we beseech Thee, that he who was the instructor of our life here on earth may become our intercessor in heaven." The "*Psalter of St. Bonaventure*," from which we have quoted these passages (almost at random), is a book in extensive use on the continent. Ten editions of it were issued at Rome, from 1834 to 1844, with the express sanction of the last Pope, Gregory XVI.; and other editions during the present pontificate, with the official imprimatur.

"A Layman" next affirms that "the power of the Pontiffs to grant 'Indulgences to sin' has never existed, save in the imagination of such Protestants as '*Lex Scripta*.'" For the better information of "A Layman," we quote the following from the decretals of Pope Gregory IX.:—*

"De adulteriis vero et aliis criminibus quæ sunt minora, potest Episcopus cum clericis post peractam pœnitentiam dispensare." "But of adulteries and other *lesser* crimes, the bishops may grant dispensation to the clergy after penance has been performed."

The passages quoted by J. H. on page 224 are all very well in their place, to prove the universality of the mission of the apostles,

* Lib. ii. cap. iv. Paris, 1595.

and the perpetuity of Christ's presence with His ministers and church throughout all ages; but until J. H. has proved the *exclusive claim* of the *Church of Rome* to these promises, we must still say that they are claimed upon unwarrantable assumptions. Instead of our having to prove that Christ has failed in His promises to His Church, in order to prove the fallibility of the Romish Church, our opponents must prove the *exclusive right* to every one of them.

In answer to the objection of J. H. respecting the meanings of *Petros* and *Petra*, we observe, that although the vernacular language in which our Saviour spoke was the Syro-Chaldaic, and although it possessed but one word, *KIPHOS*, to express both *rock* and *stone*, yet the language in which the apostles *wrote* must guide us, and form our authority as to the *true* meaning of these words; because they, being *inspired* men, would not give us a wrong meaning; if they did, they would teach *error*; and although the *French* is in the same predicament as the Syro-Chaldaic, yet we are happy to say that the *Latin* is not so faulty. And surely our opponents will not reject the authority of their own *Vulgate*! Listen to its voice:—"Et ego autem tibi dico, *quia tu es PETRUS, et super hac PETRA*," &c. The word *Petrus* is a noun *masculine*, and *petra* a noun *feminine*.

We need not say anything respecting the two columns of comparative teachings of the BIBLE and ROME, since no one has attempted to reconcile them. But respecting the quotation from "The Liturgy of the Heart of Mary Liguori!" we remark, that we should have heard no complaint from J. H., had there not occurred a typographical error. If our friends and J. H. will put a period after *Mary*, it will read thus:—"The Liturgy of the Heart of Mary. Liguori." We understand that Liguori was made a saint in the year 1839, and that Cardinal Wiseman assisted at the *operation*.

In reply to the grave charge of quoting from books which do exist passages which they do not contain, we plead NOT GUILTY; and justify our plea by observing, that we did not quote *direct* from Bellarmine's work, but from Poole's "Dialogues," published by the "Religious Tract Society," 1839, and that we gave the *page* of the book by saying "*Ibid.*" If the work of Bellarmine does not really contain the words, and NEVER *did*, Matthew Poole is to blame, and not ourselves. But we find at the beginning of the book the following notice:—"Reprinted from the last edition, as corrected and amended by the author. In this reprint the texts have been verified." Matthew Poole flourished in the times of the Commonwealth and Charles II., so that this has been before the world long enough to be detected of fraud if he be guilty of it. Besides Matthew Poole, we have the testimony of the Rev. Charles Leslie, a contemporary of our authority, for the existence of the passage in Bellarmine's work extant at that time. In Leslie's "Short and Easy Method with the Deists," (chap. xi.) we have the following passage:—"This was the current doctrine (namely, *infallibility*) of

the divines in the Church of Rome in former ages, as you may see in Bellarmine (*De Rom. Pontif.*, l. iv. c. 5), where he carries this so high as to assert, that if the Pope did command the practice of vice and forbid virtue, the Church were bound to believe that virtue was vice, and that vice was virtue. And in his preface he calls this absolute supremacy of the Pope the *summa rei Christianæ*—the sum and foundation of the Christian religion; and that to deny it was not only a simple error, but a pernicious *heresy*." So that, on the testimony of these two gentlemen, we are bound to believe that Bellarmine's work did originally contain the passage to which J. H. objects. We know that there is such a practice as *expunging* from works such passages as are obnoxious; and though the work of Bellarmine should not *now* contain the passage in question, it *may* have contained it; and our opponents have to prove against this, our evidence, *that it never did*. We must now leave our case with our jury of readers to decide whether we have or not substantiated our plea of NOT GUILTY. One thing will be evident to all, namely, that J. H. charges Cardinal Bellarmine with *impiety*, and the Cardinal condemns J. H. with being guilty of *heresy*. So much for the *unity* of our opponents.

In conclusion, we say to the supporters of the Romish Church—When you have proved the points assumed by you throughout this debate—namely, the *Divine* authority of the *Apocrypha*, the *Supremacy* of *Peter* and the *Pope*, the *Catholicity* of your Church, and its *Infallibility*,—we shall be bound to believe your Rule of Faith to be "*true*;" but not till then. And all our readers we exhort, in the words of John Locke, to "study the Holy Scriptures, and especially the New Testament: therein are contained the words of eternal life. It has God for its author, salvation for its end, and truth without any mixture of error for its matter."

THEOPHYLACT.

Philosophy.

ARE THE PRINCIPLES OF THE DEVELOPMENT THEORY TRUE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

HAVING stated in a previous article the grounds on which we consider the Development Theory entitled to be received as true, we proceed to examine what has as yet been advanced in opposition. We find "L'Ouvrier" admitting that the propounders of the theory are animated by "an ardent love of God's great and wonderful work of nature" (p. 175), and yet asserting that the principles which they advocate ascribe to "nature a power to override and render nugatory the great First Cause of being, the intelligent Creator of

he universe, which is a species of reckless daring, amounting to blasphemous impiety" (p. 245). We are at a loss to see how those accused of such impiety can be actuated by such love. And, with equal consistency, he assures us that he is "not of that number who would fear the results of the Development Theory, if generally received as truth," though "blasphemous impiety" characterizes it, and though it be a "futile, fallacious folly" (p. 245). We pass over these inconsistencies, as not affecting the question at issue, referring to them only as indicative of the amount of dependence to be placed on the assertions of our antagonist.

In his first article, "L'Ouvrier" combats the supposition that inorganic matter may become organic by natural law, and states that if such a change were the law of nature, "we should at least be able to see some plainly marked instance . . . within the limits of the historic era" (p. 178). We might, with equal reason, demand a modern instance of inorganic matter becoming organic by creative act. The absence of an historic instance of either kind, does not disprove either of the two theories which profess to explain the commencement of life; and indeed, it may be said rather to favour the Development Theory. For it is manifestly unreasonable to claim a recent instance of matter becoming organized, of that theory which considers such a change to have occurred only when life first became existent, all other subsequent forms of life being developments therefrom; whereas, on the other hand, it is not at all unreasonable to suppose, that if organic beings have, during all ages, been constantly created from inorganic matter, historic instances may occur. According to our theory, the earth, after its creation by the Divine Being, existed for a considerable period in a state of chaos, quite incompatible with the presence of life, during which time, under the influence of physical law, it developed through a series of changes which ultimately rendered it suitable for the existence of life. At the arrival of the time when life became possible, that is, when the prevalent conditions no longer were such as to restrain certain inherent properties of matter, these latent forces became active, and inorganic matter, to the extent that the then conditions of external circumstances permitted, assumed organization. This view of the subject in no way militates against God's prerogative of creation; for the production of life in matter, by means of law, as one of the most essential attributes of matter, is as much originally referable to the Creator as would be successive creations subsequent to the great pristine creative act; and, giving credence to this theory, we deem an indication of much greater faith in the Omnipotence of nature's God, and much juster appreciation of the Divine skill, wisdom, and power displayed in creation, than is that exercised by those who, while allowing that the Creator has left the operations of the heavenly bodies to the inherent law of gravitation with which He has gifted the starry system, yet cavil to admit that He may have similarly gifted the integral parts of those systems with self-acting law for effecting their minor and less

momentous operations, and brand as guilty of "blasphemous impiety" those who feel that by so believing they most glorify the great Author of all things, whose grandest works are achieved by the simplest means.

"L'Ouvrier" very confidently asserts, with italicized emphasis, "that a germinal cell produces *its specific form* of vegetable or animal life, and *no other form*." Now, that this is not the fact, but, indeed, positive falsity, we have but to refer as proof to the existence of hybrids. It is a notorious fact that, not in a few exceptional cases, but in many well-authenticated instances, the germinal cell of a given species of animal, if submitted to the embryonic conditions of some other species, will produce an offspring different from either. We adduce this rather to show the erroneousness of a proposition on which our opponent lays stress, than as an illustration of development; for our theory does not claim, except, perhaps, in some instances, the origination of species by means of hybridization, though this phenomenon is useful, as confirmatory of the fact that elemental life, when exposed to an unaccustomed series of plastic circumstances, will assume a new form of organization. While on this topic, we will deal with the objection that hybrids are infertile. Now this we imagine to be a consequence of a non-continuance of the new conditions which gave rise to the new animal; for it is manifestly impossible that the germinal cell of a hybrid can be identical with that of its progenitor, neither can the embryonic conditions of a hybrid, to which it is subjected, resemble those which were influential in its own first stages of development. So that to bring forward the infertility of hybrids as antagonistic to the principles of development, is begging the question, for the very continuance of the changed conditions which is necessary for the permanent change of species, is unavoidably wanting in the intercourse of hybrids. We have already suggested the possibility of a structural modification following a change in the foetal conditions, to which the germ of life may be subjected (see p. 173*), and this is confirmed by the occurrence of hybrids.

We now proceed to examine what is advanced as an insuperable objection to the Development Theory. It is urged that organic traces found in the earliest rocks are those of highly organized animals, whereas the theory we advocate is assumed to require that development should invariably proceed from the simpler to the more complex organisms. We shall treat this objection in two ways:—First, by showing that proof is wanting that highly organised animals were the first to exist; and, secondly, by bringing forward the fact that development may be retrogressive as well as progressive.

* Lire 24 from the top, on that page, should read, "without the agency," for "with the agency." In the last line of page 170, the comma should be between "designs, alike," instead of between "accuracy, all;" and at page 172, line 19 from the bottom, read "tends" for "sends."

First, then, we say that our opponents, by adducing instances of the fossil remains of animals that occur in the earlier formations, do not by any means substantiate the assertion that these were the first forms of life; for not only is their position ever open to the objection that a more ancient fossil of a lower order may be found to-morrow, geological research having been in no wise so extensive as to warrant positive induction; but,—and this is important,—the physical conditions prevalent at the time of the deposition of the earlier stratified rocks, though quite compatible with the existence of certain living organisms, were such as to destroy all organic forms when life became extinct, with the exception of only a few higher species whose more developed framework of bone resisted the decomposing influences at work. As the result of experiments conducted by Dr. Lindley, by immersing plants in water, with the view to ascertain the effect of certain natural causes in obliterating traces of their existence, “it was found that the dicotyledonous plants, in general, had wholly disappeared, whence it was inferred that they were unable to remain for two years in water without being totally decomposed. . . . Grasses and sedges had perished; whence it was inferred that we have no right to assume that the earth was not originally clothed with these, because we no longer find their remains. Fungi and mosses, and all the lowest forms of vegetation, had disappeared; even *equisetum* had left no traces behind.”* In the same way, the absence of the remains of the lower orders of animals is accounted for. Certain agencies, such as intense heat, were so active during the formation of the first deposits, that whole series of strata have become crystallized, and are hence known under the name of metamorphic rocks; so that little stress need be laid upon the non-preservation, under such circumstances, of the simpler forms of organization, the majority of which indeed have no bony structure. And it cannot be objected that these were circumstances in which life could not be sustained, for we know that great warmth, combined with a humid atmosphere, which must have resulted from the rapid evaporation consequent on such heat, are the very conditions most favourable to the existence of the inferior forms of animation. So that, if life existed at this period, and it may be taken as an axiom, that life is never absent where the conditions prevalent favour its presence—that Nature does “abhor a vacuum”—it must have been in those very forms whose preservation in a fossil state was impossible, not only on account of the conditions best adapted to that development, but also because of the very simplicity of their structure.

Then, secondly, we meet the objection under consideration by the fact that development need not necessarily be progressive, but may be the reverse. That is, the conditions requiring a new form of structure for the continuance of life may not be such as to require one more complex or more highly organized. The new form may

* Richardson's “Geology,” Bohn's edition, 1855, pp. 174-5

be simpler, and yet quite as perfectly adapted to the existent circumstances; and, though it may have developed from a higher order of organism, its development is quite as reasonable, and as much within the scope of our theory, as that development which is said to be progressive because it assumes at each successive stage a higher order of structure. The reader of Hugh Miller's "Footprints of the Creator," which was written to combat the Development Theory, will remember how frequently and emphatically he dwells upon the fact that each class of extinct animals, after having attained the acme of their existence by the occurrence of their most perfect forms, have been subsequently represented by a series of species gradually retrogressive, till the race became extinct. This fact, which is thought to militate so much against the Development Theory, we deem an argument in its favour; for after an organism has, through a series of species, reached that stage when the prevalent conditions are favourable to its highest development, it must manifestly follow that at the next change of conditions it must, to preserve its continuance, assume a form consistent with those new conditions; and being already at its highest stage of organism, a retrogressive development is the alternative of extinction. Let it be borne in mind, also, that the classification of animals, as of inferior and superior orders of life, is but, to a certain extent, an artificial scheme adopted by naturalists for convenience; and that, when a change in physical condition took place, it was by no means considered by Nature whether the new circumstances were such as should favour the existence of those animals and plants that were next on the list of Cuvier and Linnæus.

In conclusion, we will just refer to one of the absurdest and most frequent propositions advanced by the opponents of the Development Theory. It is put in this among other forms by "L'Ouvrier,"—"The fungi have never been observed to develop into the stately oak." Now it is almost unnecessary to state that we never supposed such a phenomenon possible. All that we assert is, that at one period of time a form of vegetation, very similar to the oak in structure, was subject to agencies which necessitated its assumption of that form as a *sine qua non* of its continued existence. By a long series of developments such as these, a connection may exist between these extremes of vegetation. But putting the connection in the abrupt form our opponent does, is only an exaggeration without logical purpose.

If in the foregoing remarks we have written anything calculated to annoy our opponent, such has been far from our intention. Our antagonism is to his opinions and not to himself. Admiring the tone of his article, we would imitate his courtesy, and if we have failed to do so, we sincerely regret it.

E. M., Jun.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

WE have read with deep interest the articles which have already appeared in this debate, referring, as they do, to what has been

designated "the mystery of mysteries," viz., the exercise of creative power, in distinction from the results of animal instinct and the effects of surrounding circumstances. We cannot, however, but remark, at the outset, on the very meagre support which our opponents have been able to give to the Development Theory, and the very subdued tone in which they have spoken its praise. We cannot also but express our surprise, that neither of the preceding writers on this question have favoured us with a definition of the principal terms used in the debate; and we shall at once attempt to supply this their lack of service.

The word "Development" signifies an unfolding, and for some time was principally employed to express those organic changes which take place in animal and vegetable bodies, from their embryo state until they arrive at maturity; but it has at the present time a much wider application, and is of very frequent occurrence in the composition of our would-be-thought profound ones. By the Development Theory is meant that speculation of philosophers which attributes the present order of things, and the variety in plants and animals, to the working of certain laws impressed upon matter, rather than to the creative fiat of an all-wise and all-powerful God. Hence, in 1748, Demaillet propounded his theory of the origin of *different* kinds of animals from one another. He taught the direct *transmutation* of individuals, through altered circumstances and volitional impulses. By way of illustration, he supposed that a *flying fish*, blown on to land, might, by some efforts of its own, aided by some internal forces, become gradually metamorphosed into a bird! In 1809, Lamarck, a most profound naturalist, gave a more scientific aspect to this transmutation theory. "He supposed the necessary metamorphoses to occur, not in individuals, but in a *succession of individuals*, and to be produced by accumulated changes, the result of certain adaptations between long-continued alteration in external conditions, such as heat or cold, dryness or moisture, or other surrounding influences, and continuously inherited internal tendencies and powers of many generations of individuals." "He supposed that the whole series of animals commenced from two primordial stocks, viz., a worm, and an infusorial animalcule, the earliest beginnings of each of which originated in a direct or spontaneous generation! The former line he imagined to pass through worms, barnacles, and shell-fish; and the latter through infusorial monad, polypes, star-fish, insects, spiders, and crabs,—both to meet in fishes, from which the vertebrata, *including man*, were in gradual procession derived!"

In the year 1846 this theory attracted great attention by the publication of that clever but unsatisfactory book, the "Vestiges of Creation." It is unnecessary for us here to state the peculiar views advanced by the author of this work, as our friend, "L'Ouvrier" has already so fully noticed them (page 176). To show, however, the dangerous tendency of the book, we may remind our readers that it was published anonymously, and that a little time ago, a

popular author and publisher was most anxious to clear himself from the accusation of being concerned in its authorship!

The absurdity of this Development Theory, when stripped of its technical terms, is very apparent. Disraeli thus amusingly expounds it:—"You know," says he, "all is development. The principle is perpetually going on. First, there was—Nothing. Then there was—Something. Then (I forget the next) I *think* there were shells—then fishes—then *we* came. Let me see—*did* we come next? Never mind that; we came at last. And the next change there will be something very superior—something with wings! Ah! that's it: we were fishes; and I believe we shall be—crows!"

Ridicule appears a lawful weapon to employ in combating such hypotheses as these, and ably has a writer in a recent publication used it, a somewhat lengthened sample of which we are tempted to quote:—"You visit the monkeys in some great zoological collection. If yonder orang-otang or chimpanzee could speak, as animals used to do, in the days of the fabulists (and very sensibly, too, in general), what sort of an harangue would it deliver? 'Gentlemen of the human species,' it might say, 'You may laugh at us as much as you choose. *Quid vetat?* It is very true that we are clumsy, inelegant brutes. I admit it. Our arms are undoubtedly very long and ungainly. The toes of our feet are turned inwards, and in consequence we are compelled to waddle along in a rather facetious way. Our thick lips, wrinkled cheeks, and protruding snouts, do not exactly constitute the most prepossessing features in the world. I grant, too, that our facial angle—so your Mr. Camper called it, when he measured us with his callipers, as he pretended to do everything, from a mouse to a Bourbon—is shockingly small. In fact, I am free to confess, that my cousin, the baboon, yonder, is as hideous a fellow as ever lived. And our habits, you say, are low and grovelling? By no means improbable! We don't pretend to be fit creatures to sit down at fine tables, or lounge in gilded drawing-rooms. But what of all this? Just a word in your ear, gentlemen. Are you aware that you and we have come from the same stock, that we are all descended from one common ancestor; that we, vile, despicable brutes, as you deem us, are, in truth, bone of your bone, and flesh of your flesh? Yes, my dainty young lady (you with the gay parasol and copious crinoline), pray don't look so indignant when I venture to suggest that there would be nothing particularly outrageous (that's my candid opinion) in your selecting a husband from this very menagerie. I am willing to make you an offer myself. It is true, we are only 'poor relations,' as one of your would-be wits has styled us; but the simple difference between us is, that you have got on faster in the world than ourselves, and consequently hold your heads a little higher than you had ought. Consult the writings of Monsieur Lamarck on the subject. He is my authority. You can't surely object to the testimony of one of your own concocted species. I would recommend you, therefore, to be a little more civil. Let us be on friendlier terms for the future. Remem-

ver, that if we are not exactly men, we are next door to humanity; if not brothers, we can yet boast of the same lineage, and are entitled to wear the same coat of arms as yourselves. Such as I am now, such was once the very, very great grandfather of your race, and, therefore, when you next 'stir us up,' be pleased to do it with a little more tenderness, and if not with fraternal leniency, yet with some recollection of the respect which is due to the common progenitor of men and monkeys."—*British Quarterly Review*, April, 1860.

It is not surprising that a theory which involved such manifest absurdities as these should, in this stage of its "development," have been generally rejected by intelligent naturalists, and supported only by a few sceptical philosophers. It was, however, reserved for Mr. Darwin, by the publication of his admitted erudite work on the "Origin of Species," to bring about that metamorphosis in the Development Theory which tardy nature has never yet been known to effect in any living being.

By "Species" has been usually understood a collection of individuals that are alike in every character, not capable of change by any accidental circumstances, and capable of uniform, invariable, and *permanent continuance by propagation*. All changes produced by accidental causes, in individuals of a species, indicate and mark what are called varieties. But Mr. Darwin, in opposition to these views, maintains that species are mutable, and that by what he calls the "principle of natural selection." What we have considered mere temporary *varieties*, are capable, in lengthened periods, of producing *species*, and even genera, and orders; and following out this train of thought, he infers, "from analogy, that probably all the organic beings which have ever lived on this earth have descended from some one primordial form, into which life was first breathed by the Creator."

Mr. Darwin's reputation as a naturalist, his careful and extensive observations and investigations, and, above all, the candid and truthful spirit in which he has written on this subject, have secured for his views no ordinary amount of attention. There are those who eagerly espouse his views, on account of their novelty and ingenuity; and there are not wanting others, who welcome them because they see in them the limitation of the idea of the exercise of creative wisdom and power. At the same time, it is important to know, on account of the bearing of the fact upon the credibility of the theory itself, that some of those who, for the reason last stated, might be expected to receive Mr. Darwin's views with extacies, candidly confess that they are far from being consistent throughout, and are to be regarded as merely introductory to something higher (?). Thus, the well-known anti-religious *Westminster Review* says,— "After much consideration, and with assuredly no bias against Mr. Darwin's views, it is our clear conviction that, as the evidence stands, it is not absolutely proven that a group of animals, having all the characters exhibited by species in nature, has ever been

originated by selection, artificial or natural." Such, then, being the fact, and as little or nothing has been advanced by the affirmative writers in this debate in defence of Mr. Darwin's modifications of an old theory, we may at present dismiss them without further comment.

A few words respecting the affirmative articles seem called for. That in the last number of the *Controversialist*, by "Delta," is of a singularly unsatisfactory nature. The remarks with which he opens are quite gratuitous and uncalled for; and the vigilance with which religious men watch the discussion of all subjects having a bearing upon the truth of the Scripture, is a pleasing sign of the times;—it is no manifestation of fear or anger, but a proof of the fact that

"Piety has found
Friends in the friends of science, and true prayer
Has flowed from lips wet with Castilian dews."

The beautiful extract with which "Delta" favours us from the *Quarterly Review*, occurs in a negative article on this very question, and may be taken as expressive of the views of the disparaged "pietists" as well as of his own. The assertion of our opponent, that "it is chiefly by the facts of every-day life in the natural world that the theory is and must be supported," is very damaging to his cause; for while Mr. Darwin's work abounds with most interesting facts and statements, they supply no direct evidence in support of his theory. Throughout the whole range of nature there is not, and, as far as we can learn, never has been, any development of new organs in animals, nor any proof of the transmutation of animals from the lower to the higher forms. When, therefore, a little further on, "Delta" informs us, "that all organic life has descended from a few primordial forms," we ask him for "the facts of every-day life" which support this statement, and wait with interest for them to be brought forward.

We cannot but express our admiration of the healthy religious spirit and reverent tone which pervade the article by E. M., Jun.; but we would remind this writer that, if all that he advances were admitted, it would still leave the question of the truth of the Development Theory utterly unestablished. We therefore leave his article without further examination, and beg of its writer to give us something more conclusive, or to admit the weakness of his position.

A. J.

That religion is false which, professing to be intended for the use of all nations, is distorted in its doctrines, and narrowed in its precepts, by the prejudices and manners of any one particular age, and any one particular country. That religion is probably true which, challenging the inquiries, and demanding the obedience of every age and every country, is calculated to promote their temporal as well as eternal interest; to co-operate with every useful quality in their government, laws, and manners; and gradually to correct whatever is defective and injurious in them.—DR. PARR.

Social Economy.

IS COUNSEL JUSTIFIED IN DEFENDING FROM PUNISHMENT A CRIMINAL OF WHOSE GUILT HE HAS BEEN PROFESSIONALLY MADE COGNIZANT?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

IN taking part in this debate, I may perhaps be permitted to state what, however, some of my readers might doubtlessly discover, that I am neither a barrister nor a lawyer; and, having said thus much, I think it right gently to hint that I have no personal interest *whatever* to be promoted by the establishment of an affirmative position in the solution of this question.

In the course of this debate, it has been stated that it is not the function of counsel to defend the guilty from the due punishment of his guilt. But the practical question remains unanswered, *how* is counsel to know that a man is guilty? Surely, this is a question for a jury to decide, after hearing the evidence. It is the duty of counsel to point out any discrepancies in this evidence, so as to prevent the possibility of unfair advantage being taken of a criminal's position. It is a grand principle in the English law, that we are to look upon a man as innocent, until he be *proved* to be guilty; and it would be an unhappy time for England if this were otherwise.

It appears to us that the question we are called upon to discuss is based upon a pure hypothesis. It has not yet been proved that counsel are ever made cognizant of a prisoner's guilt. *How* can they be supposed to discover it? Is a criminal to employ a solicitor, and tell him the secret in a similar way to confessing to a Romish priest? and then is the solicitor expected to go to counsel, and inform him that the man admits his guilt? Or is counsel to be called upon to examine the evidence, and form his judgment of such guilt? Assuming that some such a mode could be adopted, and that the unfortunate man would stand at the bar undefended, is it not possible that the judge and jury might be less careful in seeing that he was *proved*, according to the evidence, to be guilty, in case he pleaded "not guilty"? If so, a man would be transported, or hung, without being fairly and properly tried.

Supposing, again, the possibility of a murder being committed, and of certain individuals, who had a dislike for a person, being wicked enough to give false evidence of that person being the murderer, the man would be committed for trial, a report of the case would be circulated in the newspapers, and, amongst others, counsel might be deceived, and believe the person to be guilty, and, entertaining that belief, counsel would decline to defend him. The man might be ignorant, or nervous, and unable to speak for himself; and,

consequently his very manner and appearance, under such awkward circumstances, would be against him. The false swearers would come forward, and all would *appear* plausible and truthful; accordingly, the man would be condemned to the gallows, and would die innocent, solely because he was undefended by counsel!

The writers on the negative side, in order to argue their case, are bound to *imagine* that counsel, generally, are an unworthy class of persons. It has been asked what there is in the profession of an advocate, to invest him with power to set aside the great command of God, "Thou shalt not bear false witness *against* thy neighbour"? I answer that there is nothing which gives such a power, nor is counsel justified in claiming it. There is a vast difference, however, between trying to show wherein evidence may be imperfect, and affirming that the criminal is, beyond all doubt, innocent. Even if counsel were boldly to plead the innocence of the known guilty party, he would not, then, bear false witness against, but in *favour* of, his neighbour. So that the command referred to would not exactly meet the case.

In the 35th chapter of Numbers, and at the 30th verse, we read, "Whoso killeth any person, the murderer shall be put to death by the mouth of witnesses; but *one* witness shall not testify against any person to cause him to die." In the 19th chapter of Deuteronomy, and at the 15th verse, it is said, that "*one* witness shall not rise up against a man for any iniquity or any sin that he sinneth." So that the Bible is in favour of a criminal being fairly and lawfully tried, by advocating the necessity of more than one witness; and I hold, that if witnesses are requisite, it follows, as a matter of course, that those witnesses ought to be questioned, on the part of a prisoner, by competent persons, or counsel, in order that he may be defended from improper treatment, and his prosecutors be compelled to attempt to *prove* him legally guilty.

"Great men are not always wise" (Job xxxii. 9), and, therefore, judges and juries are liable to mistakes. This being so, every man is entitled to legal assistance, whatever his "iniquity" or "sin" may be.

L'Ouvrier quotes the opinion of Jeremy Bentham, as to defending a known criminal:—"A man has committed a theft; another man who, without a licence, *knowing* what he has done, has assisted him in making his escape, is punished as an accomplice. But the law—that is, the judges by whom in this behalf the law has been made—has contrived to grant to their connections, acting in the character of advocates, a licence for this purpose. *What the non-advocate is hanged for, the advocate is paid for, and admired.*" Now, it has been my lot to be present at numerous trials for theft, &c., and I say, without hesitation, and with perfect confidence, that the knowledge of an accomplice, as to guilt, *cannot* be compared with the knowledge of an advocate; for the former is acquainted with the fact from *presence and sight*; whereas, the latter can, under any circumstances, only be aware of it from *information* furnished to him. Again, the

“escape” which an accomplice might effect, would be before, and in order to prevent a trial. But the “escape” which an advocate might succeed in affording would be after that legal proceeding had been gone through, and the “mouth of witnesses” had failed beyond doubt to *prove* the prisoner guilty; for, it should be remembered, that there ought to be *no* doubt whatever, when a man’s character, liberty, or life happens to be in danger. Further, how inconsistent it would be for counsel to be allowed to act on the part of prosecutors, whereby every point would be fully brought out against the accused, and argued with force and ability, leaving the prisoner without the least protection. Some may, however, say that criminals are such disreputable beings, that they ought to have no favour shown to them. But, on the contrary, it appears to me to be our bounden duty, as Christians, to give every man, however wicked, when placed upon his trial, an opportunity of defending himself in such a way as he may think best; and, if he prefer legal assistance, he should be permitted to obtain it.

Better far that a few should escape in this world, on account of the advocacy of counsel, leaving our heavenly Judge and Master hereafter to award such punishment to sinners as seemeth to Him just and proper, than that even one should innocently suffer in consequence of an unfair or imperfect trial, for want of professional assistance.

The more we consider the subject under discussion, the more we feel certain of the justice of the view we, and those who think with us, take on this side of the question.

R. D. R.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

It is amusing to remark the innocence and earnestness with which our leading opponent, “Nona,” carries the present literary campaign into a territory altogether neutral. Any one casually reading his clever and argumentative paper might naturally suppose the question to be, “Is counsel justified in endeavouring to limit or diminish the punishment of a criminal of whose guilt he has professionally been made cognizant?” And such a question would form an admirable groove for the opinions which this writer has expressed. But with the present question they have simply nothing to do. We hold the language, which heralds this discussion, to be sufficiently explicit and precise; that the query—whether an advocate would be justified in endeavouring to *defend from punishment* an acknowledged criminal?—is only susceptible of one meaning—*i. e.*, whether counsel can be sanctioned in attempting to prove a known criminal’s *innocence*; this being the only means of effecting the desired exemption from punishment, and of meeting the terms of this discussion.

The area of debate being thus clearly defined, we will suppose a criminal to have been arraigned on a charge of murder. His guilt is well known to his counsel, though only, by powerful circumstantial evidence, apprehended by the prosecution. The advocate may

entertain an inward horror of capital punishments; he may consider it outrageous that the sacrifice of one life should involve the sacrifice of another; and some romantic idea may have entered his thoughts of a far more preferable method of entombing the guilty in some asylum during the balance of their existence. And in his enthusiasm he may have supposed that such an asylum would be an admirable moral guarantee, excellently adapted for the lustration of a depraved moral character. These rosy views may be entertained and believed with all the tenacity that self-opinionativeness supplies; and the advocate may permit his opinions and his arguments to be swayed by their surging force. But, in allowing himself to be guided by such considerations, he is silently offending against, though not ostensibly opposing, the laws of his country; and is himself, *virtually*, no inconsiderable offender. Should he prove successful in veiling the deeds of the assassin, the result would necessarily be the acquittal of the prisoner, and a severe wound would thereby be inflicted on public peace and social order. And no private convictions or conclusions ought to bias a question of guilt or innocence, where these convictions and conclusions are oblique to the existing state of the law.

The above is the most charitable supposition that we can advance of the conduct of an advocate in defending an acknowledged criminal. Listen, however, to "Nona." "The evidence of a prisoner's guilt being conclusive, it is no less necessary that the law, which he is believed to have violated, be distinct, precise, and perfectly applicable to his case." This the bench themselves will have the most ample means of ascertaining. Following the stream of our opponent's argument, we find it shortly afterwards taking a most unexpected angle into alien territory—as the following:—"Not a week elapses but some one is accused upon suspicions almost groundless. Now it is a bank official on a charge of embezzlement, who is afterwards dismissed without the slightest imputation on his character," &c., &c. Any eye, that can discover a connecting link between this excerpt and the text, must certainly be endowed with peculiar power. No one, indeed, questions that an advocate is entirely justified in defending a prisoner whose guilt is doubtful and unconfessed; and when the evidence inclines him to regard the prisoner as innocent of the charge brought against him. We would not have the law, that allows counsel to *every* prisoner, changed. The *morale* of the bar ought to prevent the *contre-temps* of a barrister staining his talents by defending one who has revolted against the laws of his country, and rebelled against the dictates of his Creator.

We should have thought it impossible, had we not a visual testimony, that any photographer of thought could have perpetrated such an argument as the following:—"Supposing that the advocate determines to cut the connection" between himself and the criminal, "what is the obvious result? Why, that his client goes to other counsel, from whom he carefully conceals as much as he can; and the

chances are, that the ends of justice will be defeated by the latter advancing bold and skilful hypotheses, which he would not have done, had he been better acquainted with the merits of the case." So that any robber might be justified in plundering an individual, if he were assured that others were intending, for the sake of spoil, not only to rob but to murder the man; that, by stripping the intended victim of his property, he would remove a temptation to others, who would not shrink at committing a deadlier deed. If it be wrong to defend a guilty individual, no healthy or unhealthy anxiety to further the "ends of justice" ought to induce him to do so. The principle is one which only a Machiavelli could sanction.

We are informed by "Nona" that the law of the land exacts a strict observance of the truth on the part of the advocate. We will not suppose that he directly infringes this requirement—indeed, if he did, it would be entirely useless. Statements of fact, unweighted by evidence, would only afford a banquet of amusement. But there is the utterance of half truths, equivocation, the suppression of facts—and, above all, the ingenious framework of specious argument—all of which are no less infractions of the truth than the most direct falsehoods. When to the foregoing pre-requisites are added a distinct and happy delivery, a continuous cascade of language, a felicitous and delightful imagery, an enthusiastic and vigorous expression, the triumph of the advocate is often complete; and when he has succeeded in saving the guilty one from punishment, when he has triumphed in unloosing upon society a criminal, the fanged thought of it will afterwards afford no pleasure, no satisfaction. Its sting will indeed be felt in every resurrection of the past.

Further; forensic talents, perversely employed, inflict no inconsiderable injury on the administration of justice itself. An advocate employing his talents to defeat the "ends of justice"—to release, if by his utmost efforts he possibly can, a person of acknowledged criminality from deserved punishment, is virtually as much a violator of the law as the man who endeavours to obstruct a policeman in the performance of his duty; or as one who attempts to further the escape of a prisoner. All are equally guilty in impeding free action of the law.

Can "Nona" imagine the debasing influence which the continual and deliberate defence of admitted criminals must eventually exert on the advocate's character? How every architect of falsehood, and obstructor of justice, must gradually lose his self-respect, and by practice still less hesitatingly enter into a defence of the vile; and with less and less difficulty wildly embark in the most disgraceful sophistries and deceptions! We have a witness to the invincibility of our position, far higher than any that mere argument can boast,—a witness, to whose autocracy, nations past and present, peoples barbarous and civilized, have willingly submitted—a witness regnant in the minds of the slave and of the free, of the conquered and of the victorious—a witness enthroned in man himself—to his eternal conscience we appeal for the decision of this great question.

S. E. L.

The Essayist.

SHAKESPERE FACTS, FANCIES, FORGERIES, AND FABRICATIONS.

V.—THE FAME, FAMILY, FAITH, AND FRIENDS OF SHAKESPERE.

SHAKESPERE was buried in the chancel of the church of the Holy Trinity, Stratford. A flat stone, underneath which his body is said to lie, bears an epitaph in wretched doggerel, traditionally reported to have been "made by himself a little before his death," but worthy only, as De Quincey thinks, of the grave-digger or the parish clerk. The oburgation is certainly more forcible and fierce than *gentle*, which was the prescriptive characteristic of the dramatist. It is as follows:—

" Good frend for Jesus sake forbear,
To digg the dust enclosed heare ;
Blest be y^e man y^e spares these stones,
And curst be he y^e moves my bones."

If we doubt the authorship of these verses, is not our doubt made greater by looking on his monument, on the north *wall* of the church, which bears these lines?—

" Judicio Pylium, genio Socratem, arte Maronem,
Terra tegit, populus mœret, Olympus habet."

" Stay, Passenger, why goest thou by so fast ?
Read, if thou canst, whom envious Death hath plast
Within this monument. SHAKESPEARE, with whom
Quick Nature dide: whose name doth deck this tombe
Far more than cost; Sith all that he has writt,
Leaves living Art but page to serve his Witt.

Obiit Año Doⁱ 1616,
Ætatis 53, die 23 Ap."

[Who wrote this inscription, Jonson, Drayton, or Dr. Hall?]

At the time of Shakespeare's death, his family consisted of his wife; Susanna, married to Dr. Hall, whose only daughter Elizabeth was alive; and Judith, married to Thomas Quiney.

On 23rd November, 1616, Judith's son was baptized, in memory of his grandfather, as appears in the register—" *Shaksper*, filius Thomas Quiney, gen."

On 3rd February, 1617, we know that Dr. John Hall, Shakespeare's son-in-law, inhabited New Place.

On May 8th, 1617, *Shakespeare* Quiney was buried.

Anne Hathaway survived William Shakespeare seven years. She died on 6th August, 1623, and was buried beside her husband on the

3th of that month, nearer to the wall than the *Siste Viator* stone of cursing. On her tombstone a brass plate bears the following inscription:—"Heere lyeth interred the body of Anne, wife of William Shakespeare, who derted [departed] this life the 6th day of Aug., 1623, being of the age of 67 yeaeres.

"Ubera tu, mater, tu lac vitamque dedisti:
Væ mihi, pro tanto munere saxa dabo.
Quam mallem amoveat lapidem bonus angelus ore,
Exeat [ut] Christi corpus imago tua
Sed nil vota valent: venias, cito, Christe, resurget,
Clausa licet tumulo, mater et astra petet."

Gravestones are almost "licensed to lie," but this *seems* to speak some truth of feeling. Was it composed by Dr. Hall, Susanna's husband, as an expression of *her* feelings? Hall could write Latin, we know; and Susanna is represented to have been "wise to salvation."

It is scarcely credible that *such* a mother as is here represented could have been a wife otherwise uncongenial to the *gentle* Shakespeare.

In the same year (1623) Shakespeare's plays were published.

In 1625 Dr. Hall sold the tithes inherited from Shakespeare.

Elizabeth Hall, Susanna's daughter, was married to Thomas Nash, of Welcombe, 22nd April, 1626.

On the coronation of Charles I., Dr. John Hall, though possessed of sufficient property and income, declined to accept [and pay for] the honour of knighthood, and paid a composition fee of £10.

John Taylor, the water-poet, in his works (iii. 72, 1680) says,—

"Spencer and Shakespeare did in *Art* excell."

November 25th, 1635, Dr. John Hall died, aged 60.

In "A Banquet of Jestes or Change of Cheare, 1639," the following words form the introduction to one of the "merrye, conceits," viz.:—"One travelling through Stratford-upon-Avon, a towne *most remarkeable for the birth of the famous William Shakespeare,*" &c.

In Bancroft's "Two Bookes of Epigrammes," 1639, there are two [118 and 119] complimentary verses to Shakespeare. In "Jocabella, or a Cabinet of Conceits," 1640, it is related,—"One asked another what Shakespeare's works were worth all being bound together; hee answered, not a farthing. Not worth a farthing, said hee; why so? He answered that his *Playes* were worth a great deale of money, but he never herd that his *Workes* were worth any thing at all."

Shakespeare's sister Joan was buried 4th November, 1646.

From a poem dedicated [1646] by S. Shephard to Philip, Earl of Pembroke, the friend of Shakespeare, and entitled "The Times Displayed," Malone has quoted this passage:—

"See him whose tragic scenes Euripides
Doth equal, and with Sophocles we may
Compare great Shakespeare: Aristophanes
Never like him the fancy could display.

Witness the Prince of Tyre, his Pericles;
His sweet and his to be admired lay
He wrote of lustful Tarquin's rape; shows he
Did understand the depth of poesie."

"Susanna, wife of John Hall, gent.; y^e daughter of William Shakespeare, gent.;" "deceased y^e 11th of July, A^o 1649, aged 66." Her grave-stone bore, and now bears [restored by Rev. W. Harness, from Dugdale's "Diary," 1653], these lines:—

"Wittie above her sexe, but that's not all,
Wise to salvation was good Mistriss Hall.
Something of Shakespeare was in *that*; but *this*,
Wholy of him with whome shee's now in blisse.

"Then, passenger, hast ne're a tear
To weep with her who *wept for all*?
That wept, yet set herselfe to chere
Them up with comforts cordiall.
Her love shall live, her merrey spread,
When thou hast ne're a tear to shed."

A most unwarrantable inference—ought we not to call it fancy?—has been wrought out of these lines by Mr. Halliwell, in his "Life of Shakespeare," p. 270, viz.:—"The poet may possibly have become piously inclined in his latter days, but I think most direct testimony is against such an opinion, and the epitaph on his daughter seems to imply the contrary." He makes these verses signify from Shakespeare she derived her powers of *wit*, but none of the influences which conduced to her *salvation*. This appears to us to be a complete misapprehension. The lines are an almost doctrinal expression of the Protestant idea of "justification by faith alone," and do not bear at all a personal or reflective second intention. From the manifest paraphrase of the text, "Rejoice with them that do rejoice, and weep with them that weep,"* we incline to attribute to the lines a clerical authorship, and hence infer a dogmatic assertion of the chief item in the creed of Protestants, which at the special period required distinct emphasis to announce her Puritanic faith as an example to her neighbours, and as a warning to the wrongheads who were otherwise inclined.

The above paragraph naturally recalls to us what Halliwell justly terms the incredible "assertion of Davies," that Shakespeare "dyed a Papist."

We cannot suppose impiety in Shakespeare. In his works, wherever a holy subject is touched, it is done with an apparently unaffected feeling of deep reverence and sacredness of speech. Shakespeare and Massinger are the holiest of the whole race of dramatists, and there are fewer expurgatory sentences in his plays than in any other playwright of his time. Him you can read aloud—with few *skips*; many others you dare scarcely open your own eye upon. We incline on this head to regard him as certainly Protestant in tone,

* Rom. xii. 15.

sentiment, and feeling. The pulpit literature of Britain is jewelled with quotations from his works.

The oath of supremacy required to be taken and kept under pain of præmunire and high treason by all magistrates by the statute of the 1st of Elizabeth, 1558-9. As John Shakespere was chief magistrate of Stratford, viz., high bailiff, in 1568, he must not only have conformed, but been conforming, to the Protestant religion—the religion established by law. His son must have been brought up in the publicly confessed creed of his father, or John Shakespere must have been a conscienceless hypocrite before his own children.

The master of the grammar school of Stratford was Thomas Hunt, curate of Luddington—*probably* the very person who married John Shakespere and Mary Arden. He must have taught the creed he was bound to preach, and Shakespere must have learnt the Scripture tasks set him by the schoolmaster.

“Eliza and our James” could scarcely publicly have favoured a recusant, nor could the Pembrokes have given him their patronage had he been an alien from the faith. Such things would certainly have been marked and remarked upon.

John Ward, vicar of Stratford, would certainly have noted *that fact* with some prominence had the case been so.

John Milton, the Puritan, whose verses were prefixed to the second folio in 1632—sixteen years after Shakespere's death—could scarcely have been ignorant of an important item like that in the great dramatist's life; and yet, in Edward Philip's “*Theatrum Poetarum*,” which is held to have been indebted to Milton in much, we find no note of anything of the sort.

It is almost impossible that, in the days of Elizabeth, a Roman Catholic could have been the most *popular* of playwrights.

Shakespere's children *appear* to have been baptized in the church of Stratford, and so he must have been a conformist. Without referring to the passages in his works, from which the question might be further argued, we conclude not only that Halliwell's inferential charge of impiety is unsubstantiated, but also that Shakespere was a Protestant—at least not a Roman Catholic.

The confession of John Shakespere, found, in 1770, between the rafters and the tiling of the house in Henley Street, we, of course, regard as a *forgery*, and a coarse product of the early age of Shakespere fabrications—before cunning study had made it an adept's art.

We have been unwittingly led in the preceding arguments to rest a little stress upon the character of Shakespere's friends. We do not think this an illegitimate process of reasoning: “A man is known by the company he keeps.” “Want of true friends,” Bacon says, “as it is the reward of perfidious natures; so it is an imposition upon great fortunes. The one deserve it, the other cannot scape it.” Shakespere was in neither of these plights. As *gentle* Shakespere, his reputation is traditional, and evidence upon that point might be multiplied. Does he not appear as if he had very fairly acted up to his own precept?—

" Love all, trust a few,
Do wrong to none ; be able for thine enemy
Rather in power than use; and *keep thy friend*
Under thy own life's key: be checked for silence,
But never taxed for speech."

If he did, then, in some sort, though reflexly, by knowing his friends we may guess in part what manner of man he was, and so be able to add to our admiration of the *poet* our love also of the *man*.

Among his *patrons*, we find Queen Elizabeth and King James. the Earls of Pembroke and Montgomery, and Lord Southampton. Among his personal friends, we know we can rank Ben Jonson, Michael Drayton, George Chapman, Leonard Digges, Nathaniel Field, Thomas Freeman, John Davies, John Marston, Richard Barnefield, and others of the literary men of his day; then among his "fellows," the actors, we have special proofs of the interchange of good offices between him and Richard Burbage, Heminge and Condell, Kempe and Armin, &c. Among the inhabitants of Stratford-upon-Avon, we find him the friend of John and William Combe, of Hanmet Sadler, Henry Walker, Francis Collins, Thomas Russell, Julius Schawe, &c., some of the most influential people in his neighbourhood. We know he was helpful to the poor in their necessities, trusted by the council of his native borough, looked upon as a boast by his kinsmen, and respectfully loved by his wife, children, and sons-in-law. "He was the best of his family." . . . "His wife and daughters did earnestly desire,"—says Dowdall, 10th April, 1693, on the authority of a clerk of the church at Stratford, above eighty years old,—“to be layd in the same grave with him.” So they are; and on their tombstones special mention is made of their connection with the bard whose monument adorns the church where they too are sepulchred. Does it not seem as if they felt an echo of these words of his arising in their hearts? [and may we not lawfully feel so, too?]

"Blessed are *you*, whose worthiness gives scope
Being had to triumph; being lacked to hope."

VI.—THE WORKS OF SHAKESPEARE.

"Remember
First to possess his books."—*Tempest*.

As we have seen, in the preceding pages, the earliest work published with the name of Shakespeare was the poem of "Venus and Adonis," 1593. This was followed, in 1594, by "Lucrece." They were both dedicated to Lord Southampton, with choice but not fulsome compliments. They were frequently reprinted during the author's lifetime. Besides his plays, he was the author of that small collection of poems entitled "The Passionate Pilgrim," first issued in 1599, and of 154 "Sonnets," and "The Lover's Complaint," published together, though known to be extant long previously, in 1609.

The following plays, either really or imputedly the productions of Shakespere, were published during the life of the great dramatist, at dates varying between 1594 and 1609, viz.:—*Titus Andronicus*, *Romeo and Juliet*, *Love's Labour Lost*, *Midsummer's Night's Dream*, *Much Ado About Nothing*, *Merchant of Venice*, *Lear*, *Troilus and Cressida*, *Pericles*, *Richard II.*, *Henry IV.* (parts *first* and *second*), *Richard III.*, *Hamlet*, *Henry V.*, *The Merry Wives of Windsor*, *The first part of the Contention between the Houses of York and Lancaster*, *The true Tragedy of Richard, Duke of York* (constituting the *second* and *third* parts of *Henry VI.*), and *The Yorkshire Tragedy* (regarded as spurious). "*Othello*" was published in 1622, with a prefatory address to the reader, by Thomas Walkley, who is supposed to have had a copyright interest in the work. The various editions of the above-mentioned plays are known and spoken of by critics as the "*Quartos*,"—that having been the form in which they were issued.

We know, from Meres, that, prior to 1598, Shakespere was the author of the following plays, not enumerated above, and not, so far as is yet known, printed while he was alive, viz.:—*The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, *Comedy of Errors*, *Love's Labour Won* (which has been variously supposed to be either *All's Well that Ends Well*, *The Tempest*, or *The Taming of the Shrew*), and *King John*.

The earliest collected edition of Shakespere's dramatic works appeared in 1623, seven years after his own death, and after the demise of his widow. It has been inferred, from this and other circumstances, that Shakespere, and his widow after him, possessed a copyright and life-rent interest in the plays, which lapsed, after their death, to the proprietors of the Globe Theatre; and that it was only then they could be made available by the players as a publication. It might also be further inferred, we think, from several expressions in the "*Dedication*" and "*Address*," of the folio of 1623, that Shakespere intended to produce a revised and amended edition of those works himself, had he been spared, in the ease and comfort of his Stratford home, to complete his design. How else shall we account for the regretful expression, emphasized by a parenthesis, "He not having the Fate, common with some, to be exequutor to his owne writings"? or this: "It had been a thing, we confesse, worthie to have bene wished, that the author himselfe had lived to have set forth and overseen his owne writings; but since it hath been ordained otherwise, and he by Death departed from that right"? &c. Do they not seem to imply regret at an unaccomplished design, as much as, if not more than, at a haughty, indolent, or heedless negligence of works so meritorious and so wonderful? There is a singular eagerness about sales, in the address to the readers, which seems to argue an interest in the work, greater than that expressed in the dedication, viz.: "Onely to keepe the memory of so worthy a Friend and Fellow alive, as was our *Shakespeare*." If this is not altogether a *fancy*, it would go far to substantiate the idea of the community of interest in keeping them

unpublished during the LIVES of the other holders, and the hasty thrusting of them into the market immediately upon the demise of their latest *beneficiare*.

The edition of 1623, collected together and published under the names, if not with the editorial care, of John Heminge and Henrie Condell, is called, now-a-days, "*The First Folio*." It bore the following words upon the title-page:—"Mr. William Shakespeare's Comedies, Histories, and Tragedies. *Published according to the true original copies*. London. Printed by Isaac Jaggard and Ed. Blount, 1623." A portrait of the author, by Martin Droeshout, graced the work; and Ben Jonson attested his own veneration for Shakespere, and the essential accuracy, considering the art of engraving then, of the likeness, by these lines, placed opposite it:—

"To the reader:—

This Figure that thou here see'st put,
It was for gentle SHAKESPEARE cut;
Wherein the graver had a strife
With Nature, to out-doo the life.
O could he but have drawne his wit
As well in brasse, as he hath hit
His face, the print would then surpass
All that was ever writ in brasse;
But, since he cannot, Reader, Look
Not on his Picture—but his Booke. B. J."

Several other commendatory verses are prefixed to the work, as was then the custom; "the names of the principal actors in all these playes" are also given; and there follows "A catalogue of the severall Comedies, Histories, and Tragedies, contained in this Volume."

This edition contains all the thirty-seven plays, now commonly accepted, with a few reservations, as Shakespere's, except "*Pericles, Prince of Tyre*;" though "*Troilus and Creasida*" seems only to have got a place in it by an afterthought, as it does not appear in the list, but holds a place, *unpag'd*, in the body of the volume.

In nine years thereafter, viz., 1632, a second edition appeared in the same form, with a few verbal alterations, but no additions. This is called "*The Second Folio*."

The first edition of "*The Two Noble Kinsmen*," published in 1634, was said, on the title-page, to be written by Fletcher and Shakespere. It is now included in the works of Beaumont and Fletcher.

There is preserved in the Bodleian Library a volume of poems, mostly short, published about 1600, with the following title:—"Cupid's Cabinet Unlock't, or the New Accademy of Complements, Odes, Epigrams, Songs and Sonnets, Poesies, Presentations, Congratulations, Ejaculations, Rhapsodies, &c., with other various fancies. Created partly for the delight, but chiefly for the use of all Ladies, Gentlemen and Strangers, who affect to speak Elegantly, or write Queintly. By W. Shakespere." The volume is curious,

but has no authoritative evidence of authenticity, of which we are aware. It proves the continued popularity of his name, and its availability, as a trade mark, to sell a book; but it can only be received as his on due proof offered, and as this has not been given, critics remain sceptical. We have been unable to discover that it bore even the remotest internal evidence of a Shakspearean authorship.

The third folio was brought out in 1664, but is scarce, because it may be presumed many copies were burnt during the Great Fire, 1666. It contained a reprint of all the plays in the former editions, and *seven* more, viz.:—Pericles, The London Prodigal, The History of Lord Cromwell, Sir John Oldcastle, Lord Cobham, The Puritan Widow, A Yorkshire Tragedy, and The Tragedy of Locrine. The first only of these is now reprinted among Shakspeare's plays.

The fourth folio, of 1685, is a mere reproduction of the third, and is very much disfigured by errors.

About the middle of the seventeenth century, Kirkman, a bookseller who dealt in and studied old plays much, attributed "The Merry Devil of Edmonton" to the pen of Shakspeare. It, however, appears in the books of the Stationers' Company, in 1608, as being written by an author whose initials are T. B. It was highly popular, but it is not likely it is Shakspeare's.

"The Birth of Merlin" was published in 1662, as written by William Shakspeare and William Rowley, but Kirkman is here again the only authority, and he is *supposed* to have used popular names to work off his stock.

"George-a-Green," and the comedy of "Mucedorus," have with equal, indeed greater unlikelihood, been proposed as additions to his works.

In 1728, Lewis Theobald, one of the editors of Shakspeare's works in opposition to Pope, printed a play entitled "The Double Falsehood," as an original drama, found in manuscript, written by William Shakspeare; but his restless vanity, and love of notoriety, urged him to claim an admired passage as his own, and so threw doubts upon the whole; and it is, of course, now regarded as an imposture, a forgery, and a fabrication—

"A past, vamped, future, old, revived, new piece."

Farmer attributed this play to Shirley; and Pope, who could see no good in Theobald, thought it belonged to the era of Shakspeare. There is no need for any such supposition. Theobald was the author of twenty other plays; and there is nothing in this one to give it such a supremacy. His "Shakspeare Annotations" are his greatest service to literature.

In 1760, Capel printed "Edward III.," as "a play thought to be writ by Shakspeare," from internal evidence, and from the external fact that it was acted before 1596, when there was no other known dramatist equal to the production of such a work. One piece of internal evidence against this theory appears to have escaped the

critic's eyes, viz., the following [anachronistic] allusion to Shakespere's "Lucrece" (P)—

" Arise, true English lady, whom our isle
May better boast of than e'er Roman might
Of her whose ransacked memory hath tasked
The vain endeavour of so many pens."

Would Shakespere, if the author, have spoken so? We fancy, no.

In 1770, "Arden of Faversham," first published in 1592, was reprinted by Edward Jacob, historian of Faversham, as *probably* a play of Shakespere's; but the reasoning in its favour does not seem to be conclusive, even to Mr. Charles Knight's Shakespere-loving mind.

The latter part of the eighteenth century was pre-eminently the age of Shakesperean commentatorship, and of literary imposture. Modern antiques then were fashioned in abundance. Of these, the chief were the Ossian-Macpherson, the Rowley-Chatterton, and the Shakespere-Ireland poems. They were each the cause of keen controversy, much of which is now forgotten. Only the last of this triumvirate of poets, whose works were somewhat "with rusty age o'erdusted," concerns us at present, and even to him we can give scant space.

Samuel, father of William Henry Ireland, was a collector and publisher of literary curiosities. C. M. Ingleby, LL.D., says:—"The house of the Irelands was, in fact, a manufactory of forgeries, done for the sole object of making money." A magnificent two-guinea folio was, after due exhibition of the pretended parchments and papers in Norfolk-street, London, and fitting reverential admiration from "black-letter dogs," published in December, 1795, with this title, viz.:—"Miscellaneous Papers and Legal Instruments under the Hand and Seal of William Shakespere, including the Tragedy of King Lear, and a small Fragment of Hamlet, from the Original MSS." Samuel Ireland was the editor. The work contained, among other things, a confession of the Protestant faith (in opposition to that of 1770, represented to have been by John Shakespere), a mortgage-deed, conundrums, or epigrams, letters to his wife, memoranda relating to theatricals, as well as the altered play of Lear, and the scrap from Hamlet. The success of the imposture was at first complete. The worshipful critics were hooked and made gudgeons of. Emboldened by the stupidity of the *cognoscenti*, a new speculation was set on foot, and the tragedy of "Kynge Vortygern," or "Vortigern and Rowena," having been got up, Parr, Pye, Boswell, Chalmers, Pinkerton, &c., were invited to inspect it. It exhibited (they decreed) all the signs of the inimitable intellect of Shakespere, and so was declared fit and proper for the stage. Drury Lane was opened for its representation. Kemble took the leading character, and Sir J. B. Burgess composed a prologue, in which it is said—

"From deep oblivion snatched, this play appears;
It claims respect, for Shakespere's name it bears."

and the audience is asked to—

“Assert your poet's fame,
And add new wreaths to Shakespeare's honoured name.”

Charles Knight says :—“The *people*, however, settled the question. When Mr. Kemble uttered the line—

“ ‘And when this solemn mockery is o'er,’

the most discordant howl echoed from the pit that ever assailed the organs of hearing. Shakespere was vindicated.”

The greatest of the extinct verbalist school of Shakesperean critics, Malone, as he was the earliest to detect and expose the Rowley-Chatterton forgeries, was the first to lodge a protest against the reception of the Ireland fabrications. This he did, in 1796, in the form of a letter to Lord Charlemont, entitled, “An Inquiry into the Authenticity of the Shakespeare Papers.” His whole argument was founded on matters external to the poetical or literary merits of the production, but it was conclusive in itself. One is now almost constrained to despise the criticism that expended itself on paper water-marks, the colour of the ink, forms of superscription, dates of notes of hand, legal *formulae*, and modes of spelling, to show that such trickster's trash could not be Shakespere's,—but we are restrained, by feeling that even in our own day such methods of inquisition are not unnecessary in literary controversy. The whole Dunciad of critichood was aroused by Malone's tractate, and the courtesies of men of letters were freely distributed in all sorts of pamphlets. W. H. Ireland's “Authentic Account” appeared in the same year. Then came Samuel Ireland's “Vindication.” George Chalmers wrote an “Apology for Believers” in these fabrications, in 1797, and supplemented it in 1799: and then Ireland—“to raise the wind,” Ingleby says—published his “Confessions.” These he used as a make-sell in the preface to “Vortigern and Rowena.”

Forgery and fraud are neither attractive nor remunerative, unless there is a public interest to be caught. About the same time as the Ireland forgeries, the Lucy-ballad seems to have been got up. John Jordan, the Stratford guide, a rhymers well versed in Shakespere, wrote [P] some doggerel, and said it “was found in a chest of drawers that formerly belonged to Mrs. Dorothy Tyler, of Shottery, near Stratford, who died in 1778, at the age of eighty.” This “complete copy of verses” was inserted in the appendix to Malone's posthumous “Life of Shakespere,” but he expresses a belief that “the whole is a forgery.” Rowe, 1709, reports that the traditional ballad was lost. In 1730, Cheetwood, in a history of the stage, inserts two verses on the same subject, but in a different versification, said to have been gathered from the singing of an old woman in an inn at Stratford, about 1690. In the MS. notes of Oldys (who died 15th April, 1761), a verse of “that bitter ballad” is copied from the recitation of a very aged gentleman in the neighbourhood of Stratford (where he died, fifty years since).

Capel, in 1779, had transmitted to him, "by an ingenious gentleman, grandson of its preserver," a Mr. Thomas Wilkes, the first verse of this ballad, which a Mr. Thomas Jones, who dwelt at Tarbick, a village in Worcestershire, a few miles from Stratford-on-Avon, and died in the year 1703, heard from several old people in Stratford. This verse, and that quoted by Oldys, are precisely similar in their source and in their words. These having been published, and *accepted* by the critics, the lost ballad was quickly discovered, or recovered [*query*, made?], but yet so palpable a fabrication, that its parts are incoherent, its style is not Elizabethan, not to say Shakesperean, and its doggreb rhyme is not even uniform. Here the law of growth is clearly traceable. The ballad was lost, and so the poaching anecdote required substantiation. It was desirable that this should be got;—one portion is manufactured, and then another. The desire created the mythical verses; the public interest as is often the case, excited to and brought into existence the forgery.

After the folio of 1685, the editions of the eighteenth century deserve chronicle, if only to show the interest taken in the works of the wondrous dramatist, and the immense amount of varied learning which was expended on their elucidation. Rowe published editions in 1709 and 1714; Pope edited others in 1725 and 1728; Theobald followed, and rivalled him, in 1733 and 1740; Sir Thomas Hanmer, in 1744; Warburton, in 1747; Dr. S. Johnson, in 1765; George Steevens, in 1766; Capel, in 1768; Johnson and Steevens were co-labourers in 1773 and 1779; Capel's "Notes" (posthumous), 1788; Malone's Supplement to Johnson and Steevens, in 1780; Isaac Reed's first edition, a revision of Johnson and Steevens, belongs to 1786; Malone's own, to 1790; and Bann's from 1786 to 1794.

The nineteenth century begun with Reed's second edition, 1803, and Malone's in 1816. But the most renowned of Shakespere's editors, during the present century, are Collier, Dyce, Campbell, Singer, Halliwell, Knight, and Staunton. Of these, in detail, it would be as unbecoming as unnecessary to speak. In all of them there is much of a valuable character. Biographical, bibliographical, critical, and textual composition; original research; valuable speculation, and careful consideration of the times and texts of Shakespere, in less or greater degree, distinguish each. There is only one of these, however, whose editions require comment at our hands, viz., Collier's, whose "Notes and Emendations of the Text of Shakespere's Plays," 1852, 3, 6; one-volumed edition of Shakespere, 1854; and six-volumed edition of Shakespere, 1858, have excited the literary public for the last few years, and have raised a controversy, unequalled in its virulence, since the days of Macpherson, Chatterton, Ireland, &c. Such matter as we have to present to our readers on this topic will, however, fall more naturally into the chapter devoted to a consideration of the Text of Shakespere, to which we relegate the subject.

VII.—THE TEXT OF SHAKESPEARE.

"To blot old books and alter their contents."—*Lucrece*.

"I'll have grounds

More relative than this. The play's the thing."—*Hamlet*.

The text of Shakespeare has long been one of the "vexed questions of literature. The original authorities for a genuine text—the manuscripts of Shakespeare—are not to be had. We have, then, only the copies of his works issued during his own lifetime, the "*Othello*," published in 1622, and the first Folio, as the groundwork of a *textus receptus* as nearly approaching to the original sources as are now obtainable. None of these, of course, possess absolute authority, except the "*Venus and Adonis*," and the "*Lucrece*," which are known to have been published with the concurrence of, and, in fact, by the author. Of this, the dedications are sufficient evidence. The early quartos, even when least carelessly printed, do not appear to have undergone either an author's or an editor's revision—indeed some of them do not even seem to have been what is technically called *read*, so numerous are the errors, palpable and acknowledged, with which they abound. Several of them are generally believed to have been piratical and unauthorized publications, hurriedly brought out, and made up from the repetition of actors, from prompters' books, and from reporters' notes, to catch the popular tide, as what were then called "get-pennies." The first Folio is declared to be printed "according to the true originall copies," and to be "absolute in their numbers, as he conceived them;" but it is, in fact, a very ill-printed book, abounding in typographical errors, in nonsense lines, in incomprehensible passages, in metrical defects, in absurd punctuation, and in obscure or imperfect speeches. These things seem to indicate that the editors either did not oversee the work, or were not capable of supervising, much less of revising it. These disfigurements destroy its authoritativeness, and make the attainment of an authentic text a matter almost of impossibility.

An authentic text is plainly not to be got at by mere black-letter reading, however extensive. Some authority must be accepted; and those plays, that were really produced under superintendence, seem to have the best claim to being the true theatrical, as opposed to the literary, texts; the text meant for the ear, not the eye; for the stage, not the closet. The characters of Heminge and Condell have not been impeached; they have not been alleged to be fabricators; no suspicion has been excited about them, or has been attached to them; on the contrary, most positive and reliable testimony has been given to the essential truth of their book, from persons who were clearly capable of knowing. The book they offered to the public was accepted. It is true it is, like most books of the time, sadly unrevised, but that cannot justify radical changes. The commentators, by treating the "plays" as a *reading* literature, have been led to expect what was neither intended nor attempted—a systematic and strict versification—*poems*, in fact, when only *plays* were made;—and so "scenes, invented merely to be *spoken*," have

been "enforcively published to be read." Many faults are permissible in spoken, that cannot be allowed in written, literature; and he who would criticize an oration by the same strict rules as a deliberate composition, would not fail to be regarded as hypercritical. This is the mistake of the commentators, and so they have gone on seeking an ideal and enforced perfection which was never aimed at. This has led to the introduction of many changes in the text, and specially to several recent re-issues of *Shakespeare's Works*, &c., by the author of "*Reasons for a New Edition of Shakespeare's Works, containing Notices of the Defects of Former Impressions*," 1841 (J. Payne Collier), which have a curious history, and are the occasion of one of the keenest and most singular controversies of the day; of both of which we shall endeavour to present a brief outline.

In the spring of 1849, Mr. J. P. Collier was in the shop of Mr. Rodd, bookseller, Newport Street, when a large packet of old books arrived from the country. It was opened, and found to contain, *inter alia*, a torn, corner-cropt, greasy and old-of-cover, blurred, beer-stained, and blotted copy of the *second* folio edition of *Shakespeare's "Plays,"* 1632, and a copy of Florio's "*New World of Worlds*," date 1611. These Collier bought for 30s. and 12s. respectively. With the former he expected to complete another edition he had at home, but he found, on trial, that the leaves he wanted were short, damaged, and defaced; so he sold his former copy, and laid past his recent purchase. When making a selection of books to take with him on leaving London, he chose this *Shakespeare* as one, and then first discovered marks on its margin. Some time after, when consulting it, he was induced to examine it, from supposing that Thomas Perkins (whose name it bore), might have been the actor in Marlowe's "*Jew of Malta*," in 1633. This was a mistake; his name was *Richard Perkins*. Then he saw that there was hardly a page which did not present, in a handwriting of that time, some emendations in the pointing or in the text, while on most of them they were frequent, and on many, numerous. After consideration, and due announcement in the literary organs, he published, in 1852, the "*Notes and Emendations to the Text of Shakespeare's Plays, from Early Manuscript Corrections in a copy of the Folio, 1632, in the Possession of*," &c. Favour greeted him at first; but the genuine *Shakespeareans* were alert right early. S. W. Singer, Rev. A. Dyce, &c., entered protests against the marring and mutilation of the text thus proposed, and expressed or implied doubts of the authenticity of the history, and the genuineness of the writing.

A *Shakespeare-criticism* epidemic broke out in consequence. Pamphleteers and periodical writers busied themselves with the debate, and new editions became the order of the day. The controversy has grown hotter every day since, until it has almost acquired a personal interest for the respective combatants.

Collier, in 1842-4, had edited an edition in accordance with the view contained in the "*Reasons*," published in 1841. This discovery [?] changed his point of view or interest, and he issued his "*Notes and*

Emendations," 1852-3; a mono-volumed Shakespere, incorporating them in 1854, followed; a list of them was introduced into a work on Shakespere and Milton, in 1856; and in 1858 an eight-volumed edition was passed through the press under his editorship. Meanwhile, opposition was gaining ground, and at length burst into energetic activity early in 1860. The following is an abstract of the opposing arguments, culled from the writings of Mr. Collier, articles in the *Edinburgh Review*, the *Athenæum*, &c.; and from the works of Messrs. Hamilton, Ingleby, Staunton, Mr. Arnold's papers in *Fraser's Magazine*, pamphlets by Mr. Singer and the Rev. A. Dyce, &c., besides several letters, contributions, &c., for and against, in the *Times*, the *Literary Gazette*, the *Critic*, and some of the provincial newspapers as well as the magazines of the day. They have been arranged with the utmost impartiality in our power, and have been adduced in their full force, though frequently in an abbreviated form. They form, as we have arranged them, the heads of a debate on this subject, which may interest many of our readers.

ANTI-COLLIER PERKINS.

In the 1842-4 "Shakespere," edited by Mr. Collier, the rule adopted by him was to adhere implicitly to the readings of the old copies wherever the words imputed to the Dramatist on their authority could be reconciled with even a plausible meaning; but now he does not hesitate to accept changes made—allowing him the hypothesis he puts forth—from recitations made prior to the suppression of the theatres, which had crept in from time to time to make sense out of difficult passages, but which do not represent the authentic text of Shakespere. This change of view-point is regarded as suspicious, not in itself only, but also as leading to three profitable (?) issues of the said emendations.

The various prefaces, letters, accounts, affidavits, &c., given by Mr. Collier as justifications of his inferences, acts, editorial changeableness, and publications, are inconsistent with themselves, the books, and other facts.

Mr. Collier "has elsewhere printed as genuine and authentic documents respecting Shakespere which other and competent judges have pronounced to be spurious, and therefore his opinion [statement] is not to be implicitly relied on in a case . . . fraught with suspicion."

The coincidences between the editorial suggestions of Collier and the

PRO-COLLIER PERKINS.

The emendations are, taking them all in all, of much value and probability—the work of a person "possessed of extraordinary powers of Shakesperean criticism." It is highly unlikely that so many emendations could be the results of mere conjectural annotation, and hence these may have possibly had a prompter-book or stage-usage authority. They at least "present us with better readings than his original editors, or his whole army of commentators."

Collier's affidavit before the Lord Chief Justice in the Queen's Bench relates the circumstances attending the purchase of the folio and of the discovery of its unexpected contents, and is therefore removed from literary to legal criticism. The number of the Perkins-folio corrections (about 20,000); the laboriousness of the task of so forging; the mental and manual toil and trouble; the elaboration of the work,—are in themselves proof of a pains-taking, studious, reverential love of Shakespere, not of secret and self-seeking crime.

Insanity could not be more effectually proven than by showing that any corrector, of such powers of comprehension, such minute and accurate industry, such patient silence, had passed off his work as another's, and so deprived himself of the honour—the literary student's

ANTI-COLLIER PERKINS.

emendations of [the supposed] Perkins are so frequent and so close, as to produce a disbelief in their fortuitousness—a belief in an origin capable of explaining this singularly happy concurrence of view—which would place the discoverer of the folio so far ahead of all contemporary Shakespere editors.

That the phraseology and idioms employed by the so-called corrector—as Mr. Singer asserted—are often not of the Shakesperean age.

That the number of adaptations—not to say plagiarisms—of the readings proposed by the old commentators indicates contrivance, use, invention, and intention.

Mr. Collier, throughout his dealings with the [so-called] Perkins emendations and their assailants, has, or at least appears to have, at every turn, done or omitted something to foster suspicion.

Singular *lacunæ* in the evidence occur, and these have been filled up by hypothesis—the former look like *suppressiones veri*, the latter like *suggestiones falsi*.

At no time has there been a want of appreciation for Shakespere's text, such as would make it likely that the corrector should want inducement to let his labour be known. The folios of 1623, 1632, 1664, and 1685, in the seventeenth century, were followed by at least a dozen editions in the eighteenth, and many more in the nineteenth, in all or most of which conjectural emendations formed a chief feature. Why did this corrector retain his silence, and continue his solitary and uncheered labour, while reward and praise were exciting so much Shakesperean activity around him?

The intentional ignoring of former emendations, in the zeal of editorship which Mr. Collier exhibited, indicated an interest other than the mere attainment of a true text, e. g., in Tranio's line, "Or so devote to Aristotle's checks," in "The Taming of the Shrew," Sir W. Blackstone had sug-

PRO-COLLIER PERKINS.

dearest remuneration—of this careful and thoughtful revision of the text.

The unexpected novelty, ingenuity, and felicity of many of the emendations are such as to lead the unprejudiced mind to accept and believe them as having been accidentally discovered, not thought on and worked into the book by a forger—else we suppose skill working for its own dishonour.

The great mass of ingenious labour, apparently unnecessary, for the accomplishment of any forger's end; and hence multiplying the chances of detection; the large amount of nonsensical emendations proposed also increasing the likelihood of suspicion:—seem warrants for the *bond fide* nature of the notes and of the correctness of the hypothesis that attributes them to a non-literary person—one working to fit the dramas for stage representation, not for closet reading.

A fabricator would at once have seen that the more wild, wayward, and apparently unnecessary the innovations made on a text would result in damage to his aim; but the Collier-Perkins changes are very numerous, often needless, frequently prosaic, many times wrong-headed, occasionally absurd, and sometimes absolutely nonsensical. This, as it would scarcely have been done by a forger, seems to evade the charge made against Collier, though it neither substantiates nor authorizes the emendations.

A fifty years' reverential exploration of the hidden nooks and corners of old English literature and devotion to Shakesperean and dramatic criticism, would be ill-ended by such an offence [or mistake] as that laid to the charge of Mr. Collier. He would thus appear to have educated a taste expressly to detect himself, or have exposed himself to detection by the very antecedents of his own life. Either way, if guilty of fault or inadvertence, he has been or become voluntarily the destroyer of his own reputation. Mr. Collier is calmer in judgment and more cautious in manner than to do so.

ANTI-COLLIER PERKINS.

gested, and Steevens, Singer, Dyce, &c., had adopted, the reading, *ethos*; but Collier shuts his eyes to this, and says that such [viz., *checks*] has been the invariable text from the first publication of the comedy in 1623 *until our own day*."

"A portentous amount of nonsense, and an enormous mass of unnecessary work," have been accumulated into a volume, and are now sought to be incorporated with the text of Shakespeare by an ingenious contriver, apparently only that he might mislead the judgment, and put inquirers off the scent.

If it be admitted, as some apologists suggest, that the Perkins-Collier folio is a stage-manager's copy adapted to a mere modern taste and style of speech, what value, as Shakespeare emendations, on the so-called corrections have? None. They are clearly fabrications, by whoever made.

These textual corrections were just discovered (?), when debates regarding the value of different readings had filled our literature with a number of bilious verbal criticisms. They had an apparent second intention—the substantiation of the readings proposed by the discoverer; and they were patiently and grossly used for gain-making by the three successive publications to which they gave rise. They thus fulfilled the antecedent probability of an imposture suited to the time and circumstances, and the subsequent probability of a fabrication being used for a gainful purpose.

The suspicious inconsistency of Mr. Collier in his treatment of the Perkins folio must not be overlooked. 1. His "Notes and Emendations" contained conjectural matter *besides* those in the folio, and only *some* of the corrections themselves. 2. His mono-volumed Shakespeare professed to *incorporate all* the corrections with the text, but only did so with *some*. 3. In "Seven Lectures on Shakespeare and Milton," he gave "a list of every note and emenda-

PRO-COLLIER PERKINS.

That the chief emendations are made on the best *acting* dramas, and not on those that are most poetical or philosophical, most read in the closet, and that many of these alterations consist of omissions—in some plays, such as *Hamlet*, as many as 200 lines are struck out—is in itself a proof that the changes were not made for a *literary* but a *theatrical* purpose, and were not intended for publication by the corrector. This is farther proven by the rhyme-endings, which are so frequently introduced—stage-managers' poetry and fustian. Neither Collier nor any other *literary* man would have made *such* changes in the hope of commending their labours to the present age.

The quantity, and particularly the quaint and daring nature of the corrections—many of them relating merely to punctuation—the variety, changeableness, and apparent fickleness of purpose, indicated by change of penmanship, ink, mode of correcting, &c, all of which are held to be arguments against the antiquity of the corrections—are in reality strong evidence that they have not been the work of a solitary, persistent forger, who would guard against such (as they would appear to him) suspicion-creating circumstances.

Regarding the pencil-jottings and their modern cursive character, it is a well-known fact that, in general, pencil notes are freer and more diffused than pen ones, and that a *fac simile* of one's pencil notes would afford but a poor means of judging of one's ordinary penmanship. It is very natural that annotations, when they first strike the mind, should be jotted in pencil, that farther thought may be given to the suggestion before its registration in the less perishable ink-character. There does not, therefore, seem to be anything puzzling in this fact.

Mr. Collier has been an assiduous student of Elizabethan literature for upwards of forty years; he has been well mixed up with Shakesperian polemics, and has exposed himself to

ANTI-COLLIER PERKINS.

tion in Mr. Collier's copy of Shakespeare's works," yet scarcely gave above a third. There was here evidently something to conceal. Now he trusts his memory, and distrusts his notes; again he distrusts his memory, and trusts his notes, and rambles about his story in a most inconsequent manner. Moreover, he roundly asserts that he "never made a single pencil-mark on the pages of the book, excepting crosses, ticks, or lines, to direct attention to particular emendations; while there are to be found in it "an infinite number," Mr. Hamilton says, "of faint pencil-marks and corrections on the margins, in obedience to which the supposed old corrector had made his emendations:" yet these Collier never mentioned in his description of the work. The pencil-writing is said to underlie the ink, and may, it is said, be often seen below it and beyond it. Indeed, continual blundering is the mildest term that can be used for the vague, long-winded, different methods in which he tries to quibble himself out of a difficulty—when straightforward truthfulness could only have one possible way.

The following external characteristics of fabrication are observable in the Perkins-folio, viz.:—1. The handwriting is [to all appearance] feigned. 2. The alterations made in ink are [i. e., have been] suggested by marks made with pencil. 3. The pencil-writing is modern. And 4. The same handwriting seemingly appears both in the pencil and the pen alterations.

The Perkins-folio is of date 1632. Collier says it had been once a Mr. Parry's. Parry's was a 1623 copy, and differed in binding, corrections, &c., from that of Mr. Collier—who says he showed him the Perkins-folio, and that he acknowledged it; while Mr. Parry disclaims having seen it till he had it presented to him in the British Museum by Sir F. Madden. Again, Collier bought the book for thirty shillings just when the parcel was opened; and he says, "when I took it home," whereas

PRO-COLLIER PERKINS.

the usual consequences of antagonism doubt, and hate. It is consonant with human nature to suppose that, opportunity arising, there should not be wanting defamers to hint a doubt, and damn with cunning leer.

To believe the folio corrections forged or rather fabricated, we must believe some one, possessed of more Shakespearean knowledge than all living and ancient commentators put together have had, was content to act more foolishly than a common begging letter-writer and jeopardizing his whole aim by learning his rôle imperfectly.

The tone and temper of the controversy on this question are singularly provocative of the thought that literary jealousy and personal pique override the love of truth. There are a virulence of tone and a ferocity of temper displayed in this controversy, which is singularly alien to the consideration which should be given to the works of gentle Shakespeare.

No test-word, anachronism, or chronological difficulty has yet been discovered by which the validity of the hypothesis of Collier might be tried, and the falsehood [if any] precipitated by such a drop of pure logic as might make it unmistakably apparent. Singer suggested "*whedding*," Dyce, *unheard*; and Ingleby, *cheers*; but they have each been shown to be untenable as objections. Besides, Halliwell has shown that the folio of 1632 has undergone some modernization, and so may much more probably an acting copy have done.

Even the test of imputed plagiarism fails when put to trial. Hamilton adduces "*Hamlet*," of which there are three quartos, as a test of the deficiency of originality in the emendations; but this is evidently an unfair selection; for the nearer the corrector came to the truth, the more nearly must he have approached to the readings of the original text. Dr. Ingleby acts more fairly. He chooses "*Measure for Measure*," collects the conjectural emenda-

ANTI-COLLIER PERKINS.

r. Wellesley, on whose testimony he lies, says that Rodd "had put it by another customer." These appear to be fatal discrepancies in a story which might and ought to be so plainly told.

The intense agony and self-will with which Collier maintains the thesis of the [supposed] Perkins corrections is a singular corroboration of self-identification with the [reputed] author, and is hence suspicious; and all the more so that, in doing this, Collier acts in opposition to his antecedents as a Shakespere editor—a scrupulous adherence to the old texts. And all this froth and fury is for the honour of a hypothetical, not a real, being!

The unequivocal decision of the greatest palæographers of the day, Sir F. Madden, Messrs. Bond, Hamilton, &c., is that the "Old Corrector" never lived in the seventeenth century, but that the notes were fabricated at a recent period. In this opinion, Messrs. Ingleby, Staunton, Maskelyne, Arnold, Watts, Professor Bodenstedt, &c., are understood to concur. The opponents of the Collier-Perkins folio corrections have given their names to the public as a pledge of their honesty. The defenders have carefully adopted and retained the anonymous. The better Shakespereans hold aloof from the contest, and so show that they sympathize with the adverse party.

PRO-COLLIER PERKINS.

tions of former commentators or editors; and finds that of fifty-five alterations proposed by the Perkins-folio corrector, twenty-nine coincide with other suggestions, while twenty-six have no known authority except this Old Corrector. He, whoever he was, then, who annotated this folio, has made nearly as many original emendations on this play as all the commentators during two centuries—supposing that he had actually borrowed all the others. This shows a power and boldness not easily to be accounted for on the score of falsehood, fraud, and wilful imposition. Even in the "Hamlet" there are no coincidences between the suggestions of contemporary critics—or of any editor more modern than Johnson, 1765—1779. If the former fact gave evidence of unhesitating boldness, will it do here to argue that the supposed forger was afraid to "take" or "convey" more modern readings? Does it not rather force us to believe that the folio corrections here are of a date anterior to Collier's birth? Ingleby's "True Restoration," viz., *writing*, in "Hamlet," is pressed into the service of the antagonists of the folio by a very roundabout logic—scarcely trustworthy as *reasoning*.

Collier's position, as a Shakesperean critic, had been already won; and he is not likely to have hazarded that by any act so certain to displace him from his "coigne of vantage," as a wilful fraud or forger.

We have now, as well as possible in our space, with our means and in our circumstances, presented a *résumé* of the chief items requiring notice in the life and about the writings of Shakespere. We have aimed at little more than supplying our readers with a distinct notion of the poet, the man, his works and his ways, so far as they could be gathered or guessed from the stray materials known of his and their history. We hope we have succeeded in being useful, if not agreeable, companions in this investigation into the "Shakespere facts, fancies, forgeries, and fabrications," in which all thinking men are now interesting themselves. If so, we shall be glad.

S. N.

HARD WORK.

SOME years ago—in that period of human development outwardly symbolized by pinafores, when a confectioner's window was our school of design, a pocket full of marbles (not bought, but *soon*), the consummation of happiness, and the Arabian Nights our book of books, the very king and emperor of books—the wonder was, to me, how it happened that a great, gaunt, hideous, and altogether frightful genius (instead of a silver-winged fairy) should have power, at the command of the owner of the magical lamp; to call into existence all that desire could crave, or imagination invent. I was troubled not a little also, that a scamp like Aladdin should have fallen upon so valuable a treasure.

Time reveals all things; and so in the process of years experience, whose teaching is always *practical*, has taught me this:—that, like Aladdin, we are one and all adventurers; that the lamp of power, the revealer of hidden thoughts and things, is wisdom; and that he who once holds this wonderful lamp, even for a moment, stands that moment face to face with the grim, knit-browed, giant-limbed, determined-looking devil called hard work; and the owner of the lamp commands, and the sinewy giant obeys. And all that is worthy in philosophy, science, poetry, government, and commerce, is the handiwork of this greatest of all the great powers.

A long time ago a certain curse was decreed: "By the sweat of thy brow shalt thou earn thy bread." From childhood we have brought one memorial up into our maturity—its petulance—else would we always have seen that there is love, the truest love, at the root even of God's curse. The hand strikes the offending child; but the heart pities it. The tempest rages; but what mean these flowers afterwards, these herbs, and this grain? If the storm and the rain had not been, these had not been. What sounds are those of praise, of love, of rejoicing, that we hear from cathedral, chapel, hall, welling up, pealing out in rapturous thrills of harmony? What mean those leviathans that lie on the breathing sea; those engines that pant with the haste of commerce? those sacred temples that point, ever by sunlight and by moonlight, with index spire, up to the soul's "sweet home"? those songs of Paradise lost and gained, those sculptured marbles, and those paintings so like life? They mean this:—they are the flowers after the storm, the wheat after the rain; they are the blessings that have grown up out of the deep, rank soil of the first curse; they mean that man has seen the grim genius of hard work, and has commanded him; and these things, behold, **THEY ARE.**

Civilization is another name for hard work; just as barbarism is a synonym for idleness. And so the idler and the savage are twin brothers. The savage eats earth rather than till the ground for its produce; the idler lives an earthy life, has earth-thoughts, earth-hopes, earth-memories, earth-fooleries, and earth-fopperies; and lo! the image of the heavenly becomes the image of the earthly, and

crumbles hopelessly into nonentity and completest oblivion. Idleness leaves no memorial in this world of hard work.

Education is that which would lift man from the pillow of idleness to the throne of wisdom. Just as education in art teaches how to give earth's dullest ore a mirror surface, so education in thought turns the dull, inactive mind into a bright, reflective one. For, after all, education is not only a drawing forth, but a process of twofold revealing. Nature finds the metal for the wires; thought compels the electric fires. Seeing and understanding are the two processes;—the what is it, and why is it? These questions have given us our heroes; and hard work has been at the bottom of all.

If we cannot be Raphaels, Handels, Miltons, Stephensons, we can be *all we can*. Let us—and as a sign that we mean to be, and to do, and to suffer—let us at once cast off every unmanly fear, strip off all the mummy bandages of fashion, loose all the silken bonds of idleness, and thus give our panting souls room for their wings to expand. No pillars of salt, no castles in the air; present work and present success. In every grain of garnered wheat is a germ. In every success is a hope. The hard husk holds in its heart the future flower. The palace of a true education and of a true life springs up only at the command of the owner of the lamp of wisdom, given to the genius of hard work.

F. G.

A VISION OF THE FUTURE.

THE *British Controversialist* has now entered upon its second decade. The hopes and fears of those associated with its interests, from its commencement to the present hour, have been neither few nor small, while its present literary position affords bright hopes for a glorious future of extensive usefulness to the rising and maturing thought and reason of its numerous readers. At first decried as a medium for free-thinkers, in an offensive sense, then cavilled at as an arena for petty squabbling, and literary inanities; again, its name complained of, while its matter was approved; but eventually, tolerated, merely as an harmless (!) nuisance,—it has become an established fact. Prophets have proved false; friends have stood true, and have become a numerous band, exhibiting to the world a triumph unique in its excellence, unparalleled in its beneficent effects, and enduring as eternity in its moral and intellectual results.

Those papers which have formed a distinctive feature of its educational department, from the pen of our worthy friend, S. Neil, Esq., on Logic, Rhetoric, Philosophy, and Epoch Men, have won for themselves and the *British Controversialist* a wide reputation. The controversies have included all the most stirring subjects which have occupied the human mind for many years, and its pages have recorded the thoughts of men of every shade of opinion, and of every rank in literary fame and merit.

But our reader may impatiently ask, Why tell me of this?—why grandiloquise upon this trite subject? This is all known; and thus it is which constitutes the peculiar title of this serial to be designated *Our Magazine*. Gentle reader, we do not wish to waste your time, nor provoke your ire; we are fully aware that all this is admitted by you, but these pages will, we hope, reach the hands and come under the notice of many persons who are not privileged, like ourselves, to be perfectly familiar with the history and merits of the *British Controversialist*; hence we claim your patience and forbearance under the infliction to which our peccadillo has thus far subjected you. Our friend, Mr. Neil, has conferred a great benefit upon us all by the papers he has written for our particular service; they have given us the means whereby we may acquire still further knowledge of a systematic character in other cognate subjects to those he has written upon; and we therefore respectfully inquire why those cognate subjects should not be introduced into these pages, and be treated systematically, as a sequel to logic and rhetoric?

We can readily imagine the reader casting about in his own mind to know what subjects we refer to in this strange and awkward manner. Well, we will at once reveal the great secret which has troubled our mental rest, like that fabled incubus said to disturb the somnolent hours of the dyspeptic. But, wait,—let us do it orderly,—according to the dictates alike of philosophy and theology. Well, we are now quite calm, collected, and demure; calm as a philosopher; collected as a practised general in the crisis of battle; and demure as a would-be orator on his *début*.

A knowledge of the arbitrary signs and sounds by which thoughts are communicated is a *sine quâ non* to every reader of this Serial. The method or art of using these signs and sounds, in the best possible manner, both in the acquisition and communication of knowledge, is made equally necessary and facile by the logic and rhetoric of our earlier volumes. Grammar was the pre-requisite; then we had logic and rhetoric. Thus we are possessed of the means to acquire and to communicate; and the question becomes, What shall be the subject of acquisition and communication? If a man, starting from this point, turns his thoughts within, the first question occupying his attention is the science of being,—he thinks and feels,—therefore he says, "I am." He looks forth into the world, and finds many another self, and he therefore thinks and feels there are relations of duty and obligation; he is conscious of time, space, number, cause and effect, and looks to an intelligent first cause. Moreover, he finds himself surrounded by existences, animate and inanimate, possessing peculiarities of a more or less permanent nature. Of these he is influenced, favourably or unfavourably, and his comfort or discomfort is affected. Men call those sciences "arts," or methods by which these departments of knowledge are classed, for acquisition or communication, as mental philosophy, metaphysics, ethics, political economy, political philosophy, jurisprudence, theology, physics, or natural philosophy, and

natural history. Why should not all, except the last three subjects, be systematically treated in these pages? Reader, it is for you to say; if you and wish it, the means are within your reach, and you alone can employ them. Do you ask, *How?* We answer,—first make up your minds that *you need a knowledge of the subjects named, to constitute yourself a good citizen*; then place the means to provide the supply within reach of the conductors of *Our Magazine*, by doubling the monthly circulation of the *British Controversialist*. We humbly desire you to remember we do not implicate the conductors in any promise,—we only say, Do as we do,—express your wants and wishes on this question, and get your friends, who are like-minded with yourself, to subscribe regularly for the Magazine, and your wants and your wishes, we venture to predict, will be realised.

In conclusion, we must own we feel puzzled to know by what title to designate this brief paper. We cannot call it *the "Round-about paper"*—although it is a roundabout paper—because the title is given by one of our brethren to his gossip with his readers. Suppose we call it a Vision of the Future of the *British Controversialist*? Well, we think it will do; and we hope it is a vision that will be verified.

VALE.

[We for some time hesitated to give publicity to the above communication; but, having done so, we earnestly invite an expression of opinion from our readers on its suggestions.—ED. B. C.]

Poetic Section.

ORIGINAL POETRY.

REST.

THE sun-down past: still moonbeams stealing,
 Like bright fire-flies round the eaves:
 And weary earth, her gold hunt ceasing,
 O'er by-gone contentment grieves,
 And I rest.

The twilight past: remembrance stealing,
 Flushed with child-loves, to my heart.
 Heaven's darkness still one star revealing
 Hope of healing from life's smart.

And I rest.

The night gloom past. Dawn-music gladdening
 Wildly gladdening o'er my soul;
 And thus it chimes, "He who sits saddening
 May not, can not, reach the goal
 Of true rest."

The morning past: full day is glowing,
 Golden-eyed upon the fields;
 And he who works, though Time be mowing,
 Reaps the fruit that summer yields.
 Wherefore rest?

The summer past: the eterne stealing,
 Glory laden, to my face,
 And voices through the breath-hush pealing,
 "Peace to him who ran the race."
 And I rest.

The whole year past: a mourner kneeling
 Where the sheaves lie turf'd with green,
 And voices through the silence pealing,
 "Heaven for the heart that once hath been."
 And I rest.—F. G.

SERENADE.

Bright moonlight bathes the night
 In seas of silver sheen,
 And Ada sleeps in fairy bower,
 The linden trees between.

Heaven wears no frown to-night;
 The spiritual moon
 Embalms in soul-subduing light
 The stilly midnight noon.

How sweet the voice of night!
 'Mid lilies Ada lies,

And Seraphs guard the golden light
 That rests within those eyes.

My heart is freed to-night
 From all its carking cares;
 For voices whisper that I love
 An angel, unawares.

Bright moonlight bathes the night
 In seas of silver sheen:
 My heart lies hid in yonder bower,
 The linden trees between.

FRED.

SONG.

Maiden, mark! the day is waning!
 Swift the last hour glides away;
 See how sable night is gaining
 Fast upon the twilight grey.
 See, sweet maiden, see how swiftly
 Night succeeds to joyous day!
 Thus so gently, softly, swiftly,
 Our fond dream hath pass'd away!
 Oh! I think upon the morrow
 With a bitter pang of sorrow.

Yet we oft the hours have chidden
 For their torpor and delay;
 Oft in fancy have forbidden
 Night to close the fleeting day;
 Ah! then, why has longing perish'd
 For the morrow's quick return?
 Why is Hope no longer cherish'd?
 Hath Love's ardour ceased to burn?
 Ah! to-morrow we must sever!
 And, sweet maid, it is for ever!

BETA.

TO LITTLE NELLY.

They say bright angels sometimes come
 All shining from the skies,
 And clad in bright and deathless bloom,
 Look on us with Love's eyes.
 And how, in many a cottage home,
 All circled with sad cares,
 The pure in heart oft entertain
 These angels unawares.

I know a maiden now of earth,
 Six summers since of heaven,
 Whose dimpled cheeks rose-red with
 mirth,
 A world of woe might leaven.
 If every home such sunshine held,
 All gleaming in its heart,
 I ween our earth and heaven's fair court
 Would be less wide apart.—F. G.

MAYING.

My heart goes maying, all the year.
Oh, happy heart! oh winsome world-
home!

And not one melancholy tear,
Nor treacherous sigh, nor tremulous fear,
Can come this happy heart a-near,
Since life is love, and love the heart's
home.

My hopes go maying all the year.
Oh, the world is fair, but the soul is
fairest.

And not a trace of cloud or tear
Is ever shadowed through the clear
Ambrosial air, that *far* and fair
Embalms the beauty that is rarest.

My heart goes maying all the year.
Oh, who dare say that life is sadness?
Into this lily-cup I peer,
Where Heaven in love has dropt a tear;
Sky, stars, and moon, are mirrored here;
Dreamt ye your *home* was all so near?
But Love crowns life, and life is gladness.

PANLOTA.

MY MOUNTAIN HOME.

Ye who are tired of your city wiles,—
Tired of the toil that knows no smiles:
Come, where the valleys are pranked with flowers.
Come, where the shadows beguile the hours
With sunny smiles and rainbow showers;—
Come to my mountain home.

Ye who can love your mother-earth
The better for knowing the woeful dearth
Of brotherly love, in the peopled plains,
Where strife and sorrow, and conscience stains,
Make up the price of its golden chains,
Come to my mountain home.

Ye who would know of the fairy spells
That haunt the deep hollows and hallow the dells;
Of the voices that hymn of the distant sea,
Of the winds and their weird wild melody,—
Of all that is chainless, and stainless, and free;
Come to my mountain home.—F. G.

"THREE HUNDRED SONNETS," REVIEWED IN ONE.*

"List, list! oh, list!" "Three hundred Sonnets" here,
Dripped from the pen of MARTIN FARQUHAR TUPPER
While seated just before his horse's crupper,
In "Rides and Reveries,"—at times quite near,
And seasons distant,—while his mind sought rest
From working into foolish crambo rhythm
The common-places he aye carries with'm,—
"Proverbial Philosophy" exprest
In lines of thunderous no-meaning sound,
Claim our attention, and demand our ear.
Impatient reader, be forewarned,—forbear
To tread upon the bard's fantastic ground.
Else will you feel your inmost nature creep
With a most potent spell,—the wish to sleep.—N.

* "Three Hundred Sonnets, by Martin F. Tupper, D.C.L." London: Hall, Virtue, & Co.

TO ANNIE.

I love thee; *not* because thou hast
 A face for beauty unsurpass'd;
 An eye that shines with lustre bright,
 And flouts the diamond's lesser light;
 A queenly tread, an air divine,
 A form without a faulty line.
 Nor yet because in jetty glow
 Rich raven tresses softly flow
 O'er shoulders white as mountain snow.

No! tho' thou wert supremely fair
 Amongst the loveliest things of earth,
 Without a loving heart were there,
 Say, what were all thy beauty worth?
 'Tis but a passing, transient charm,
 That shrinks beneath the glance of age,
 It blooms while lifetime's summer's
 warm,

And withers 'neath the winter's rage.
 But a heart confiding, loving, pure,
 Will to the end of life endure.
 Tho' sickness come, tho' misery fall, —
 'Twill cheer, subdue, and soften all.
 'Tis true, when every friend hath fled,
 It lives when Beauty's flower is dead.

As when with stern, resistless sway,
 Grim clouds eclipse the lord of day,
 Red lightnings leap across the sky,
 And thunders roll, and tempests fly,
 One fairy form alone is seen,
 Love-like, high o'er the troubled scene.
 The rainbow hangs in glittering sheen,
 Surrounds the earth with arms of peace,
 And bids the tempest-struggle cease.
 So, when misfortunes darkly lour,
 And on the soul their tempest pour, —
 When man, oppress'd with heavy care,
 Yields to thy iron hand, Despair!

There rises through the thick'ning
 storm

One soul-exalting, lovely form,
 That whispers of a better day,
 And points with love-lit eye the way;
 That ever strives to cheer and please;
 And brighter glows as storms increase;
 That bids the pangs of woe depart,
 And 'tis a love-confiding heart!

And such a heart is thine. Thou hast
 A soul for goodness unsurpass'd;
 That melts in tears at others' grief;
 Finds pleasure to afford relief;
 That laugh'st not at the widow's wail,
 Nor scoffs the needy orphan's tale,
 Nor arrogant, nor haughty state
 Lords o'er the poor unfortunate;
 That ever striv'st the force to stay
 Of misery's cold and cruel sway.
 And these are greater charms for me
 Than Wealth or Beauty's phantasy —
 And these are wherefore I love thee.

While Beauty thrills the amorous eye
 With all-absorbing ecstasy;
 While thoughtless Folly fondly proves
 The emptiness of heartless loves;
 While outward show to hapless pairs
 Its woeful load of discord bears,
 Will we in bleas'd contentment live
 The little life that God may give.
 And while with soft, propitious gale
 Love gently fills the yielding sail,
 Our boat adown the ebbing tide
 Of life shall calmly, smoothly glide,
 Myself will tend the sail, and thy fair
 hand shall guide!

Whitby.

ALFRED.

LIFE THOUGHTS.

I would my destiny might be
 To battle for the Right, —
 To live and die for Liberty!
 An angel whispers, "Hope and see!
 Hope is the heart of might."

I would my life some tale might tell
 To all the coming years,
 Of moments reaped and garnered well.
 An angel whispers, "Work! then sing
 Thy song of smiles and tears."

And if my life might only be
 A sunbeam in the world,
 To wake some soul from apathy.
 An angel whispers, "Pray; then see
 The flag of Love unfurled."

My life sits brooding at my heart,
 And sings wild songs to me;
 I'll up! and, manlike, take my part,
 In all that Heaven has set apart
 For me to do and be. — F. G.

The Reviewer.

Report of the Yorkshire Union of Mechanics' Institutes. 1860.
Leeds: Edward Baines and Sons.

WE have here the twenty-third annual report of an association which is designed to promote the prosperity of mechanics' and other institutions by exchanging Essays and papers, by facilitating the engagement of lecturers, and by employing an active agent to devote his whole time to the interests of the union. By these means, some seventy-five institutions have been drawn into association with each other, and a very healthy stimulus has been brought to bear upon them. The general report of the union, and the various reports of the institutions of which it is composed, are for the most part of a very cheering character, and reveal an amount and variety of educational effort which is truly astonishing.

The enumeration of the contents of this goodly pamphlet of 125 pages will afford the best evidence of the extent and utility of the operations of the union. We have the rules, list of the central committee, proceedings of the annual meeting, report, agents' report, Leeds Educational Board, Yorkshire Union Village Library, hints to persons wishing to establish a mechanics' institution for a small town or village, West Riding Penny Savings' Bank, rules for a mechanics' institution, essay and discussion class, Society of Arts' examinations, conditions essential to the attainment of a prosperous mechanics' institute, illustrated village lectures, lectures of Mr. Barnett Blake, advantages of belonging to the Yorkshire Union's Manuscript Lectures, gratuitous lectures, paid lectures, aid to instruction in science, Examination of Society of Arts, 1861, Leeds Educational Board Examination, cash accounts and subscription lists, reports from the associated institutes, in alphabetical order, tabular view of the institutes comprised in the Yorkshire Union, &c.

An organization, with such extensive and well-directed operations as these must be productive of much good; and it would be well for the literary institutions of England if every county possessed an equally vigorous "union."

The Student. An Address. By Rev. G. W. CONDER. London: Kent and Co.

THIS is a spirited, lovingly powerful, and intellectual oration delivered to the members of the Spring Hill College, near Birmingham, but worthy of being thoughtfully read by every one aiming at living that life of thought which characterizes the student. To such we can honestly commend it.

The Best Safeguard for a Young Man. By GEORGE HILL SMITH. London: Simpkin, Marshall, & Co.

THIS is an interesting and well-written essay, for which a handsome prize of books was awarded to the writer by the Committee of the Young Men's Literary and Commercial Association, Dublin. In a spirit of Christian earnestness the writer enforces many wise and weighty counsels.

The Topic.

OUGHT THE USE OF TOBACCO TO BE DISCOURAGED?

AFFIRMATIVE.

The use of tobacco ought to be discouraged, because its effects are injurious, both physically, mentally, and morally. It is physically deleterious. Its use is injurious to the mental faculties, and is intimately connected with and leads to other injurious habits. Though it has not in the same degree injurious effects upon all who use it, yet its natural tendency is of a degrading, debasing, besotting character. The great extent to which it is employed incurs a vast waste of both time and money. Its use tends to lessen a man's self-respect, as well as to lower him in the estimation of those whose esteem is most valuable. It is a most senseless, vapid, and inane employment for an intelligent being to spend time in inhaling and expiring tobacco-smoke.—S. S.

If we consider this question in a physical or economical point of view, it would lead us to the conclusion that the use of tobacco ought to be discouraged; it creates an appetite for an unhealthy stimulant, which drains the capital of the country of a large amount.—A. W.

At best the virtue of tobacco is medicinal, not nutritive. The habitual indulgence in it squanders a large amount of money, which, when the smoker has puffed it away, leaves him without the least shadow of an equivalent in either bodily or mental stamina; consequently, the money expended is entirely wasted. Wherefore we conclude that the use of tobacco ought to be strenuously discouraged, excepting as a medicine.—LUTHER.

Tobacco smoking does not improve the man; we see, alas! the majority of those who indulge in it do so in connexion with the curse of the land—drink. Whiskey-drinking and smoking

go hand in hand, the drinking-cup and the tobacco-pipe are very seldom absent from each other's company. Young men, especially, should beware of the use of tobacco, on account of the evils to which it leads.—J. W. L.

We make laws for the consumption of smoke, and yet we enter the smoking room, and sit enjoying the narcotic weed, while the atmosphere is filled with its effluvia. If a habit exists, which is prejudicial to health, it ought to be discouraged. If we use an agent which acts injuriously upon the system, that agent ought to be abandoned. The use of tobacco exists to a very large extent, and is prejudicial to health, for it is an active narcotic agent, and acts deleteriously upon the nervous system. Consider the chemical ingredients of tobacco; its volatile oil, its volatile alkali, and its empyreumatic oil—the two last possessing poisonous qualities to a large degree—and then inquire if this does not account, to a great extent, for the nervous and stomach complaints which are so prevalent? Therefore, we would say, discourage the use of tobacco (especially among the young); for by doing so you improve the health of the community, and tend to prolong life.—J. T. K.

The use of tobacco ought to be discouraged, because it contains poison, which enters and pervades the human system to the gradual but certain detriment of physical and mental faculties. The first use of it deranges the whole system, and the stomach naturally revolts from it. The use of tobacco promotes drinking habits, which lead to inferior and demoralized society. As the inner man of smokers becomes disordered, so does the outer man; their dress, apartments, and whole household, present a slovenly, not to say, dirty, appearance. Smoking or chewing induces habits of indolence, listlessness,

apathy. The use of tobacco ought to be discouraged, because it is a waste of money and time; and because it tends to uphold the villanous and ever-to-be detested slave-trade. Arguments on the negative side of this question must inevitably end in smoke!—BETA.

Time is man's estate—his greatest treasure. It is the "bounden duty" of all to use it well, and exercise, with respect to it, the very greatest economy. The use of tobacco tends to form a habit of wasting time, by inducing a dreamy habit of obliviousness, which all men should be careful to avoid. "Do thyself no harm," saith the Scripture. We ought to avoid all practices which war against health—one of the most-to-be desired blessings that a man can enjoy. The use of tobacco often proves hurtful to the human frame. Borghi relates an anecdote of a man who had so dried his brain by smoking, that, after his death, a little black lump, made up of membranes only, was all that was found in his skull. Economy in money matters is also of great importance. It has been computed that £48,000,000 are annually spent in this country upon strong drinks and tobacco. Does not this single fact speak volumes? We should rigorously avoid all habits which tend to make us unmindful of the comfort of others. The use of tobacco, especially when carried to an extreme, has this effect.—T. L. P.

It is a matter of regret, that so many of our youth (nay, mere boys) are to be seen indulging in the habit of smoking; allowing it to have the mastery of them, and thereby clinging to them through life. That the evil effects of smoking are great, we have sufficient medical testimony to prove; and as no benefits accrue from its use, we say, Let its use be discouraged.—T. I. M.

The use of tobacco ought to be discouraged, because it injures the brain, weakens the memory, and prevents the right development of the intellect. It is altogether a bad habit, and is an outward sign of an inward infirmity.

I can for two ounces of tobacco become a subscriber to the *British Controversialist*; and while smokers are darkening their intellect, I can be improving mine by the most excellent discussions contained within these pages.—J. W.

The following remarks, founded upon experience, may serve to show that the chewing and smoking of tobacco is injurious, even when used moderately. It is a well-known fact, that almost every individual who learns to smoke does so at the expense of his comfort; for he has frequently to go away from the company he may be in to some quiet corner, in order to gratify his passion. Having a few hours every day to devote to study, I sometimes resolve to accomplish a certain amount of work—perhaps to write an exercise, or read a philosophical book: but, before proceeding to do so, I indulge in smoking for a short time, and find, when I commence to write, that my hand is tremulous; and when I begin to read, my brain is sluggish, and entirely incapacitated for exertion. These are the effects of smoking upon almost all who indulge in the practice; therefore, the use of tobacco ought to be discouraged.—J. L.

There are few habits with which so many peculiar considerations are connected as with tobacco-smoking; or which are more purely artificial, or more repulsive to the natural taste. King James says, "Herein is not only a great vanity, but a great contempt of God's good gifts, that the sweetness of man's breath, being a good gift of God, should be wilfully corrupted by this stinking smoke." The fragrant cloud that arises from this weed, when in a state of ignition, may possibly not be unpleasant to those who do not smoke, but the reeking, nauseous effluvia that remains after its use, is disgusting even to those accustomed to tobacco. Though tobacco at this time may be pronounced cheap in comparison with its price in former years, yet the habitual use of it involves an expenditure which may be far more advantageously employed. Smoking is the common resort of idle

persons; it unfits both the mind and body for that sedulous application without which no success can be obtained in any difficult undertakings. And thus the smoker—

"Murders time, he crushes in the birth
A power ethereal, only not adored."

Experience tells us that the indulgence in this narcotic weed is productive of consumption, an emaciated frame, a parched throat, a propensity to drink. The slave to smoke never enjoys the hilarious sensation of a vigorous health; he begins his day's pursuits with a feverish throat, a clammy mouth, an enfeebled pulsation, and a low, despondent mind. We therefore condemn the use of tobacco on the ground of its being a *filthy, expensive, time-consuming, and pernicious habit*.—FRED. A. R.

What fills our gaols with men from whom every human feeling seems to have fled? What crowds our work-houses and lunatic asylums? What brings to poverty and wretchedness hundreds of husbands, wives, and children? The blighting influence of one great national evil, "Drink!" Shall we, then, who are the fathers of children, fresh in life's rosy morn, foster in our midst another habit, which, from its tendency to lead youth into evil company, is equally pernicious. No! let us beware; and not, for the sake of what may seem a pleasure, sacrifice the well-being of those from whose joy we should derive one great source of our own happiness.—E. G.

The habit of smoking is *expensive*. Though all smokers come not up to the average of "from ten to twenty-five cigars daily for each individual,"* as we are told is the case in Rotterdam, yet there is not a smoker of your acquaintance but will tell you that his pipe or cigar costs him a pretty round sum in the year. It is *idling*. A fellow tells you he is going "to have a smoke," just as he would tell you he was going to his dinner. Possibly the former has

greater attractions for him; at any rate he as willingly gives up his time to it. It is a *filthy* habit. Smoking or chewing—it's all the same; spitting is a consequent upon both; while blinding and choking smoke, and an offensive smell, result from the former. Such reasons, one would think, were sufficient to banish from civilized society any mere *luxury*. But the friends of the weed put forth higher claims for their client; they actually contend that it innocuously smooths the rough path of life before them. But is it so? Were such the case, man might well be pleased to buy at a little sacrifice so great a good; while woman would gladly suffer some inconvenience in order that he who toiled might soothe both body and brain. Here, however, we turn the tables, contending that tobacco is *absolutely hurtful*. This is no jumped-at conclusion. It is arrived at by chemically assigning tobacco its proper place. Sir Benjamin Brodie does this distinctly, when he ranks it with "alcohol" and other vegetable productions," which act "upon the nervous system." Dr. Marshall Hall, in a letter* to the junior members of the medical profession, says, "It is plain tobacco acts on the cerebrum, the medulla oblongata, and the heart; its effects are stupidity, defective breathing, defective action of the heart—forms of debility and impaired energy. These phenomena are primarily physical and physiological; no doubt the blood is poisoned, and in its turn poisons the brain, the medulla, and the heart. Sometimes, in those who smoke for the first time, these symptoms occur in a form even of danger." Immediately following, he gives the details of a case illustrating his remarks. Dr. Geoghegan, of Dublin, a high authority in such matters, speaking some time since to a friend who is addicted to the pipe, bore a strong testimony against it, warning him of its eminently injurious consequences. Finally, is it not an *unsafe principle* to

* *Irish Times*, Oct. 9, 1860.

* See the *Lancet*, for October, 1857.

told that pleasure is to be sought for its own sake? Is it not much more so when the pleasure-giving habit is injurious? This is the case with the use of tobacco. Does the weed lessen hunger, and soothe the mind in times of distress? It does so by partially deadening the natural susceptibilities. Surely this is not allowable. When body or mind is in an abnormal condition, should not natural means be resorted to, to restore their tone, and not such as tend to render them still more abnormal? Seeing, then, that tobacco is a *positive nuisance*, and a *positive evil*, ought it not to be banished by common consent from this world of civilization, science, and Christianity?—D.

NEGATIVE.

Abstractedly speaking, it is perhaps better not to smoke, as, abstractedly speaking, it would be better to drink nothing but water. But we are not dealing with abstractions. In real life water almost always tastes of pills, and is otherwise an unsatisfactory beverage: and in real life people, who work, want something to look forward to. All we can say for tobacco is, that taken in moderation, it supplies that something in a cheap, accessible, and harmless form.—SAMUEL.

Though tobacco does some harm, its main effect is to furnish the greatest amount of enjoyment which is derived from any one source of physical gratification. No one can watch the labourer enjoying his mid-day rest, or plodding home at night, or sitting after the day's work at his cottage-door, without understanding that tobacco is the one great luxury of his existence. Such a man has not to trouble himself with the amount of duty it has paid. Be that as it may, he knows that it comes well within the reach of his scanty means, and that is about the only nice thing that does.—HORNHAND.

The fact that certain squeamish, asthmatical old women flash their prophetic eyes far into the fuliginous future, and see emaciated generations wasting

away before the poisonous drug, does not in the least affect us, inasmuch as the abuse of an article like tobacco does not seem at all likely to prevent its use with all strong-minded men who act out the precept, "Enough is as good as a feast."—SPITTOON.

Kane, the Arctic explorer, told an Englishman very shortly before he died, that it was tobacco that had enabled him to keep up the spirits and the courage of his men under their dreadful sufferings. He was opposed to their having much alcohol, and he found that they would go willingly without stimulants, and preserve their equanimity and elasticity of spirits, if he did but supply them with a moderate quantity of tobacco. This fact, I think, ought to weigh with those who oppose the use of tobacco without any better reason than that they don't like it, forsooth, because they never felt the want of it. I hope they never will, but I much question it.—PUFF.

Spenser calls it "*Divine tobacco*," and Lilly, "*The holy weed Nicotian*." Great, however, have been the obstacles through which the divine weed had to struggle. Christian kings wrote big books against it. Pope Urban excommunicated those who used it in churches (not, we allow, altogether without reason). The Czar of Muscovy cut off the noses of the snuffers. And Shah Jehan tortured all smokers. Christendom and Islam combined in vain against tobacco. There must be something very congenial to human tastes in what resisted this combination of persecution, unless, as in more momentous matters, the sufferings of the martyrs of tobacco were the seeds of its triumphs.—S. E.

Of all the luxuries in which Englishmen indulge, smoking is the most harmless, and affords the greatest amount of innocent gratification. Its soothing influence is felt by thousands, and thoroughly enjoyed by all who follow the example of Sir Walter Raleigh, who conferred no small blessing upon his fellow-countrymen by the in-

troduction of tobacco into England. The labouring classes of this country, who are dependent for their daily bread on the sweat of toil, need some stimulant to enable them to work on day by day, and through the influence of tobacco are they alone able to achieve so much, for it is a stimulant, without any of those evil effects which follow the use of alcohol. Dr. Kane, the celebrated Arctic traveller, says that without tobacco his followers would never have been able to overcome all the difficulties they had to encounter. The merchant, during the cares and troubles of the day, looks forward with pleasure to the time when he shall derive some comfort from a smoke in the evening, for over his meerschaum he plans and schemes for the future. The old boys of Greenwich love a smoke as much now as when it helped to cheer them through the storm, or beguile away many a lonely and weary midnight watch. And so on, through all trades and professions smoking is enjoyed; and should any measure be brought forward to discourage its use, such a storm of opposition will be raised against it, that it will be powerless. For smoking leads to thinking and enables man to forget for the time the cares of the world. Around, and often during the few quiet minutes which he enjoys while smoking, thoughts are suggested which lay the foundation of future prosperity; and whatever any old crusty philosopher may say, his is a theoretical, philosophical view of the question; ours is a practical one,—and practice before theory, all the world over.—S. W.

Notwithstanding the strictures of Sir Benjamin Brodie, I think the use of tobacco ought *not* to be discouraged. I can advance nothing original to support my opinion, which is based on the following reasons:—Tobacco is one of the most effectual and pleasant sedatives we possess; a fact which can only be proved by those who use it. It is used by the inhabitants of all nations without exception, and its use is increasing

yearly in Great Britain and Ireland, as shown by the Custom House returns. Surely an article of such universal consumption must have some virtue in it. Its use, instead of undermining the constitution of man, enables him—as far as my experience goes—to endure hardships with a cheerfulness which, under the circumstances, could scarcely be expected. The experience of men every way as well qualified as Sir Benjamin Brodie of judging of the effects of tobacco must be taken into consideration. Dr. Pritchard, at the recent meeting of the Social Science Association, tells us that by means of tobacco he has been enabled to enter climes and places, where others had failed. The opinion of this eminent traveller is corroborated by Dr. Lankester, the able editor of the *Sanitary Review*. My remarks apply to the use of tobacco. Concerning its injurious effects when *abused*, I presume there are not two opinions; it is difficult, I admit, to draw the line of demarcation between moderate and excessive smoking; it remains for lovers of the weed to show by moderation, and a regard for the comfort and convenience of others, that the assertions of the anti-tobacco-nists are without foundation; it is, in fact, my opinion, that they may attempt to suppress sunshine with as great success as smoking.—J. W.

This is a subject upon which capital arguments could be adduced “on both sides of the question;” but as my convictions tend, so will I uphold; and I proceed, therefore, briefly to state my reasons for affirming that the use of tobacco ought *not* to be discouraged. Generally, in the first instance, tobacco-smoking is not an absolute necessity, as that health can be retained without it, this is a fact that needs no demonstration; but after the use of it has been indulged in for a short period, the pleasure and comfort derived therefrom induces the habit to become continuous, and we have to consider whether this habit is injurious to the health. Sir Benjamin Brodie admits that an *occasional* indulgence is not deleterious;

but the term occasional is a vague expression, and subject to several constructions. As there are some who would deem smoking a pipe once in a week as coming under that head, whilst there are others who would severally consider it an occasional indulgence down to two, or even three pipes in a day. Taking, however, one pipe in a day as a moderate medium, or less if this can be proved to be really injurious to the health, then we arrive at this interrogatory:—Should we discontinue a habit from which we derive pleasure and genial comfort, and which does not injure the health, simply because if it were indulged in to *excess*, it would injure the health? Why, if such reasoning as that were good, it would also apply to the rise of numerous other actual necessities, such as tea, water, ale, &c. *Excess* in any of these would also be deleterious; and should we on that account destroy their use altogether? Most decidedly, No!—J. C.

Dr. Close, Dean of Carlisle, condemns the use of tobacco on religious and moral grounds. Sir Benjamin Brodie and Sir C. Hastings confine themselves more particularly to the effect it produces on the nervous system. Some condemn the use of tea; some of coffee; some of flesh; and we have no doubt there could be some found who condemn the use of cabbages. The allopathist condemns the homœopathist, and the hydropathist condemns them both. One medical authority says that "he has used tobacco for twenty-three years, without observing any injurious effects." Another says:—"It has the effect of deranging the nervous system; of rendering the smokers lazy and listless, indisposed to bodily, and incapable of much mental exertion." Tobacco is used very generally by working men: are we to infer that working men, as a class, are "lazy and listless, and indisposed to bodily exertion"? To admit such, would be a libel upon the industrious orders of our country. All the arguments that have been used against the use of tobacco, if not convincing, might

have been very instructive, had they been confined to the abuse of it. "Everybody believes that it is bad to smoke in excess; and a man knows when he has smoked too many cigars, just as he knows when he has drunk too much wine, or eaten too much pudding." But we are told, that to use it at all is destructive alike to sound health and good morals. It is characterised as a "useless, foolish, vulgar, offensive, and demoralizing habit." A reverend gentleman goes to the length of saying:—"The use of tobacco is a criminal indulgence, unbecoming the professors of the wisdom of God." By what train of reasoning he found out that tobacco was "a criminal indulgence," we have no means of knowing. Acts of a criminal nature are, in general, done in secret; smokers do it openly. We are inclined to suppose that the reverend gentlemen meant to say that, if he had the power, he did not want the inclination to make the person using tobacco a criminal, and to punish him accordingly. We don't doubt it. Dean Close has given to the world one real case of cancer in the tongue, and considers it as sufficient evidence for smokers to fling away their pipes and cigars. We may yet hope to hear of some one insisting that the use of turnips should be given up, because a case of colic had occurred through using them. All classes of the community, with a few exceptions, use tobacco, in some form or other. It would be a very interesting and curious inquiry if, by any means, reliable statistics could be collected of a given number of smokers and non-smokers (other things being equal), to note accurately the various phases, as they occur, of the rapid development of the non-smoker in physical strength, moral excellence, and intellectual vigour, with the gradual deterioration of the smoker,—stunted stature, physical debility, and an intellect shrouded and "wasting away before the poisonous drug; the glories of Britain eclipsed in clouds which her own children have helped to make." We hold that the use of tobacco is the source

of an innocent and harmless enjoyment to thousands. Let its opponents point out the actual amount of injury the use of tobacco is capable of producing; give us something that we can grasp, and it will deserve the attention and serious consideration of all who wish the social elevation of mankind. We must have more than a few isolated facts, and inconclusive abstractions,—some tangible reasons why the use of it should be abandoned. The facts for its use are all on the side of the smoker. Its soothing influence is attested by the smoke of a million pipes. The gentle curl of the ascending "cloud" from a million cigars proves incontestably that

its use is approved, and acted upon by almost general consent. To use any of their own arguments, "one page of personal experience is worth folios of the *cretifancies*." We say, then, from our own experience,—let those who use tobacco, use it still;—the immoral, the feeble in frame, and the weak in intellect, are not alone to be found in the ranks of those who are partakers of the "poisonous plant." We knew of many instances where the use of tobacco has proved highly beneficial, and are of opinion that no reliable reasons have been given for its discouragement.

D. R. R.

The Societies' Section.

The Southampton Society for Mutual Education.—The half-yearly meeting of the above society was held at the Society's Rooms, Hanover-buildings, on Friday, October 5th. There was a good attendance of the members. The secretary read the report, which showed that the number of members on the books was smaller than had been for some time before, principally owing to the fact of several having left the town; it is fully expected, however, that in a few weeks the number of members will be as large as ever. The magazine still continues to be one of the chief features of the society, and the library has been made good use of. The report having been unanimously adopted, the following officers for the next half year were elected; Eustace H. Jones, Esq., President; Messrs. Pooley and Marshall, vice-presidents; Mr. Edward J. Knight, Editor; Mr. Bance, Secretary. The lectures (the whole of which are delivered by members of the Society) will be commenced during the present month.

The Amateur Literary Society.—The council of this Society has resolved, in compliance with numerous requests, to

abolish the annual subscription heretofore required of members, and thus the great objection of expense which has been urged is for ever done away with. This association consists of those who are desirous of ensuring purity and correctness of thought and style in literary composition, whether for the ordinary purposes of life, or with a view to following literature as a profession. It is by no means exclusive, but admits into full communion all grades and denominations; and gentlemen who wish to enter for the ensuing session should at once communicate with the Honorary Secretary, William Whyte, Esq., 28, St. Vincent-place, Glasgow. Every candidate for admission must send in a probationary essay or poem, and, if this be approved of, he will be enrolled on payment of the entrance fee of 3s. 6d. The Honorary President of the Society is the Rev George Clif, of the Grange School, Sunderland, author of "An English Education," &c. The President of Council is John W. W. Penney, Esq., B.A., author of "Talk and Talkers," &c.; and the Honorary Fellows are Rev. G. Gilfillan, M.A.; W. M. Thackeray, Esq.; Charles Dickens,

Esq.; J. A. Cooper, Esq., F.R.S.L.; Alfred Elwes, Esq., President of the British Literary Society, author of "Frank and Andrea," &c. The "Societies Magazine," noticed in our last number, is published quarterly,

and contains essays, tales, poetry, critiques, &c. Three numbers are already out, and may be had, post free, for 1s. 6d., from the publisher, J. F. Hope, 16, Great Marlborough-street, London.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS TO WHICH ANSWERS ARE SOLICITED.

112. Can any of your numerous readers tell me who wrote the National Anthem, and when?—J. EVANS.

113. In Gillsillan's "Literary Portrait of De Quincey," there is the following passage:—"It is painful to be compelled to inscribe upon such a shield the word *Desdichado*." The sentence is to me unintelligible, from my unacquaintance with the concluding word. Would you kindly give an explanation in the "Inquirers' Section," and any hint as to supplying the desideratum, under which it will be seen, and the labour will be gladly acted on?—SELF-TAUGHT.

114. Be good enough to inform the subscriber if any of the works of the celebrated Spaniard, Lope de Vega, are to be found in England; and, if so, the particulars thereof. English translations are what is wanted.—ADOLESCENTS.

115. Can any of your readers inform me whether any of the mitres of the bishops of the Church of England are still in existence? and, if so, on what occasions are they worn?—CHURCHMAN.

116. Where can I find an account of the lives of the Lord High Admirals of England?—J. K. H.

117. Can any of your correspondents inform me where a history of the Irish Houses of Parliament may be procured, and where one might be enabled to find the names of the Speakers of the Irish House of Commons?—J. E. H.

118. What is the most complete

history of the Isle of Wight, and who are the publishers?—VECTIS.

119. Can any of your readers inform me where the chapter relating to scholarships of "Normal Seminaries," under the Minutes of Council of 2nd June, 1856, is to be got? An early answer will favour.—D. R. R.

120. Can any of your readers give me an idea of the approximate number of distinct species of animals now existing?—E.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

101. *Quotations*.—May I be permitted to inform "Augustine," in the pages of your valuable serial, in reply to his inquiry, that I have found the "Homilist" in valuable as a mine for originality, and condensation of eloquent passages, and gems of thought, and doubt not the work would be equally valuable to him?—W. G.

107. *Latin and French Grammar for self-instructors*.—In respect to the question asked by "Sylvia May," in the October Part, I may say that the best manual for students instructing themselves in the Latin tongue, is the work called "Lessons in Latin," by the Rev. J. R. Beard, D.D. London: John Cassell. Price 8s. It contains all that is to be found in ordinary Latin grammars, conveyed in a more lucid and intelligent manner, with easy and progressive exercises, to test the advance of the learner. It is specially designed for those studying Latin without a master. For French, I may recommend the "Lessons in French," by Professor

Fasquelle, price 4s. 6d., published by the same firm.—FRED. A. R.

107. Cassell's "Lessons in Latin; Latin an Elementary Grammar of the being Language; intended especially for those who are desirous of learning Latin without a Master." Cloth, 3s. Cassell's "Lessons in French," by Professor Fasquelle. Complete in one vol., 4s. 6d. The above works are likely to be useful to "Sylvia May." They are published by Cassell, Petter, and Galpin, London. If, however, "Sylvia May" is one of the earnest students of the *British Controversialist*, and is determined to obtain a thorough mastery of the Latin tongue, if he will *rigidly* follow out the plan we are about to lay down, we can promise him an amount of success no less gratifying than encouraging. Procure, at once, Kennedy's "Latin Grammar" (in which the quantities are all carefully marked), price 3s. 6d.; Longman and Co.; and Virgil's "Æneid," Book I. (with interlinear translations), price 1s. 6d.; Walton and Maberly. Study these two works with the greatest care, taking a few lines of Virgil and a very small portion of the grammar DAILY. Let it be done thoroughly. When "Sylvia May" has thoroughly acquired a knowledge of the words, and their meanings, in his first author, let him procure "Parsing Lessons to Virgil," price 1s. 6d.; Walton and Maberly. Let a few words be taken at first, and let each noun and each verb be carefully worked out. Be careful not to overstrain the attention by taking too great a range at one time. When these two books have been mastered, a school-like acquaintance with the First Æneid will have been obtained, as well as a general knowledge of the grammar. This much accomplished, let "Sylvia May" procure the "De Amicitia," "De Senectute," and "Brutus," of Cicero, published at 1s., by John Weale; also Riddle's "Young Scholar's English-Latin and Latin-English Dictionary," price 12s.; Longman and Co. Translate, every day, one page of the "De Amicitia"

into close but idiomatic English, and on the day following, re-translate it into Latin, and correct it from the text. Let this be done throughout. Then read the whole in course, and copy it out, *verbatim*, three or four times. This is hard work, but it brings a glorious harvest. The practice of reviewing is a very great help to accuracy and thoroughness. Every day let the lesson of the preceding day be gone over; at the end of the week, the studies of the week: and so on. If "Sylvia May" will unswervingly follow our advice, he will acquire a foundation, *strong and firm*, on which he may, at his leisure, build a knowledge of the Latin language both sound and critical.—T. L. P.

111. *Origin of Wakes or Feasts.*—"The festival of the day on which the church of any parish was dedicated, is specially enjoined in the law of Edward the Confessor; and from this festival originated the wakes of more modern times;—a name derived either from the verb *wicken*, to consecrate, or, as seems more probable, from the Saxon word for the vigil, by which the festival was preceded. The institution of these festivals is to be traced to Gregory the Great, who advised Mellito, whom he had sent as Abbot into Britain, to encourage the people to hold festivals around the churches on the days of their consecration, or of the commemoration of the martyrs whose relics were placed there, that he might prevent them from attending their idol feasts. An old English sermon states how the vigils were changed from feasts to fasts; how, "in the beginning of holy church, men and women comyng to church over nyghte, with candelus, and other lyghte, and woken in the church alle nyghte in her devocynes;" but, "by processe of tyme," they "turned the good, holy devocyon, into synne; wherefore holy faders ordeyned the people to leve that wakyng, and faste the evon, and so turned the wakyng into fastyng; but yett holdith the olde name, and is called in Latin *vigilia*, that is, *wakyng* in English."—*Hampson*, ii. 125.

LITERARY NOTES.

Charles Knight's historical labours have materially affected his health, and the monthly-part issue of his "England" has been discontinued, to afford leisure for mature study.

Herbert Ingram, M.P., proprietor of the *Illustrated London News*—one of the self-made men of our age, was drowned in Lake Michigan, North America, in September.

Her literary labours, such as they are, are said to have enabled Miss Warner to purchase a bit of "The Wide, wide world," in the middle of the Hudson, for 11,000 dollars. It is to be called Warner's Island. This is both *Say and Seal*.

The Liverpool Free Library, the gift of William Brown, is opened. There are nearly 20,000 volumes upon its shelves. This is a volunteer movement, of which there is much need, and for which there ought to be much heartfelt praise and appreciation.

Mr. E. Landells, one of the original proprietors of *Punch*, and one of the most popular illustrators of the day, is dead.

Messrs. Chapman and Hall are to publish Mr. Peter Cunningham's new biographical and autobiographical work called "Father and Son."

A marble monument, by M. Strackee, has been erected in the New Park, Rotterdam, in honour of Tollens, the merchant poet,—a poet as well circumstanced as Rogers, as popular as Burns,—who died at Ryenrick in 1854.

Under the auspices of the Prince Consort, Blanchard Jerrold is to issue a "History of Industrial Exhibitions."

The speeches and proclamations of Napoleon III. have been collected and published.

Hannay's contributions to the "Quarterly" are to be republished.

Eliza Cook's "Poems," illustrated by Gilbert, are to be issued as a Christmas book by Messrs. Routledge.

The gift-villa in the *Avenue de l'Impératrice*, from the city of Paris to Lamartine, is now ready for occupancy.

A poem full of fine philosophy and of genuine poetry, "imagination all compact," bearing the name of "Merlin the Sorcerer," has been lately issued by Edgar Quinet, the historian philosopher, and is exciting a great deal of interest.

Since January, 1858, C. E. Mudie has added to his library of history and biography 87,210 vols.; travel and adventure, 50,572; fiction, 165,455; science, religion, reviews, and miscellaneous works, 87,856; total, 391,083 volumes.

In the third volume of Lamartine's own edition of his works, now publishing by subscription, a hitherto unpublished production, entitled "Saul," appears.

"Engineers and Engine-makers" is the new work undertaken by Mr. Smiles.

"The Mormons and their Territory" is a book creating much stir in France. The author is M. Jules Remy.

It is asserted that Dickens, Thackeray, and Trollope, will each come on the *tapis* with a new monthly serial novel.

The Harpers, of New York, are said to have paid £1,000 to Dickens for the American copyright of "Hunted Down."

Biographies of James Watt and George Stephenson have been issued in German.

The prose works of Hood, the humourist, are to be issued in monthly volumes by Derby and Jackson, New York.

"The Remains" of Daniel Manin, president of the republic of Venice, 1848—49, have been published at Paris, edited and revised by Madame Planat de la Faye.

The late Robert Stephenson is to have a bust beside his father, in the library of the Literary and Philosophical Society of Newcastle. Mr. Wyon sculptured the father, and has been commissioned to produce this bust of the son.

Oxenford is said to be about to resign the *baton* as *Times* dramatic-critic to Tom Taylor, who is also art-critic.

George G. Cunningham, author of "Lives of Eminent and Illustrions Englishmen," and editor of several useful geographical compositions, died at Windermere, on 25th of September.

"Temple-bar," a London Magazine, conducted by G. A. Sala, will appear in December.

H. Sutherland Edwards is engaged on a "History of the Opera and the Ballet," in two volumes.

"Two Black Masks" is to be the title of a new fiction by Mr. Blanchard Jerrold, so that G. A. Sala is not to be "Quite Alone" in that field of literary effort, though his expected fiction is to bear that name.

Rev. Alexander Fletcher, author of "Family Devotions," &c., expired September 30th.

M. Louis Blanc has been lecturing in Scotland, and in some towns of England, on Co-operation, Mysterious Personages, Labour-life in Paris, The Salons of Paris.

Victor Hugo is engaged on a new work, "*Les Misérables*," for the copyright of which, it is said, a Paris publisher has offered £8,000. The sixth volume of his son's translation of Shakespeare has been lately issued.

The Recorder of Birmingham, Mr. Commissioner Hill, has a biographical work ready for press.

A new novel, by Signor Ruffini, author of "*Lorenzo Benoni*," &c., is in the press of Messrs. Smith, Elder, and Co.

"The Origin and Succession of Life on the Earth," by the Oxford Professor of Geology, Mr. Philips, taking the anti-Darwin side of the question, is nearly ready.

C. W. Opzoomer is editing at Amsterdam a new annotated issue of Shakespeare in Dutch.

A translation of the New Testament from a MS. of the 14th century, in the Vatican Library, has just been published at Geneva.

A "Life of Smollett" is employing the time of the author of the "*Life of Fielding*,"—Frederic Lawrence.

José Guill y Benté, the celebrated Cuban poet, lawyer, novelist, essayist, and historian, is preparing for the press "*A History of the Conquest of America*."

"Boudicca" is the subject of Alfred Tennyson's new poem. It is to be ready in the spring.

"A Treatise on Ancient Oratory," found in the Island of Incheolm, is to be edited by Professor Simpson.

Four thousand florins have been provided for in the budget of Holland this year, for the promotion and encouragement of literature.

A complete Dictionary of the Dutch language is to be compiled under the auspices of the Government of Holland.

A Shakespere memorial is to be erected in Melbourne; the committee engaged in it have agreed to trust the selection of a fitting design to the discretion of Thomas Carlyle, John Ruskin, and Sir C. Eastlake.

A hitherto unknown poem of John Bunyan's is to be published by J. C. Hotten, under the editorship of the distinguished Bunyanist, George Offor, who is to supply, in an introduction, several new facts in the biography of the marvellous dreamer of Bedford.

Sir Henry Herbert's "Diary" of Plays licensed while he was Master of the Revels, viz., 1622—1640, from the MS. possessed by Lord Powis, which was copied by Malone when collecting materials for his "Historical Account of the Stage," is to be published.

John Hunter — 1728-1793 — the "gifted interpreter of the Divine power and wisdom at work in the laws of organic life," and "the founder of scientific surgery," is to have a statue of marble placed as a memorial in the Hunterian Museum by the members of the College of Surgeons.

A subscription is being raised in Glasgow and its neighbourhood to aid John Young, a local poet, who has met with a disabling accident by fire. The means proposed is to present him with an edition of his poems, consisting of a thousand copies, by the disposal of which he may eke out a living.

Speculative Thought.

THOUGHT is the force of forces. In the very heart of the most perfect mechanical invention thought pulsates, and teaches it to labour. At the very root of habit thought lies, and operates. In the most recondite—and, to the inapprehensive mind—unmeaning, mathematical *formulae* thought hides, and yet perks out. To the strange ciphers of the scroll of heaven thought imparts significance, and from the age-old characters with which the rock-volumes of nature are inscribed thought educes the history of otherwise unrecorded times. By thought steam has been harnessed to do the will of man, the electric fluid has been made his messenger, the ocean has been mapped into highways, and even the stars in the sky have been arranged into lighthouses and sea-guides, reckoners of time, and tests of chronology. Thought unites and disunites the elements, brings into effective nearness or connection differing powers, and causes them to work together in harmonious action in fulfilment of its predestination. Thought links in one, by the bonds of causation, long series of effects, and either originates or controls the manifestations of the latent powers of bodies. The thin air is dispossessed of its apparent unity by chemical elimination, and the solid brilliancy of the diamond is reduced to elemental tenuousness by the skill of the thinker. The might of mind constructs artificial explosives destructive as the lightning's flash, and its precautionary forethought disarms the thunderbolt of its deadly energy. Seizing the impalpable sunbeams, thought makes a pencil of light, and prisons for ever the artistic brilliancy it produces "as a thing of joy." Thought interpenetrates all matter with its intentions, and makes it subject and submissive; and thought interprets all the manifestations of material existence, making each phenomenon only a letter in the alphabet of science, to be read hereafter into new meanings and in new conjunctions, and to be used again as symbols of truths which have become precious to the soul. Matter is almost, as it were, vitalized by thought, and it is thereby gifted with energy, endowed with intelligence, moulded into grace, fashioned into new utilities, and made perdurably capable of reading to man lessons of wisdom. Thought is the elixir of life. The far space-distances, orb-filled and glorious, have had projected into them the lives of many thinkers, so that they now live with the life and in the harmony of their thoughts, and the seeming chaos of immensity has been woven into form by the passing through it of thought—the shuttle of life. The hard rock-surfaces have had their hieroglyphic pages re-written and translated into living and vital speech by thought. The animate

spirit has even consented to shut itself up in the enclosure of an inanimate thing—a book—and yet retains its ancient prerogative of befriending and teaching, encouraging and delighting, its fellow-spirits. Years cannot dim the beauty of Homer's thought, destroy the potency of Plato's speculations, break the spell of entrancement with which Demosthenes enthalls, silence the imperial voice of Julius Cæsar, or impair the gaiety of Horace. The heart of man pulses yet with some of Harvey's life; the "old red sandstone" holds a lien of Hugh Miller's spirit; the skiey vault is even now beaming into our souls light gained from the intellect of Copernicus, Kepler, and Newton. Franklin still curbs the lightning, Watt still reins in the steam-steeds, Columbus guides to the Western world, and Vasco da Gama to the Eastern. Solon, Justinian, and Grotius superintend law, Euclid enspirits mathematics, Aristotle regulates thought, and Bacon holds an episcopate over experiment. The majestic domes of St. Peter's and St. Paul's enmonument and canonize the souls of Raphael, Michael Angelo, and Wren. The iron-ribbed earth is conscious of Stephenson, the waves are yet under the vicariate of Bell and Fulton. The trade and commerce of Britain are vital with Arkwright's inventiveness, Crompton's perseverance, Smith's thought, Peel's legislation. Hildebrand rules yet in the Vatican, William the Norman's sceptre is powerful still in England, Luther's voice is living even in this day, Washington preserves America, Clive governs India, Wesley informs the church with new life, Howard animates and organizes philanthropic effort, and Cromwell warns, and awes, and quells, even to this hour. Scaliger revivifies classical literature; Tell inspires Switzerland; Faust and Guttenberg give wings to words, making them indeed *εκα πτεροεντα*; and Shakespeare, by his transcendent genius, makes, as Bacon says, *Dramatica poesis veluti Historia spectabilis*.

Of all vital things, the most vital is thought; it permeates and suffuses, works in, into, and over all things; it is the inner life of all—of discovery, invention, science, history, ethics, law, and religion.

"On earth, there is nothing great but man;
In man, there is nothing great but *mind*."

Thought is the key which admits to the jewel-casket of man, nature, and life—indeed, it is the very element in which life *is*—it is

"The pith and marrow of our attributes."

Of cunning, composite, mysterious man, the essential and the quintessence is thought. Out of that, and by that, the individual becomes manifest, grows, lives, and exerts its changeful being; it is the efflorescence of existence—life of our life. It is the energy by which happiness, improvement, knowledge, development, progress, civilization, and moral activity become possible; and all that is noble, laudable, good, is

"Won from the void and formless infinite"

of nescience, ignorance, or error. Without thought, science is but a rude and indigested mass of mere observation—of facts—

“It is an army with no general,
An arch without a keystone;”

worse than a blank leaf of nature's ledger, if reason has not been the accountant. Science derives its chief value from thought;—the sages are not only the teachers, but the interpreters of the ages—they supply the solution to the great riddles of existence, the Past, the Present, and the Future. Thought is the might of seers; it is the nerve of action, the spring at whose unwinding effects strike out into potentiality, and the series of affairs is set in motion. Statesmanship, diplomacy, trade, manufactures, navigation, war, literature, science, art, &c., are only the blossomings of human thought.

It is necessary, by repetition and reiteration, to emphasize this idea. A spurious practicality has invaded the mind of our age, and *thinking* has been lowered to a mere ensigny, while *doing* has been promoted to an undisputed captaincy and chieftainhood. Idealism is contemned, realism is the faith of the times. The genator has been supplanted by the genatrix, and “the grey mare” has been regarded as “the better horse.” The far-darting power of conceptiveness springs forth from thought, and requires to be nourished and brought to maturity by the concomitance and encirclement of practicality. Thought is the husband of experiment, experiment the mother of science and of art. By the marriage of thought and nature truth is born. The germs and influences, from which it gains birth, existed in us before. The old undergoes transformation to produce the new; but the new is old as nature and as thought, though the generative conjunction of both had not as yet taken place.

“Truth is within ourselves; it takes no rise
From outward things, whate'er you may believe:
There is an inmost centre in us all,
Where truth abides in fulness.

. Watch narrowly
The demonstration of a truth, its birth,
And you will trace the effluence to its spring
And source within us, where broods radiance vast,
To be elicited ray by ray.”

The value of a thought cannot be told. Who can estimate the money-worth of Watt's inventions, of Jenner's discovery, of Hill's postage reform, of Wheatstone's telegraph, of Stephenson's railways, of Chambers' literature for the people, of Simpson's ameliorations of human suffering by chloroform, of Howard's philanthropic ideas, of Peel's free trade measures? Who could reckon the price due for pleasure and instruction received from the plays of Shakespeare, the poems of Milton, the novels of Scott, the histories of Macaulay, Grote, and Froude, the essays of Jeffrey, the songs of Burns, the wit of Jerrold, the philosophic speculations of Reid, Whately, and Hamilton, the moral treatises of Butler, Chalmers, and Whewell?

For what amount can we assess the discoveries of Newton, Herschell, and Hutton,—the chemical researches of Scheele, Liebig, and Faraday,—the glorious interpretations of the phenomena of heaven given to us by Ross, Halley, and Nichol—the systematizations of Nature by Linnaeus, Jussieu, and Oken—the inventions of Telford, Hoe, and Cooke,—the art-products of Raphael, Hogarth, Scheffer,—the political improvements of Pitt, Peel, and Gladstone,—the moral efforts of Fry, Oberlin, and Miss Nightingale,—and the religious influences of Hall, Chalmers, and Foster? The indeterminable value of these items of civilization arises from the fact that they are the firstlings only of an infinite series of effects, whose manifestations are unceasing, yet whose root and birth-germ were once—a thought; small as a grain of mustard seed, and yet fruitful as Egyptian corn.

“ ’Tis in the advance of individual minds
That the slow crowd places its expectation,
Eventually to follow;—as the sea
Waits ages in its bed; till some one wave
Of all the multitudinous mass extends
The empire of the whole, some feet, perhaps,
Over the strip of land which could confine
Its fellows so long time: thenceforth the rest,
Even to the meanest, hurry in at once,
And so much is clear gained.”

If this lengthy exordium has effected its purpose, it will have supplied the basis of a belief in the worth of thought, and of the revealer of thought,—

“ The master mind,
The thinker, the explorer, the creator.”

But it should do more; it should lead us to determine for ourselves that thought shall not always remain latent in us; but that, with the lit lamp of consciousness, we shall search through the chambers of the soul for the old chronicles that were written by the scribe Memory in the archives of the past, and read the daily record of clerkly experience regarding the present,—in order that we also may know the might of the secrets they contain, and the value of the thought within us—that we should, in short, each become the students and disciples of a genuine philosophy, and acquire the self-knowledge which results from the exercise of *speculative thought*.

It is often difficult to explain what is meant by a scientific phrase; but our minds always gain in precision of effort by establishing, or even endeavouring to establish, the determinate conception of which we intend any phrase to be expressive. “Speculative thought” we employ to signify the free use of reason for the attainment of wisdom. Not the dialectic use merely, but the cognitive as well; indeed, every faculty and capacity of the mind exercised according to its natural bent, under its natural excitants, in its usual forms, and for the fulfilment of its preordained purpose. The

results of speculative thought are called philosophy—the organon of wisdom. Reason may exercise itself either on the concrete or the abstract—its result in the former operations will constitute physical science, in the latter, metaphysical. In the one it is the artificer of truth; in the other it is the legislatrix;—the end, aim, and purpose of the artificer is determined by a plan and a constructed thought existent previous to his labours; the legislatrix has the fixing and enforcing of law upon all aims undertaken under her auspices and by her counsel. In this way reason is a law unto herself,—has her legislative functions inborn and native, and is incapable of making any exertion of her activity but in conformity, real or seeming, with the regulative principles which bind it and operate in it, making it what it is. The reason necessarily elaborates its results according to the laws which overrule its nature, but the matter upon which it may expend its elaborative energies is different; and hence arise the two distinct divisions of human effort in thought—bringing into being respectively, as we have said, physical and metaphysical science.

“Taken in its largest comprehension, as the knowledge of abstract and separate substances, Aristotle raises the philosophy of mind above all other parts of learning. He assigns to it the investigation of the principles and causes of things in general, and ranks it not only as superior, but also as prior, in the order of nature, to the whole tribe of arts and sciences. But what is first in nature is not first in man. Nature begins with causes which produce effects [*Deduction*]. Man begins with effects, and by them ascends to causes [*Induction*]. Thus all human study and investigation proceed, of necessity, in the reverse of the natural order of things, from sensible to intelligible; from body, the effect, to mind, which is both the first and final cause. Now *Physics*, being the name given by the Peripatetic to the philosophy of body, from the necessary course of human studies, some of his interpreters called that of mind *Metaphysics*, implying also by the term that its subject, being more sublime and difficult than any other as relating to universals, the study of it would come most properly and successfully after that of physics. Taking it, however, in its natural order, as furnishing the general principles of all other parts of learning, which descend from thence to the cultivation of particular subjects, Aristotle himself called this the First Philosophy; but as its subject is universal being, particularly mind, which is the highest and most universal, he gave it also the appellation of the Universal Science, common to all the rest; and, lastly, to finish his encomium of this first and universal philosophy, he honoured it with the exclusive name of *Wisdom*.*

Wisdom is the possession of truth. Truth may be either subjective or objective, referring to our own mental nature and capacities, or to the kinds and powers of all that lies beyond and

* Tatham's "Scale and Chart of Truth." Vol. i., p. 17.

out of our own being. Beyond ourselves, however, we feel differing influences and impulses, and these we must learn to know, that we may use and enjoy, or repel and destroy them; these other things, like our own nature, dispart, we find, into two forms—material and intellectual; and so we are led again to recognize two great divisions of knowledge—the physical and the metaphysical.

Perhaps the words *physics* and *psychics*, if understood, would more readily keep before thought the contrast involved in these two *species* of reflective results. *Physics* we would then define as a knowledge of the existence, properties, powers (latent), capacities (active), of *unconscious* external nature; *psychics* we would employ to signify a knowledge of all *conscious* nature—in so far as the manifestations of consciousness were concerned. On these *words*, however, it is not necessary to insist; if it be remembered that all nature *may* be regarded as consisting of *existences*—which manifest themselves and perform their several functions in creation unconsciously, and are therefore physical or consciously, and are therefore *psychical* or metaphysical.

The interpretation, the utilizing, or the systematizing of unconscious existences constitutes the prime objects of the *physical sciences* and their resulting *arts*. The knowing, using, and improving of the capacities of human nature are (so far as man is concerned) the prime objects of metaphysical science, *i. e.*, the investigation of consciousness in itself, its operations, its intents, and its results. Metaphysics have a value in and for themselves; physics attain their chief worth from their adaptability to gratify the wants—mental or material—of man. Metaphysics are legislative, productive, prophetic; physics is interpretive, inventive, instrumental; and the former lights and carries the torch-flame of thought for the latter. Out of the soul, the morphic or shaping spirit alike of theory and invention arises, and it becomes dynamic only so far as it lives by and with thought. So long as the soul-powers of man are unstirred, physical inquiry and discovery are impossible; for soul is formative, and nature plastic; so soon, however, as cognition in its faintest and almost image-less specific form operates, a metaphysic arises, and the soul develops from the unconscious into the conscious state. Excitation leads to intercourse, and then mind seeks to subdue matter to its will; and this is the moment of the birth of what we have ventured in this paper to designate Speculative Thought.

As soon as speculative thought exerts itself, it finds that the first and chief question for it is—What can I know?—what are the sphere and contents of the possibly knowable? Ignorance is an inevitable consequence of the limitation of our being, and that we cannot overleap; but error is the result of the wrong or partial exercise of our intellectual powers. Nature denies us the possession of full knowledge; but she does not occasion error, or make that inevitable. The exertion of the critical power is forced on us by the intensity of our own keenness to be, and to be active. In ourselves

we perceive a power of examinative, dialectic reasoning—consciousness awakes within us by the process of thinking. We become known to ourselves by the effects our organic activities produce in, upon, or about us. By noticing and noting these phenomena, we learn their causes, and become aware of our own special personality. In the course of this investigation, we feel that we are possessed of intuitive emotions and appetites—some of which we can control and guide, and others of which are inappeasable unless gratified and satisfied; we become sensible of having faculties, which we can employ or leave torpid, in a great measure, as and when we like; and we learn to know that we *are* voluntary agents, reposeless beings, craving continually the subjugation of all that is without us to our individuality, and brought by this desire into perpetual conflict with opposing forces, powers, inclinations, or phenomena—chances or changes. Besides this, we accept it as a law of being that every existence has a final cause; and we feel that the final cause of our being thinking agents is that we may know—and, of course, know the truth—the truth of what we are, of what things are, of what their causes are. The spontaneous life of mere being in this act of critical thought passes into a reflective life, and gives occasion to the efforts of speculative inferences, in its endeavour to discover—first, the sources of knowledge; second, the possibilities and utilities of knowledge; third, the limits of human reason in thought—in acquiring knowledge.

When we have so far consciously examined self, and investigated nature as to recognize the distinctions existing between our animal and our spiritual functions, the laws under which they act, and the kind and degree of claim they have upon our regard; when we have learned to distinguish the outward from the inward, and to make the former submissive to the latter; when, in short, we have become *egoistic*, i.e., self-conscious, endued with a perception of identity, influenced by and subject to the idea of personality—of being an individual essence, whose impulses, energies, activities, emotions, affections, inquisitiveness, is centred and concentrated in one being, though not *upon* it,—then we have a new outlook for thought. We feel each capacity—instinctive, sensitive, intellective—yearning and working outwards to gratification, upwards to a course of development, progress, exertion, reality, and life, or inwards in mortifying self-weariness and distress. Thought finds its choicest occupation in seeking growth, development, activity, and, if it may be, ecstasy. Out of the soul of each attribute there springs some design, which may be faint and vapourous at first, but which ultimately becomes

“ Like a smooth wave, o’ergilded by the morn,
High-heaving ere it cast itself ashore,
Buoyant, elate”—

and anxious to take the leap that would bring it into contact with its object; or,—varying the metaphor once more,—the thinker seems as if he

"Felt new roots
Quicken within him; branches new, that sprung
Aloft, and, with expanding energies,
Tingled, and for immortal fruit prepared."

Feeling so, he cannot avoid entertaining the desire to know how far each aim, or hope, act, or preparative, is legitimated by the inner intimations of consciousness, and by the outer environments of circumstance; and so the idea of duty roots itself in the soul, and grows into a maturity of fruitful thought. At first with a strange, sad tremulousness, later with an eager earnestness, and later still with an unrelaxing emphasis and interest, the mind employs itself upon the question—What ought I to do?

To the heart's tumultuous beat, in asking this question, the appetites give an answer, and invite it to taste their delicate delights in fulness of participative joy—promising measureless happiness as the result; the faculties, with various energies, clamour for exercise for their vitality, and seem determined neither to be dormant nor subdued in the intensity of their ardour for recognition and for opportunity; the will, with penetrating influence and persistency, works all these tense and straining aspirants for leadership and action under the curb of its own purposes, and looses or restrains their energies according to its determinations—and now it listens to the music of the conscious nerves, jubilant at the immunity they are enjoying; again it hearkens to the throbings of the excited heart, whose tides moan for a sleep that never comes to them in life; and then it feels the quivering pulses of the powers of thought, soul-fed, soul-led, rushing throughout nature with unresting speed, and finding flushful joy from its magnetic touch;—from all these there arises a rapturous sense of being, a jocund magic seems to sparkle throughout life, and the mind seems to become brimful of the delicious nectar of enjoyment. But this concentration of passionate effort soon exhausts the spirit, and brings a longing for some opiate to still the intense turbulence of life, and the blind whirl and dance of action. It is not long till man, outworn and overwearied, sighs after something that he has not succeeded in finding—happiness, and God, the source of it; and so the question arises again, What ought I to do? How are life's solid joys, useful powers, lasting hopes, to be acquired? By what course of life is life made truest, noblest, best? Here, again, is a field of effort for speculative thought, of which it would be well for man should the result be to make him use St. Augustine's prayer,—"*Fecisti nos tibi, et manet cor irrequietum donec restat in te.*" "Thou hast made us for Thyself, and the heart is restless till it rests in Thee."

The self-examining criticism to which thought leads the soul is not a halting-place for inquiry—it is a stage only on the journey of the reflective intellect. As we have seen, it passes from the query, What can I do? to that of, What ought I to do? being what and as I am. This arranged, there starts up the inevitable Why? If life be, as it is, short at best, uncertain at any time, why resign the

opportunity of indulging in those delights which our appetites and faculties make possible, even though the "voluptuous swell" of their indulgence may afterwards "ache along each nerve"?—Why cast aside the possible, with its headlong tides of disport, its hurrying mirth, its

"Delicious gambols and high phantasies;"

that the icy breath of the probable may cool the pleasure of the present with damp, dank issues from the future? There is in the secret well-springs of the heart a fountain of hope whose waters play into the bliss-thirsty being, and balm its life with fine lucidness. Hope's music sings of a perennial life continued and permanized in some subtler medium than that now ours, in which a perfect bliss and satisfying rapture may be found and used; and that the hour of sacrifice—when Death uplifts the high priest's knife to sheathe it in his victim—may but release the essence in which life dwells, much as the light which the Levite dropped into the censer only freed the subtle odours of the gums from the sifted ashes, and made them rise to heaven. If there are capacities within us on which earthly pleasure palls, that sigh for other joys, despise the body's desires, and spurn at the limits by which our earth-life is spanned and measured, then there must be cause for hope, though every hope comes shadowed by a fear. These hopes and fears—if we let the heart speak—will tell us why we ought to do those duties upon which our intellectual nature decides as the best homage to God, and of the holiest utility with regard to our own fate—as the best preparation for the life beyond life.

Thus man becomes a spiritualist by the mere growth of thought—if his thought be at all reflective rather than instinctive. His nature exerts a prophetic force upon him, and he feels that rust and disuse are not for *him*.

"To eyes, to ears,
To every organ of the copious mind,"

Nature offers proof that the control of time is not to be continuous over his soul; for he feels himself,

"At will, keep measure with his flight;
At will, outstrip it."

He cannot believe that the finely adjusted springs of life and sense, with all the rich treasure of the acquisitions he has made, are in a moment to become the objects of a disappointing and destructive disenchantment. Hope, a reasonable hope, glows in his ardent veins, and by-and-bye an intense faith (for hope is only the chrysalis of faith) mounts and soars and wings itself into the eternal lights of heaven.

The positivist may look on nature with an ardent eye—its sun-brown hills, its brooks, its groves, its vales of fertile farms, its skies of starry brilliancy, its myriads of phenomena, of life, and of law;

and may feel the joy of being amphitheatred in such a world of marvels—resonant with science, art, poetry, and enjoyment; but to him it must be crisp and dry—dull, dead-like, and inane—if only his little hour of life be given to search into and know its secrets and its sacredness. If he must prison his hope, and love, and life within the narrow rounds of the fast-fleeting years of animal existence; and, if he feels that there is no light to direct man

“To victory over life’s distress, and shew

The future path whose light runs through death’s glooms,”

that energetic being which he feels bounding with the pulsing play of intellectual life cannot be to him the high and holy possession which it ought; nor can his philosophy of life be fully satisfactory to any soul whose hopes are thrilling with the full passion of life. For him there need be no Why? Utility will give him an instant answer to his momentary query. But the melody of being is not dirge-like and funereal: it is vital and hopeful, aspiring and triumphal. Speculative thought would circumscribe the circuit of its range immensely, did it cease to regard the immortal yearnings of mortal men—the tremulous forth-stretching of the sight to catch the sun-dawn on Futurity.

Being! Duty! Hope! three words of rare significance to man! These are the root-lying themes of philosophy. They comprise all the interests of man and life, time and eternity. Upon such topics philosophy expends her energies, and expands her powers. If these be worthy of human regard, if these possess an intensity of interest for man, if these deal with the highest problems of intellectuality, then there is worth, value, need, and scope for every exertion of speculative thought, not in psychics only but in physics—not regarding our own nature only, but regarding all Nature—its source, its energies, its operations, and its laws.

This is prescriptively the season of serious self-communing. The hidden but germinative powers of thought collect and aggregate themselves now, and impart their birth-essence to resolves. As the years roll on, and the circuit of the soul’s horizon widens as the Past contracts upon us, the Present flees from us, and the Future opens its embracing arms—of life or death—to us and for us, the voiceless teachings of time rise up—like the secret writing of a palimpsest—out of the fibres of our memory, and induce, as well as conduce, to thought. If these few pencillings of ours should shape themselves into articulate influences in the minds of our readers, and cause them at this season to raise again, and consciously the three grand queries of metaphysics—What can I know and do?—What ought I to do, become, and be?—What may I hope?—we shall rejoice. Let us each measure his idea of duty by the power he possesses, and the hopes he entertains; and whensoever the new year of another being opens upon us, all is likely to be well. May *that* and all prior new years be happy—because made so by Duty done, Hope felt, and Faith securely founded. Adieu. S. N.

Philosophy.

ARE THE PRINCIPLES OF THE DEVELOPMENT THEORY TRUE?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

HAVING discussed, in last month's Number, the negative articles which had, prior to that time, appeared, we now close the affirmative side of the debate by replying to A. J.'s article. This we find to be a somewhat difficult matter; not, however, because of the force of his reasonings, but from the utter absence of any arguments whatever. He expresses his surprise at no definition of the word "development" having been given. If he re-peruse carefully our remarks, he will find that the theory, so named, is explained, which we imagine to be more to the purpose than would be the wanting verbal exegesis. He, however, attempts to supply our alleged deficiency by informing us that the "word development signifies an unfolding;" for which enlightenment we are sincerely grateful, and hope that, after the acquisition of such information, we shall not any longer be deemed merely "would-be-thought profound ones." Then follow a copious use of notes of exclamation—a pitiable attempt at jocoseness—the use of ridicule as "a lawful weapon"—and a forty-three-lines long ridiculous (literally so) quotation from a recent review,—all of which are sufficient indications of the writer's want of sound and logical objections to our arguments. We had thought the day was past in which sarcasm could be honestly pitted against science. We can excuse the dull wit of that Italian friar, who thought he was effectually opposing Galileo's doctrines by preaching from the words, "Ye men of Galilee, why stand ye gazing up into heaven?" We can understand why Columbus, before his great discovery, should have been ridiculed as a dreamer. We can even conceive of the sneering and taunting reception accorded to the alleged facts of the earlier geologists;—all this seems only what might have been expected from those who were blinded by inveterate prejudice, and unenlightened by acquaintance with the subjects on which they affected to pass judgment. But that in this so oft-vaunted "nineteenth century," and in a Magazine so advanced in liberality of tone and opinion as the *British Controversialist*, a writer should bring forward would-be witticisms, and illogical sneers, worthy of the middle ages, in opposition to a scientific theory, entertained by distinguished savans, is strange indeed. If it be said that ours is but a pseudo-scientific theory, this should be confirmed by arguments, as no amount of sarcasm will prove it to be such a one.

A. J. summarily dismisses the believers in the Development Theory as "a few sceptical philosophers." Among the men so stigmatized, are the author of the "Vestiges," Professors Draper, Wallace, and Huxley, Dr. Hooker, and Mr. Darwin. The names of Lamarck and Oken are well-known in the scientific world as propounders of the theory. Though they may have been sceptical, they were certainly not deficient in scientific knowledge, or philosophical acumen. We cannot refrain from quoting the following facts, recorded by the great Cuvier, which decidedly favour the theory:—"A villous plant, transported to a moist place, becomes smooth. Beasts lose hair in hot countries, but gain hair in cold. Certain external parts, such as stamens, thorns, digits, teeth, spines, are subject to variation of number, both in the more and the less. Parts of minor importance, such as barbs of wheat, &c., vary as to their proportions; homologous parts (*des parties de nature analogue*) change into one another, i. e., stamens into petals, as in double flowers; wings into feet; feet into jaws; and we might add, adhesive into breathing organs." A distinguished modern divine, though an opponent of the theory, has yet thus admitted what we deem the Principle of Development:—"Man, and a small number of animals peculiarly serviceable to man, are endowed with a capacity of adaptation to all the differences of climate, and other circumstances, not indeed unlimited, but extending through a wide range. This capacity requires, for its complete development, a gradual proceeding in subjection to the agents of change; for which the life of no individual is sufficiently long, nor even the duration of several generations. The process must be carried on through many steps of descent, and in its course *considerable alterations of structure are slowly produced.*" *

Having considered what claims special attention in the articles of our opponents, we will, without recapitulating our arguments, recur in outline to the principal natural facts which favour the Development Theory; and for this purpose we cannot do better than make use of the following *resumé* from a recent number of the *Edinburgh Review*:—"The laws of irrelative or vegetative repetition, referred to at page 437 of Mr. Darwin's work; the law of unity of plan, or relations to an archetype; the analogies of transitory, embryonal stages in a higher animal, to the matured forms of lower animals; the phenomena of parthenogenesis; a certain parallelism in the laws governing the succession of forms throughout time and space; the progressive departure from type, or from the more generalised to the more specialized structures, exemplified in the series of species, from their first introduction, to the existing form." To these phenomena we may add the occurrence of hybrids, and other exceptional forms, proving that life, when exposed to new conditions, can and does assume new structures. When this and the foregoing facts are taken into consideration, and it is remembered

* Dr. J. Pye Smith on "Scripture and Geology," 3rd edit., p. 73.

that each change of species, during the pre-Adamic ages, was immediately preceded by a geological convulsion, changing the physical conditions of the earth, we cannot but think that the intelligent and impartial reader will recognise the working of the natural laws of cause and effect, and give credence to the Development Theory accordingly, and will perceive, also, that this theory attributes to the Creator a more harmoniously and beautifully designed, and more efficiently executed creation, than does that hypothesis (for such it really is, as much as the one we advocate), which supposes Him to have separately formed each individual species.

E. M., JUN.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

WE are seriously impressed with the importance of the duty devolving upon us as we resume our consideration of this question. While our confidence in truth is great, and in the inherent power of truth to live and manifest itself in the world, we are exceedingly anxious that our small meed of influence should ever be on the side of truth. Perhaps no subject could possibly be more free from the vices of controversy than the one before us: this is to us a matter of felicitation, because we can pleasurably entertain opposing sentiments, without fear of destroying the bonds of good fellowship.

In our previous articles, we have observed that the greater portion of our experience, knowledge, and observation, prove the Development Theory a fallacy; the facts of every-day life, education, and history, contradict the theory; and hence the burden of proof lies with our opponents. In stating the peculiar features of the Development Theory, we remarked, that it affirms all nature to possess an inherent tendency to perfection, collaterally with a tendency to modification in all vital forces, for the most part of a favourable character, but not necessarily so. Thus, inanimate matter may possibly become animate, and this again may progress to the highest state of development possible in this sublunary sphere; or the whole, or parts, may become modified for good or evil by the associated circumstances connected with its being:—time, favourable circumstances, and the struggle for existence being the data for reasoning upon and deducing the efficient cause of development. In combating these views, we have remarked, that all bodies, whether animate or inanimate, have certain properties; that inorganic and organic matter are essentially distinct in their nature; and that organic matter is, farther, of two kinds, and these again are perfectly distinct, viz., the animal and vegetable kingdoms. We have shown that these three divisions of the physical world are essentially distinct in their natures and fundamental properties, and that no instance is recorded of any transitional link from either of these classes of being to the other, neither does any one class possess the power to furnish this transitional link. We have also shown that each class of beings has

assigned to it definite and invariable courses by which it is propagated, while no instance of the kind of change attributed to development is recorded on the pages of history or science.

We continued our remarks, by observing, that although the Development Theory and the transmutation of species had their origin in an age remarkable for scepticism, still our faith in truth leads us to believe that truth, and especially the Holy Scriptures, will prove equal to the conquest, and come off more than victorious. That Theory was seen to teach that the world, having been formed from nebulous matter, was originally metamorphic in its character; that by the process of natural laws the first forms of organic life were originated; that these forms were gradually developed and perfected, until the crowning act of creation was presented in the human shape divine, although still higher and more perfect development may be expected from the same natural laws during the course of vast enduring eons yet to come. All these assumptions we have shown to be either groundless or contrary to fact, or, at least, so purely hypothetical, as to be valueless for argument's sake. We have also shown reason to believe that, however much some forms of organic life may vary, still it is within such limits as must necessarily preserve the characteristic identity of the specific organism. This is manifest from the earliest embryonic condition to the latest moment of each individual life. We concluded our previous article with the observation, that the theory is a system of assumptions without proof, is contrary to fact; and that, in common with all theories, opposed to observation and the historic experiences of this world's life, demonstrable proof of each and every step must be produced by the advocates of the theory, from its foundation maxim to the most minute detail: until this is done, the permanence of species must be considered a truthful fact, and the theory of development remain an exploded fallacy or baseless hypothesis, alike opposed to reason, fact, and revelation.

In reply to these remarks, we have had articles from E. M., jun., and "Delta." We shall now proceed to analyze their advocacy of the theory, and either be convinced of their truthfulness, or prove their reasoning unsound, and baseless as the fabric of a vision.

E. M. has presented us with a syllogistic argument, to the effect, that it is more honourable to God, and more accordant with reason, to consider natural means as the order or law of creation; that the Development Theory is a natural means, accounting for the creation of species; and, consequently, the theory is true.

Thus E. M. puts the question plainly before us, by affirming that the Development Theory is true, because it is a natural means of accounting for creation; and all natural means of accounting for creation are more honourable to God, and more accordant with reason. He makes no effort to blink the question, and plainly indicates to us his reason for believing the theory true. How far he has succeeded in proving the theory true, we shall proceed to show. We think that E. M. has made some confusion in the terms

he has used and the ideas for which they stand, which vitiates the whole of *his reasoning* upon the theory. In the phrase, "explanation by natural means of the natural phenomenon of the creation of species," he purposes to convey to us his views respecting the mode of creation—that it is not a making out of nothing, but a modification of pre-existent materials. We know that biblical, classical, and common use justify us in characterizing E. M.'s use of the word "création" in his argument as absurd, because unreasonable and contrary to fact: it is unreasonable, because modification is not creation; and is contrary to fact, because God created all things by the word of His power, and the things "that were not, were made to appear," not as a modification of old materials, but as existences originated by the Almighty fiat. Take, for example, the familiar instance in which the word is used in civil life—"a peerage is created." This intimates an exercise of royal power and prerogative, by which that which only existed in the royal mind is made an actual existence; and it is in a sense somewhat analogous to this, that the word "creation," and its cognate forms, are applied to the act of Deity with reference to all existences in the natural world. The terms employed by E. M. reduce all creation to a mere modification of pre-existent materials, and, pushed to its *ultima ratio*, makes matter eternal, and God a mere concatenation of material forces—a conclusion which, we opine, E. M. would be far from advocating, although he must be necessarily convinced that such is the consequence of his use of the terms and the arguments based upon them. We are thoroughly assured in our own mind that E. M. would be shocked to advocate such monstrous notions as implied by his line of argument; and his blindness to the consequences of his fallacies is caused by the confusion existing between the ideas in his mind and the terms he has employed to express to us those ideas. It cannot be validly objected to the foregoing remarks, that God has endowed the material forces of the universe with this power, or imposed upon them this law of development. This would be assuming that for true which requires to be proved—is, in fact, a *petitio principii*. Revelation, science, and observation prove incontestibly that God has endowed each particular class of existence with peculiarities, which may be considered essential properties of its being, with possible variations within certain ascertainable limits; which limits are nearer to, or more remote from, other individual classes, according to contingent circumstances affecting each individual organism. And no greater fallacy can, by any possibility, be entertained, than to suppose that God has made any parts of His created universe subject "to inherent and self-acting laws, which work with ceaseless, unerring, and immutable accuracy," to produce such changes in their organism or being, as to constitute such specific differences, as are properly designated new creations, new beings, differing essentially from those causes which bring them into existence. So far as we have been able to observe the laws of

nature, like does in all cases produce like, not with that apparent uniformity which man imposes upon his mechanical productions, but with that uniformity in all that is essential, combined with that beautiful variation in non-essentials, which philosophers, no less than poets, delight to descant upon. Besides, to suppose that God has imposed upon any existence inherent, self-acting, ceaseless, and immutable laws, is to make God to have created a being whose powers or nature is beyond His own control—which is an absurdity.

Moreover, E. M. says, "We honour God more by giving the preference to laws given to matter at its creation than to modification and impulse communicated from without to matter." This, we must admit, is rather amusing, considering that the most celebrated work of modern times is devoted entirely to the proof of "modification and impulse" from extraneous causes, as the law regulating the origin of species, or in E. M.'s phraseology, as creating new species. This is most certainly arguing in a circle, and the British Controversialists well know how to place confidence in such reasoning.

From considerations such as those we have now presented to the reader, it must be apparent that *it is not more honourable to God*, and not more in accordance with the intelligence of rational beings, to give the preference to natural than to *supernatural* means, in the explanation of phenomena connected with creation, and by consequence with the creation or origin of species, by development or natural selection.

That the creation of species by natural means is explained by the Development Theory is, if possible, a still more glaring fallacy than the preceding one, which we have seen is so easily and completely exploded. This will be apparent on the most cursory glance at its absurdities.

The creation of species by natural means—what a contradiction of ideas and terms! Natural laws to possess the power of making nature; the law to make its subject; the accident of being to be the cause of that being! Is it possible that such incongruous absurdities can obtain credence in this nineteenth century? To combat such assumptions with argument is useless; to see, is to condemn them. The first proposition of E. M. being a fallacy, and the second a glaring absurdity, the third proposition is necessarily unproven, and the Development Theory, according to E. M.'s reasoning, untrue.

"Delta," a little more conversant with the subject he discusses, is more fully aware of the weakness of the cause he advocates, and, consequently, he is more wary in the terms he employs. His argument is, that such great confusion exists among naturalists as to what is a species, that it would be unsafe to dogmatize on the subject; that careful observation and enlarged views must be brought to bear upon the question. He further observes, that the varieties existing between individuals of the same species are oftentimes more widely marked than the differences existing between

different species, and that these special varieties may continually diverge, until they become different species; hence, by this course of reasoning, we may prove that the same causes may produce different effects; one species may create, in E. M.'s phraseology, another species. Thus we perceive, however carefully our opponents may guard themselves in their reasoning, they cannot escape inconsistency, absurdity, or contradiction; their reasoning must necessarily be a series of arguments in a circle.

The second article of E. M. is self-refuted; therefore to occupy further space in opposing its incongruities would be tedious to the reader, and answer no good purpose in the cause of truth.

In conclusion, we submit to the candid reader that our remarks tend to show, by the facts of science, history, and revelation, that the Development Theory, and the origin of species by natural selection, is unsound as a theory, contrary to fact, and opposed to reason. So far, we think, we have proved our thesis; the verdict, however, remains with the British Controversialists. L'OUVRIER.

Social Economy.

IS COUNSEL JUSTIFIED IN DEFENDING FROM PUNISHMENT A CRIMINAL OF WHOSE GUILT HE HAS BEEN PROFESSIONALLY MADE COGNIZANT?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

It would not be easy to overrate the deep interest and eminently practical importance of the question before us, and yet we fear that few questions are ever so carelessly treated, or so unsatisfactorily answered and determined. Professional habit and professional interest are staunch and loud in behalf of an affirmative reply, oftentimes with arguments whose logic and morality are sorely wanting; while, on the other hand, unthinking Prejudice glibly theorizes, or abstract Morality, folding its hands, and closing both eyes and ears, preaches a homily, and descants on the enormity of that which it brands as an offence. A moment's glance at the nature and bearings of the question will at once show that it is really incumbent upon every man to form an opinion on the subject, and to endeavour to extend and enforce his opinion, if he would perform his duty as a citizen. The primary object of society is mutual aid—to become helpmeets of each other. The perfection of this principle—real community of interests—is to be found only in the domestic circle. Diversity of interests exists between family and family, between tribe and tribe. This diversity of interest, acting on man's fallen nature, rapidly turns to opposition and strife. With no arbiter between the contending individuals or

bodies, force and violence necessarily result; and from their occurrence, a sense of insecurity springs up. The next step in human society is association for mutual protection and defence: this is the institution of civil society and of nationality, as distinguished from the society of the family and of friendship—in a word, the institution of government. In its earliest and rudest form, government is the mere combination of men for warlike purposes, under the chieftainship of certain leaders. At every turn, however, the passions of mankind introduce confusion and strife. The freedom of each individual clashes with the freedom of his neighbour, and the limits of individual freedom are thus marked out by individual power. At every stage mankind feel the need, therefore, of some new modification of their modes of government and association, by which they may more nearly attain to that system of mutual restraint which we term justice. This justice we, in our day, divide into civil and criminal. Without descending to niceties, we may describe the object of civil justice to be the affording to every man the means of securing his rights; it is positive, and concerns the individual. Criminal justice, on the other hand, aims at punishing *wrongs*, and thereby deterring from their repetition; it is negative, and concerns the public rather than the individual. Civil justice, in point of fact, is in every case the public enforcement of a contract, or mutual agreement (either tacit or express), between man and man; it compels the fulfilment of those obligations which men *create* as between themselves; it secures alike to buyer and seller, employer and employed, the particular *quid pro quo* agreed upon in each case: and thus it secures that confidence in mutual dealings which is the soul of trade and commerce. Criminal justice is the enforcement of the fitting penalty for each breach of that bond of good conduct under which every man is bound towards the community of which he is a member; it punishes the breach of obligations which *exist* as the condition of citizenship; and thus it secures to all men alike security and protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property. Criminal justice is the condition of the existence of societies and states; civil justice is the condition of their progress and growth. I give my labour, time, or money for a certain possession, and civil justice watches over the transaction, and guards it till that possession is mine; then criminal justice, by its penalties, deters the thief from taking away that which I have gained.

In the foregoing *résumé* we have had two objects in view. *First*, we trust that, while drawing a clear distinction between civil and criminal justice, we have shown that they have a mutual correspondence and parallelism, so that the same principles, as to the moral duty of an advocate, will apply alike in each case; and, consequently, that it is not only allowable but necessary to draw our arguments from, and to apply our reasonings to, both of these two divisions of justice, in order to ensure a sound and truthful conclusion. *Secondly*, we have endeavoured to impress upon the mind

of the reader the importance of the question, as affecting the very foundation upon which the existence and progress of human society and civil government rest. Now let us bring ourselves face to face with the real problem at issue, and fairly estimate the startling difficulties and irreconcilable contradictions which it apparently involves. The accurate definition of those restraints upon man's natural and physical liberty to do what he *will* as far as by any means he *can*, the transgression of which shall be deemed a crime punishable by the community; and the extent to which the fulfilment of civil contracts and obligations shall be deemed a right, enforceable at the option of each individual;—or, in other words, the determination of the boundaries and guiding principles of criminal and civil justice,—is the province of the legislature. With this we have no concern in the present debate; our topic concerns only the *administration* of law and justice. There are evidently three parties to be considered—the community, the accused, and the advocate. We might add a fourth, the individual complainant; but this is unnecessary, since (except in the case of a merely malicious prosecution or lawsuit) his interest is that of the community. Now the community demand the due administration of justice; whatever defeats, or seeks to defeat that end, is itself a crime. If a man will not pay, his creditor is left to sue him, and the matter ends there; but if he swear falsely that he has paid, and so try to defeat private and civil justice, he becomes liable to be indicted criminally for perjury. Again, as Bentham remarks in the quotation made by "L'Ouvrier" (p. 186), to aid an escape from justice is to become criminally liable as an accomplice. Now, to defend a prisoner, whose guilt is known to the advocate, is very like acting perjury; to protest a belief in that prisoner's innocence is moral perjury; and to succeed in defending such a prisoner is completely to defeat public law and justice. The same remarks apply where counsel appears in a civil court, either for plaintiff or defendant, knowing at the time that he has "no case"—that his success will be the defeat of justice. Again, our judges are selected from the bar; that is, from men who have thus deliberately assisted in defeating justice, if paid for so doing. Thus it may be said that a taint of dishonesty and impurity is introduced into the judicial office; the fount of justice is corrupted, as well as its stream obstructed and diverted. Then as to the result. It is evident that impunity will harden the criminal, and invite others to crime; the administration of law will be looked upon as partially a hollow sham, and punishment will be regarded as a matter of chance and lottery. Lastly, as regards the advocate. We need not follow "L'Ouvrier" through his homily, nor invoke the awful sanctions of religion, and—we speak with reverence—appeal to the sacred attributes and titles of the Deity, in order to establish the moral and personal obligation of truth and truth-speaking. It is waste time to prove by argument the moral degradation of allying oneself with the cause of guilt and the deliberate practice of falsehood.

We have put the case strongly, without any evasion. Our opponents will scarcely claim or wish for freer admissions. It would *appear* that the advocate who defends a prisoner, knowing him to be guilty, or who pleads or defends a cause knowing it to be bad, thereby sets at nought the laws of his country, does his best to sap the foundations of society, and utterly repudiates the obligations of moral duty.

Now, in the light of this *theory*, let us look upon the practice of the world around us. Does society instinctively and persistently denounce and endeavour to suppress or punish the custom of English advocates in this particular? Can we trace its results in the evident obstruction and defeat of justice to any serious extent? Do we find its baneful influence corrupting the judicial office? Has crime increased, and been emboldened, since it has been allowed the privilege of having counsel? Has it produced the inevitable result of destroying the honour, honesty, and moral sense of the English bar? Are the members of that profession behind all other classes in moral elevation, in virtue, and in religion? Common honesty and common *truthfulness* must compel every one to answer these questions in the negative. Here, then, is a patent contradiction between facts and theory. It may be said that counsel seldom are cognizant of the guilt of their clients; but we reply, that this is merely begging the question. They are *sometimes* cognizant of their clients' guilt in criminal cases, and they are often cognizant of the fact that truth and justice are opposed to them in civil cases. Besides, while the infrequency of such cases might lessen the indignation of society, it could not in the least affect the morality of the profession. Men who have established as a rule that they will set at nought the responsibilities and obligations of morality, whenever occasion offers, are no whit worse or better because those occasions are actually many or few. In morality, actions are little more than evidences and proofs of the existence of the principles and passions from which they spring.

We find ourselves thus involved in a sheer absurdity. Theory tells us that a certain principle or rule of conduct is inimical to society, is criminal, favours crime, and degrades those who adopt it; yet society disregard the matter, no evil social results follow, and the morality of those who adopt this principle does not suffer. Let us consider the consequences which would arise, if counsel were to renounce the present rules of their profession, and adopt the views of "L'Ouvrier" and R. T. G. Would society benefit? Clearly not; for as soon as it was known that no counsel would defend a client who acknowledged his guilt, the lips of every criminal and of every unjust litigant would be sealed against any admissions. Nor would the matter end there: it would immediately lead these classes to bend all their energies towards strengthening their cases; the help they now seek from the ability, legal skill, and eloquence of counsel, they would then endeavour to supply by the concoction of false evidence. Perjury, and suborna-

tion of perjury, would fearfully increase. The remedy would thus introduce infinitely more and worse evils than the disease. We are not to do evil that good may come; but we ought certainly to hesitate before we pronounce a course of conduct to be good, the practice of which we find to result in the vast multiplication of evil. Society evidently would be a loser by the change. The effects, too, would be in every way evil as regards the accused. Debarred from a natural resource, they would become more desperate and unscrupulous in their efforts to put down truth by the upheaping of falsehoods and frauds; and they would be shut out from the honourable and candid advice often given to them now by their solicitors and counsel. The evils arising from the latter fact would be severely felt in civil causes. Numerous, indeed, are the cases which are now abandoned or compromised under the advice of counsel, but which would then be fought out *a l'outrance*. In all instances the just cause and the innocent would suffer increased costs and delays. Evil, and evil only, therefore, would result to society, to suitors, and to the accused, from the supposed change. How, then, would it affect counsel? For morality's sake, he is not to defend the man of whose wrong or guilt he is cognizant. What is *cognizance*? Suppose the man, who gave himself up as the murderer of Francis Saville Kent, had been brought to trial; would the knowledge of his previous confession have been cognizance of his guilt? Of course not, it will be said. It appears, then, that confession alone will not make counsel cognizant of the guilt confessed. A man having confessed has, therefore, nothing to do but turn round and deny his confession, and he will regain his right to counsel. It may be urged that there was no evidence to corroborate the self-crimination of the man alluded to. According to this, "L'Ouvrier" and R. T. G. would make counsel take the office of judge and jury: if facts tally with confession, he is to return a verdict of guilty, and refuse to defend. This leads us to the necessary consequences of the change advocated by our opponents. Every man must first convince his counsel that he is innocent, before he can get any one to undertake his cause. If he appear, therefore, at the bar undefended, he will thereby proclaim to the jury who are to try him that every advocate, to whom he had applied, was convinced of his guilt. And this result flows from abstract theory as certainly as from the practical adoption of the principle now in review. If it be immoral to defend that which is "known" to be a bad cause, it is equally so to defend that which we honestly believe to be a bad cause. It is impossible to draw the line between knowledge and belief as regards facts which we have not actually witnessed. As with personal morality, so with the advocate's duties to the community. We may extend the argument of Bentham, and say that the advocate, who defends a man he believes to be guilty, commits the same offence as the man who, believing him to be guilty, aids him in evading or escaping from punishment. Here, therefore, we find that the theory of our

opponents, whether adopted in practice or carried out in argument, necessarily leads to the uttermost absurdities and the most fearful evils. Vain and foolish, indeed, are our boastings that we assume innocence till guilt is proved; that no man is bound to criminate himself; that every one is warned against the consequences of making any admissions in the preliminary investigations of our police courts; that no man is put to interrogation, as abroad; that the province of the prosecutor is jealously guarded from that of the judge; that while one accuses and labours to convict, and the other determines and declares the law, a jury of twelve laymen alone shall decide the question of guilty or not guilty, and that solely upon the evidence then and there brought before them. Vain, indeed, we say, is it for us to plume ourselves upon these things, if we would have secret trials where he who is asked to aid sits only to judge, and, by refusing to help, proclaims to the jury and to the world that, knowing all from the lips of the accused, he verily believes him to be guilty. We leave the reader to draw the parallel, and to reflect upon the utter confusion and injustice which would arise from a similar practice in civil causes.

There are even further consequences still. Few men would accept the chance of counsel's aid on such terms as we have noticed; and no counsel could afford to give the time and thought which would be required, in order to ascertain in each case whether he was morally justified in accepting a brief for the defence. The profession of advocate would at once be narrowed down (in criminal matters, at least) to that of prosecutors. We should thus return to the old rule, forbidding persons tried for felony the privilege of counsel. In the name of morality and theory, we should retrace our steps back to a system "at which," says Sydney Smith, in words not more eloquent than true, "common sense and common feeling revolt; for it is full of brutal cruelty and of base inattention of those who make laws, to the happiness of those for whom laws are made. . . . Help is denied to all. Age cannot have it, nor ignorance, nor the modesty of women. One hard, uncharitable rule silences the defenders of the wretched, and at the bitterest of human moments mercy is blotted out from the ways of men." No one can candidly and intelligently consider this matter, without seeing that such would be the inevitable result of the dogma that counsel ought not to defend, when cognizant (*i. e.*, morally convinced) of a prisoner's guilt. Moral theorizing and prejudice, when regardless of the facts and realities of life, may always be dragged into the service of injustice and oppression. What, for instance, is more easy than to raise a plea in behalf of that barbarous practice to which we have just alluded? To "allow" counsel to a prisoner may be denounced and hooted down as "an expedient contrived for selling impunity to such criminals as have wherewithal to purchase it." It is easy thus to reason and declaim. "Thrice is he armed who hath his quarrel just," or his conscience clear; "therefore" innocence needs no advocate, and

"therefore" the allowance of counsel is only aiding the richer and more inexcusable criminals. The "therefores" would be well enough, if triple armour were a sure defence to the timid, the ignorant, and the wretched—if, in a word, man was not man, but a moral machine.

We have exposed the folly and injustice of the plain, unvarnished negative reply to the question in debate, and our earlier remarks showed that we were not prepared to support an unqualified affirmative in a theoretical point of view. Let us, therefore, consider the nature of an advocate's duties and office, and the principles which should guide a conscientious and upright man in the discharge of them. We have shown that the punishment of crime is the primary object of government; the efficient prosecution, or following up, of an offence, with a view to its due punishment, is therefore the duty of the State. Hence the necessity of employing prosecuting counsel; i. e., men thoroughly well versed in the law, and skilful in setting forth and eliciting facts. Now, no man can be at once the advocate of a particular conclusion and an impartial judge. His duty is to state the case against the prisoner, to narrate all its circumstances, and to link them together by argument into a proof of guilt. Having thus set the matter before (in England) the jury, he has to prove the circumstances he has narrated. Here a multitude of questions arise. Does the advocate know all facts connected with the case, and has he brought out all that are material? Can he, while doing his duty to the community, always judge aright, even if he try to do so, what facts are material to the accused? His connecting theory and argument may be honest; but are there no others more evidently true? He seeks certain replies. Can he, at the same time, conjecture or detect the animus that prompts them, or sift and expose the character of the witnesses who utter them? Can he view the case at once, on the suppositions that the accused is guilty and that he is innocent? Has he a moral right to put that question, or to put it in that particular form? A thousand similar questions arise, to show that the accused, if innocent, is struggling at a disadvantage against practised professional skill. The judge may interpose in his favour, but can he be on the alert for the prisoner, and maintain judicial impartiality? Judges, too, are fallible. As Sydney Smith wittily says, "the majority are upright and pure; but some have been selected for flexible politics—some are passionate—some are in a hurry—some resemble ancient females—some have the gout—some are eighty years old—some are blind, deaf, and have lost the power of smelling." If the innocent are to have a fair chance against the professional skill arrayed against them, the procedure of our courts must be conducted in the strictest accordance with philosophical and legal rules of evidence, and technical forms necessarily intricate and professional, and therefore, after all, of little avail, unless applied in their defence by professional skill. The duty of the defending counsel, therefore, is to act as a shield; to

elicit truths which would otherwise be overlooked; to discover facts and circumstances most material perhaps, and yet wholly forgotten, under the influence of terror and shame, or unmentioned, from an inability to see their bearing and influence. It is no less his duty, both to his client and to the community, to see that *a conviction, if gained, should be gained by strictly legal means and forms.* The State does not profess to punish *actual* guilt; it punishes *legally proven* guilt. Therefore an advocate is morally justified and socially justified in securing the acquittal of a man whom he knows to be really guilty, if the prosecution fail in *legal proof* of that fact. A counsel neither vouches to a falsehood, nor defeats the administration of justice, in such a case. The rules of evidence and of procedure are as real a part of the law as the penal code; and they are more important, for they are the restrictions found necessary to protect the safety of the innocent; and better far for the community, more righteous far in morality, that the wicked be allowed to escape, than that the innocent be condemned. Again: suppose no legal flaw, no insufficiency or faultiness of evidence occur, and that the prisoner's guilt is known to his counsel—it may be, that the damning testimony is that of an infamous witness, or of one who, though speaking truth, is actuated by malice and revenge; then we say that counsel morally is justified, and, for the sake of society; is in duty bound to elicit these matters, and, if possible, to secure an acquittal on these grounds. For the peace and happiness of society, and for the security of innocence, it is incumbent alike on jurymen and on counsel to allow the criminal to escape, rather than to convict on the evidence of the infamous or the malicious. We might multiply instances, especially if we turned, as we have a right to do, to illustrations drawn from civil proceedings; but we feel we have done enough to convince the reflecting. We, therefore, shall conclude by a brief statement of our view of the course which should be pursued by the advocate acting in obedience to the behests of a pure morality, and the dictates of an enlightened conscience.

The office of counsel is purely ministerial. When he accepts a brief for the defence of a prisoner, he becomes so far a servant of that prisoner. He is bound, as we have shown, to see that his client is acquitted, unless legally proved guilty of a legal offence, according to the laws of evidence and technical procedure. Actual guilt is not the question. He is also bound to see that the evidence brought before the jury is such as to justify *them* in pronouncing a verdict. The facts proved may bear another explanation; motives may be suggested which would account for apparently condemning acts. Now, suppose counsel suggests these motives, and offers these explanations, all the while knowing his client's guilt. Is that immoral? He does not bluster, and call Heaven to witness his client's innocence; he does not say his explanations and suggestions *are* true. He simply puts it to the jury—"Is there anything in what *you* have heard and learned *in this court*

which will justify *your* reasons and consciences in deciding that such explanations and suggestions are not true? If not, *you* are not justified in convicting my client. *You* are convicting upon insufficient grounds—on grounds which will render an innocent man liable to unjust condemnation.” We say, that the man who would not thus act and thus speak is not discharging his *duty*. His knowledge is not the knowledge of the jury. They are bound to apply the most anxious and careful reflection and reasoning to that which *they* know, and not to that which *he* knows. If he is silent, because knowing the prisoner’s guilt on other grounds, he acts as though (for morality’s sake) he should countenance and aid an execution by Lynch law, because he saw the victim commit some crime punishable by death, according to the laws of the land. The purest morality and the highest devotion to truth demand that counsel, cognizant of the prisoner’s guilt, should act as if he were ignorant, or else demand to be sworn, and then bring his knowledge before the jury as evidence. One of these alternatives is moral right; the middle course argued for by our opponents is moral cowardice, a miserable self-deception, the wretched compromise and the half truth which betray an uneasy conscience, a quibbling reason, and an unenlightened mind.

It scarcely needs any inquiry whether it would be the moral duty of counsel to volunteer as a witness against his client, and to detail the confession made to him under the seal of secrecy. The common sense of humanity, and the laws of all civilized countries, would brand such an act as an act of moral treachery and baseness, and would forbid its allowance. The duty of an advocate towards himself as a responsible moral being, towards his client, the court in which he pleads, and his country, is simply to act as if he were ignorant of his client’s guilt, to conduct the case with all his ability and skill, *addressing himself solely to the evidence in court*. Conscience and morality condemn most severely any assertion that his client is innocent, or that he believes him to be so. That, of course, would be unvarnished falsehood and moral perjury. The fact of his client’s innocence is not in evidence, or the trial would not be in process; his own beliefs are not in evidence, and therefore, by keeping to the rule we have laid down, he will neither be tempted to, nor commit, falsehood. Locking up the secret in his own breast, and allowing it to influence him only so far as to restrain his tongue in these respects, he will proceed with his cause. If all legal rules are satisfied, and the weight of evidence brought into court becomes irresistible, he will probably decline to proceed further with the defence, and throw his client on the mercy of the court. Or, if those rules are not satisfied, or that evidence fail in sufficiency, he will endeavour to secure an acquittal. In either case, we believe that he will act with an approving conscience, and will have performed his duty before God and man. B. S.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

"Veritas non recipit magis ac minus."

We have often heard persons exclaim, "The courts of law are not courts of justice;" and there is one expression in the statement of the question now under debate, which would seem to give truthfulness to the assertion. "*Professionally made cognizant*:" what is meant by this? It seems to imply, that a man may hear of another having committed a murder, and must do all he can to bring the criminal to justice, if, when he was "*made cognizant*" thereof, he was at breakfast; but if he ascertained the fact in his "*office*," or "*chambers*," where he follows his profession, he must be quiet, and ignore the fact. Something of this kind seems to be implied in the question. We stumbled at the phrase, and we determined to try if we could not prove that "*the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth*," must prevail over any quibble brought forward to shade it.

We say, then, that "*counsel*" is *not* "*justified in defending from punishment a criminal of whose guilt he has been professionally made cognizant*." And in attempting to establish this position, we will notice the desire for information expressed by "*Nona*," on page 183, where he says, "We should like to know, if an advocate's conduct, in defending a guilty client, be unjustifiable, when did he cross the delicate line between right and wrong?" We reply, that "*his transgression dates*" from that time when he was "*professionally made cognizant*" of the guilt of his client. It is important also to notice that the words used in the question are, "*defending from punishment*;" not, as "*Nona*" merely asserts, in his concluding clause, "*defending a criminal*." We may defend a friend, in the hope of *ameliorating* his punishment; but we should not be justified in *shielding* him from a just punishment. Taking the motto at the head of "*Nona's*" article, we ask, Do justice and mercy combine, when a prisoner, who is guilty, escapes unscathed from the bar? Is it justice to the public to allow mercy *alone* to rule in courts of equity? Then, indeed, were murderers happy beings, and robbers safer than princes.

We know truly—

"That, in the course of justice, none of us
Should see salvation;"

yet in our salvation justice has had her due, and can now go hand in hand with mercy. Does "*Nona*" think, that had no death been endured for the sins of a world, the sword of justice would now be sheathed? It is only because such priceless blood has been shed, and that death's bonds have held so rich a treasure as that which slept in Joseph's tomb, that the stern brow of justice has softened into the smiling lineaments of almighty mercy. And as it is with Heaven's laws, so should it be with earth's. The soul that sinneth

shall be punished, saith God's law; man's law is an echo of it. As God's law demands justice, so should man's. As God's law is *empowered* by mercy, so also should man's be. Does "Nona" really think that, when a man has committed a murder, his counsel is justified in trying to screen him from the death he deserves? If an advocate has been professionally made cognizant of his client's guilt, he must know that his client deserves punishment; his conscience must, therefore, have some elasticity in it, if he attempt to evade the law. He may do what he can to have that punishment *softened*; he may exert his utmost influence to let *mercy* characterize the sentence of the judge; and he will be justified in so doing. Defending a guilty client from punishment ought to be considered equal to an evasion of the law; but recommending a guilty client to mercy is in every respect praiseworthy.

With regard to what "Nona" says (pp. 180, 181), we would ask, Is not a prisoner at the bar at liberty to call on what witnesses he thinks proper, to ask them any questions he thinks will throw light upon the darker hue of the group of suspicious circumstances linked together? Should the prisoner narrate his own side of the case, and say no more than the truth, and no less,—if he state the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, what of the quibbles brought to bear against him? We have been rejoiced to see the sly and ever-watchful lawyer put at bay by the simple, truthful assertion of upright lips; ay! by the steady gaze of a truthful eye. We will, however, admit that, when adverse circumstances are so grouped together as to throw a shade over truth, there is little hope for "any simple man," unless he has nerve enough to keep calm and undismayed. Let the prisoner, then, have his advocate; let him leave to his counsel the collecting of favourable incidents, the judicious arrangement of them, the cross-examination of the accusers, &c., and then let him make the best of the case he can. But if he try to defend his client from a punishment he professionally knows he deserves, then, we say, he is *not* justified in such a course, and we would rather be without his conscience.

"Nona" says, on page 183, "When requested to conduct a case, an advocate can hardly form such an opinion of the individual's guilt or innocence," &c. The question, however, we are discussing settles all that; it tells us that the advocate has no occasion to form any opinion, because he is "professionally made cognizant." He is told at the outset that his client is guilty; if he takes up the case, and attempt to defend his client from punishment, he must attempt to prove to a judge and jury that his client is "*not guilty*," although that client has told him he *is*! This is our way of viewing the matter, and "what the non-advocate is hanged for, the advocate is paid for and admired;" the *non-advocate* meets the death and fate of a dog, is forgotten by posterity, or held up as a warning; the *advocate* dies in peace and honour, is lauded by historians, and regarded as an honour to his country, and a model for imitation.

In coming to a conclusion, we feel that, although truth is on our

side, and, therefore, that we are strong, yet we have not defended our cause with a strength which might have been brought to bear on the subject. But we firmly believe that, in the course of this argument, should any quotations from the "Guide to all Truth" be made, they will appear in the negative articles. By its laws man may be tried, by its counsels he is preserved amid temptations, by its assurances he is consoled, and by its words of truth he is enabled to be the champion of truth. BETA.

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

"Hear me, ye venerable core,
As counsel for poor mortals."—Burns.

It appears, from the course pursued by some of our opponents, that they must have expected us to adopt the argument of Paley,—that the assertion of an advocate, when he declares the innocence of a client whom he knows to be guilty, may be regarded as a simple falsehood,—i. e., a lie by which no one is deceived, and which is, on this account, divested of its criminality; since such declaration may be expected of him in the discharge of his duty. From this opinion we do, however, dissent; and, without taking other ground, we maintain that counsel is expected to speak truly; nay, Blackstone, in his "Commentaries," cites certain statutes by which counsel, *guilty of deceit* or collusion, are punishable with imprisonment for a year and a day, and perpetual silence in the courts; "a punishment," adds this famous writer, "still sometimes inflicted for gross misdemeanours in practice." However much, then, may be urged in extenuation of the advocate's conduct, who by artful, illusive colouring, or exaggeration of facts, seeks to snatch from the gallows some guilty, shrinking wretch, it must ever be acknowledged that a lie is a lie, whether uttered without or within the bar; and that the forensic gown and wig confer no license for invading the sacred domain of truth. We have, therefore, had the pleasure of setting out on the present inquiry, and of journeying, as far as the first stage, in company with our adversaries; but the road diverging immediately thereafter, we parted. Who has taken the right path? We shall see.

It is assumed by the writers on the other side that mendacity is the only means of defending a criminal known to be guilty; or, to state the case with more precision, that such defence involves a lie. For this assumption, not a shadow of proof is led; and on such sandy foundation no inconsiderable portion of the opposition argument is based. We might dismiss this part of our subject with a simple denial; but as our object is not to vanquish, but to convince, we prefer giving the point a full, and, we trust, impartial consideration.

"L'Ouvrier" has accused an advocate, circumstanced as he is supposed to be by this debate, of "acting a lie." What meaning is to be attached to the phrase in the present instance? The dumb

man of Manchester, in the play, portrays, by most expressive pantomimic action, his innocence of the murder with which he is accused; but we are sure our friend does not attribute to counsel any such dumb-show. That the mere appearance of counsel, in conducting the criminal's defence, cannot be construed into "acting a lie," is plain, when we reflect that no one ever forms any opinion of the guilt or innocence of a prisoner from the fact that, during his trial, he has professional assistance. The case would be quite altered if counsel were expected to defend those only whom they believed innocent of the act laid to their charge. Then to conduct a defence, such as we are considering, would indeed be acting a lie; for it could not be done without violating the confidence which the community would place in the members of the bar. But though lies cannot be acted on a client's behalf, they may be uttered. Yet let it not be supposed for one moment that any legal gentleman of principle would condescend to act in such a manner, much less that he must necessarily do so. Even some of the popular ideas regarding an advocate contradict this notion.

In the minds of the multitude, your lawyer is a clever, astute, sharp-witted fellow, who can see further into a mill-stone than most folks, and can, in the vulgar phrase, drive a coach and four through any Act of Parliament,—a figurative feat which, being interpreted, means that he can give to any statute a reading our legislators never dreamt of. Why these qualities should be required merely to affirm black to be white, is rather difficult to account for; though, if the conducting of delicate cases, with a due regard to truth, is supposed, the necessity of such qualification becomes quite apparent. Here it will be advisable to consider the object sought by a pleader, as well as the means by which this object is to be attained; since a proper conception regarding these points will rid our subject of any difficulty which may appear connected with it, and since our opponents have in these particulars found a little misrepresentation necessary to make their point good. S. E. L. informs us, and in doing so but echoes the opinion of his friends who precede him, that an attempt to prove a known criminal's innocence is "the only means of effecting the desired exemption from punishment." We pass over the impossibility of any such attempt succeeding, and proceed to show it to be unnecessary. The law holds every man innocent until convicted; and to convict, requires a chain of evidence in which there is no glaring imperfection. When a person, guiltless of the charge imputed to him, is tried, it may be easy to bring forward an *alibi*, or proof that, at the time the crime was committed, he was present elsewhere; or, according to the nature of the charge, indubitable evidence may be adduced to prove that the offence could not possibly be committed by him. This is proving a prisoner innocent, and can only be accomplished when such is indeed the case; not always, even then, and certainly never when the prisoner is guilty. This, however, is not the only condition upon which a discharge from the bar can be

demanded. As we formerly observed, the law must recognize and provide a penalty for every offence with which a culprit is charged; and not till the accusation has been legally proven in open court, can a verdict of guilty be returned. An ample field is here presented for the gentlemen of the long robe exercising their acumen in a legitimate manner, and exhibiting their professional abilities. On examination, an indictment may be found to be informal, or not in conformity with existing laws; hence we occasionally find, when a prisoner is arraigned on several counts, some of these counts are departed from, and the trial proceeds upon others of minor importance. This, then, is the duty of counsel:—to discover and declare those legal flaws; to scrutinize the criminating evidence, and note what about it is weak and incoherent; afterwards collecting together his observations, and laying them before the jury, to claim his client's acquittal,—not on the ground of his innocence, but because the prosecutor has not made out his case. The difference between the two courses of procedure is broad and well defined; the one is negative, the other positive; this rests upon truth, that has no other foundation than audacity and falsehood.

In proceeding to review, briefly, the negative articles, we trust these cardinal points will not be lost sight of,—that the advocate seeks the acquittal of his client without affirming his innocence, and that he avails himself of those means only which the law affords.

The larger portion of the introductory article is devoted to exhibiting the importance of truth in social intercourse, and, we need scarcely remark, receives an approving response from us. "L'Ouvrier" then declares the hero of this debate "an accomplice after the fact," which he might be, if his information were received under ordinary circumstances; but this is not the case. *He* acquires his knowledge in the character of a confidant, and cannot, therefore, declare anything to the prejudice of his client, without violating his sacred trust. On the committal of an offender, he is formally warned not to communicate what might afterwards be advanced against him; and we admire this generous spirit pervading our laws; but what shall we think of the man who, having insinuated himself into the confidence of some fallen brother, by appearing to hold out the ægis of protection, and wormed from him the secret, which he fain would conceal, will then, instead of improving his client by an example of inviolate honour, declare to the world his guilt, and seek his condemnation? How differently acted the world's great Advocate, when the erring woman was brought to Him in the temple! "Woman, where are those thine accusers? Hath no man condemned thee? She said, No man, Lord. And Jesus said unto her, Neither do I condemn thee: go, and sin no more." "L'Ouvrier" holds that the duty incumbent upon counsel, as a citizen, ought to prevent him permitting a criminal to escape, when he can do so. To comply with this dictum, he would, of course, require to break the engagement with his client; and the question then presents itself, Whether ought his

general engagement to the state, as citizen, or his special engagement to the criminal, as his advocate, be observed? Paley resolves the difficulty in this manner: "Promises of secrecy ought not to be violated, although the public would derive advantage from the discovery. Such promises contain no unlawfulness in them to destroy their obligation, for as the information would not have been imparted upon any other condition, the public lose nothing by the promise which they would have gained without it."*

Proceeding now to the second article, we are treated to a trial burlesqued in the most approved fashion by R. T. G., in which a legal worthy, existing nowhere but in that gentleman's imagination, frightens the witnesses out of their wits, melts the hearts of the jurymen by pathetic appeals, or sets their hair on end by predicting the future attendance on them of an innocent man's shade, should they pronounce his client guilty; and by such noble efforts, not forgetting a profusion of lies, he succeeds in securing the safety of some atrocious malefactor. The best method of exposing such puerility is to place alongside the compressed report of a *bonâ fide* trial; and these lines being written in Glasgow, we select one from the cases before the last circuit court held there. A girl from Dumbartonshire, bearing a most romantic name, was accused of the murder of her mistress, by administering arsenic mixed in porridge at breakfast; the porridge was prepared and handed to her mistress by the girl; arsenic, the undoubted cause of death, was kept in the house, and lay within reach of the accused; suspicion fell upon the servant alone, and the victim herself at once and persistently accused her with the crime. Add to this, that accused made a statement regarding her master, which he, on oath, denied, and you have the facts of the case for the prosecution. For the defence it was alleged that no sufficient motive could be offered, nothing but a difference about some coppers with deceased, and that no administration could be proved. But what we wish to be noticed is, that the prisoner's counsel, after reviewing the evidence, made no assertion of his client's innocence, but, in the words of the report, "maintained that the case was not proven; and, therefore, he thought, the only conclusion the jury could come to was not to return a verdict of guilty, *or even, perhaps, of not guilty*, but certainly he thought they would find it to be their duty to adopt an intermediate course, and say—not proven:"† which they did.

Let the reader contrast this with the conduct of Sergeant Twister, and draw what conclusion he thinks proper. The principle which has been our loadstar throughout this debate is, that it is better to prefer the escape of the guilty, when proof or law is defective, than, disregarding the imperfection, to convict; because such shortcomings would most probably appear when an innocent person

* "Moral Philosophy."

† This, as our readers doubtless know, is a verdict peculiar to Scotland; and the case illustrates our principle better than an English one could.

happened to be arraigned; and if in the former case they were not respected, neither could they be in this. "The escape of one delinquent can never produce so much harm to the community as may arise from the infraction of a rule, upon which the purity of public justice, and the existence of civil liberty, essentially depend." Thus writes Paley; but R. T. G., cleverly shifting the weight of our argument from the above principle to the maxim incidentally quoted by us, that "it is better that ten guilty men should escape than an innocent man suffer," seeks to bring our case to the ground by an arrow from the quiver of "pigeon Paley." A moment's consideration will explain the maxim. If ten guilty men escape, nine must have done so from want of evidence, since if the first owed his safety to weakness of law, we are neither Medes nor Persians, and could alter that law; if a guilty man suffer, it cannot be from lack of proof, but because the penalty he undergoes is not sufficiently hedged round with safeguards. A legal system may be a terror to evil-doers, but cannot be called a protection to those who do well, if indiscriminate like this characterize it. One-half of its object, and that the more important, not being served, confidence could be no longer reposed in such a system of uncertainty; and on this confidence the foundations of society rest. Two risks would be run; of being injured by the violators of the law, and then by the law itself.

Towards the close of his article, "R. T. G." accuses us of endeavouring "to show that counsellors are philanthropic gentlemen," &c. We fancy our friend is caught napping here, as we are not aware of attempting anything of the sort; but, nevertheless, we see no necessity for "R. T. G." casting so much aspersion on the legal profession as he does; it contains, doubtless, good and bad, as does every calling, yet from its ranks may be collected a brilliant galaxy of names illustrious for learning, integrity, love of freedom, and untiring zeal in the people's cause, that can be matched with that of any other learned body.

"S. E. L.," whose paper must now be noticed, thinks we wrote wide of the mark; we only hope this number will convince him of our desire to stick to the point. He finds a difficulty in connecting with the text the sentences commencing "Not a week elapses but some one is accused upon suspicions almost groundless. Now it is a bank official," &c. Although this difficulty can scarcely have been experienced by other readers, still for "S. E. L.'s" special edification we will at least endeavour to explain what is meant, and show the connection. Our justification of the advocate, resting on the service he renders society by preventing any improper interpretation of law in a case where a guilty man was concerned, lest it might act prejudicially to the innocent afterwards, it appeared to us advisable to remind the reader that such cases occur frequently; hence the sentence in question, and the illustrations following, which could be easily recognized. Again, the writer cavils about our remarks regarding the result that would follow if an advocate

retired from a case on learning his client's guilt; he forgets that we entirely differ regarding the quality of the first advocate's act, supposing he had not abandoned the case. We hold it to be right; he maintains it to be wrong. The case of a thief who robs a man, that another, who intends both robbery and murder, may have no inducement for committing those crimes, is no parallel; because the act of the first thief both "S. E. L." and ourselves are agreed upon as being wrong. So we recommend our friend to wipe his spectacles, and take another look at the "photograph."

Here our limits compel us reluctantly to draw the line. More might have been added, but enough has been already written to exhibit our position clearly: "that the affirmative articles are characterized neither by "ridiculous absurdity" nor "blasphemous impiety"—epithets courteously bestowed upon our theme by a magnanimous opponent—we certainly believe; that they may serve a good end by inducing many to consider the question carefully, we sincerely trust; and now with our readers we leave the case, hopeful of obtaining at their hands a verdict favourable to our cause.

NONA.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

WE have been not a little amused by the erratic warfare of our opponents—their valour is somewhat akin to that of the warrior who shut his eyes while firing his gun, thinking that the surest way to hit his foe, because his attention was not then diverted by surrounding objects—a shadowy subterfuge, behind which he sought to hide his own cowardice.

"Nona" writes with amazing zeal, to prove that the intricacies of law and the interest of the community necessitate an order or profession devoted to the study of the law, and to the accusation and defence of persons charged with the commission of crime. More than three pages of his argument are engaged upon this topic, while scarcely one page has any shadow of reference to the subject of this debate. We admit the propriety of lawyers and counsel being allowed to exist in a highly civilized state of society like the present; the question implies this, as a condition ceded; what necessity, then, to prove it? E. D. R. occupies a considerable portion of his brief argument in the inquiry, How and when is the counsel made cognizant of the criminal's guilt? This one reply is no part of the question. We have not to prove how nor when this knowledge of guilt is communicated to counsel. The question assumes, as a condition of this debate, that counsel has been made professionally cognizant of the criminal's guilt as a part of his instructions to defend. Thus we perceive we have not to prove that counsel is necessary, nor to demonstrate how nor when the knowledge of guilt is communicated to counsel; neither have we to deal with the character of the crime, nor with the duration of the punishment. We have simply to consider whether counsel is justified in defending a criminal from all punishment who has confessed his guilt to him in confidence.

It is apparent, from these remarks, that nearly the whole of the papers written by our opponents are beside the question; and that we have placed the right construction upon the terms of the question will be evident, when it is considered that the words "counsel," "justified," "defending," "punishment," "criminal," "guilt," "professionally," and "cognizant," have no limitation imposed upon them by which less than *all* is signified of each term—each is universal in its application to its own particular category.

In our previous article we have shown that God is truth, and requires man to be truthful; He has impressed His anger against lying in His sentence upon the liar, "Lying lips are an abomination to the Lord;" that truth is an exact representation to others, by word or deed, of our communications to them; that truth is not altered by the character of the individual, although the individual is morally right or wrong in proportion as he is truthful or not; that in all times and all places truth has received the approbation, and falsehood the condemnation, of mankind; that the utility of truthfulness is apparent from the varied relations of life, which are supported by the confidence reposed in the truth of our fellow-men: it was thus shown that truth is demanded from all men, by the example and the nature of God, by His law, by the common consent of all men in all times and all places, by its moral propriety, by its utility in sustaining the multifarious relationships of society; and that nothing in the person, character, or office of the advocate relieves him of the necessity to be and do in all things truthfully. Besides, we have shown that it is the duty of all men, in any state, to bring the criminal to justice; and this universal duty is of paramount importance, and overrides that private duty owing to his client by the counsel. It is thus the duty of counsel to defend the guilty criminal from undue punishment, and to assist in enforcing due punishment. This is required by his duty to society; that by his duty to his client. "Nona" observes (page 183), that when counsel is "requested to conduct a case, he can hardly form such an opinion of the individual's innocence or guilt as would justify him in accepting or declining the duty." To this we reply, that the question under debate fully admits that counsel has such a knowledge of the innocence or guilt of the prisoner charged, as shall be sufficient to justify him in accepting or declining the position of advocate for the prisoner. The case supposed by our question is bad; the guilt of the criminal is clearly and distinctly known to the counsel; and our debate is upon the moral propriety or impropriety of defending a known criminal from punishment—that just punishment which the municipal and moral law equally inflicts. Appearances of guilt or innocence have nothing to do with the matter; it is fact that our question deals with. Is it morally and socially right for a professional advocate to defend a person from punishment of any kind or degree who, it is well known to him, has broken the laws of God and man? We think the hardihood of "Nona" is indeed great, if he advocate the affirmative of such a thesis as he

has undertaken. "Judicial errors" and "human fallibility" have nothing to do with the point at issue. It is the duty of all men, whether professional counsel or others, to uphold the majesty of law by advocating just punishment to every guilty criminal. Society demands it, the law theoretically enforces it, and God requires it. "Nona" again observes, that "the defence of the criminal does not imply his belief in that client's innocence;" but our question imposes upon us this condition, that the counsel knows the criminal's guilt, and defends him from any punishment as an innocent man: which necessitates that counsel should "willingly put forward a false statement," and perseveringly use deceit to effect the object he has in view. On the supposition that the advocate does "cut the connection," if the criminal goes to other counsel, and does conceal his guilt, that can be no valid reason in support of, or in opposition to, either view of the question now under debate. A careful examination of the pretentious paper of "Nona" will fully convince every reader that he has simply been writing about another and different matter altogether, and has never approached one single point of the matter at issue.

H. K. is entirely wrong in assuming that "this question is unfairly put." If it is not the subject upon which he wishes to write, so far well; he is perfectly at liberty to enjoy his opinion; but we presume the conductors of this Serial have the perfect right to put a question in any form pleasing to themselves, and acceptable to their readers, without being exposed to a charge of unfairness; but it is a *ruse* often adopted by those who feel the weakness of their position, to complain of the terms upon which they are admitted to the combat. If H. K. really believes the question unfairly put, why does he write upon the question at all? We have no choice in the form of the question ourselves, but simply accept it as it stands, and we support the negative. We were at liberty to do so or not; and we presume that H. K. was not *compelled* to write against his will. The supposition of a difference between legal punishment and moral guilt is simply beside the question. Our present duty is with the fact, and includes the knowledge of absolute guilt, with the certainty of its appropriate punishment marked out by the law, and active effort to enable the criminal to escape the just punishment due to his crime. And if H. K. affirms this, we fear he is hopelessly lost to all sense of justice and moral propriety.

That a criminal has the right to be defended from undue punishment by the employment of counsel, and that it is the duty of counsel to do and say all in his power to attain this end, is apparent on the merest glance at the question; but to suppose that it is the duty of counsel to defend a criminal from all punishment, that he may go forth into society as an innocent man, is not only preposterously absurd, but is subversive of all law, morals, and justice, and, from every point of view, must be considered subversive of civil society. Yet such is the unreasonable argument of our opponent.

As to the parade of the forms of criminal procedure, caricatured by H. K.'s description; it is simply an absurdity, and no argument. The case of Baron Martin and the young man, so pathetically dragged in by H. K. (p. 247), goes to show that the learned judge wished the prisoner to be tried, because he wished it to be proved what was the legal estimate of his guilt; he wished the responsibility of condemnation to rest with the jury, not with himself. If a prisoner pleads guilty to an indictment, it is the judge who takes upon himself the duty of determining the amount of guilt, and the amount of punishment also; but when not guilty is pleaded, it is the jury who estimate the guilt, and the judge only assigns the legal punishment for the crime designated by the verdict of the jury. All this is, however, beside the question; H. K. is completely *hors du combat*.

It is for the counsel to produce all the favourable and extenuating circumstances justly and prominently before the court, that undue punishment may not be inflicted; but it is a legal and moral wrong for counsel to aid the criminal to escape from punishment, or, in other words, from justice. In the case adduced of M. Bernard, we have yet to learn that counsel attempted to prove him innocent of a crime, after he had confessed to him the commission of that crime. The fact is, M. Bernard committed no crime against the laws of England, and, therefore, was not worthy of punishment. Having, therefore, committed no crime in the eyes of the law, he had none to confess, and counsel had no criminal to defend, but an innocent man—i. e., legally innocent. But this is a case not applicable to the subject of debate, unless it may be remotely considered as supporting our own view of the matter. It is folly to wander farther in search of argument in the paper of our friend H. K., for he appears to have become mystified with his subject; and he has so completely mystified the subject while under his hands, that we should become tedious to the reader, if we followed all his erratic vagaries.

Again we cross the lance with friend R. D. R.; the fates seem to favour our antagonism. We fully coincide with him in his statement, that he is neither barrister nor lawyer. It is, perhaps, a mercy to those poor wretches who fall into the hands of those learned professions, that friend R. D. R. is not possessed of a diploma, "to eat the oyster, and give the shells to his clients," for certainly they thereby escaped a fearful catastrophe; i. e., judging, at least, from his present effort.

The practical question, "How is counsel to know that a man is guilty?" as asked by R. D. R., we beg to inform him, is duly answered in the question at the head of this debate, in the words, "a criminal of whose guilt he has been *professionally made cognizant*." According to the old law maxim, a man is rightly to be considered innocent until he is proved guilty; but if he confesses his crime, there is no longer any doubt to his counsel. While H. K. laments that the question is unfairly put, R. D. R. boasts of

its purity ; for he exclaims, it is a pure hypothesis ; then he proceeds to hypothecate, to an alarming extent, upon subjects as far removed from the question as the antipodes. Sure Pelion was never heaped upon Ossa in such fearful confusion before. What, we would ask, has this question to do with Catholic priests, slanderous accusations, newspaper reports, or any nonsense of that character? Is it by such means that counsel receive their instructions to defend their clients? If not, what have they to do with this debate? Such folly as these hypothecations insult the common sense of the reader, and must be worthy only universal contempt.

We indignantly repudiate the charge made by R. D. B. against the advocates of the negative in this debate. We do not imagine, neither is there any necessity for us "to imagine, that counsel generally are an unworthy class of persons." We believe the profession to be of the noblest among the sons of men ; we are proud to recognize them as, in the great majority of instances, the brightest ornaments of society, the most honourable, upright, and just men in the nation ; and we resent the foul stigma R. D. B. would, in a side wind, attempt to affix upon the character of so honourable a profession. As to one witness or twenty, that is not the question, nor has it any reference to the question. The simple matter we are called to give our opinion upon is this :—Is counsel to speak and act truly, or as an accomplice after the fact : to lie, in word and deed, purposely to effect the criminal's escape from justice? To the latter we give a negative, to the former an affirmative reply, and feel assured the reader will approve and endorse our opinion, as morally and legally just and true.

L'OUVRIER.

The Essayist.

JAMES MILL: HISTORIAN, PSYCHOLOGIST, AND
ECONOMIST.

WE do not think we shall greatly err if we judge that, among the intelligent readers of the *British Controversialist*, there may be some who feel interested in the life and writings of the historian of India, the friend of Bentham, the founder of the *Westminster Review*, and the father (we announce it, despite of its seeming anticlimax) of John Stuart Mill, the inheritor of the name, but the winner of a wider fame than that of his philosophical progenitor and predecessor.

To bespeak a thinking reader's interest, these connotatives will suffice ; and further preface is, therefore, unnecessary.

James Mill was born 6th April, 1773, in the parish of Logie and Pert, in the county of Forfar, N.B. The district is thinly peopled,

and agricultural, and the North Esk flows along the fields, while the laws (or hills) of Logie tower over it, and impart a degree of picturesqueness to the scenery. His father was a farmer on the estate of Tettercairn; and here, in the humble seclusion of a small plot of arable ground, worked principally by the members of the family, James Mill was reared upon "a little oatmeal." After a short attendance at the parish school, where his parts early manifested themselves, he was transferred, for the attainment of a higher course of instruction, to the grammar school of Montrose. Here he showed such aptitude, that it was determined that he should proceed to the University of Edinburgh, to study for the ministry of the national church.

Without creating any great stir, or figuring with much distinction under collegiate instruction, Mill seems to have made fair progress, judging, not from his works only, but from the fact that he was duly licensed, after examination in the several branches of the University curriculum, as a preacher in the Church of Scotland, and had every prospect of acquiring the topmost height of an intellectual Scotchman's ambition in those days—that of a country pastor, seated in a quiet manse, surrounded by a loving and reverential people, possessed of a little learned leisure and much practical power, exerting a highly beneficial influence on his flock, and perhaps, in due time, reigning as president-king of the visible church of the nation, under the title and with the power of a moderator. A clergyman then, in Scotland, was *ex officio* a gentleman, entitled to hold his own in any arena, with noble, gentleman, laird, or lawyer. The theology and ethics of the church, however, were unsatisfactory to his mind, much more highly imbued with "the dim splendour of Plato" than with the cold, logical brilliancy of Calvin's "Institutes," and the keen practicality of Knox's "Book of Discipline." Under the tutelage of Professor John Bruce—a disciple and friend of Adam Smith's—he did, indeed, study the philosophy of Bacon and Locke, in their application to Taste, Science, History, and Ethics, and he retained the influences of the teachings of that able man and dexterous sinecurist; but the genial enthusiasm of Andrew Dalzell, Professor of Greek, a most recondite scholar in the history, philosophy, poetry, eloquence, antiquities, literature, and language of which he was the teacher, seems to have completely won upon the mind of James Mill, and to have made him in sympathies a Platonist, while in intellectual tenets a pupil of Bruce, and so a Baconian. The influence of these and other teachers in the University, among others of Adam Ferguson, and his then assistant, the well-known Dugald Stewart, James Balfour of Pilrig, &c., as well as that of the literary society of Edinburgh towards the close of the last century, continued to have a great effect upon him during a great part of his life. There can be little doubt that the prevailing scepticism of that circle had touched and tinged his mind, and that led him, on reflection, to prefer the honourable resignation of all his world-prospects of position and power, to a latitudinarian confor-

mity, and a subvented subscription to articles of faith he did not honestly entertain. His determination, however moved, approved itself right in the end, and justified itself by its issues. His aptitudes were of a kind little fitted for the peculiar routine of ministerial duties, as they were performed in Scotland; and it was well that he chose a field of action which, though more precarious and less respected, opened up other paths to fame, competence, and power.

While pursuing his own studies, as was (and is) much the custom in Scotland, he superintended the intellectual culture of the family of, Sir John Stuart, his father's landlord, and his own patron. In the capacity of tutor he accompanied that gentleman to London; and when there found himself inclined to adopt the life of a literary man in the great metropolis. Having set up his home in London, in 1800, he began to look about him for a task, such as might afford a fair hope of acquiring a position in his country's literature. The recent acquittal, in 1795, of Warren Hastings, from the impeachment and trial to which he had been subjected, had created a curiosity in the public mind to know something of that vast territory which the hardihood and skill of Clive had subjected to British influences, and the audacious unscrupulosity of Hastings had preserved and extended. This field Mill determined to occupy; and, with the most stubborn perseverance, commenced the serious studies which were requisite to its adequate performance.

Meanwhile, he required to live. He became, at first, a contributor to the *Monthly Review*, established in 1749, and the *British Critic* (1793). Shortly after the establishment of the *Edinburgh Review*, 1802, the *Eclectic*, 1806, he wrote articles of considerable value and importance. In a periodical called the "Philanthropist," the organ of the Quakers, his papers frequently appeared. By these and other hack-work labours, he is said to have been able to make about an average income of £300 a year; and about 1805, he thought himself competent to sustain the respectable position of an English householder by entering into "the holy state of matrimony."

Notwithstanding the difficulties surrounding a position such as that in which he found himself, Mills, while he was thus earning the precarious subsistence won from hack-labour for the press, went on, with the indomitable perseverance of a hero, to compose his History of British India. He had never been in India; knew nothing of the Eastern languages; had no personal friendship with eminent Anglo-Indian Nabobs. The vague, marvel-teeming notions of India, prevalent in his day, as a land almost magically endowed with the power of producing wealth; as a land sown with gold, studded with jewels, strewn with crores and lacs of rupees; whose monarchs were irresponsible and mighty as a Xerxes, and wealthy as a Giamschid, and whose natives were prodigal alike of salaams and the precious metals; where loot was plentiful for the soldier, and cent. per cent. at least was certain to the trader, and salaries were

the mere *honoraria*, not the incomes of the administrative agents, required to be forgotten or unlearned. The singular and varied geography of the district had to be mastered; the distinct and widely differing systems of native government and British management; the products of the soil, and of the rocks and rivers; the statistical facts of the different provinces and places; the discipline of the native and other country soldiery; the intrigues of politicians; the campaigns of warriors; the revolts of subjects; the amount and kind of taxation,—and a thousand other difficult and mind-distracting items of knowledge,—had to be got together, worked out of chaotic indistinctness to orderly clearness, and set into perfect unity and collateral intelligibility. The materials for this Herculean task were far-scattered and hard to get, especially if, as they required to be, authentic and trustworthy. A great collection of pamphlets, of parliamentary documents and speeches, of reports of trials and discussions, of notes acquired from oral examinations and from books; of old war despatches and commercial minutes, of abstracts of business in the India House; of resolutions of the directorate, and of counter-resolutions by the proprietary; of newspaper paragraphs, and of magazine papers; of excerpts from biographies, books of travel, gazetteers, and dictionaries;—these were the mass of elements, bulky, verbose, contradictory, detached, of differing value, both as to truthfulness and interest, which it was necessary for the first historian to fuse together into a new compound; and this he did, with consummate ability and success.

These are the points which Mr. Mill set before himself for a task:—

I. To describe the circumstances in which the intercourse of Britain and India commenced, and to detail the particulars of its early progress till the time at which it became fixed, firm, and durable.

II. To exhibit a view, as accurately as possible, of the people with whom the British then began to hold transactions; their character, history, manners, religion, arts, literature, and laws, as well as the physical circumstances of their soil, climate, and productions.

III. To narrate, till the time of writing, the history of the transactions of Britain with India.

Nearly sixteen years were occupied in the preliminary labours needed to produce this history, and in the composition of its various and minute details. Begun about 1800, it was published towards the close of 1817, and it brings down the narrative till 1805. In literary merit, it is inferior to the great classics of Gibbon and Hume. In painstaking research, it far excels the latter; and in acute, critical sagacity, worthily rivals the former, while it surpasses it in lucid expressions, and passionless impartiality. His delineation of Clive, though objected to by Macaulay, and some others of less authority, is keen, incisive, and able. His descriptive sketch of Hastings is severe, bold, discriminating, and honest;

and there is a dash, rapidity, and stir about the recital of the administration of Wellesley, which animates and fascinates the reader. His account of the aboriginal inhabitants, the ancient civilisation, the condition and characters of the people, and the general lucidity of arrangement and style, are even yet remarkable; while the profound thought, the liberal views, the far-seeing policy, and the pure historic spirit of the writer, are admirable in every sense. The "*History of British India*" is a clear, compact, well-digested, and philosophical book,—a great work, nobly planned and worthily executed. It was issued first in three volumes quarto, but was almost immediately republished in five volumes octavo. At first of course it met with rancorous criticism, but at length it triumphed over the contented ignorance and apathy of Englishmen, and brought the interests of India within the circuit of the sympathies of his countrymen, and led, in no small measure, to the improvement and consolidation of the British Empire in India.

One of the most honourable and praiseworthy acts of the East India Court of Directors was the appointment, in 1819, of James Mill to the office of Examiner in the India House. Though he had advanced, boldly and honestly, with a straightforward candour, and an unflinching integrity, many criticisms hostile to the doings, or rather the misdoings, of this vast and overshadowing commercial company, and had not shrunk from exposing the craft, duplicity, and greediness with which many of their schemes were carried out, they acknowledged his ability, and recognised his worth by offering him (unsolicitedly) this most excellent and responsible situation,—a position nearly equivalent to the chief secretaryship of the Indian government.

No sooner had the onerous labours of his *History* been completed, than we find him at new and almost equally important work. About this time (1818—1824), Constable, the famous Edinburgh publisher, was re-issuing the *Encyclopædia*, with a supplement. Its editor was Professor Mackey Napier, and among the contributors were Anzo, Biot, Jameson, Jeffrey, Leslie, Mackintosh, Malthus, Mill, Playfair, Ricardo, Scott, Steward, Thomson, Young, Wallace, &c.,—all men, not of British, but of European reputation. To it Mill contributed the articles, Colonies, Education, Government, Jurisprudence, Law of Nations, Liberty of the Press, Prison Discipline, &c.,—subjects of immense importance, and worthy of the ablest pen. It is saying little to say they were, in every line, full of the most palpable indications of a lofty and pure intellect, mighty of grasp, daring in aim, and bold in utterance. They were re-published separately, collectively, and as tracts, and they have had no small influence in changing the current of political action and social speculation upon these subjects. They are ripe in analytic skill and in ratiocinative power; their tone is liberal, kindly, and cultivated:—they are works of mark even to this day.

The heavy duties and the stern responsibilities of his official

position, and the grand intensities of thought requisite to compose those splendid treatises, did not overtask his energies; on the contrary, in 1821, he issued what he calls a "school book," entitled, "The Elements of Political Economy," whose object he states to be "to detach the essential principles of the science from all extraneous topics, to state the propositions clearly, and in their logical order, and to subjoin its demonstration to each." This is a plain, easily understood, carefully reasoned, and instructive work; not broad in its foundations, but compact, firm, and full of *thinking*.

In 1823, James Mill had the satisfaction of seeing his son, the now world-known John Stuart Mill—born 1806, and the eldest son of a family of nine, who had been carefully educated under his own supervising care—enter the service of the East India Company. Mr. Mill was one of the early converts to the principles of utility expounded by Jeremy Bentham. In 1824, the disciples of this school of moral philosophers started the *Westminster Review*, as an organ for the diffusion of their tenets. Bentham, it is said, furnished the capital, and Mr. Mill is reported to have been the virtual editor. Thereafter, he was a frequenter at the intellectual *réunions* of Queen-square-place, Westminster, the residence of Bentham. Abbot, Browning, Brougham, Burton, Dumont, Mr. Francis, Place, Dr. Southwood Smith, Colonel Thompson, Ricardo, Roebuck, Romilly, and others of the disciples and friends of Bentham were brought *en rapport* with the singularly philosophical mind which the utilitarian morals had fascinated, and the character of Bentham had captivated. For their contributions to the *Westminster* and the *London and Westminster Review*, Mill and his son, we have been told, could never be prevailed upon to accept any pecuniary remuneration. Many other contributors followed their example. In 1831 appeared the famous and *telling* article on the "Ballot," from the pen of James Mill. It is said to have produced a greater effect upon the public mind than any article in any periodical before or since. It was quoted in almost every newspaper, was separately reprinted, made converts by thousands, and added hundreds of new subscribers, for the time, to the *Westminster Review*.

It was in 1829, however, that the greatest and most original effort of James Mill's intellect was made available to the public. This work was entitled "An Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind." It contains the most perfect, exhaustive, and complete exposition of the sensational metaphysics which has yet been produced. Order, brevity, and clearness distinguish and pervade the composition. The theorizing is bold, able, uncompromising. Starting from the principles of Locke, to go no further back—but in the special and modified form in which they were promulgated in the much more talked of than read "Observations on Man, his Frame, his Duty, and his Expectations," by David Hartley, M.D., the preface to the first edition of which is dated December, 1748—Mill regarded every feeling and idea of the mind belonging to or originated in the mind as being the products of sensations and asso-

ciations. The simple states of the mind are sensations—on the general matter of which the ordinary opinions are adhered to, except in a series of acute remarks upon the feeling of muscularity and the perceptions arising from the operations of the alimentary canal. Ideas he considers as copies, traces, impressions, and remembrances of sensations whose immediate power and presence have died away, and which depend upon memory for their resurrection. These form the whole material of thought, emotion, and intelligence. These materials, so soon as they have been deposited in or impressed upon the mind, come under the influence of the supreme law of human thinking—association. As they enter the mind synchronously or successively, so also do they reappear, and so give rise in the former case to complex ideas, or, in the latter case, to trains of thinking. The operation of *naming* is next expounded in a lengthy and luminous disquisition (chap. iv.) on the origin and nature of the parts of speech; and the chief processes of formal logic are explained in a section on predication. From these premised observations, Mill concludes that the whole elementary processes of thought may be reduced to these four, viz.:—Sensation, Ideation, Association, and Naming. Out of these elements he proceeds to elaborate a scheme of the more complex phenomena of the mind—Consciousness, Conception, Imagination, Classification, Abstraction, Memory, Belief, Ratiocination. After this the author tests the accuracy of his system, and rests the proof of it on an inductive investigation into the contents in signification of metaphysical terms, and explaining them in accordance with his theory, decides that his analysis is true, valid, and correct. This is not even an analysis of the Analysis; it is merely a roughly sketched outline of the items of the work. It would be unfair, without a much more extended and adequate notice, to enter into any criticism upon its teachings or its method. The power of the analyst's intellect is evident on every page. To be truly estimated, it should be read and thought over. Our own impression is, that it errs by eliminating from the mind all constructing energy and self-assertiveness—in narrowing the field of observation, and in leaving unnoticed the vitality of the intellect itself. It seems to be an anatomical analysis of a dead, not a living mind.

It ought to have been mentioned, that many of the best papers on education and jurisprudence in the earlier issues of the *Edinburgh Review* proceeded from the pen of James Mill. Some of his collaborateurs in that work, however, did not spare him in their criticisms; and he appears, eventually, to have declined to contribute farther: perhaps this fact had some latent effect in bringing the *Westminster Review* into being. Among the young adherents of the Liberal party, whose standard this journal upbore in literature, Mill was looked up to with scarcely less respect than Bentham himself. Of course, he excited the ire of the genuine Whigs by his Radicalism, which was of a very pronounced character. In his "Dissertation on Ethical Philosophy," Mackintosh had spoken with

some superficialities, and in a considerably cavalier manner, of one of the philosophical idols of Mill, the great but decried Hobbes; he had ventured to criticise, with a good deal of asperity, and with some sophistical arguments, the Benthamic "Morals," and he had alluded to Mill's "Analysis" in a depreciating way in his text, reserving a word of laudation only for his notes; but he had added to all these offences the greater enormity of seeming to know what he really had not studied—at least, in this light it appeared to Mill. In a scathing and remorseless critique, entitled, "A Fragment on Mackintosh," James Mill reviewed this contribution to philosophical literature, and thereby seriously damaged the reputation of one of the great leaders of the Whigs, and one of the chief opponents of the school of metaphysics in which he believed. In it he speaks with great harshness and severity, though not passionately, of the deceptive appearance of extensive reading, varied learning, and scrupulous quotation, which he thought he noticed in Sir James Mackintosh's famous production.

We have heard of only one other work for which we are indebted to the genius of Mill; one of the works in which the disciple of Bentham has even been supposed by some to have outstripped his master in philosophical insight, definiteness of thought, and the union of abstract speculation with practical sagacity, "Observations on the Conditions of a Perfect Penal Code," appended to a report on that subject, presented to the Legislative Assembly of the State of Louisiana.

In 1836, his son, John Stuart Mill, succeeded him as conductor of the *Westminster Review*; he afterwards also succeeded to the Examinership in the India House, which his father had held so long. The latter part of James Mill's life was spent in Kensington, where, on the 23rd June, 1836, he died, in the sixty-fourth year of his age. His wife survived him; and at his death nine of his children were alive—five of these had, however, attained their majority.

A life of uncompromising integrity, honest effort, acute reflection, and beneficial exertion, ended in calmness; and the name of James Mill now worthily occupies a place of pre-eminence among Britain's self-made men.

Q. S.

The Reviewer.

The Men of the Scottish Reformation. By Rev. J. S. SAMPSON.
Edinburgh: Macphail. London: Simpkin & Co.

THE first General Assembly of the Church of the Scottish Reformation was holden at Edinburgh on the 20th December, 1560, three centuries ago. The tri-centenary of that great, that

eventful day, is to be commemorated and reverentially kept by the Protestant evangelical churches of Scotland; and not a few of the Nonconformists of England will, it is understood, make use of that event in history as matter for discourse and practical suggestion on that same day. There is an aptness, therefore, in the publication of a work whose aim is "to elucidate the various questions involved in the history of the Scottish Reformation, which make it worthy both of note and comment." Yet it is not a mere get-money publication, it is an honest book, and an earnest one withal, erring, indeed, if anything, on the over-earnest side. The narrative is briefly and interestingly told; the sweep of events is graphically chronicled; the general form and tendency of the movement is plainly and attractively described. We are only sorry that so much of the critical element should have prevailed in the book, and that works are sometimes referred to in no measured terms of harshness, which some who may peruse this book may not have read. Yet there is a sort of *controversial* zest given by this means to the work, which keeps alive attention, and makes one feel a sense of briskness in the author's style. For our own part, we would have liked a more gallant mode of address had been used towards Miss Strickland in his various raids against her views. There is pith, power, vividness, and telling earnestness in the book; which, though disfigured with some unsmoothness of phrase, is well worthy of perusal now when the commemoration days of the Scottish Reformation are so near at hand. We have little doubt the author will be heard of again in the ecclesiastico-historic fields of fight. *Au revoir!*

History of the British Empire. By W. F. COLLIER, B.A., Sion College, Dublin. London: Nelson & Sons.

THIS is a capital, clear, brief abridgment of the chief facts in Britain's glorious story. The outline is carefully sketched. The details are often touched with a spirit of life; the manners of the people at different times are fairly and fully described, and the literature of the periods is concisely noted. A great many tabular forms are given; chronological and synchronistic abstracts, &c., add much to its value. Though professedly written for schools, it contains quite as much history as the civil service, the middle-class degree, or the school of arts' examinations require the student to know. Its orderly correctness ought to be a great help to the mastering of its contents easily, rapidly, and surely.

A History of Scotland. By Rev. JAMES MACKENZIE. London: Nelson & Sons.

THIS is a lively, attractive, readable book, likely to be the pride of boys. It is biographico-historic. It is a story of the people rather than the kings of Scotland, and has many finely toned chapters. It is, perhaps, a little too literary in its allusions for school children, but would delight youths, and even instruct men

who have not had the advantage of historic culture during their lesson days. If it had had a few of such tabular epitomes of chronology, &c., as the preceding volume has, it would have been considerably more useful.

On the Fundamental Causes of Diversity of Style. By Rev. D. RUNNIMAN, D.D. Edinburgh: A. & C. Black.

THESE 36 octavo pages, at the cost of one shilling, give a few critical observations on style and language, composed when the author was a student early in the century. They are composed after the manner of MacGill, Blair, Payne, &c., sententious, philosophical, but what would now be called dull. They are useful, plain, and clear, but the repose of twenty-five years they have already enjoyed ought scarcely to have been disturbed now.

The Early Closing Movement;—What can I do for it? By the Editor of *Chambers' Exeter Journal*. Exeter: W. Chambers.

THIS is an energetic, hearty, healthy pamphlet. Its text is, "We affirm that it is a sin against Nature, Providence, and the Gospel, to overwork ourselves, or to employ others in excessive toil." The writer expresses regret that amid his numerous avocations he has had "but little time to correct any errors in composition." For this we are sorry. It would have been much more efficacious had the *manner* equalled the *matter* of the essay. As a general tract, it ought to have been freed from its localizing allusions. It is clever, suggestive, and forcible, as the following sentences will show:—"Time alone is real capital. . . . This [ten instead of twelve hours' work] will give us for three hundred members [persons] six hundred hours a day. Taking six working days in the week, we find in each week 3,600 hours; multiplying this by 52, for the number of weeks in the year, gives us an annual loss of 187,200 hours. Let us divide these hours by ten,—and we have taken the time as ten hours daily, because it is those useful working hours that are wasted, we may say wantonly wasted,—and we now see that collectively the wasted hours amount to more than one man's average life, viz., 59 years 253 days in every year. It is for you, reader, to decide on the merits of the question. Do your shopping early, and you make one step towards redeeming the past, and securing better for the future." It ought to be a useful tract, and should be extensively read.

The History of France. Vols. I. and II. By EYRE EVANS CROWE. London: Longmans & Co.

IN the 131 volumes of Lardner's "Cabinet Cyclopædia," no three were more valuable for clear condensation, and rapid, yet careful narrative, than those which supplied the history of France, from the earliest period to the abdication of Napoleon. That work has been re-issued from time to time, and held its place well as a manual for ordinary readers, and the general run of students. Our interest

in and about France has, since the first publication of that work, been much increased, and Mr. Eyre Evans Crowe has consented to re-write for us the annals of France, after a full, fair, and lengthened examination of authorities. The work is distinguished by careful and conscientious research, scrupulous exactness, candid and impartial analysis, rather than by brilliancy or pictorialism of style, by epigrammatic characterization, or sprightly detail. It is a thoughtful, painstaking, honest work, rather than a flashy and popular (in the worst sense—it is in the *better*) book. The first volume is occupied, of course, by the record of ancient and mediæval France, and is more an elaborate abstract, than, properly speaking, a history. But it contains a fund of well-told facts, acute thoughts, ingenious interpretations or elucidations, and a laboriously compiled collection of personal incident and ethnological detail. It closes with the scholastic era, and the second volume begins with the accession of Charles VI. in 1380, and goes on 180 years—to the death of Henry II. in 1559. For the next three centuries he reserves three volumes, and if they increase in graphic intensity as they do in interest, then no romance will equal in charm the work of this author. Those who desire to gain an acquaintance with the facts of early French history, and to trace the growing influence of France upon the European mind, can scarcely find a safer and surer guide than Mr. E. E. Crowe. We cannot even except Smyth and Stevens.

Italy in Transition. By W. ARTHUR, A.M. Third Edition.
London: Hamilton, Adams, and Co. 1860.

THE words "third edition," on the title-page of this book, indicate no less the fascination of the subject, than the ability with which the author has treated it. History constantly repeats itself: hence, while lovers of liberty all the world over rejoice at the recent march of events in Italy, Englishmen view, with intensified interest, the spectacle of a nation passing through substantially the same process of destruction and reconstruction as did this England in centuries gone by.

Since the date of Mr. Arthur's book, events have progressed with a rapidity almost beyond belief. The conquests of Sicily and Naples, then deemed scarcely possible, have since become realized facts. The information, however, it contains is still of great importance and interest as regards the conduct of the Italians in this, the great crisis of their history; and also as regards certain religious ecclesiastical problems, which only await solution till political matters have ceased to be so engrossing.

Mr. Arthur's qualifications as a traveller-author are many. Shrewd and discreet we should judge him always to be, having that temper of mind which preserves him from the undue familiarity which repels rather than invites confidence, and from that extreme reserve which prevents the acquisition of the very information most valuable and desired. Hence the opinions, feelings, and ideas embodied in his conversations with Italians of all ranks and parties

are of a very instructive and suggestive character. At the same time, greater care might have been exercised in avoiding repeating several times over conversations almost identical in matter and manner. One fault we have especially to complain of; we mean the constant reference to the extent and variety of his travels in all quarters of the globe. These references are so frequent, as to become quite offensive. Thus, his descent of Mont Cenis reminds him of his descent from the Neilgherries into the plains of Mysore; Turin reminds him of Carlsruhe and Philadelphia; the blessing of the national colours at Milan reminds him of a similar scene at Paris in 1848; a Sunday in Milan reminds him of a Sunday he spent at a swinging feast in India; here he calls upon images of the plain of Esdraelon, "with Bedouins, and pistols, and spears;" an election at Bologna suggests election experiences in the United States; and so on, *ad infinitum*. These reminiscences carry no meaning to the general reader, who is not particularly interested in knowing where Mr. Arthur has been, and we submit, they are in very bad taste. With the exceptions we have stated, the book is exceedingly valuable; its style is kind and lively, and the information it embodies is of an important character. The headings of a few of its chapters will explain its title. "Savoy, pending Annexation." "Turin during the Voting upon Annexation." "Milan during the Rejoicing upon Annexation." "Bologna during the General Election," &c.

Mr. Arthur's information respecting Savoy will surprise many people, who have taken it for granted that the Savoyards would look with no favour upon the treaty, whereby they were handed over, like so many chattels, from the free government of Sardinia to the despotic government of France. This, it seems, is a mistake, the annexation being regarded with favour by the great majority of the inhabitants. The most of them seem to be pretty accurately stated in the following bit of conversation:—"Why should we be hooked across the mountains to those Piedmontese? They are not of our blood; they speak another tongue. And as to trade or intercourse! you consider the sea between France and England a barrier. What is that to Mont Cenis? You are across in an hour or two, to carry goods by shiploads; but to carry a thousand tons over Mont Cenis will take the transport corps of our army."

Mr. Arthur's account of the bearing and temper of the people of Central Italy, during their transition period, corresponds with those received from other sources. Instead of the wild excitement, which would not have been unnatural, order was everywhere preserved; a dignity of pride seems to have distinguished them, as though conscious of the responsibility which was laid upon them to behave as men deserving of freedom, as the eyes of all Europe were watching for opportunity of praise or blame. One thought absorbed all: Italy was at last united. The idea of nationality, so long nurtured in their bosoms, was now to be realized. "For the first time since ancient Rome, they could say, We are a nation."

Much curiosity has been felt by English Protestants as to how far the antagonism of the Italians to the temporal power of the Pope, and to the Romish priesthood generally, had prepared them for the reception of what we deem a purer form of Christianity. Mr. Arthur experienced this curiosity largely, and lost no opportunity of seeking the information which would enable him to come to something like a just conclusion. The result of his endeavours is very well summed up in the following paragraph :—

“ One of the first things I heard in England on landing was a statement from a gentleman, who had just returned from Florence, to a lady in the railway carriage, that all Northern Italy was ripe for Protestantism. This is a rash saying. Northern Italy is nothing of the kind. The people are weary of the priests, alienated from the church, resolved to be free, and panting after the union and glory of their country. Many of them are convinced that in religion they have been imposed upon, and that the church edifice they see around them is not the solid building on the rock reared by Christ and His apostles, but a ‘ frail and whited clump of stones.’ It can hardly be doubted that large numbers, perhaps a majority, of the people, and probably a considerable portion of the priesthood, would be not only ready but glad to join any national reform which would break off their yoke, and render religion more rational, as they know it; for in the benefits of this they might partake, without exposing themselves individually to persecution. If any great statesman or leading ecclesiastic could initiate such a movement, it is hard to say where it might be carried. Did Cavour and the King avow their independence of Rome, and solemnly regret the pretensions of the Pope to universal dominion, no doubt they would divide the kingdom into two parties; but there can be little question that the army and the intelligent portion of the country would be with them; and future generations of Italians would look upon the movement as do the present generations in countries where it has occurred, namely, as the turning-point of national vigour and life. Public events appear to lead to a position that will force the State to choose between spiritual independence and temporal degradation, and it is by this dilemma that Providence has again and again wrought out the rescue of nations.”

“ *Assent and Consent.*” *What does it Imply and Involve? What is my Position? What is my Duty?* By an IRISH CLERGYMAN. London: Nisbet and Co. 1860. Price 6d.

THIS is a temperate, and yet an emphatic, expression of dissent from several of the obligatory vows taken by English priests before their ordination in the Established Church. The Irish Clergyman sketches the history of the “ assent and consent ” to show, we presume, how almost hopeless it is to expect a repeal of passages which can lay claim to such hoar antiquity. The Irish Clergyman is dissatisfied with the service for the baptism of infants, and does not think it well that the minister should be obliged to say, “ Dearly beloved brethren, seeing now that this child is regenerate,” &c. The author of this startling tractate brings similar objections against kneeling when receiving the bread and wine at the Lord’s Supper; against the absolution prayer in the “ Order for the Visitation of the Sick ;” also against some of the Thirty-nine Articles. There is an earnestness and catholicity of spirit pervading this pamphlet, which, for a controversial work, is much in its favour.

Allar Light: a Tribute to the Memory of the Rev. Alexander Fletcher, D.D. By the Rev. JOHN MACFARLANE, LL.D. London: Nisbet and Co.

THIS unpretending little volume is an affectionate memorial of a man who was highly and justly esteemed as a Christian minister of more than ordinary intelligence, consistency, and usefulness.

Its chief characteristics are, judicious thought, devout feeling, and a style adapted to its subject. The narrative portion is simple and serious, all that good sense and Christian piety would dictate as appropriate to such a theme. Dr. Fletcher was always an acceptable, if not an eloquent, preacher, but his chief forte, especially in later life, was as a preacher to the young; and Dr. Macfarlane beautifully recognizes this fact in the following passage:—
 "His renown is almost world-wide as a preacher to the lambs of the flock; consequently, we only obey the voice of a universal suffrage when we place this crown upon his hoary head, and summon a bereaved childhood to shed its tributary tear over his honoured grave."

We predict a wide circulation to this touching and appropriate *In memoriam*.

In reading books, observe this direction: consider the scope and design of the whole, and judge of the particular passages with reference to that; and if there be any single passage, which thou apprehendest not the meaning of, or which at the first reading seems to have another meaning than is agreeable to the author's design, build nothing upon such a passage, but wait awhile to see if the author will not explain himself; and if he does not, and thou canst not at last discern how that passage can, without some straining of words, be reconciled with others, then conclude however, and take for granted, that the author, if he appears a man of judgment, is consistent with himself, and consequently that in that passage (however the words may sound) he did not mean to thwart and contradict all the rest of his book.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

Those grave sciences, logic and rhetoric, the one for judgment, the other for ornament, do suppose the learner ripe for both; else it is, as if one should learn to weigh, or measure, or to paint the wind. Those arts are the rules and directions how to set forth and dispose the matter: and if the mind be empty thereof, if it have not gathered that which Cicero calleth *syntaxis* and *suppellex*, *stuff* and *variety*; to begin with those arts, it doth work but this effect, that the wisdom of those arts, which is great and universal, will be made almost contemptible, and degenerate into childish sophistry.—*Bacon.*

The Topic.

IS SPIRITUALISM TRUE?

AFFIRMATIVE.

"THE night side of nature" has always been felt to be full of mystery. The potent dreads which fill the soul of even the bravest, when the self-concentrativeness of darkness enables them to become sensible of the pressure of "the invisible world" upon their souls, is a proof written *a priori* in the human frame of the intense reality of spiritual manifestations—of the fact, that Spiritualism is true.—D. H.

We have no intention of pushing the *Home*-argument of the *Cornhill Magazine* upon our readers. What we have to say is much more palpable and plain, viz.,—the believers in Spiritualism have not hesitated to guarantee, by the publication of their names, &c., their statements and their faith. Its opponents have almost entirely shrouded themselves in the strictest, almost Junius-like, anonymity. Which, then, is most likely to be honest and trustworthy,—those who expose themselves to test and railery, or those who merely gibe and rail behind the screen of a few types indicative of nothing, nobody, and nowhere?—QUID.

In the second book of Akenside's "Pleasures of the Imagination," the following query is put:—

"Is thy short span
Capacious of this universal frame?
Thy wisdom all-sufficient? Thou, alas!
Dost thou aspire to judge between the
Lord
Of nature, and His works?"

Unbelievers in Spiritualism, who wish to limit truth to the measure of their own single, unaided comprehensions, ought to ponder on this before they definitely dissent. The spiritual world has always been regarded as nearer man than can be told in human speech.

Inspiration, genius, seership, premonitions, visions, impressions, &c., are all forms of acknowledged spiritual agency. Why should these be its only forms? and man's acquaintance with the spirit not be like his knowledge of all things else, widened by the precession of the suns?—SPOT.

Socrates had his demon; Homer, his muse; Luther, his spiritual aids and enemies; Swedenborg, his angel attendants;—in fact, all great minds had their special forms of communion with the world beyond the grave; and it is still true, as George Herbert sang, two centuries ago:—

"More servants wait on man
Than he'll take notice of. In every path
He treads down that which doth
befriend him,
When sickness makes him pale and
wan.
Oh, mighty love! Man is one world,
and hath
Another to attend him."—Q. E. D.

"The philosophic mind" of the present age is decidedly one of doubt. The apparition, in some form or other, of spiritual agencies to human beings has been for ever a tradition among men; nor is there any feeling so widely or so vividly diffused as that which teaches us to believe that there are "ministering spirits" wandering on the missions of mercy of the One Divinity, over the earth, and among men, and making all things work together for the fulfilment of the sublime purposes with which he has entrusted the ages; and men, in olden times, have not unfrequently entertained angels unawares, until their blessing gave them knowledge of the fact. Homer concurs with Scripture in asserting that in the—

"Similitude of strangers oft
The gods, who can all forms with ease
assume,
Repair to populous cities."

If we have cast away the highest faculty of our soul—faith, which is "the evidence of things not seen," how can we hope to know the wondrous mysteries of nature, undreamt of as they are in the rationalizing faithlessness of modern philosophy? That such thinking abounds, is no proof that Spiritualism is untrue.—T. B. D.

The consciousness of man has two relationships, one to the material and outward world, another to the spiritual world, of which it is the intermediary organ. If man will find or make the sabbath of his soul in the world of objective existence, will close the eyes of his understanding upon all forms of higher being, and, microscope-like, looks only on the littleness that the world exhibits, it is impossible that he can see and know the higher relationships in which he stands to the universe of souls. In some so-called preternatural moment, his heart may be opened to emotions admonitory of nobler things; and in this so-called abnormal state, he feels that there are surrounding beings whose interests are knit with his; yet so soon as the hour of emotive excitement is past, he strives to persuade himself that all was dream and phantasy. It is not so, but through our blindness. The consciousness, when properly active and healthy, has a power of knowing far more widely and acutely than is ordinarily the case. This exquisite seeing is the revealer of the spirit-world. The soul diffuses itself into the sense of spiritual relations, and so becomes sensible of those finer, purer essences, whose lives mingle the forces of their being with those of men, and touch them into the harmonies of a diviner life. This double power of consciousness, by which the ordinary latencies of Spiritualism are made present to the knowing mind, is but rarely developed, now-a-days, among men.

Only one-half of man's mental capacity is brought into play, and the blindness of our own consciousness we make an argument against the possibility of light and being of a spiritual kind. Though a blind man deny colour and form, we do not believe him to be right. Spiritualism is only the use of the whole consciousness of man, and its revelations must be true.—SOCRATES.

The wonders of modern science have been so strangely productive of new and fresh sensations and excitements, that men have materialized the very spirits within them, or they would see at once that the new spirit manifestations now recognized among men as forming the embryotic elements of a science transcending the mere psychological school which is current among us, and rising into the region of a grand and world-pervading ontology, and a metaphysic inductively proven, is only the recoil and differential development of human thought, which has hitherto been over-weighted by the material only. There is nothing really "stranger than fiction" in the matter. Steam was once as unbelievable a sprite as any ever brought into communication with man by any *medium*. Electricity, with its semi-spiritual agency, and thought-flashing energy, was once no more thoroughly subjugated to the powers of ordinary men, than are the manifestations of the spiritual world. Men doubted and denied regarding these, but their reality is now attested. The arch wizard of our day—science—has now worked these marvels into undeniable demonstrability. If these were, in their early day, *a priori* as much matters of hesitance and unbelief, as are now the agencies of the universe of spirits, why should we cloud our own souls, or clog our own progress into higher regions of existence, by doubt and denial? Let us give the same experimental acceptance to this new power as we have given to others, and we may rest assured that not a long time will elapse till we have mountain masses of evidence that Spiritualism is true.—G. G.

"All newly discovered truths," says I. H. Fichte, one of the most celebrated living philosophers of Germany, "have, at first, the lot of struggling against the old beliefs; but in the end they are always victorious." This is a true induction from the history of human effort. Spiritualism is now going through this constantly recurring ordeal. It is rich in the demonstrative power of facts; unless our opponents are, like King David, "in his haste," prepared to say, "all men are liars." The responsibility of proving an affirmative has been undertaken by many well-known persons. Among these we may justifiably name Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton, Wm. Howitt, Dr. Collyer, Mrs. E. B. Browning, Mrs. Crowe, Dr. Höfer, editor of the "Biographie Universelle," Tiedeman, the Metaphysician, &c.; and though these and many others have given the guarantee of their names to the genuineness of the several reports which have been issued, regarding spiritual intercourse, in which they have taken part, their opponents have never dared to charge them with "falsehood, fraud, and wilful imposition," but content themselves with uttering the contemptuous term *fudge!* and characterizing these persons as *dupes*. Even though an equal array of names could be given on the anti-spiritual side, they would not weigh like these: These are witnesses that they know and believe the truth; the others can only affirm that they know nothing, and believe little, of the matter. If there is any likelihood of error, let the opponents show it. The affirmation of the spiritualists is the strength of their cause.—L. D. P.

NEGATIVE.

To prove anything true, it is indispensable that we should understand the first principles of that which we investigate, the causes of its existence, its various operations, and its final results; and having all these clearly before our minds, we may nearly always judge of the truth or falsehood of any

matter that is brought before our attention. But with Spiritualism it is different; we know the effects which are produced, but upon their causes speculation runs wild, and the most extravagant hypotheses abound. And as to the mode of operation which produces these effects, as much mystery is connected with this as with the former. We nearly all believe that the air around us is filled with guardian spirits from the world of light, and tempting spirits from the pit of darkness; but to give full credence to the fact, that they are permitted to make us aware of their presence, by putting seeming life into inanimate objects, we do well to hesitate ere we uphold such belief. The late article in the *Cornhill Magazine*, coming, as the editor affirms, from a friend in whose good faith and honourable character he can confidently repose, is far too serious a statement to be lightly passed over. We can do nothing less, we think, than believe in the sincerity of the writer. We do not doubt for a moment that he saw what he narrates, although we believe that the excitement of his brain, during the last *séance* of which he writes (when Mr. Home played so prominent a part in the affair) created, and caused him to revel in, the splendid temple of imagination. We know a lady friend in whose statements we can fully rely, that was one of a party which gave table-turning a fair trial. She declares that the table did rise on *one* side, and that it went from one part of the room to another, without the smallest outward force that she was aware of; and this happened in the presence of no professional table-turner, but in that of friends equally curious on the popular subject. Nearly all of the party had headaches after the occurrence, but this may be traced to the excitement they were in. But for all this, were they *spiritual* manifestations? We believe not; but we do believe that they are the workings of phenomena with which we are yet unacquainted, and which may require another New-

ton to unravel. Until he had placed before the world his law of gravitation, philosophers were as greatly distressed to know the secret stirrings which kept the rolling orbs of heaven around their common centre, as men of science now are at a loss to know why a table moves of its own accord, and gives successive raps with its lifeless feet. Let us take care, however, not to laugh in our ignorance, but try, by all the means in our power, to elucidate the fact, and philosophically show that a table may move and talk without being possessed with an evil spirit.—*IOTA*.

"Spiritualism," or spirit-rapping, is not true. It is an imposition upon the credulous, used, in most cases, to make money, and in others to create awe. It appears that the region where spirits mostly manifest themselves is in a drawing-room; and that their principal freaks are conducted under tables, or in the dark. It seems singular that spirits should observe so much secrecy in the manifestations which it is alleged they make. If they themselves are invisible, whence their extreme anxiety to perform their operations hiddenly? Were spiritual communications necessary to the inhabitants of this world, is it likely that the spirits would make such fools of themselves as to rap, spin, and lift up tables? Some extraordinary articles upon this subject have appeared in "Once a Week." It will, indeed, be surprising if any one person, after a perusal of these articles, can have any doubt of Spiritualism being an imposture. From first to last, it is a successful cheat, and I sincerely hope that it will soon be universally treated with the contempt it deserves. In conclusion (quoting from the article above referred to):—"I cannot conceive a more accommodating audience for a conjuror's devices, nor, indeed, a much more ridiculous spectacle than a company of ladies and gentlemen, prepared for something out of the common, sitting exactly as the exhibitor himself has disposed them, credulous, if not already half convinced, in a state of breathless expec-

tation, squeezed together in the dark. If my readers will really let their minds dwell on this combination for a moment, and if it does not tickle them, they must be deficient in a sense of humour."—*J. C.*

What! *pros* and *cons* on the question, "Is Spiritualism True?" Of all the subjects on which the mind of man can be suffered to dwell, none so barren and unproductive; and, after all, what is the result? Opinion, and little more. We believe that Spiritualism, in its intended signification, is a doctrine as erroneous as is Materialism. That we have an incorporeal essence, cannot be denied; but that it can be seen, independent of the material man, is a question, to the solution of which we will not pretend. With all deference to the giant *littérateur*, Dr. Johnson, we cannot believe in ghosts and hobgoblins. The Bible very pointedly informs us that God is a Spirit, and that no man hath seen Him at any time. Had the question, "Is Spirit-Rapping True?" been propounded, it would have been more applicable to the article, "Stranger than Fiction." The universally received definition of "Spirit-Rapping," notwithstanding the evidence of Mr. Thackeray's friend of *twenty-five years' standing*, is, that it is an "impudent cheat." "Ten thousand failures," says the author of "Stranger than Fiction," "do not disprove a single fact." True; but it shows that the science, in which he is so strong a believer, is either extremely embryotic or unprofitable. Ten thousand attempts for one success! That poor spider, and that unfortunate King Bruce—it would have been an *alas-and-alackaday* sort of a thing for both, had their success depended upon such scientific discipline. It is consolatory to readers of "Stranger than Fiction" to find, that the worthy editor allows them "to give or withhold their belief." And the writer's own scepticism only confirms the general discredit in which it is held:—"I refuse to believe such things on the evidence of other people's eyes; and I

may, possibly, go so far as to protest that I would not believe them on the evidence of my own." How is he likely to gain proselytes?—J. R. P.

As long as spiritual manifestations are confined to mahogany movements, little faith can be placed in their reality; for though they can rap and make a noise forcibly enough, yet for the true test of their presence (and we ask it with all seriousness), have they ever performed a charitable action, or been the promulgators of a useful idea? It is no proof of their presence that we are unable to account for the phenomena which accompany their manifestations; for these may either be the result of some hidden law of nature, or perhaps some peculiar combination of electrical and magnetic influence. However, be this as it may, it does seem strange that these inhabitants of other worlds are such proficient in the art of music, and yet are unable to communicate any information, except through the medium of raps, that primitive and tedious system, which casts a doubt upon all their transactions, and leads us to suppose that all their phenomena are but magical tricks cleverly performed, or are the result of machinery artfully adapted for the purpose.—J. T. K.

All who have had the patience to read the article, "Stranger than Fiction," in the *Cornhill Magazine*, must have been compelled to hold, however much they may have been advocates of the theory of Spiritualism, that that article was a little too much overdrawn. When we hear of people floating in the air, without calling in the aid of a magic-lantern, and when musical instruments play of their own accord, without hidden springs, like a musical box, we must, were we to believe what we hear, have an idea that Dr. Cumming's "great tribulation" is already "coming on the earth." I will not enter into a long analysis of that article, nor am I prepared to do so. They who may wish, may find one in recent numbers of "Once a Week," in which Mr.

Home is discovered to be little more than a wizard of a *higher* scale, and whose tricks are found to be, if not spiritual, at least moonshine. I only wonder that the learned editor of the "Cornhill Magazine" did not put the MS. of the article in question into the waste-paper-basket instead of his Magazine. If our friends on the affirmative will answer these questions, I will believe their statements:—1. Did they *themselves* ever see a ghost or spirit? or did they ever hear any sound that could not be accounted for naturally; and when? 2. Did they ever see a table move in such a manner, that looking under the table would not furnish the solution? 3. Did they ever hear any musical instrument play of itself, after it had been examined by them, and no machinery found?—F. S. MILLS.

Truth is the narrative of fact. And all that we know of the existence of spirits is from divine revelation. But that record of facts never, in one instance, represents those spirits and the denizens of this earth as holding communication through the medium of tables, nor at the bidding of professional media, nor yet for the gratification of the assembled curious. And whereas much of the phenomena can be accounted for by science, and nothing connected with table-turning clearly demonstrates the presence of spirits, it follows that, wanting a substratum of clearly defined fact, the superstructure, Spiritualism, is "baseless as the fabric of a dream."—LUTHER.

Is Spiritualism true? This is a question of interest and importance. When we think of the marvellous discoveries which have been made by the researches of men, surely it behoves us not rashly to deny even the most astounding phenomena. So far as Spiritism refers to the turning of tables, and to the rapping out of direct answers to direct questions, we can give our own feeble testimony to its truth and reality. We have more than once seen this result. We can also

state, upon the authority of a lady of travel and experience, a fact which we have not seen elsewhere noticed. It is that, if the interrogators know the correct answer to the question, the table will rap out a correct answer. When, however, the interrogators are ignorant of the correct answer to their question, the table also evidences hesitation and uncertainty. As to the still more astonishing part of the narrative in the *Cornhill Magazine*, we feel a little doubt. Why should these strange manifestations take place in twilight dim, and under other circumstances likely to excite the imaginations of the beholders? We think, too, that "Spiritualism" is not a proper term to apply to these manifestations. We cannot think that spirits, if wishing to hold communication with mortals, *would choose such clumsy media as hats and tables*. Our own theory is, that the motion of the table is produced by the *involuntary* pressure of those whose hands are placed on it. This will also account for the correct number of raps being given, only when the operators themselves know the answer they wish to elicit.—T. L. P.

I have seen little, and read nothing, concerning Spiritualism; but the little I have seen has induced me to think that the *something*, whatever it may be, which moves tables, proceeds from the bodies or from the minds of those who place their hands upon the tables. A number of persons sit round a table, and place their hands upon the top of it; some time passes, and a trembling is felt by one or more of the operators. The table, spirit, or whatever else it may be called, is asked to knock three times, and it knocks once, twice, or thrice, but very *feebly*, and some one observes that "it is not strong enough yet;" a little more time passes, the knocks become louder, and it is said that "it (the something) is stronger." The rest of the phenomena now follow. Now, it appears to me, and I think it must appear to every one who considers the matter attentively, that this *some-*

thing, which manifests itself in so gradual a manner, must either be some physical property proceeding from the bodies of those whose hands are placed upon the table, or some portion of the mind of *each of them*, which, by the strong and long-continued *willing*, passes, or seems to pass, in some mysterious way, into the table, and there obeys, or seems to obey, the commands of any one of the operators who happens to be the spokesman. Therefore I think that Spiritualism, in the *usual* acceptance of the term, is not true.—T.

I cannot conceive how any man in his senses can believe in the so-called manifestations of Spiritualism. I do not doubt the veracity of those gentlemen who tell us that they have witnessed chairs and tables raised up from the ground, and men floating about in the air; I believe they have heard tunes played on accordions and guitars, and that they have seen and heard all the physical phenomena of Spiritualism, as described by them. All these ridiculous performances take place in almost total darkness, which fact alone is enough to raise suspicion, and incline us to believe that other than spiritual agencies are at work. It is simply absurd to fancy that the spirits of the dead can be influenced by the wishes of those on earth; and believers in this doctrine I look upon either as the dupes of some crafty medium, or their own disordered senses. Why not turn the spirits to some practical account in this matter-of-fact age? It would be interesting to know the ultimate fate of the *Great Eastern* or the Atlantic cable, and a great deal more sensible on the part of the spirits, than pulling young ladies' feet, or pinching old gentlemen's thighs.—J. W.

Those who take the affirmative side in this question have the whole *onus probandi*. They have to prove that the *miracles* of Spiritualism are genuine, real occurrences, not gross impositions, or, at least, mere delusions. They tell us that tables and chairs walk about

the room, and rise to the ceiling; that men are lifted up into the air, and carried about by some unseen agency; that a number of raps are heard at a table in a dark room. But what then? Do these wonderful occurrences take place publicly and openly? Do these spiritual communications appear to any who disbelieve in them? or are they confined to a few who are initiated in the mysteries, and are called media? Has anything ever been discovered by means of the spirits? Has any information ever been communicated on any subject by the rappers? A proposal was recently made in the papers that the spirits should be asked to discover the author of the Road murder. Has any medium accepted the challenge? There could not be a fairer test of the truth, or otherwise, of the pretensions of Spiritualism than the foregoing; yet none of those, who are most learned in ghostly science, will accept it. Is it possible that, in these days of enlightenment and civilization, any one can be found who will believe, on the bare unsupported *ipse dixit* of one or two interested individuals, the improbable, childish, and utterly incredible stories related in the recent article in the *Cornhill Magazine*?—J. G. J.

The hypothesis of spiritual manifestation is so flagrantly at variance with the present order of things, that it must necessarily be false in principle, therefore deceptive in result. The assumption, that man has power over departed spirits, cannot be true, for the following reasons:—1st. If there be two separate spheres of existence hereafter,—heaven and hell,—to the one or the other of which the spirits of all men go, there to remain *everlastingly*, without one moment's intermission of bliss or misery from that fixed and eternal state, it is impossible for a soul to be *absent* for however short a period; for then the everlasting character of the whole would be violated, and hereafter would not be eternity; for if it were possible spirits could be summoned, for a moment of time, they might be

for an age, and even throughout the world's duration, since they would be at the bidding of whoever liked to summon them. 2nd. The Almighty is said to have the keys of death and hell, or *hades*; therefore man has no authority in respect to the unseen world, and could not summon one soul to quit its precincts, without the delegation of God. 3rd. If departed spirits did appear upon the old stage of their existence, they would manifest themselves in a manner and a mode, the reality of which should be demonstrable to the senses of mankind at large, and fully attested by creditable evidence, such as the Mosaic miracles, the appearance of the angels at the tomb of Christ, and the miracles which Christ wrought. All preternatural effects absolutely appeal to the senses. If the senses are not satisfied, the mind cannot be convinced, and the agency has failed to effect what it endeavoured to perform. 4th. The Almighty never wastes materials nor exhibits His power, either in the operations of nature or grace, unless there is a necessity for it; therefore we say, that preternatural agency being unneeded in the present day, we are not justified in expecting it. The economy under which we live does not require it. 5th. The object of preternatural interference has ever been to attest the truth of some assumption of power or declaration of doctrine foreign to the existing and conceived notions of mankind; *e. g.*, Christ established His dispensation by the aid of those adjuncts. Spiritualism neither claims to establish or attest anything; it must necessarily be useless and futile, and cannot be, what it is asserted to be, "from above." 6th. We content ourselves on this head with one reference to Holy Writ—to the parable of Lazarus and Dives. A spirit in hell once craved permission to revisit the earth and his father's house, to tell of his torments and agonies. In the throes of his pain, he craved to testify to his brethren, lest they should endure like torments; but, alas! the prayer came

from the doomed, and it asked the impossible;—there was a great gulf, an impassable barrier, over which it were impossible the one or the other could pass. But could that tortured spirit have left for one short hour the prison of his perpetual doom, he would have gone and told his brethren of his

quenchless thirst, and of the gnawing agony of his unmitigable suffering. But he could not, "for they (his brethren) had Moses and the prophets; and if they would not hear them, neither would they be persuaded, though one rose from the dead."

The Societies' Section.

WORCESTERSHIRE EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTES.

THE Worcestershire Union of Institutes met at Stourbridge on Tuesday, the 13th of November. A considerable number of visitors from the various literary and educational institutes in the county attended. In the morning the Council of the Union met for the transaction of business; while a dinner at the Talbot Hotel, and a conversation, occupied the rest of the day.

The meeting of the Council of the Union was held in the Lecture-room of the Stourbridge Institute, J. S. Pakington, Esq., the President of the Union, in the chair. Lord Lyttelton, J. H. H. Foley, Esq., M.P., J. S. Isaacs, Esq., Rev. D. Melville, Rev. Dr. Williamson, W. Ackroyd, Esq., and other gentlemen, were present, as also were delegates from institutions in the following places:—Bromsgrove, Droitwich, Dudley, Evesham, Lye, Malvern, Nailsworth, Pershore, Redditch, Stourbridge, Stourport, and Worcester.

The first business was the election of officers for the ensuing year. J. S. Pakington, Esq., was again elected President; as also were the vice-presidents, Lord Lyttelton, the Hon. and Rev. W. H. Lyttelton, E. Holland, Esq., M.P., and Sir Edward Lechmere. J. S. Isaacs, Esq., was re-elected treasurer, J. Tree, Esq., was again elected honorary secretary, and the Rev. W. Walters joined with him in the office. The election of committee took place by ballot. From the delegates the five

following gentlemen were elected:—Messrs. Dark, Marson, Elliott, Lowe, and New; and from the subscribers, the Revs. David Malville and W. Lee. The place fixed upon for the annual meeting next year was Malvern. The following institutions were duly admitted to the Union:—The Dudley Mechanics' Institution, the Kidderminster Mutual Improvement Society, the Worcester Early Closing Association, and the Nailsworth Literary and Mechanics' Institution. The annual report was then adopted. Examinations were conducted by the Rev. G. D. Boyle, of Hagley, and Mr. F. Marcus, of Bromsgrove. Four essays had been sent in for the gold medal offered by J. L. Marsden, Esq., M.D., of Malvern, "On the use and opportunity of recreation and amusement in connection with mechanics' institutions," but the award had not yet been made. For the elementary examinations there were eight candidates at Dudley, six at Kidderminster, and four at Stourport. Mr. Marcus had placed his services at the disposal of the Union as organizing master. After speaking of lectures, diagrams, and libraries, the question of placing the Union in connection with the Society of Arts was brought on; the Council decided on joining it. The treasurer's account showed an expenditure for the year, of £69 4s. 9d., and there was a balance due to the bank of £14 15s. 6d. Various votes of thanks were then passed, and after the Chairman had acknowledged the con-

pliment paid to him as president, the Council separated. The proceedings lasted four hours.

The dinner at the Talbot Hotel was attended by about 100 gentlemen. The President of the Union, J. S. Pakington, Esq., occupied the chair. The party soon separated, but again met a little later, in the Corn Exchange, where the *conversations* was held.

At this about 400 ladies and gentlemen, with the members of the Stourbridge Association, and delegates from others in the Union, were present. Tea was provided on the occasion. J. H. H. Foley, Esq., M.P., occupied the chair; and there were also present Lord Lyttelton, Sir John Pakington, Bart., M.P., Sir James Kay Shuttleworth, W. O. Foster, Esq., M.P., Sir Henry Lambert, the Hon. C. B. Adderley, M.P., Hon. F. H. W. G. Calthorpe, M.P., G. Holland, Esq., M.P., J. S. Pakington, Esq., the Revs. J. W. Grier, Hugh Sherrard, R. P. Turner, J. Whiteley, Mr. Barnett Blake, secretary to the Yorkshire Union of Institutes; Mr. A. Talbot, secretary to the South Staffordshire Union; and Mr. Free, secretary to the Worcestershire Union of Institutions, &c.

In introducing the business of the evening, the chairman went through the history of the Stourbridge Institute. As regards the Union of Institutes, he thought it calculated to do much good. The examinations tended to this end, and had a stimulating effect, even on the members who did not at present take part in them. They were indebted to Mr. Pakington for introducing this Union.

The chairman afterwards distributed some prizes gained by the members of the Stourbridge Institute.

Lord Lyttelton then rose to move the first resolution—one referring to the advantages of the Union of Institutes. He said the general principles of the union of such institutes was the principle of the institutes themselves—union is strength. It was very encouraging to point in that neighbourhood to the fact that these institutions

were increasing in numbers and usefulness year by year. His lordship, after further remarks on the subject of the union of institutes, concluded by moving, "That the union of mechanics' institutions tends to increase their individual efficiency."

Sir J. K. Shuttleworth next addressed the meeting. He said that Lord Lyttelton had alluded to the degree of despondency with which the want of pre-eminently successful results from the operations of mechanics' institutes had too often been regarded, not only by the public, but by the earnest friends of education, who had almost despaired of seeing any great beneficial results from the deep interest they took in the social amelioration of the working classes. He (Sir J. Shuttleworth) had always been accustomed to attribute that despondency to early misconceptions as to the objects sought by those institutions. In the first instance it was put forth by Mr. Birkbeck—supported as he was by the genius and patriotism of Lord Brougham—that there were needed institutions to develop those latent powers of cultivation to be found amongst the working classes. Mr. Birkbeck said that a period would arrive when we should have to bring to bear the cultivation of high scientific knowledge. Scientific lectures were found to be beyond the few intellectual means of the working classes, who had neither leisure, nor time, nor education to follow them; consequently, they dwindled in extent, and from scientific they became popular, and from that they became simply amusing. Thence they came down, as was the case especially in Yorkshire, to a course of three or four lectures, or a single lecture, many of them being given gratuitously. The institutions the Worcestershire Union intended to group, however, were of a totally different order. For thirty years past they had been attempting to raise, upon the basis of the old Sunday school, the elementary school, but they had had to struggle with a great number of surrounding difficulties, and no an-

tagonist—as Mr. Birkbeck said—was greater than that of the workmaster. It was almost impossible for the working classes to find time for such education as was requisite. It was therefore to supply the disadvantages of elementary schools, to win young men from sensual gratification, to supply them after leaving school with the necessary rudimentary instruction, that their mechanics' institutions and evening schools principally aimed. That was a view of working men's institutes nearly opposite to that which Mr. Birkbeck dealt with; but it led step by step to a view much higher than the one taken by him. Sir J. K. Shuttleworth went on to say that unless government was prepared to follow up elementary schools by night schools, a very large proportion of the means now extended would be utterly wasted and thrown away. The sum now expended upon education was £2,000,000 per annum, of which government supplied £430,000, all of which very large expenditure was very much at stake unless the present means of education were extended by the formation of evening schools. After some remarks upon the relation of capital to labour, the speaker referred to the variety of political interests represented by the gentlemen present at the meeting, and said he could only regard their presence as a most significant phenomenon in the history of the education of the country, and concluded by eulogising those exertions in the promotion of education.

Mr. Barnett Blake, of the Yorkshire Union of Institutes, supported the resolution, which was carried unanimously.

The next resolution, "That in order to secure the benefits of general examinations, every effort should be made to promote the establishment of classes at individual institutions," was moved by the Right Hon. Sir John Pakington, M.P. The right hon. baronet said that he did not rescind one iota of the opinion he had expressed in public and private, that the greatest boon they could ex-

tend to their countrymen was to organize, promote, and extend the systematic and sound education of the people. It was a large and comprehensive word, was education. Schools must be the foundation of all instruction, and all future education. They had all heard of the insufficiency of schools, and of the religious differences which unhappily had too long, and as he thought unnecessarily, beset the subject. There were also the financial difficulties; but all these important matters had been referred for consideration to a royal commission, and they hoped soon to receive a report; and he trusted that that report would show the mode in which several, if not all these difficulties were to be remedied. But he felt sure that however far the commission was successful in pointing out difficulties, they would tell us that in the present state of the population of England, looking to the necessities of the working classes, and the demands made upon them, the rudimentary education must cease at or about the age of twelve. Sir J. K. Shuttleworth had alluded to the admirable Act of Parliament, which required that a certain amount of education should be given to children up to the age of thirteen; but if he took twelve years of age as the age at which the education of the children of the working classes must cease, he placed it at rather a high standard. In agricultural districts it was lower. His belief was, that of all the various distinctions which existed in the social position of the richer and poorer classes of the country, there was none greater than that at which this education ceased. In the richer classes twelve years of age was considered to be the commencement rather than the termination of the period of education; but in the humbler classes, education, in the elementary sense, terminated altogether at twelve years of age. After expressing his satisfaction at the connection to be formed between this union and the Society of Arts, and expressing his conviction that such a connection

would increase the efficiency of the Worcestershire Union, the right hon. baronet concluded by assuring them that he should always continue to take the same interest in the object sought to be obtained that he had hitherto done.

The Hon. F. H. W. G. Calthorpe, M.P., seconded the resolution.

The Right Hon. C. B. Adderley, M.P., moved the third resolution:—"That periodical examinations are absolutely necessary for the development of the resources of mechanics' institutes," and in doing so made some practical remarks on education.

Mr. Holland, M.P., seconded the resolution.

Mr. J. P. Brown-Westhead moved the next resolution:—"That manly exercises and other innocent recreations, both out of doors and in-doors, should be encouraged in mechanics' institutions."

The Rev. J. W. Grier seconded it, and it was carried unanimously.

The next resolution was moved by Mr. W. O. Foster:—"That the Worcestershire Union of Educational Institutes is eminently worthy of support."

It was seconded by Sir H. Lambert, and

Mr. J. S. Pakington then moved a resolution thanking the officers of the Stourbridge Associated Institute for the cordial reception they had given to the gentlemen from the other institutes in union, on the occasion of this annual meeting.

Mr. Millward, of Redditch, seconded the resolution, and after a vote of thanks to Mr. Foley, for his conduct in the chair, the assembly broke up.

The Southampton Society for Mutual Education.—In this society lectures are delivered every Friday evening; readings and recitations, followed by critical remarks, take place on Monday and Thursday evenings; discussions are held on the last Thursday in each month; a manuscript magazine is circulated monthly; the library is one of great usefulness, and is accessible to the members on Monday and Friday evenings; the reading room is open

every evening from seven to ten o'clock, and is well supplied with periodicals; arrangements are made for playing at chess and draughts; a museum is in course of formation; and educational classes are conducted in connection with the society. The whole of the meetings are held at the society's rooms, No. 19, Hanover-buildings, commencing punctually at half-past eight o'clock. The following are the lectures delivered, or to be delivered, for the fourteenth session, during the quarter ending Christmas, 1860:—Oct. 26, Musical Entertainment; Nov. 2, Mr. W. Buckler, "The Volunteer Movement;" Nov. 9, Mr. Harvey, "Patriotism;" Nov. 16, Mr. J. A. Barling, "Manners and Customs of the Chinese;" Nov. 23, Mr. Maw, "An Evening with the Poets;" Nov. 30, Mr. Stott, Subject to be announced; Dec. 6, Mr. Cox, "The Earth;" Dec. 14, Mr. S. Winship, "John Pounds, the Founder of the Ragged Schools;" Dec. 21, Mr. W. Hebb, "Oliver Cromwell, and the Times in which he lived;" Dec. 28, Mr. C. V. Lewis, "Animal Life." The terms of membership are, an entrance fee of 1s., and a quarterly subscription of 2s. 6d., payable in advance. Members and their friends are admitted free to the lectures and readings. Secretary, Mr. E. Bance, No. 19, Hanover-buildings.

Seaton Delaval Mechanics' Institute.

—At the annual soirée, held Oct. 20, 1860, T. E. Forster, Esq., in the chair, the following report was read, viz., "In laying their report before the members and friends of this institute, the committee have great pleasure in stating that its progress during the last year has been satisfactory. The number of names now on the books is 54, an increase of 17 over last year. The number of books now in the library is 422. By amalgamation with the 'Northern Union of Mechanics' Institutions,' we now receive every two months a box, containing from 18 to 20 volumes of excellent books. The annual income has been £28 14s., including donations (which we thankfully acknowledge)

from the following gentlemen:—Mr. Green, of Gateshead, £1 1s.; Mr. Bagnall, of Newcastle, £1; and Messrs. Wilson and Son, of Newcastle, 10s.; and the expenditure £25 7s. 7d., leaving a balance of £3 6s. 5d. The newspapers and periodicals received into the reading room are the *Northern Daily Express* and the *Newcastle Daily Chronicle*, the *Leeds Mercury*, three times a week, the *Illustrated London News*, the *Alliance*, *Reynold's Newspaper*, and the *Morpeth Herald*; the *Family Herald*, *Cassell's Illustrated Family Paper*, *Leisure Hour*, *Chambers's Journal*, and *Punch*; also the *British Controversialist*, monthly, and the *Scottish Quarterly Review*. During the winter months we have had, in connection with the institute, a grammar class and a reading class. The former was well attended, and the committee give their cordial thanks to Mr. Edward Patterson for his kindness in officiating as teacher. Although we have made some progress during the last year, yet it is to be regretted that, out of about 600 working men and lads, there should only be found 54 names enrolled in the books of an institution that has for its object the dissemination of knowledge, and the elevation of the working classes." [Here follows a well-written and effective address to the inhabitants of the district, which we regret want of space does not permit us to give.] The report is signed, John Robinson, Sec.

Dialectic Section of the Evesham Institute.—The annual general meeting of the members of the section was held in the Council Chamber of the Town-hall, on Wednesday evening, Sept. 11th. About sixty persons sat down to an excellent supper, provided under the direction of Mr. Alfred Cox, the active secretary of the section; after supper, the president, Mr. Joseph Jones, called upon the secretary to read the report of the proceedings of the section during the past session, from which it appeared that a larger number of members had attended the debates, and greater interest had been manifested in the discus-

sions, than at any previous season; after some discussion as to the propriety of establishing the prize essay scheme as recommended by the committee, the report was adopted on the motion of Mr. A. New, seconded by Mr. G. Ballinger. The president then proceeded to the election of the officers for the ensuing quarter, and the following gentlemen were elected; president, Anthony Martin, Esq.; vice-presidents, Messrs. C. Warrington and Roberts; secretary, Mr. A. Cox; committee, Messrs. Jones, Cole, and Kedwards. In the absence of the new president, Mr. C. Warrington, the senior vice-president, took the chair; and, after a short address, called upon the members to give in subjects for discussion. Several subjects were promised. Mr. Joseph Jones gave a summary of the debates of the past session, and urged the members to keep up in the ensuing season the same good tone and friendly feeling manifested during the past year. Herbert New, Esq., addressed the meeting upon the principle of free discussion, which was the foundation of the section; and the Rev. J. C. Lunn made a practical and interesting speech on the value of prize essays; the study of political economy; the respect due to honest, out-spoken opponents in debate, and the power of eloquent speaking, particularly instancing the oratory of the late Sir Robert Peel. The proceedings of the evening were much enlivened by the vocal performances of Messrs. Wheatley, F. Haynes, and H. Smith.

The Amateur Literary Society.—Gentlemen who have been debarred from joining this excellent society, by the largeness of the sum hitherto demanded annually of the members, will be glad to learn that in spite of considerable opposition, an "Act of Council" has been passed, wherein the fixed subscription is for ever abolished, and only an admission-fee of 3s. 6d. is enforced. The A.L.S. is by no means exclusive, but comprehends persons of every age and rank. The president for the time being is John W. W. Penney, Esq., B.A.,

&c. &c.; and the following have accepted the title of *honorary fellows*, unanimously conferred on them:—Charles Dickens, Esq., W. M. Thackeray, Esq., Rev. George Gilfillan, M.A., J. A. Cooper, Esq., F.R.S.L., Alfred Elwes, Esq., president of the B.L.S., author of "Frank and Andrea," &c. The Rev. George Iliff, M.A., *honorary president* for last session, and the ex-secretary, W. Whyte, Esq., have been placed in the list of *honorary associates*. The objects of the society have been frequently laid before the readers of the *Controversialist*, and such as wish to be better informed on the point will find *full particulars* in the *New Quarterly Magazine*, published by the society, by Mr. Hope, of Great Marlborough-street. Several numbers of this periodical are now out, containing essays, tales, sketches, poetry, &c.; and the press generally have been favourable to the undertaking. It is much to be regretted, however, that the sale as yet will not cover the heavy expenses unexpectedly incurred; and if the copies on hand are not speedily bought up, it is feared that the project will have to be prematurely abandoned. Prospectuses, rules, &c., may be obtained, on sending stamps to cover postage, of the secretary, J. Ezra Holmes, Esq., Middle-gate-street, Hartlepool.

Wakefield Mechanics' Institute.—

The *soirée* of the above institution was held in the large room of the Wakefield Corn Exchange, on the 20th November. Mr. E. A. Leatham, M.P., was in the chair, and prominent amongst the gentlemen on the platform was Mr. John

Bright, M.P., Mr. Monckton Milnes, M.P., and Mr. Collins, M.P., were also present; as were also Mr. Charlesworth, and the Mayor of Wakefield. The chairman, in his speech, strove to persuade the audience of the fallacy of the idea that evil could result to society from the universal diffusion of knowledge among the people. Mr. Bright's lengthy oration was chiefly political. The following are specimens of his opinions:—"There is nothing more important in the education of all classes in the country than the consideration of the principles on which laws should be founded, and on which the permanent peace and greatness of the commonwealth were based." After this, by reference to wages, strikes, prices, &c., he proved the importance of directing education to the consideration of political questions, and concluded by saying that if these things were studied more, the people would be enabled to see that they might govern themselves more wisely; if they did so, they would raise mankind to a much higher level; they might bring greater glory to their country; they might dispense greater happiness amongst the families of which it was composed, and they might do something "to justify the ways of God to man." Messrs. Milnes, M.P., Collins, M.P., &c., also addressed the meeting.

Oxford Union Debating Society.—

On Tuesday evening, Nov. 12th, it was affirmed, after debate, by 40 *ayes* to 28 *noes*, "that the general tone of the *Saturday Review* is subversive of the principles of true criticism."

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS TO WHICH ANSWERS ARE SOLICITED.

121. LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.—

I am anxious to examine, with due collation of authorities, the important philosophical speculation regarding Li-

berty and Necessity. Perhaps some of your able contributors on psychological topics would not grudge to favour an inquiring mind with some help towards the attainment of a list of works on this matter, which would afford a fair and

impartial view of the question.—D. N. M.

122. Can you inform me of whom, or by what means, it is likely I could obtain a recommendation which is necessary as a voucher to entitle me to the privilege of a reader at the reading-room of the British Museum?—J. SARGENT.

123. Will any of your readers be kind enough to inform me where I can procure a first-class work on foreign words, with their English derivations and meanings? Also, say whose English dictionary is considered the best. Price no object.—S. S.

124. When, and by whom, was the variation of the compass discovered?—M. G.

125. What is meant by "Accepting the Chiltern Hundreds"?—Y. W.

126. I have seen it somewhere asserted that the philibeg, or short kilt, worn by the Highlanders, and which appears so picturesque in the London Scottish Volunteers, is an invention of the sixteenth century. Is this true or false?—ANGLO-SCOTUS.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

112. *The National Anthem*.—A definite and satisfactory answer cannot be afforded, I fear, to the question of J. Evans. The following excerpt may be of use to him. "Our National Anthem of 'God Save the King,' composed in the time of George I., has always been considered of English origin; but on reading the amusing 'Memoirs of Madame de Cregny,' it appears to have been almost a literal translation of the Cantique, which was always sung by the demoiselles de St. Cyr, when Louis XIV. entered the chapel of that establishment to hear morning prayer. The words were by M. de Brinon, and the music by the famous Lully:—

'Grand Dieu! sauve le Roi.
Grand Dieu! venge le Roi.
Vive le Roi!

Que toujours glorieux,
Louis victorieux!
Voye ses ennemis

Toujours soumis!

Grand Dieu! sauve le Roi.

Grand Dieu! venge le Roi.

Vive le Roi!

It appears to have been translated and adapted to the House of Hanover by Handel, the German composer." J. E. is doubtless aware of the antiquity of the expression, "God Save the King."—J. R. PAGE.

In answer to your correspondent who inquires about the "National Anthem," I refer him to "Notes and Queries" for October 10th, No. 151. It there states that it was composed by Dr. Henry Carey, a natural son of the Earl of Halifax; he was born about 1696, in London. The anthem, both words and music, were composed by him in honour of the birthday of George II. Henry Carey died, in 1744, by suicide. The article is signed, "Francis Dickens, Dusseldorf."—C.

118. I think the best works on the Isle of Wight are "The History, Topography, and Antiquities of the Isle of Wight," by W. Davenport Adams, price 25s.: Smith, Elder, and Co. And "The Isle of Wight," by the Rev. E. Venables, 7s. 6d. Stanford. Edward Knight.

121. The following list will supply D. N. M. with a collection of the chief works, chronologically and controversially arranged, which have appeared in English literature during the two previous centuries:—

LIBERTY.

Of Free Will, in Reply to Hobbes, 1838.

The Boyle Lecture Sermons, by Sam. Clarke, D.D., 1704.

Defence and Vindication of Human Liberty, by Rev. John Jackson, 1730.

Review of the Principal Questions in Morals, Chap. VIII., Richard Price, D.D., 1769.

Origin of Evil, Book V., W. King, D.D., 1781.

Essays on the Active Powers, VIII., Thomas Reid, 1785.

Essays, Philosophical and Literary, by James Gregory, M.D., 1792.

Active and Moral Powers, by Dugald Stewart, 1828.

Review of Edwards on the Will, by H. P. Tappan, 1839.

Lectures, by Thomas Brown, 1820.

Elements of Morality, by Whewell, 1839.

On Human Nature, Rev. J. G. Mac-Vicar, 1853.

Moral Freedom, Cairns, 1838.

NECESSITY.

Treatise of Liberty and Necessity, by Thomas Hobbes, 1654.

Philosophical Enquiry concerning Human Liberty, Anthony Collins, 1717.

Observations on Man, by D. Hartley, LL.D., 1749.

Sketches of Man, Morality, and Religion, by Lord Kames, 1751 and 1774.

Essays and Treatise on Human Nature, D. Hume, 1777.

Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will, by Jonathan Edwards, 1757.

Philos. Necess., Illustrated by Joseph Priestly, LL.D., 1778.

Essay on Philosophic Necessity, by Alexander Crombie, LL.D., 1793.

Political Justice, by Godwin, 1793.

Moral Philosophy, by T. Belshaw, 1801.

System of Logic, J. S. Mills, 1838.

Philosophy of Necessity, by Charles Bray, 1840.

An excellent essay on the general question will be found in Hazlitt's

"Remains," vol. i., worthy of study.—NEMASIL.

121. *Liberty and necessity*.—I find it stated in a work entitled "Notes to assist the Memory" (Murray, 1825) that "Among the necessarian writers, Hume, Hobbes, Collins, Hutchinson, Edwards, Hartley, Priestly, and, perhaps, Locke, may be classed. The principal advocates for philosophical liberty are Clarke, Beattie, Butler, Price, Law, Bryant, Wollaston, and Horsey." Perhaps this may be of use to your inquiring correspondent. If so, I shall be glad.—T. L. B.

123. We know of no *first-class* work of the kind desired. In Ogilvie's Dictionary (Blackie, £4 10s.), the greater part of the most common foreign words will be found explained. It is the best. Worcester's (by Bohn), 16s., is fair and useful.—W. F.

124. *Variation of the compass*.—The variation of the compass was first discovered by Sebastian Cabot, circa 1500; the variation of that variation by one Gillebrand, circa 1625; the dip or inclination of the needle was discovered by a Mr. Norman, circa 1576.

125. A Member of Parliament cannot resign his seat, but if he accepts an office in the gift of the Sovereign, he must vacate his seat. When, therefore, a member wishes to resign, the Sovereign bestows upon him the nominal office of Steward of the Chiltern Hundreds,—a range of chalk hills in Bedford and Buckingham, not far from Aylesbury, which are Crown lands; and so, by a convenient fiction, he gets quit of his M.P.-ship.—WRIGHT.

LITERARY NOTES.

Robert Chambers has a third volume of "The Domestic Annals of Scotland" in the press.

MM. Pereire announce as in preparation a *new* Encyclopedia, among the contributors to which are to be Guizot, Cousin, Thiers, Villemain, Sand, Michelet, Pere Enfantin, Proudhon, &c.

At Leipsic there is now publishing, in the Russian language, a newspaper entitled "Budonshnosty" (*The Future*).

Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton is wintering, engaged in literary pursuits, in Corfu.

At Constantinople, a new journal in the Turkish tongue, called "The Trans-

lator of Events," has been lately started."

Wilkie Collins's "Woman in White" has been put upon the stage.

Two bronze doors, for the capital of Washington, have just been finished in Munich. They are devoted to scenes in the life of Columbus, in compartments between which are niched busts of all those who have written his history. A fine head of Washington Irving is conspicuous.

The University of Naples has been reorganized.

A list of plays acted before the Court, in 1638, has been found. "The Merry Wives of Windsor," and "Julius Cæsar," were in the programme.

Henry Butterworth, law-publisher and literary man, died 2nd Nov.

"Prison-books, and their Authors," is the title of a book from the pen of J. A. Langford, now in the press.

A Biography of Beethoven is shortly to be issued.

Signor Ruffini, author of "Lorenzo Benoni," &c., has "Lavinia" nearly ready.

Meyerbeer's opera, "L'Africaine," is re-christened "Vasco di Gama," and is still promised, at an interval.

"Great expectations" of delight "all the year round," are entertained about Charles Dickens's new story. It is believed that this serial will not be an "uncommercial traveller," even though its *dénouement*, like "Oliver Twist," and "Little Dorrit," may be "hunted down" by some obscure dramatist before its author's *déshabillage* has been put under cover.

The Anti-Hegelian philosopher, Arthur Schopenhauer, born at Dantzic in 1788, died in Frankfort-on-the-Maine, 21st September. His first work, entitled, "The World Regarded as Will and Thought," was published in 1818, and he revised, a few days before his decease, the proof sheets of the second edition of a work to be published by Brockhaus, of Leipzig, which discusses "The Two-fold Fundamental Problem of Ethics."

A genealogical tree, tracing the pedigree of Thomas Campbell to "the Bruce of Bannockburn," has been published.

Dr. Lankester's "Lectures on Food" are to be published at a low price.

Servian song is to find a translator in Owen Meredith (Bulwer).

Mrs. Oliphant's new novel will bear the title of "The House on the Moor."

George MacDonald, author of the weird poem, "Phantastes," is engaged on a novel.

Wright's (Thomas) "Archæological Essays" are in the press of J. R. Smith.

"Paul the Pope, and Paul the Friar; the Story of an Interdict," is the subject of T. A. Trollope's new sketch of Italian History.

The tenth library edition of Alison's "History of Europe" is announced.

W. B. Lander's "Complete [?] Works" are issued by Ticknor and Field, New York.

"The Vestiges of Creation" has reached the 11th edition.

Theodosia Trollope, sister of Messrs. Anthony and T. A. Trollope, and Italian correspondent to the *Athenæum*, has in the press "The Last Eighteen Months in Italy."

The Messrs. Griffin promise the concluding portion of the Rev F. D. Maurice's "Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy" this month.

Butt's "History of Italy," vol. iii., is to be issued in December.

Dr. Jos. Angus has in the press "A Handbook of the English Tongue."

The favourable reception which Mr. Neil's "Shakespeare Papers" received from several critics of *status* has induced him to extend and enlarge them, so as to form a small volume, which will be, at an early date, laid before the public.

Herschel's "Elements of Astronomy," and De Morgan's "Algebra," have been translated into Chinese, and published at Shanghai.

Dr. Roscher, Professor of Political Economy—the most profound Statist in Germany—as Rector, in succession to

Dr. Wachter, Professor of Jurisprudence of the Leipsic University, delivered an inaugural address on University education.

The *Caledonian Mercury*, a Scottish newspaper, published in Edinburgh; established 1724, is the property of Mr. Allen, the improver of the Electric Telegraph, and has been the property of his family since 1772.

A memoir of Kepler, by M. O. Struve, published in the "Memoirs of the Academy of St. Petersburg," contains many new facts regarding him, especially in his relations with Schiller's hero, *Wallenstein*.

The *Toronto Globe* has been printed on paper made from straw.

The Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, and the British and Foreign Bible Society, issue annually 38,000,000 Bibles, Testaments, and religious works, in about 150 languages.

Messrs. Williams and Norgate announce a quarterly "Natural History Review," to be an organ of biological science, and to have each department under able editorial superintendence.

A memoir of Professor George Wilson, the Technologist, by his sister, Jessie Aitken Wilson, is almost ready.

A second volume of Cooper's "Athenæ Cantabrigienses" is in the press.

Bancroft's "History of the United States," vol ix., is in the press.

"Cromwell, the Protector of the English Republic," is the title of a tragedy in verse, by A. de Maziere, published by Hachette and Co., Paris.

"Temple-Bar" makes its appearance this month.

J. W. Parker, junior, managing editor of "Fraser," died 10th ult.

The Earl of Airlie has been lecturing in Forfar on "Adam Smith."

"Scottish Life in the Last Century" is about to receive fresh illustration by the publication of the autobiographies of Rev. Alexander Carlyle, D.D., Inveresk, and Rev. Dr. Somerville, of Jedburgh. The record will extend from the '45 Rebellion till Napoleon's capture, and will be rich in anecdote of Hume, Home, Smith, Blair, Robertson, Burns, Dugald Stewart, Ferguson, &c.

Messrs. Mansel and Veitch are to superintend the completion of Sir William Hamilton's "Reid."

Hepworth Dixon's "Personal History of Lord Bacon" is to be published simultaneously in London and Boston. 1,400 were disposed of at Murray's sale.

"Songs of the Covenant Times," by an Ayrshire Minister (Rev. James Murray, of Crannock), are now in the press. Much of the author's MS. we have been privileged to see; and we can assure our readers that the "songs" have pith, power, and poetry in them, which are far from common.

A memoir of the Right Hon. James Wilson, the Neckar of India, appeared in a supplement to *The Economist* of 17th ult., from the pen of the present editor, Walter Bagebot, his son-in-law.

"The proverbs and sayings of Scotland" are to be edited by Mr. A. Hialop, of Glasgow.

Materials for a third volume of the late Lord Dundonald's memoirs are understood to exist.

Dr. Croly, Rector of St. Stephen's, Walbrook, author of "Salathiel," "Marston," &c., journalist, poet, novelist, dramatist, and popular preacher, died on 24th November, suddenly, aged 75.

INDEX.

	PAGE
EPOCH MEN:—Socrates	1
Adam Smith—Scientific Politics ..	73, 145
Philosophy of Socrates	217, 269
Speculative Thought	361

DEBATES:—

RELIGION:—Is the Catholic Rule of Faith true?	
Affirmative Articles 13, 85, 157, 223, 296	
Negative Articles 18, 93, 163, 228, 301	

PHILOSOPHY:—Is the Poetry of Tennyson as Healthy in its Tendencies as that of Longfellow?	
Affirmative Articles	27, 101
Negative Articles	36, 114

Are the Principles of the Development Theory true?	
Affirmative Articles 169, 237, 310, 371	
Negative Articles	175, 240, 314, 373

HISTORY:—Was Joan of Arc an Impostor?	
Affirmative Articles	39, 117
Negative Articles	44, 121

SOCIAL ECONOMY:—Is Counsel justified in defending from Punishment a Criminal of whose Guilt he has been professionally made cognizant?	
Affirmative Articles 179, 246, 319, 377, 388	
Negative Articles 184, 249, 321, 386, 393	

THE ESSAYIST:—

Giovanni Battista Niccolini	46
Shakespeare Facts, Fancies, Forgeries, and Fabrications ..	125, 167, 252, 324
Notes on the Autobiography of William Cowper	265
Hard Work	342
A Vision of the Future	343
James Mill: Historian, Psychologist, and Economist	397

THE REVIEWER:—

Altar Light	410
"Assent and Consent"	409
Bright (John) and his Calumniators ..	199
Cainus Marius	277
Chatterton, The Life of	199
Diversity of Style, Fundamental Causes of	406
Early Closing Movement, The	406
England and Missions	53
Gabriel de Mirabeau	199
Historical Geography of Palestine ..	198
History of France	406
History of Scotland	405
History of the British Empire	405
Industrial Labour	199
Italy in Transition	407

	PAGE
Learn to Live	200
Lectures to Young Men	52
Men of the Scottish Reformation	404
Original Language of St. Matthew's Gospel	53

Report of the Yorkshire Union of Mechanics' Institutes	349
Sects in Syria	277
Teacher, The	52
The Denominational Reason Why ..	196
The New Quarterly Magazine	199
The Student	349
The Best Safeguard for a Young Man ..	349

POETIC SECTION:—British Poetry ..	56
Leaves from the Olive Mount	270
Original Poetry	345

THE INQUIRER:—Questions ..	60, 203, 278, 357, 423
-----------------------------------	------------------------

A Curious Book	278
Age of the "Te Deum"	279
Banking	60
Bookbinding	204
Encyclopedias	61
French Serials	61
Grammatical Difficulty	61
Gyroscope	205
History of the Popes	61
History of the Gipsies	204
Laird of Logan	60
Latin and French Grammar	357
Liberty and Necessity	424
Massada	204
Origin of Wakes	358
Quotations	278, 357
Shakespeare's Works	61
The Bampton Lecture	61
The Chiltern Hundreds	426
The Isle of Wight	424
The Japanese Language	61
The National Anthem	424
Theory of Civilization	205
Trollius, or Globe Flower	278
Variation of the Compass	425
Works on the English Language	61

THE TOPIC:—

Government appointing Official Auditors to examine Public Bodies ..	63
House of Lords and Paper Duty	135
Spiritualism	411
The Expedition of Garibaldi	296
The Government Scheme of Fortification	279
The Use of Tobacco	350

THE SOCIETIES' SECTION:—

Reports of Societies 68, 211, 285, 356, 418	
Literary Notes 73, 144, 215, 287, 359, 425	

CONTRIBUTORS' SIGNATURES.

A. J.	43, 318
A Layman	163
Anglo-Saxon	36
Beta	388
B. S.	114, 385
Delta	59, 240
Edmund	116
E. M., jun.	175, 314, 373
E. W. S.	270
F. G.	60, 277, 343

G. A. H. E.	124
Gregory	93
H. K.	249
Ignatius	18, 301
J. H.	228
Lex Scripta	101, 237
L'Ouvrier 121, 179, 186, 246, 377, 397	
Montgomery	169
Nona	184, 393

Q. S.	404
R. M. A.	52
R. T. G.	252
R. D. E.	321
S. E. L.	198, 323
S. N.	12, 64, 134, 156, 222, 265, 297, 341, 370
Theophylact	27, 310
Vale	345
W. H. P.	46





400 10 1935



